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Abstract 
Planned community relocation or “resettlement” is not new, however the contexts in which 
people are being relocated and the safeguards in place to protect them are changing. 
Multilateral development banks are under competing pressures to minimise the negative 
impacts of community resettlement without over-burdening the governments of borrowing 
countries. Intensive debates are underway about what rights should be afforded to resettled 
people and what safeguards are most effective. Similar concerns are being voiced by policy-
makers working on climate change adaptation, who are looking to the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) to identify ways to safeguard communities being resettled in 
response to climate change. One of the most important tensions shaping these debates, is 
how resettlement safeguards developed at an international or “global” level can cater to the 
needs and aspirations of affected people in different local settings.  
As a contribution to this debate, this thesis explores a resettlement scheme for an ADB co-
financed railway project in Cambodia in which advocacy interventions resulted in 
significant improvements in the resettlement sites over the eight years of the project from 
2006 to 2014. Drawing on the railway project as a case study, the research focuses on 
understanding how safeguards, developed at a “headquarter level”, aligned and misaligned 
with community needs and aspirations at different points in time. It investigates how 
advocacy interventions altered the course of the project and considers the implications of 
relying on resettlement safeguards in a country where domestic legal protections are 
otherwise not well-established.  
The research is founded on an appreciation of the valuable literature that exists to understand 
resettlement. It uses legal geography and theories of scale to build on the conceptual 
frameworks already available. It does this through analysing the socio-legal dimensions of 
the resettlement process from multiple stakeholder perspectives over time. This approach 
enables a close field-based analysis of how different actors (communities, NGOs, 
governments and financiers) experienced and understood resettlement tensions at different 
scales: at a community level in five locations in Cambodia, and at national, international and 
institutional scales. Through a qualitative analysis of different stakeholder perspectives, the 
research goes behind the scenes and behind the paper work to investigate how the risks and 
impacts of the project were rationalised by decision-makers as they unfolded. It draws on 
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interviews with NGOs, consultants, safeguards and resettlement specialists in Cambodia and 
other sites of decision-making and institutional influence: especially within the ADB, World 
Bank and Australian Government.  
From a community perspective, the resettlement process was an uneven and arbitrary 
experience, but the reactions were different across the five resettlement sites. Like many 
resettlement schemes, the rights and benefits available to affected people were determined 
by the precise physical space in which they lived prior to the project. Rather than following 
the natural contours of how communities were living, the scheme drew new lines of social 
organisation based on the ADB resettlement policy guidelines. Intensive NGO interventions 
using creative trans-national strategies brought international scrutiny to the project. Yet, as 
additional compensation was provided and services and infrastructure slowly improved in 
the resettlement sites, the resettlement dynamics began to change. The appeal of resettlement 
increased for many community members who were left behind. Over time resettlement 
standards improved in some of the sites so much that they became “islands of governance”, 
demarcated or ring-fenced from the otherwise limited support provided to people partially-
affected by the project but not given the option of relocation. While efforts were made by 
NGOs to advocate for those who were partially affected, but not relocated, clear limitations 
in the scope of the safeguards policy emerged. NGOs were required to navigate complex 
community tensions, revealing how conflicting community interests and aspirations, which 
inevitably characterise resettlement, are also inherently difficult to incorporate into 
advocacy campaigns.  
The experiences described provide rich insights into the realities of being embroiled in so-
called “community-driven accountability processes”,1 as well as the adaptation strategies 
community members employed to navigate resettlement. The research explores how 
community awareness of resettlement safeguards was built through contact with NGOs, and 
also through the gradual engagement of ADB staff once the project’s impacts were 
publicised. Over time, community members developed a sophisticated understanding of the 
rights and benefits afforded by the project and the ADB safeguards and accountability 
framework in place.  
                                                 
1 Community-driven or citizen-driven accountability is an approach adopted by the World Bank. For discussion and critique 
see: Clark, Fox & Treakle (2003); Ebrahim & Herz (2007). 
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From the perspectives of financiers, the interviews also reveal how debates about the “right” 
way to address resettlement problems were occurring within the ADB, Cambodian and 
Australian Governments, and there were many points of controversy among staff members 
and consultants. There were also many disagreements behind the scenes about the adequacy 
of the resettlement processes in place, due diligence and accountability.  
The case of the Cambodian railway project conveys how resettlement impacts are not easily 
overcome through internal monitoring, supervision and technical assistance at a project 
level, even where these aspects of a project are well resourced. These challenges are 
particularly complex in places where there is a significant disparity between national 
government standards for resettlement and international, project-specific safeguards, as is 
the case in Cambodia. The research conveys the extent of influence that international 
financiers have on the quality of resettlement within the bounds of a given project, as well 
as the limits of this influence on other aspects of governance external to these projects. The 
research supports a move away from simple approaches to resettlement premised on the 
notion that it is possible to mitigate negative social and environmental impacts of 
infrastructure projects only through the establishment of safeguards and monitoring systems. 
Instead it supports an approach which more explicitly includes local civil society actors and 
international advocacy NGOs, recognising the valuable roles they play. 
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សេចក្តេីសខេប 
ជាស ៀខរាល់ឆ្ន ាំ មនុេសរាប់លាននាក្់សៅសលើពិភពសលាក្ត្រវូផ្លា េ់បត  ូ
ក្ន្នាខ េ់សៅសោយសា ន្រកា អភិវឌ្ឍសេោា  ចនាេមព ័នធ ។ 
កា ផ្លា េ់បត  ូក្ន្នាខសនេះបខកស ើខសោយផ្លា ល់ និខសោយត្បសោលពី
នគ បូនីយក្មម កា ក្សាខផ្ល វូថ្នល់ សាព ន អណ្ត ខូន្ ៉ែ និខគសត្ោខ
វា អីគគ ិេនី។ កា ផ្លា េ់បត  ូទីតាំខ បេ់េេគមន៍តមន្ផ្នកា  ឬ 
“កា តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី” បានអនុវរតស ើខស ើមបីសោេះត្សាយឥទធិពល
ននគសត្ោខទាំខសនេះ ប ុន្នត  វ ធាននកា គាំពា សផ្សខៗ
ន្ លបានោក្់សចញ ស ើមបីកា ពា េេគមន៍ក្ន ុខអាំ ុខសពល
តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី បានកាា យជាត្បភពទាំនាេ់ វាខត្ក្មុេខគមេុីវ ធាល 
នឹខអនក្ផ្តល់េិ ញ្ញ វរថ ុ ល់គសត្ោខអេ់សត្ចើនទេវរស ៍មក្សេើយ។ 
ទាំនាេ់ទាំខសនេះវាធ្ងន់ធ្ង ជាពិសេេ សៅតមបណ្តត ត្បសទេន្ លោន
 វ ធាននកា ក្ន ុខត្េកុ្រិចរួចេត្ោប់កា ពា េេគមន៍ន្ លអាច
 ខសត្គេះសោយសា កា បខេ ាំឲ្យផ្លា េ់បត  ូក្ន្នាខ េ់សៅ។ 
យុទធនាកា រេ ូ មរិឆ្ាខត្បសទេ េត្ោប់ជួយត្ទត្ទខ់ ល់េេគមន៍
េថ ិរក្ន ុខរាំបន់ទ ាំខសនាេះ បានសក្ើនស ើខទាំខទាំេាំ និខលក្េណ្ៈ
េម ុគសាម ញសជឿនសលឿន។ សាថ ប័ន ូចជាធ្នាគ ពិភពសលាក្ និខ
ធ្នាគ អភិវឌ្ឍន៍អាេុី (ADB) ជាស ើម ក្ាំពុខេថ ិរសត្កាមេាំពាធ្
ត្បន្ជខគន ឲ្យជួយការ់បនថយជាអរិប ោនូវផ្លប េះពាល់អវ ធាជជោន
 បេ់គសត្ោខសៅសលើេេគមន៍ សោយសជៀេវាខផ្ខន្  នូវ
កា ោក្់បនទ ុក្សត្ចើនសពក្សៅសលើ ោា ភិបាលទទួលក្មច ី ជាពិសេេ
សៅតមត្បសទេោនសេ ាក្ិចចផុ្យត្េួយសទើបសខើបសចញពីជសោា េះ។ 
កា យល់ ឹខពីេនទ ុ េះននកា សធ្វ ី វ ធានិសោគសៅសលើសេោា  ចនាេមព ័នធ
សៅក្ន ុខរាំបន់ទ ាំខសនាេះ បានបាំផ្ុេនូវកា ពិភាក្ាខ្ា ាំខកាា ថា 
សរើត្បជាជន ខផ្លប េះពាល់គួ ទទួលបានេិទធិអវ ីខ្ា េះ 
សរើវ ធាននកា គាំពា អវ ីខ្ា េះន្ លោនត្បេិទធភាពបាំផ្ុរេត្ោប់
កា តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី និខ សរើេិទធិ និខេតខ់ោទាំខសនេះ
អាចពត្ខឹខអនុវរតន៍ោ ខណ្តបានសៅក្ន ុខប ធាបទន្ លត្បព័នធចាប់
ក្ន ុខត្េកុ្សៅមិនទន់ក្សាខបាន ខឹោាំ។ ក្ត ីបា មភ ត្េស ៀខគន សនេះ 
ក្៏ោនសលើក្ស ើខសោយមជឈោា នអនក្ក្សាខសគលនសោបាយ
8 
 
ន្ លក្ាំពុខសធ្វ ីកា ក្ន ុខបញ្ហា បនាុាំនឹខកា ន្ត្បត្បួលអាកាេនរុ 
សេើយ ំពឹខេខឃឹមកាន់ន្រសត្ចើនស ើខសៅសលើធ្នាគ ពិភពសលាក្ 
និខ ADB ក្ន ុខកា  ក្បានយុទធសាស្តេត  និខ វ ធាននកា កា ពា លអ ៗបាំផ្ុរ
េត្ោប់ជួយត្ទត្ទខ់ ល់េេគមន៍ក្ាំពុខតាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
ក្ន ុខក្ិចច ត្បឹខន្ត្បខបនាុាំនឹខកា ន្ត្បត្បួលអាកាេនរុ។ 
ភាពតនរឹខខ្ា ាំខបាំផ្ុរមួយក្ន ុខកា ក្សាខសគលនសោបាយ
តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី គឺ សរើ វ ធាននកា េត្ោប់គាំពា កា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី
ន្ លបានបសខក ើរស ើខសៅក្ត្មិរអនត  ជារិវាអាចបាំសពញ
បានលអប ុណ្តា នូវរត្មូវកា  និខបាំណ្ខត្បាថាន ខ្ុេៗគន  បេ់ត្បជាជន
 ខផ្លប េះពាល់សៅតមរាំបន់ខ្ុេន្បាក្គន ជាខ្ា ាំខន្បបសនេះ? 
ស ើមបី មួចាំ ន្ណ្ក្ ល់កា ជន្ជក្ន្វក្ន្ញក្ ូចសលើក្ស ើខសៅខ្ខសលើ 
និសក្េបបទសនេះនឹខពិនិរយពីសត្គខកា ណ្៍តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី ួយ 
ក្ន ុខគសត្ោខសៅក្មព ុជាមួយ បេ់ ADB ន្ លក្ន ុខសនាេះ 
អនតរាគមន៍រេ ូ មរិបានជួយឲ្យទីតាំខេត្ោប់កា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី
ន្ត្បត្បួលលអ ត្បសេើ ស ើខគួ ឲ្យក្រ់េាំគល់ ក្ន ុខ យៈសពល ៨ឆ្ន ាំ 
ននគសត្ោខគឺ ចាប់ពីឆ្ន ាំ២០០៦  ល់ ២០១៤ ។ កា េិក្ាសនេះ 
ជាកា វ ធាភាគន្ផ្អក្សលើកា ចុេះអសខករ ល់ក្ន្នាខថាសរើរួអខគនានា 
(េេគមន៍ NGOs  ោា ភិបាល និខោច េ់ជាំនួយ) បានជួប 
និខបានយល់ ឹខប ុណ្តា ពីភាពតនរឹខក្ន ុខកា តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
សៅតមក្ត្មិរខ្ុេៗគន ៖ សៅក្ត្មិរេេគមន៍ ក្ន ុខ ៥ទីតាំខ
សៅក្មព ុជា សេើយនិខសៅក្ត្មិរជារិ អនត ជារិ និខសាថ ប័ន។ 
កា េិក្ាសនេះពាោមន្េវខយល់ថា សរើវ ធាននកា គាំពា 
ន្ លបសខក ើរស ើខសៅក្ត្មិរអនត  ជារិ ឬ “ក្ត្មិរ
ទីចារ់កា ក្ណ្តត ល” វាេមត្េបឬមិនេមត្េបប ុណ្តា សៅនឹខ
រត្មូវកា  និខបាំណ្ខត្បាថាន  បេ់េេគមន៍សៅតមមូលោា ន 
និខសៅតមសពលសវលាខ្ុេៗគន សនាេះ? កា េិក្ាសនេះ ពិនិរយពី
ផ្លពាក្់ព័នធ ននកា ពឹខន្ផ្អក្សលើ វ ធាននកា គាំពា េត្ោប់
កា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី សៅក្ន ុខត្បសទេន្ លោនក្ិចចកា ពា ក្ន ុខត្េកុ្
ទន់សខ្ាយទល់នឹខកា បខេ ាំត្បជាជនឲ្យផ្លា េ់បត  ូក្ន្នាខ េ់សៅ។ 
កា េិក្ាសនេះ យក្គសត្ោខផ្ល វូន្ ក្ក្មព ុជា  បេ់ ADB សធ្វ ីជា
ក្ ណ្ីេិក្ា និខន្ផ្អក្សលើកា ត្សាវត្ជាវន្បបគុណ្ភាពេុីជសត្ៅ ជាមួយ
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េោជិក្េេគមន៍ន្ លត្រវូផ្លា េ់បត  ូក្ន្នាខ េ់សៅសោយសា 
គសត្ោខផ្ល វូន្ ក្ និខជាមួយត្បជាជនន្ លសៅបនត េ់សៅ
ក្ន ុខទីតាំខស ើម បេ់ខ្ល នួតមបសណ្តត យផ្ល វូន្ ក្។ កា េិក្ា
ក្៏សត្បើត្បាេ់ផ្ខន្  នូវេោភ េន៍ជាមួយ អខគកា មិនន្មន ោា ភិបាល 
(NGOs) អនក្ក្សាខសគលនសោបាយថាន ក្់ខ្ពេ់ ទីត្បឹក្ា 
និខអនក្ោនជាំនាញឯក្សទេខ្ខ វ ធាននកា គាំពា  
និខកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មីសៅតម ាំណ្តក្់កាលេាំខ្ន់ៗសផ្សខសទៀរ
ននកា េសត្មចចិរត៖ ជាពិសេេសៅក្ន ុខ ADB ធ្នាគ ពិភពសលាក្ 
និខ ោា ភិបាលអូត្សាត លី។ 
សោយបនតកា ងា ពីកា ត្សាវត្ជាវោនត្សាប់េត ីពីកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
និសក្េបបទសនេះផ្តល់គាំនិរពីភាពតនរឹខក្ាំពុខោនេពវនថ្ង 
ក្ន ុខន្ផ្នក្អភិបាលក្ិចចសលើកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី។ និសក្េបបទ
បងាា ញោ ខចាេ់ពីទាំនាក្់ទាំនខ វាខកា អភិវឌ្ឍ 
នឹខកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មីសៅក្មព ុជា សោយពនយល់ពីន្បបបទន្ ល
 ាំសណ្ើ កា ទាំខពី សនេះចូលពាក្់ព័នធគន ។ សៅក្ន ុខប ធាបទននគសត្ោខ
ផ្ល វូន្ ក្សនេះ េិទធិ និខអរថ ត្បសោជន៍ត្រវូបាន ល់
ត្បជាជន ខផ្លប េះពាល់ ត្រវូបានក្ាំណ្រ់សោយទាំេាំទីតាំខជាក្់លាក្់
ន្ លពួក្សគបាន េ់សៅមក្ទល់សពលគសត្ោខចាប់សផ្តើម។ 
ជាជាខសធ្វ ីតមទត្មខ់ធ្មមតន្ លេេគមន៍នា ប់ េ់សៅសនាេះ 
គសត្ោខបានបសខក ើរសគលកា ណ្៍ថ្មីនន សបៀបស ៀបចាំេខគម។ 
ចាំណុ្ចសនេះនាាំឲ្យោនផ្លប េះពាល់មិនសេម ើគន ជាខ្ា ាំខសៅក្ត្មិរ
អនុគសត្ោខ សៅសពលកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មីចាប់សផ្តើមស ើខ។ 
អនតរាគមន៍ោ ខខ្ា ាំខកាា  បេ់ NGO សោយសត្បើយុទធសាស្តេត
ឆ្ាខត្បសទេោនលក្េណ្ៈនចន ត្បឌ្ិរខ្ពេ់ បានទក្់ទញមជឈោា ន
អនត  ជារិឲ្យពិនិរយតមោនោ ខលអ ិរលអន់សលើគសត្ោខសនេះ។ ប ុន្នត
ត្េបគន នឹខកា ផ្តល់េាំណ្ខប េះប ូ វ សេើយសេវា និខសេោា  ចនាេមព ័នធ
សៅតមរាំបន់តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មីបានលអ ត្បសេើ ស ើខយឺរៗសនាេះ េនទ ុេះ
ននកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មីក្៏បានផ្លា េ់បត  ូ។ កា តាំខទីលាំសៅជាថ្មី
កាន់ន្រោនលក្េណ្ៈទក្់ទញខ្ា ាំខស ើខេត្ោប់េោជិក្
េេគមន៍ជាសត្ចើនន្ លសៅឯសត្កាយក្ន ុខរាំបន់ស ើមសៅស ើយ។ 
មួយ យៈសពលសត្កាយមក្េតខ់ោននកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មីបានលអ
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ត្បសេើ ស ើខជាខ្ា ាំខសៅតមទីតាំខមួយចាំនួន ន្ លបានកាា យជា 
“សកាេះននអភិបាលក្ិចចលអ ” សោយោនកា ក្ាំណ្រ់ត្ពាំត្បទល់ 
ឬ បខេ ុ៊ុំព័ទធ ោច់ពីរាំបន់ន្ លោនកា ផ្តល់ជាំនួយត្ទត្ទខ់
រិចជាខ ល់ត្បជាជន ខផ្លប េះពាល់ន្រមួយភាគ និខមិនត្រវូបាន
គិរបញ្ច លូក្ន ុខគសត្ោខតាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី។ កា ត្សាវត្ជាវសនេះ បងាា ញពី 
ទាំេាំឥទធិពលន្ លអនក្ផ្តល់េិ ញ្ញ វរថ ុអនត  ជារិអាចោនសៅក្ន ុខ
ត្ក្បខ្័ណ្ឌ ននគសត្ោខណ្តមួយ ត្ពមទាំខក្ត្មិរត្ពាំ ន្ ននន
ឥទធិពលសនេះសៅសលើទិ ាភាពសផ្សខសទៀរននអភិបាលក្ិចច
ន្ លគម នពាក្់ព័នធ ល់គសត្ោខ។ 
ក្ន ុខសពលន្ លអខគកា  NGOs ត្បឹខរេ ូ មរិជួយ ល់
អនក្ ខផ្លប េះពាល់មួយភាគន្រគម នកា ក្ាំណ្រ់ឲ្យសៅតាំខទីលាំសៅ
ជាថ្មីសនាេះ សគអាចស ើញចាេ់នូវក្ាំេិរជាសត្ចើន
ក្ន ុខសគលនសោបាយផ្តល់កា គាំពា ។ NGOs ត្រវូសធ្វ ីកា 
ក្ន ុខប ធាោកាេមួយោនភាពតនរឹខោ ខេម ុគសាម ញសៅក្ន ុខ
េេគមន៍ន្ លបងាា ញថា ផ្លត្បសោជន៍ និខបាំណ្ខត្បាថាន  បេ់
េេគមន៍វាត្បទាំខត្បសទើេគន ជាខ្ា ាំខ និខជាបញ្ហា មួយ
សជៀេមិនផ្រុក្ន ុខកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី សេើយក្៏ពិបាក្នឹខ
ោក្់បញ្ច លូសៅក្ន ុខន្ផ្នកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី និខយុទធនាកា រេ ូ មរិ
ទ ាំខឡាយសទៀរផ្ខ។ 
សោយសត្បើត្ក្បខ្័ណ្ឌ ចាប់ និខត្ទឹេត ីោត្រោា ន សនាេះ និសក្េបបទសនេះ 
សត្បើត្បាេ់ត្ក្បខ្័ណ្ឌ ទេសនទនស ើមបីន្េវ ខយល់ពីកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
និខរភាជ ប់ កា ជន្ជក្ន្វក្ន្ញក្ពីកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី ជាមួយនឹខ
កា េិក្ាធ្ាំទូលាយថ្មីៗជាសត្ចើនេត ីព ី គណ្សនយយភាព និខចលនា
េខគមេុីវ ធាលឆ្ាខត្បសទេ។ តម យៈកា ពិនិរយសលើគសត្ោខសៅក្ត្មិរ
សផ្សខៗ (ក្ត្មិរអនុគសត្ោខ មូលោា ន រាំបន់ និខអនត  ជារិ) 
កា េិក្ាសនេះត្សាវត្ជាវថា សរើសគលកា ណ្៍កា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
“ន្ លោន សបៀប បបអនុវរតលអ ៗបាំផ្ុរ” (សទេះបីោនកា យក្ចិរត
ទុក្ោក្់ ឬបាំណ្ខលអោ ខណ្ត ក្ន ុខសពល ចនាស ៀបចាំវាស ើខ
សៅក្ត្មិរអនត  ជារិក្ត ី) អាចោនផ្លប េះពាល់អវ ធាជជោនក្ន ុខសពល
អនុវរត  និខក្ត្មបានេមត្េបនឹខរត្មូវកា  បេ់ជនទាំខឡាយ
ន្ លសគលគ ណ្៍ទាំខសនាេះត្រវូជួយគាំត្ទ ោ ខ ូចសមតច? 
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កា េិក្ាសនេះន្វក្ន្ញក្ថា ផ្លប េះពាល់ននកា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
មិនន្មនងាយសោេះត្សាយបានតមកា ពិនិរយតមោននផ្ាក្ន ុខ 
កា ត្គប់ត្គខ និខជាំនួយបសចចក្សទេសៅក្ត្មិរគសត្ោខស ើយ 
សទេះបីទិ ាភាពទាំខអេ់សនេះន្រខទទួលបានកា ផ្តល់ធ្នននសត្ចើន
ត្គប់ត្គន់សៅក្ន ុខគសត្ោខក្៏សោយ។ បញ្ហា ត្បឈមទាំខសនេះ 
ន្រខេម ុគសាម ញជាពិសេេសៅតមក្ន្នាខន្ លោនភាពមិនេុីគន
ខ្ា ាំខ វាខ េតខ់ោ ោា ភិបាលថាន ក្់ជារិេត្ោប់កា តាំខលាំសៅជាថ្មី 
ជាមួយនឹខេតខ់ោគាំពា ជាក្់លាក្់ បេ់គសត្ោខនិខជាលក្េណ្ៈ
អនត  ជារិ  ូចក្ ណ្ីសៅត្បសទេក្មព ុជា ជាស ើម។  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
Globally, many millions of people are displaced by infrastructure development each year.2 
Displacement occurs directly and indirectly through urbanisation, construction of roads, 
bridges, mines, and hydropower schemes.3 Recently, displacement is also occurring through 
other processes which restrict access to land, such as forest protection and conservation.4 
Since the 1980s, multilateral development banks have required borrowing governments to 
comply with “safeguards” and prepare resettlement plans to assist people negatively affected 
by their projects. Yet, the effectiveness of these resettlement safeguards has been the source 
of conflict between civil society groups and project financiers for many decades.5 These 
conflicts have been particularly acute in countries where there are few local protections 
otherwise available for communities at risk of displacement.6  
Multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, are under increasing pressure to 
reduce the negative community impacts of resettlement, without placing undue burdens on 
the governments of borrowing countries.7 Since 2012, the World Bank has been undertaking 
a multi-country consultation process to both improve its involuntary resettlement policy and 
to develop a more straight-forward safeguards system in response to borrower demands.8 
Policy-makers around the world are watching the outcomes of these negotiations with 
interest, especially as resettlement is being proposed as a potential climate change adaptation 
measure for populations in vulnerable locations.9 The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change has signalled that resettlement may be an adaptation option 
                                                 
2 Accurately accessing the numbers of people displaced by development and infrastructure projects is very difficult and 
the data available is not reliable, see Chapter 2; Also see: McDowell & Morrell (2010, p. 37); Oliver-Smith (2010, p. 12). 
3 See generally: McDowell & Morell (2010); Scudder (2012); Oliver-Smith (2009). 
4 McDowell & Morell (2010); Vandergeest, Bose & Idahosa (2007); Agrawal & Redford (2009); Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau 
(2006); De Sherbinin, Castro, Gemenne, Cernea, Adamo, Fearnside, Krieger, Lahmani, Oliver-Smith & Pankhurst (2011). 
5 See: Oliver-Smith (2010).  
6 This argument is developed throughout the thesis. See Chapters 2 and 4.  
7 Von Bernstorff & Dann (2013, p. 7). 
8 The consultation began in 2012 and was intended to be a two year consultation, but is still ongoing. For details of the 
review see: World Bank (2015e).  
9  Ferris (2012); De Sherbinin, Castro, Gemenne, Cernea, Adamo, Fearnside, Krieger, Lahmani, Oliver-Smith & Pankhurst 
(2011);  
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for communities exposed to climate change, renewing demand for understanding “best 
practices” and the safeguards which might be most effective.10 While refugee resettlement 
involves different processes again, large influxes of refugees in recent years have also 
intensified concerns about how to re-establish livelihoods and cohesive communities in new 
settings.11  
Drawing on the ADB co-financed railway project in Cambodia as a case study, this thesis 
explores contemporary tensions shaping the implementation of resettlement safeguards in a 
country where domestic legal protections are not well established. It explores how 
communities and advocates used creative strategies to influence the outcomes of the 
resettlement scheme, resulting in improvements in the resettlement sites over the eight years 
of the project. It also considers the experience of people who were not provided with the 
option of relocation and investigates the changing social dynamics of these communities as 
the project evolved. The findings of the study are based on in-depth interviews with 
community members in five locations in Cambodia (Pursat, Poipet, Sihanoukville, Phnom 
Penh and Battambang), and with NGOs and financiers in multiple locations where decisions 
were being made in relation to the project and where safeguards policies were being 
generated (Phnom Penh, Australia and Washington D.C.).  
This introduction first provides a brief background to understand resettlement safeguards in 
the context of development and infrastructure projects. It then introduces the railway case 
study, before explaining the questions guiding the research and the structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Safeguards and development-induced displacement  
Resettlement schemes for infrastructure projects have a long history of negatively impacting 
people who are relocated.12 Early studies in Africa and Latin America in the 1960s describe 
how resettlement created multi-dimensional types of stress on households relating to anxiety 
about the resettlement process, abrupt shifts and loss of livelihood opportunities, 
physiological and health effects as well as socio-cultural stress relating to loss of place and 
loss of control.13 Often poorly timed and implemented external assistance exacerbated the 
                                                 
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2011). 
11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015b, p. 10). 
12 Colson (1971); Scudder (1962, 1993, 2005, 2012); Chambers (1970); Hansen & Oliver-Smith (1982); Oberai (1988); 
Cernea (1986). 
13 Colson (1971); Scudder (1962, 1993).  
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stress of relocation, disproportionately impacting vulnerable members, especially older 
people and children.14  
In response to concerns about the treatment of resettled people and pressure from advocacy 
groups throughout the 1970s-80s, multilateral development banks such as the World Bank 
and ADB, introduced safeguard policies into their internal operations aimed at preventing 
or mitigating undue harm to people and the environment. Safeguards require certain 
processes to be followed where there is a risk that an investment will have detrimental 
impacts on affected populations.15 The World Bank was the first institution to introduce an 
Involuntary Resettlement Policy in 1980. The policy influenced other multilateral agencies 
to adopt similar models, including the ADB, Inter-American Development Bank, the 
African Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.16  
The involuntary resettlement policies of the World Bank and the ADB mandate that 
involuntary resettlement should be avoided, or minimised, wherever possible exploring all 
viable alternative project designs.17 Where it is not possible to avoid resettlement, then 
displaced persons are to be assisted in their efforts to improve their livelihoods and standards 
of living, or at least to restore them to pre-displacement levels. Both policies require 
displacement to be minimised, compensation to be provided and livelihoods to be re-
established so that affected households are not adversely affected by resettlement. Detailed 
resettlement plans must be prepared, including inventories of losses and livelihood 
baselines. Monitoring processes are also required. These standards are not limited to people 
being relocated. They also apply to people who have lost access to land on which their 
livelihoods rely, such as loss of access to forests, farmlands, water bodies or other income-
generating resources.18  
To provide a forum to enforce these safeguards, the World Bank established the Inspection 
Panel in 1993, which enables project-affected people to make complaints directly to the 
Bank to seek compliance with the safeguards.19 The ADB followed suit in 1995 and 
                                                 
14 Scudder (1993). 
15 Cernea & Mathur (2011). 
16  Cernea & Mathur (2011). For an analysis of the influence of the World Bank, see: Park (2014).  
17 World Bank (2001); Asian Development Bank (2009b). Note that the World Bank policies are under review, and both 
banks are piloting various alternative models, such as the “Country Systems” approach, as explored in Chapter 2 and 8.  
18 World Bank (2001); Asian Development Bank (2009b). Specific safeguards were also introduced to protect against a 
range of other impacts, especially protections for the environment and indigenous people.  
19  Bissell & Nanwani (2009). 
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established an Inspection Function which became its Accountability Mechanism in 2003, 
consisting of the Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) and the Compliance 
Review Panel (CRP).20 These mechanisms are often called “community-driven” or “citizen-
driven” accountability mechanisms, because while they may have various shortcomings, in 
theory, they provide a forum to enable project-affected people to make complaints directly, 
or through a local representative.21 In exceptional circumstances an international 
organisation (i.e. an advocacy NGO) acting as an agent for the affected persons may make 
a complaint. In practice, however, project-affected people are often represented by local or 
international agents (NGOs), as was the case with the Cambodian railway. These grievance 
mechanisms are particularly crucial in places where people experience limited protections 
through their own country’s legal systems, as is the case in Cambodia.22  
Cambodia’s social protection system is among the least developed in the Asia Pacific, 
meaning that there are very limited formal supports or government safety nets available to 
people experiencing hardship. 23 Legal protections for people at risk of displacement are also 
very weak.24 These weak social and legal protections can be partially attributed to 
Cambodia’s recent history, as Cambodia is still recovering from the Khmer Rouge conflict 
of the 1970s-90s. It was only in the late 1990s that relative political stability was 
established.25 A number of authors have identified the consequences of weak legal 
protections and inequitable government policies as resulting in widespread land conflicts, 
and highly uneven access to land, land title and protection of land rights.26 Similar patterns 
of unevenness shape resettlement processes. In Cambodia, like many countries, the 
standards set by multilateral development banks for resettlement and the complaints 
mechanisms available to project-affected people are at odds with the social and legal 
protections otherwise available to Cambodian citizens. People displaced by infrastructure 
projects involving a multilateral development bank, such as the World Bank or ADB, are 
entitled to enforce the safeguards standards through the Banks’ complaints mechanisms.27 
Donor countries, such as Australia, provide funding to the World Bank and ADB on the 
                                                 
20 See the discussion in Park (2014). Also see Chapter 2.  
21 For a general discussion, see Clark, Fox & Treakle (2003); Ebrahim & Herz (2007). 
22 Williams (2013); Grimsditch & Henderson (2009, pp. 37-39).  
23 Asian Development Bank (2013). 
24 See generally: Williams (2013); Grimsditch, Kol & Sherchan (2012); Grimsditch & Henderson (2009). See the 
discussion in Chapter 4.  
25 See Chapter 4.  
26 For example, see: Dwyer (2015); Milne (2013); Biddulph (2010).  
27 Bissell & Nanwani (2009); Suzuki & Nanwani (2005); World Bank (2015c); Park (2014). See Chapter 2.  
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condition that projects in foreign countries are managed in accordance with the safeguard 
systems. These protections differ for people who are relocated for a Cambodian Government 
project or for a private investment. These differences have led some authors to describe 
multilateral development bank projects as creating exceptions, or leading to “islands of 
governance”, which are potentially isolated from broader governmental systems and 
standards.28 These notions of “islands of governance” or places of exception is a theme that 
emerges throughout this thesis, and is developed further in the final empirical chapter 
(Chapter 8).  
The differences between the rights and treatment of ordinary citizens and those who fall 
within the bounds of certain projects has been subject of debate within the multilateral 
development banks, and in part, has led to an interest in supporting a “country systems” 
approach where a borrowing country’s own institutions and processes are used to implement 
development projects.29 Under these arrangements, borrowing countries are ostensibly 
provided with intensive support from multilateral development banks prior to and during 
projects to ensure they meet the benchmark standards required. These new safeguards 
models are currently being piloted in a number of countries, but have been criticised by civil 
society groups who argue that these new models reduce the protections available to project-
affected people.30 Debates about how to protect people experiencing displacement, what 
rights should be afforded to project-affected people, especially in settings where few other 
protections exist, provide the broad context for this research. Tensions between local, 
country-level resettlement practices and international multilateral development bank or 
donor country expectations are exemplified in recent resettlement conflicts in Cambodia, 
including in the Cambodian railway project.   
1.3 The Cambodian railway project  
Cambodia has a population of around 15 million people and is one of the poorest countries 
in Southeast Asia.31 It is geographically situated between Vietnam to the east and Thailand 
to the northwest and borders Laos to the northeast and the Gulf of Thailand to the south. As 
                                                 
28 CIDSE (2006, 20); Connell & Grimsditch (2014); Johns (2015) 
29 See for example: World Bank (2015a); Asian Development Bank (2015d). Also see Chapter 8. During the research, I 
conducted a review of the World Bank pilot of the new financing modality, Program-for-Results in Vietnam for the Bank 
Information Center, which relies on country systems, see: Jessie Connell & Grimsditch (2014).  
30 See for example: Bank Information Center (2005).  
31 Cambodia is listed as a “Least Developed Country” by the United Nations based on several socio-economic indicators, 
see: < http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc_info.shtml> accessed 29 November 2015.   
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is the case in many countries in Southeast Asia, forced community relocations have 
increased in Cambodia over the past 15 years to make way for public infrastructure projects, 
private development and urban beautification.32 In the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge 
conflict which devastated Cambodia in the 1970s-90s, the Cambodian Government has 
promoted economic growth. The past decade has seen an increasing number of land conflicts 
exacerbated by weak land tenure security arrangements across the country. Large numbers 
of people have been displaced in the absence of clear legal protections.33 Resettlement 
processes have been characterised by conflict between communities, financiers of 
infrastructure projects, NGOs and the Cambodian Government.34 Advocacy NGOs have 
emerged as influential actors in resettlement disputes, coordinating vocal, high-profile 
campaigns. NGOs have compiled data on resettled populations, publicised relocation events 
locally and internationally and utilised the accountability and complaints mechanisms of the 
World Bank and the ADB.35 
The ADB Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia Project (or simply, the “Cambodian 
railway project”), began in 2006, and involved Cambodia’s largest community resettlement 
for an infrastructure project to date. Co-financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the Australian Government, it affected approximately 20,000 people, of whom 4,610 
were required to relocate.36 The railway project aimed to improve economic opportunities 
for Cambodians by integrating Cambodia into the regional railway network of the Western 
Greater Mekong Sub-region. Under ADB’s supervision, the Cambodian Government was 
responsible for implementing the USD 141 million project in accordance with ADB 
safeguards and its involuntary resettlement policy.37 The ADB also managed a USD 21.5 
million grant for the project from the Australian Government.38  
                                                 
32 NGO Forum on Cambodia (2014).  
33 See: NGO Forum on Cambodia (2014); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2014); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2012); Also see 
generally: Amnesty International (2008); Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011).   
34 See media reports such as: Lei Win (2011).  
35 Many of these advocacy activities have been undertaken by Equitable Cambodia, (formerly Bridges Across Borders 
Cambodia), Inclusive Development International, Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT)  and AidWatch.   
36 (ADB 2014f); Estimates of the number of households affected have varied over the course of the project. ADB’s website 
materials and formal reporting of the numbers of affected households also differ. The ADB in Cambodia calculates the 
average household size as 4.7 people using demographic data, see: Asian Development Bank (2014b, p. 1). The average 
urban household (4.8 members) is slightly larger than the average rural household (4.6 members). 
37 The 1995 ADB Policy on Involuntary Resettlement applies to most of the people affected by the project, see: Asian 
Development Bank (1995); Also see Chapter 5.  
38 See Chapter 5.  
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The original plan was to rehabilitate the railway system that fell into disrepair in the 1970s 
and then connect Cambodia by rail from Kunming in China, through Vietnam, all the way 
to Singapore via Thailand and Malaysia.39 However, notwithstanding the technical 
assistance, consultant, capacity building and supervision costs of the project, and the 
preparation of more than 50 detailed reports, including economic, financial modelling and 
technical assessments, feasibility studies, multiple revised resettlement plans, numerous 
social and environmental monitoring studies and income restoration programs, the partly 
implemented project was cancelled in 2014, with more than 300 km of tracks still awaiting 
repair.40 Financiers are reluctant to extend further financing to the beleaguered and costly 
investment, although the Cambodian Government will still need to repay around USD 81.1 
million, with interest, for the partly finished project.41  
By the time the project was cancelled, resettlement had already taken place. Households 
were required to relocate if they had residences, structures and other assets within the 
railway corridor of impact, which is a narrow 7 metre corridor (3.5 metres on either side of 
the railway centreline). Most of the affected households were considered to be “illegal 
settlers” under Cambodian law, as the areas directly adjacent to the railway lines were state 
public property on which occupation is not legal. An important aspect of the ADB 
resettlement policy was that it compensated people considered to be squatting “illegally” for 
loss of assets and businesses, but not for loss of land. However, relocated households were 
provided with new plots of land in the resettlement sites and were promised that they would 
receive land title if they lived in the resettlement sites for five years or more, although it was 
not explained how this process would occur.42  
Only people living within 3.5 metres of the railway centreline were moved to new locations, 
despite the fact that a much larger number of people were living in the wider railway right 
of way, which is an area of 20-30 metres on either side of the centreline and also considered 
state public property.43 Households in these areas had generally been living in these locations 
                                                 
39 Asian Development Bank (2006). 
40 Asian Development Bank (2014g); Asian Development Bank (2014a).  
41 Chapters 5 and 8 go some way to explaining why the project was cancelled, and how the Cambodian Government has 
been left with an outstanding loan of USD 81.1 million plus interest for the unfinished project. This aspect of the case study 
is important, but it is not elaborated here as the primary focus of the research relates to the resettlement aspects of the 
railway project.  
42 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007). 
43 The right of way is 20 metres on each side of the centreline in densely populated areas and 30 metres on each side outside 
the cities, see: Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 47).  
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for many years, sometime decades. The resettlement policy did not seek to identify and 
resettle whole communities, rather it only relocated households who were living precisely 
within the corridor of impact. The remaining “partially-affected” households who were 
living in the wider railway right of way were compensated only if their assets and structures 
were partially within the corridor of impact. These households were generally moved back 
from the area past the 3.5 metre point, as shown in Figure 1 below. Residents living in the 
right of way were not provided with land title in the areas beyond 3.5 metres, but it was 
agreed that they could remain living there for at least five years without being relocated or 
evicted.44 In the initial plans, it was promised that if these people were relocated at a later 
date they would also receive the same compensation and livelihood re-establishment support 
as those who had relocated earlier,45 however no formal arrangements were put in place to 
ensure this would occur after the ADB finalises its involvement in the project.  
Figure 1: Railway line depicting corridor of impact 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
People were affected by the railway all along the railway line, however the households most 
directly affected and required to move were located in clusters in five locations: Phnom 
Penh, Pursat, Sihanoukville, Battambang and Poipet. Resettlement sites were established in 
                                                 
44 Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
45 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 14). 
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each of the five places to accommodate the relocating households from each area. Figure 2 
below shows a map of Cambodia indicating the locations of the resettlement sites.  
Figure 2: Map of railway project identifying resettlement sites 
 
Critical to understanding the resettlement impacts of this particular project is an appreciation 
of the different micro-geographies of each of the resettlement sites, especially the proximity 
of the sites to urban centres, sources of employment, and distances from former residences. 
Figure 3 below shows the different distances people moved from their previous locations.  
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The Phnom Penh resettlement site is in a peri-urban location approximately 20 km from the 
city and far from where the affected households lived previously. The Battambang site is 
approximately 5-7 km away, the Sihanoukville site is 10 km away, the Poipet site is 4-5 km 
away. In the Pursat site, people were relocated only 400 metres from most former residences. 
In Pursat, people affected were mostly living in the village of Bamnak, which is in the 
countryside 45 km east of Pursat.46  
Many of the households affected by the project were already very poor prior to relocation. 
The original resettlement plan estimated that half of all affected households belonged to poor 
and vulnerable groups and that poor, female-headed households accounted for 22.3 percent 
of all affected households.47   
Resettlement began in 2010 and was beset with problems from the outset. The resettlement 
process was plagued by reports of intimidation of individuals by Government officials, 
inadequacies in the conditions and locations of the resettlement sites, and very low amounts 
of compensation leading to the impoverishment of those who were relocated. 48 At least six 
different resettlement plans and a detailed measurement survey of the people affected were 
prepared, as well as an inventory of losses, a baseline of livelihoods and compensation plan. 
                                                 
46 While Bamnak is not an “urban centre” as such, the area where most people were living along the railway was still 
relatively condensed with a local market, and not surrounded by vacant, available land. 
47 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007). This is discussed in further 
detail in Chapters 5 and 7.  
48 Bugalski & Medallo (2012)  
Figure 3: Approximate distances people moved from previous residences 
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Social and environmental monitoring arrangements were also established.49 Before the 
partly-finished project was cancelled in 2014, resettlement costs for the project had grown 
from USD 3.8 million in 2006, to USD 7.6 million in 2009, to at least USD 14.6 million in 
2014.50 
Local and international advocacy NGOs brought intense international scrutiny to the project. 
They collected data on affected households, advocated directly to the Australian 
Government and ADB and supported formal complaints by communities to the ADB 
Accountability Mechanism and the Australian Human Rights Commission. These 
complaints resulted in a series of additional compensation payments and improvements in 
the services available and the amenity of the resettlement sites over time.51  
Tensions culminated in an internal ADB CRP investigation in 2013, which found that the 
ADB was in breach of its own safeguards. It identified numerous deficiencies in the original 
2006 Resettlement Plan and its implementation. The CRP recommendations included an 
additional compensation scheme for resettled households to the value of USD 3-4 million, 
which was approved by the ADB Board.52 The CRP was particularly critical that ADB staff 
only became fully engaged in supervising the project after NGOs drew attention to its 
deficiencies. It stated:  
Gradual proactive engagement at the required level and intensity began only 
in late 2010 after NGOs presented their concerns to the President of the 
ADB.53  
The CRP also stated that: 
In a post-conflict situation, such as that in Cambodia, where a country is 
emerging from decades of civil war, donors need to proactively engage with 
the government and provide it with support at a much higher level and 
intensity than was provided by ADB in this case.54  
                                                 
49 The resettlement plans are catalogued on the ADB project website at: http://adb.org/projects/37269-013/activities. 
50 The evolving project costs are detailed throughout the project reports uploaded to the ADB project website: 
http://adb.org/projects/37269-013/activities.  
51 See Chapter 5.  
52  Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
53 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 5). 
54 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 5) 
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The railway project is one of a series of internationally financed projects in Cambodia in 
recent years which have resulted in heightened conflict between donors, financiers, the 
Cambodian Government and NGOs and communities. Other prominent examples include 
the Highway One Project, also financed by the ADB, and the Boeung Kak lake conflict, 
which implicated the World Bank. The Boeung Kak Lake conflict was an extreme example 
in December 2010, resulting in the World Bank’s landmark decision to freeze loans to 
Cambodia. This followed a World Bank Inspection Panel complaint regarding the Boeung 
Kak Lake development in central Phnom Penh. In this instance, the Cambodian Government 
refused to address complaints that a land titling program financed by the World Bank was 
excluding families living on high-value land who also had a claim to the lake area where the 
development was taking place.55 Thus, many of the most publicised resettlement conflicts 
in Cambodia have involved an international financier, which has opened additional avenues 
for NGOs and communities to campaign than if only domestic investors were involved. 
Similar dynamics emerged in these relocation events, including the impoverishment of 
displaced communities, especially immediately after relocation,56 at the same time as 
communities experiencing highly uneven and differentiated impacts and benefits. In the 
Highway One case, Boeung Kak Lake conflict and the railway project, there have been 
significant challenges on behalf of the Cambodian Government in meeting the resettlement 
standards set by international institutions, and very limited monitoring of projects requiring 
resettlement by international institutions or the Cambodian Government.57 Yet, in each of 
these examples, resettlement conditions began to improve slowly in response to NGO 
advocacy.58  
1.4 39-40. Research questions  
Using the Cambodian railway project as a case study, the research aims to examine the 
tensions shaping resettlement safeguards at a number of scales: local, national, international 
and institutional through a close field-based study. It seeks to interrogate whether the actions 
of different actors involved in the railway resettlement process – local and international 
                                                 
55 The impacts of the World Bank’s Land Management and Administration Program (LMAP) were brought to the Bank’s 
attention through a complaint to the World Bank Inspection Panel made by the NGO, Equitable Cambodia (then, Bridges 
Across Borders Cambodia), on behalf of the affected families in the Boeung Kak Lake area; See: Grimsditch, Kol & 
Sherchan (2012). Also see: Cambodia Daily (2013). 
56 Sugita (2005); Bugalski & Medallo (2012); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a). 
57 Sugita (2005); Grimsditch & Henderson (2009); Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
58 See Chapters 4, 5,7 and 8.  
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NGOs, as well as international financiers and the Cambodian Government – aligned with or 
addressed affected peoples’ aspirations or concerns. It seeks to capture how different actors 
involved in the railway resettlement process understood and approached their roles in the 
conflict.  
The research is premised on the view that resettlement safeguards models and approaches, 
as well as the advocacy campaigns designed to support communities, need to cater to or 
reflect the different local needs and aspirations of people affected by relocation. 
Accordingly, three broad inter-related questions guided the research:  
 How did the actions and responses of the parties involved in resettlement 
processes for the railway (financiers, governments and NGOs) align with project-
affected people’s aspirations and concerns? 
  
 Has the experience of involuntary resettlement faced by displaced communities 
been mitigated by NGO advocacy, and in what ways? 
 
 What are the implications of using international safeguards and accountability 
mechanisms to influence resettlement processes in a country in which domestic 
legal systems are not well established? 
 
The thesis links debates about resettlement to other broader emerging literatures on 
accountability, civil society movements and the nature and role of NGOs in development 
processes. This approach problematises the role of law, accountability and the operation of 
trans-national civil society networks in a post-conflict context as expressed in the context of 
resettlement negotiations. The study also recognises that land conflicts – manifested in the 
example of the railway resettlement – are taking place on an increasing scale, frequency and 
complexity in Southeast Asia. As Hall et al argue, these conflicts are “irreversibly shifting 
the relations between people and land” 59 in contemporary Southeast Asia. Cambodia is an 
extreme example where these multi-faceted dynamics are unfolding.60 A transformative 
dimension of these changing relations is that the sheer number and diversity of actors 
                                                 
59 Note that Hall et al. primarily refer to processes of agrarian change. See: Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011, pp. 3-4). On land 
conflicts, also see: Dwyer (2015); Milne (2013); Biddulph (2010).  
60 Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011, pp. 3-4).  
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embroiled in these conflicts has increased.61 Not only are local and national governments 
involved with “often contradictory agendas, rules and enforcement procedures,” there is now 
a “plethora of agents under the broad umbrella of ‘civil society’” whose linkages extend 
beyond the “nation”.62 There is also a saturation of donors, transnational companies and 
multilateral organisations involved in either supporting or resisting these processes, directly 
and tangentially. Thus, the railway resettlement is a highly visible example of land and 
resettlement conflicts occurring in the region. It is hoped that in drawing out the nuances 
surrounding the Cambodian railway project, by extension, the dynamics of other, less visible 
resettlement processes, land conflicts and civil society activities will also become less obscure. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 situates the research in the existing literature on resettlement, providing an 
overview of the main debates and themes underpinning resettlement research. It provides 
estimates of the number of people affected by development-induced displacement, and 
introduces the central concepts and language used in the literature. The chapter draws out 
the different socio-anthropological and rights-based approaches to understanding 
resettlement. In doing so, it provides important background about how human rights 
frameworks, safeguards, and accountability mechanisms have developed over time to 
support resettlement processes. The final sections of the chapter introduce emerging 
approaches to resettlement articulated by authors such as Oliver-Smith and Fisher, whose 
work examines transnational linkages and advocacy organisations and the ways they interact 
with local populations.63 These emerging approaches are particularly relevant for building 
the conceptual framework for the research.  
Chapter 3 further develops the theoretical framework and positions the study at the 
intersection between human geography and socio-legal studies. It draws on theories of scale 
and legal pluralism, particularly from legal geography. Legal geography is primarily 
concerned with how law operates to influence or create the (natural or built) environment of 
specific places.64 It uses these perspectives to focus attention on how global or universal 
legal processes are translated into local conditions, shaping communities, not only spatially, 
                                                 
61 Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011, pp. 3-4).  
62 Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011, pp.5-6). 
63 Fisher (2009); Oliver-Smith (2010). 
64 Gillespie (2012 ). 
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but also socially and politically. This process is sometimes referred to within legal 
geography as the study of the “localisation of laws”.65 Thinking in this way raises questions 
about how international law, standards and resettlement policies have potential to re-shape 
communities by altering the rights, opportunities and living spaces of those affected, creating 
new legal boundaries between those who are required to move, those who are not, and those 
whose grievances “fit” within resettlement policy categories. Legal geography provides a 
powerful lens to examine the current research because of the multiple and contradictory 
ways in which laws – domestic Cambodian law, local customary norms, international 
safeguards and resettlement policies – have re-organised the railway communities in 
Cambodia. Together with the literature examined in Chapter 2, these perspectives provide a 
conceptual framework for the research. 
Chapter 4 turns its focus to Cambodia and provides an outline of the central events shaping 
Cambodia’s recent history. It identifies the multiple legal and cultural regimes shaping its 
contemporary regulatory environment, and argues that there are few local legal protections 
for Cambodian citizens at risk of displacement. It also explores recent trends towards 
financing infrastructure development in the Asia Pacific region through concessional 
lending, rather than through development assistance or “aid”. Chapter 4 situates the railway 
project in the context of other major infrastructure projects requiring resettlement in 
Cambodia.  
Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of the stakeholders involved in the railway project, 
explaining its original aims and how the resettlement plans were developed. It also provides 
background on the NGOs involved in the railway advocacy and how the financiers 
responded to advocacy campaigns as the project encountered serious problems from 2010 
onwards. This chapter provides critical background to understand the research.  
The methodology is explained in Chapter 6. The research began in 2011, however the 
primary fieldwork was conducted over a six-month period in 2013. A combination of 
qualitative research methods were used, primarily using field-based research and in-depth 
interviews with NGOs and project financiers in multiple sites (primarily Phnom Penh, 
Washington D.C. and Australia) and community-based interviews with people affected by 
the project in Cambodia in the five locations. Interviews and informal focus groups were 
                                                 
65 Gillespie (2012 ). 
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conducted with 144 community members across the five resettlement locations: Poipet, 
Phnom Penh, Battambang, Sihanoukville and Pursat. Around half of the interviews were 
conducted with people who remained living along the railway in each of these locations who 
were not given the option of relocation.66 These people had either received a small amount 
of compensation to move back from the railway line or had not been considered in the 
resettlement plans at all. Greater attention was given to communities relocated in parts of 
the country outside Phnom Penh, as these communities were less frequently accessed by 
NGOs.  
Chapters 7 and 8 explore the central themes emerging from the interviews and field research. 
Chapter 7 explores how the five communities were affected differently by the resettlement 
process. It focuses on capturing people’s experiences of resettlement, their aspirations and 
coping strategies, as well as the factors that shaped their decisions about how to navigate 
resettlement. The chapter draws primarily on qualitative research to understand the 
responses of people in both the resettlement sites and the communities who remained living 
along the railway in each of the five locations. It explores the significance of using the ADB 
accountability mechanism for affected people, many of whom had previously had minimal 
contact with international organisations and NGOs. It also explores how the resettlement 
process for the project had very uneven impacts at a sub-project level. As advocates and 
communities complained and the conditions in the resettlement sites improved, so did the 
appeal of resettlement for those who were not relocated but instead remained living along 
the railway without tenure security. Resettlement standards improved in some of the sites so 
much that it resulted in highly inequitable treatment for people who were partially affected 
by the project, but not given the option of relocation. Project financiers continued to apply 
the minimising displacement principle, although it was widely acknowledged that this had 
created a perverse set of circumstances for people affected by the project in more remote 
areas.  
Chapter 8 explores how the resettlement safeguards were perceived and experienced by 
critical actors at other scales. It draws on interviews with senior policymakers, consultants, 
safeguards and resettlement specialists within the ADB, World Bank and Australian 
Government, as well as interviews with NGOs and community advocates. It also draws on 
                                                 
66 See Appendix B.  
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experiences in Washington D.C. during the Spring Meetings in April 2013, when the World 
Bank held a series of consultations with civil society groups about reforming its social and 
environmental safeguards policy.67 The interviews reveal the challenges of encouraging 
local country “ownership” of resettlement planning processes on the one hand, and 
international standards and requirements for “accountability” on the other. As the chapter 
argues, this tension often manifests itself in so-called “islands of governance”, especially 
where there is a significant disparity between national government standards and 
international project-specific resettlement policies, as was the case in the railway. Chapter 9 
then presents the conclusions of the research, and considers the ways in which scaled 
approaches offer insights which build on existing knowledge about resettlement. 
 
 
  
                                                 
67 I was based in Washington D.C. for 3 months in early 2013 and attended the Civil Society Stream of the Spring Meetings, 
and the consultations with civil society on the safeguards review. During this time I also interviewed a number of social 
safeguards specialists working on the review and members of the World Bank Inspection Panel. For details of the Spring 
Meetings, see: http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2013/. For details of the World Bank safeguards review, see: 
https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies). 
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Chapter 2 
Approaches and debates in the  
study of  resettlement 
 
Resettlement is a complex multidimensional process that 
transcends the housing aspect. It has various dimensions: 
physical, legal, economic, social, cultural, psychological, 
environmental, political-administrative, and territorial, each 
with different attributes...68 
 
Impoverishment and disempowerment have been the rule 
rather than the exception with respect to resettled people 
around the world. 69 
 
2.1 Overview 
In almost all countries of the world, governments acquire land and resettle people to build 
roads, bridges and other infrastructure, although the legal protections in place, policy 
procedures and social expectations vary enormously. Community resettlement has been 
studied within a number of academic disciplines – geography, anthropology, law, and 
sociology – giving rise to a considerable body of literature to inform the current study.70 
This chapter identifies two broad approaches to writing about resettlement. The first is a 
                                                 
68 Correa, Ramirez & Haris (2011, p. 55). 
69 Bartolme, de Wet, Manderm & Kumar Nagraj (2000, p. 7). 
70 While these approaches often overlap, early studies tended to be framed in terms of their disciplinary contribution. 
Examples from geography include: Hilton (1959), Sendut (1962); from anthropology they include: Colson (1971), Scudder 
(1962, 1993), Hansen & Oliver-Smith (1982); from law Barutciski (2006); from sociology: Cernea (1986, 1999); Harrell-
Bond & Monahan (1988); Recently there has been a tendency towards multi-disciplinary studies. For examples, see: 
McDowell & Morrell (2010), Bennett & McDowell (2012), Oliver-Smith (2010, 2009), Vandergeest, Bose & Idahosa 
(2007).  
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socio-anthropological literature focused on understanding the meaning that communities 
make of the experience of relocation, its impacts on livelihoods and social and cultural 
consequences. The second, an increasingly prevailing approach to resettlement studies, is a 
rights-based or legal-advocacy literature, which identifies the rights of resettled individuals, 
the development of legal protections, the gaps that exist in these protections and the ways in 
which resettlement complies with, or potentially violates, domestic and international law.71 
This chapter argues that while this literature collectively highlights many critical aspects of 
resettlement, at certain junctures these approaches have also operated independently from 
one another to obscure the complexity of community resistance and the ways NGOs work 
with communities throughout resettlement processes. While there are some studies which 
examine the complexity of grassroots movements and the changing dynamics of 
communities as they become involved in advocacy campaigns, they are temporally and 
geographically limited. Many of these studies are situated in India and Latin America, and 
relate to displacement events that occurred 15-20 years ago, when international 
accountability structures were different and many of the transnational advocacy groups were 
first emerging.72 Advocacy movements have developed rapidly in Cambodia since the 
1990s, although there is limited analysis of resettlement or of the ways in which advocates 
are working to influence resettlement processes in Cambodia, outside the material published 
directly by NGOs.73 
First, this chapter provides an understanding of the main debates and themes underpinning 
resettlement research. It introduces the central concepts and language used in the 
resettlement literature and estimates the number of people affected by development-induced 
displacement. Secondly, it draws out the different socio-anthropological and rights-based 
approaches to understanding resettlement. In doing so, it provides context about how human 
rights frameworks and accountability mechanisms have developed over time to support 
resettlement processes. The chapter then introduces scaled approaches to resettlement 
                                                 
71 For example: Barutciski (2006), W. C. Robinson (2003), Penz, Drydyk & Bose (2011), Bissell & Nanwani (2009), 
Terminski (2013). Human-rights based approaches are becoming increasingly central to the work of advocates, especially 
in Cambodia: Bugalski & Medallo (2012), Bugalski (2010), Inclusive Development International (2013), Bank Information 
Center & Inclusive Development International (2013), Bridges Across Borders, Equitable Cambodia & Stiftung (2012), 
Equitable Cambodia & Inclusive Development International (2013).  
72 See for example: Hansen & Oliver-Smith (1982); Rodrigues (2004); Leslie (2005), Lahiri-Dutt & Wasson (2008). The 
exception would be Fisher (2009) and Oliver-Smith (2010) who have examined resettlement resistance movements more 
broadly, rather than in relation to a specific displacement event or location. 
73 Examples of this analysis includes: Bugalski & Medallo (2012), Equitable Cambodia & Inclusive Development 
International (2013), Bridges Across Borders, Equitable Cambodia & Stiftung (2012), Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2011, 
2013a, 2013b).   
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articulated by key authors such as Oliver-Smith and Fisher, whose work examines the 
transnational linkages developed by advocacy organisations and the ways they interact with 
local populations.74 The final sections of the chapter also explore intersecting themes 
relevant to the research, including the literature on NGOs, accountability and risk. Together, 
these bodies of literature provide important background to situate the current study.  
2.2 Conceptualising “resettlement”, “relocation”, “DIDR” and “DFDR” 
Development-induced displacement and resettlement, or “DIDR”, broadly encompasses 
people who are displaced by development and infrastructure projects, such as dams, hydro-
power projects, urban upgrading and other state-sanctioned programs.75 Planned community 
resettlement for development and infrastructure projects is referred to in the literature in 
various ways. Some of these terms include “involuntary resettlement”, “forced relocation”, 
“forced displacement”, “DIDR”, “development-forced displacement and resettlement” or 
“DFDR”. These terms are largely interchangeable, although they have slightly different 
meanings depending on the context in which they are used. The most basic distinction can 
be made between displacement, which relates to the process of being uprooted from one’s 
home or “displaced”, whereas relocation or resettlement relate to the process of moving to 
a new location. Even then, there is frequent slippage in the literature between the concepts 
and language of displacement, relocation and resettlement. 
While the literature often refers to “relocation” and “resettlement” interchangeably, there 
are distinctions made between the two processes by multilateral organisations, such as the 
World Bank. A feature of the World Bank’s policy on Involuntary Resettlement is that since 
the 1980s it has applied both to the physical relocation of communities, as well as to the loss 
of access to land and resources on behalf of those communities, whether or not they are 
physically relocated. The World Bank describes “resettlement” as a broad process 
encompassing all direct economic and social losses resulting from land taking and restriction 
of access to land, including relocation or loss of shelter, loss of assets or access to assets, or 
loss of income or means of livelihoods whether or not affected persons move to another 
location. It also includes the involuntary restriction of access to legally designated parks and 
protected areas resulting in adverse impacts on the livelihoods of displaced persons.76 In 
                                                 
74 Fisher (2009); Oliver-Smith (1994, 2010). 
75 Bennett & McDowell (2012, p. 21). 
76 World Bank (2004, p. 5) 
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contrast, “relocation” (as a component of resettlement) is considered more narrowly to relate 
to the “process whereby a community’s housing, assets, and public infrastructure are rebuilt 
in another location.”77 The World Bank has also put forward the “resettlement as 
development” approach, in which resettlement should be seen as an opportunity to improve 
the lives of affected people, and that all resettlement programs should be conceived of and 
executed as development programs in which affected households are also project 
beneficiaries.78   
The degree to which people are forced to move has been a focus of the forced migration and 
resettlement literature for many decades.79 There is no simple dichotomy between voluntary 
and involuntary relocation, rather the “involuntary” or “forced” aspect of community 
relocation is best understood on a gradual continuum, depending on the specific factors 
driving displacement. In the context of internal resettlement in Laos, authors such as Baird 
and Shoemaker have problematized the notion of volition, arguing that it is not easy to 
separate voluntary and involuntary resettlement.80 Their research relates to internal 
resettlement of villagers, especially ethnic minorities, from the upland areas of Laos to 
lowland areas with the goal of reducing swidden agriculture and opium production, 
centralizing people closer to services and ostensibly improving the lives of rural populations. 
Baird and Shoemaker argue that both state and non-state actors find it convenient to frame 
resettlement as “voluntary”, even though the affected villagers are coerced over a long 
period of time and the range of options available to them is narrow.  
In circumstances relating specifically to infrastructure projects, the academic literature uses 
terms such as development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), or 
development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR).81 Both terms denote the 
process involved in relocation as well as a body of norms and organisational policies related 
to resettlement, such as the World Bank policy on Involuntary Resettlement. Oliver-Smith, 
uses the term development-forced displacement to recognise that the decision to relocate, or 
the drivers of relocation, come from “above” as state-planned and enacted processes.82 
Instead of trying to characterise resettlement in voluntary and involuntary terms, Elizabeth 
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Ferris focuses on identifying the “locus of control” in resettlement, as a way of describing 
how the decision to displace usually rests with external actors, such as the government, 
rather than the community.83 In recognition of these debates, the World Bank uses the term 
“involuntary resettlement” and describes involuntary land acquisition as a “lack of informed 
consent and power of choice on the part of people directly affected by the acquisition.”84  
Bearing in mind the subtle differences in the language described above, throughout the 
thesis, terms such as DIDR, resettlement and relocation are often used interchangeably. This 
interchangeability of language reflects the relatively flexible use of resettlement language in 
the literature generally. 
This thesis focuses on development-induced displacement and resettlement, but it is 
important to be aware of the other types of resettlement occurring globally and how these 
processes relate to the current research. A related type of resettlement is that which is taking 
place in the context of climate change and other large-scale environmental events, such as 
disasters. Recent literature also suggests an increasing number of people are being resettled 
by governments for programs targeted at disaster-risk reduction, environmental 
conservation and climate change adaptation.85 For example, the planned resettlement of 
groups of people and sometimes whole communities to locations less vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change is underway in the South Pacific, Vietnam, Mozambique and 
parts of Alaska in the United States.86 This type of resettlement is not the focus of the current 
research, however it is relevant. Policy makers tasked with financing and developing climate 
change adaptation options are increasingly looking to the field of DIDR to understand what 
can be learnt from these experiences.87   
There is an obvious distinction between people displaced by conflict and persecution and 
development-induced displacement. There is very little overlap between these fields, 
presumably because violent, political and/or ethnic conflicts tend to result in protracted 
diplomatic processes which raise different issues shaping efforts to stabilise and resettle 
people displaced in this way. Similarly, a distinction can be drawn between refugee-related 
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resettlement and other types of planned community resettlement. Refugee resettlement is a 
narrow concept and process, set up as a discretionary practice under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees88 and adopted only by a small number of the States who 
are party to the Refugee Convention. It involves people who have been granted refugee 
status who are resettled in a third country which has agreed to admit them as refugees with 
permanent residence status (i.e. not repatriating them in their home country and not settling 
them in the country in which they initially sought asylum, but resettling them in a third 
country which has agreed to offer protection). 89  
Differences also exist between understandings of resettlement which concentrate on the 
impacts, processes and rights which attach to an individual person being resettled, and 
understandings concerned with the processes and dynamics of community resettlement. 
Community resettlement involves the movement of a group of people in a way that aims to 
retain important characteristics, including social structures, cultural rituals, and economic 
organisation.90 Ferris argues that the displacement of individual persons, and by extension, 
issues relating to their decision to move, consent for movement, and the types of 
compensation they can seek, has become the domain of lawyers and human rights advocates. 
Alternatively, planned community resettlement has predominantly been the concern of 
anthropologists, sociologists and economists who focus on the collective impacts of 
resettlement on the social, cultural and economic fabric of groups of people or 
communities.91  
An early typology of community resettlement developed by Oberai provides a useful starting 
point for understanding the various forms of planned relocation and the spectrum of 
voluntary and involuntary processes which underpin this type of migration. This typology 
captures relatively contemporary forced migration processes and does not attempt to 
incorporate some of the earliest relocation events on record, such as those accompanying 
the religious military campaigns of the “Crusades” in Europe in the Middle Ages. Oberai 
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identifies six broad objectives that past resettlement programs have sought to achieve, 
summarised below: 92  
 Population redistribution – movement of populations from one part of the 
country to another, typically to distribute populations more evenly (for 
example, the transmigration schemes carried out in Indonesia);93 
  
 Colonisation and development of new areas – territorialisation through 
moving populations to new and unexplored areas to expand physical and 
economic development;  
 
 Provision of land for the landless – where land has been supplied in order to 
assist poor or unemployed populations, or those with small and fragmented 
land holdings. This involves moving people to areas where land is 
available; 
 
 Promotion of regional development – movement of populations to promote 
industry and trade, exploitation of minerals, forestry and other natural 
resources in rural areas to discourage rural-urban migration; 
 
 Agricultural development – movement of people to support and increase 
agricultural production. 
 
 Reducing poverty, improving standards of living and achieving broad social 
development objectives, for example resettling people who live in very 
poor areas.  
While many of these categories may overlap or the reasons for resettlement may be multiple, 
there are at least five other processes that can be added to Oberai’s typology, including:  
 Development-induced displacement and resettlement – resulting from the 
building of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, dams and often driven by 
                                                 
92 See the original typology developed by Oberai (1988, pp. 8-22).  
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a combination of actors (e.g. governments, international financiers and 
private investors);  
 
 Environment and climate change-related resettlement – resulting from 
environmental events, such as disasters, and or in anticipation of climate 
change-related processes;  
 
 Movement associated with protected area displacement, such as 
conservation and forest protection;94  
 
 Relocations motivated by ethnic, religious or communal conflicts – 
involving state-organised integration or separation of communities on these 
grounds;95 
 
 Relocation of people from rural areas to be closer to markets and urban 
centres, as is occurring in contemporary China;96 
 
 Post-conflict related or refugee-related resettlement – following the end of a 
conflict or resettlement of refugees in a third country when it is not possible 
for them to be repatriated or reside in the country in which they sought 
asylum.  
Hall et al. also provide a useful way of understanding displacing processes in relation to 
present-day Southeast Asia, which they prefer to conceptualise in terms of “powers of 
exclusion”.97 While it is important not to conflate exclusion with displacement, it is worth 
appreciating how these processes can be interrelated. In their study of land dilemmas they 
identify six processes driving rural land transformations leading to exclusion. They include: 
(1) the regularisation of access to land, including state-organised land titling or land 
formalisation schemes; (2) the expansion of efforts to conserve forests by restricting access 
to them, especially by limiting agricultural activities incompatible with forest conservation; 
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(3) the conversion of land to support “boom crops”, such as rubber; (4) the conversion of 
agrarian land to “post-agrarian uses”, such as peri-urban or tourist uses; (5) conversion of 
shared or common land into individually owned property at the village level’98 and (6) 
mobilization of groups to assert their access to land, at the expense of other land users.99 
Thus, there are many different circumstances in which people are excluded, displaced and/or 
are subjected to various government-led and private resettlement schemes. Hall et al.’s 
approach is particularly helpful because it helps situates displacing processes within a much 
broader context of socio-economic change, land reform and regulation. 
Accurately accessing the numbers of people displaced by development and infrastructure 
projects is very difficult and the data available is not reliable.100 Many of the well-known 
large-scale community resettlements have occurred in the context of dam-building. 
Significant among these are the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River in Zimbabwe (1955-
1959), Volta Dam in Ghana (1960-1968), Sobradinho Dam in Brazil (1974-1977), Sardar 
Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in India (1979-2008), Nam Theun 2 in Laos (1993-
2010) and the Three Gorges Dam in China (1992-2009).101  
Many people displaced by development projects are formally resettled to new locations. 
Many others are simply displaced with nowhere to move, or may experience secondary 
impacts – such as flooding or reduced food supplies – which make it untenable to continue 
living in their communities of origin.102 As such, the numbers of people displaced by 
development and infrastructure processes are very difficult to assess. The general consensus 
in the field, however, is that development-induced displacement and resettlement has 
increased in the past few decades.103 An often quoted statistic is that the since 1990, roughly 
10 million people each year have been physically displaced by infrastructure projects, 
amounting to more than 200 million people in two decades.104 Cernea argues that the 
numbers are closer to around 15 million people each year.105 The World Commission on 
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Dams report estimated that between 40-80 million people were displaced by hydro-electric 
dams prior to the year 2000 alone.106 Other estimates which include river-dependent 
communities indirectly displaced or adversely impacted by dams are closer to 472 million 
for the same period.107 There are certain hydropower projects which have individually 
involved resettlement on an enormous scale. The Three Gorges Dam in China completed in 
2009 is probably the most high-profile example of mass resettlement. It is the world’s largest 
hydropower project, inundating more than 1,000 square km of land and forcing the direct 
displacement and relocation of more than 1.3 million people. It is also estimated to have 
displaced 4 million additional people due to reservoir-linked erosion and flooding over a 
ten-year period.108  
2.3 Socio-anthropological approaches 
Development-related resettlement programs were first described by anthropologists, such as 
Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder in the 1950s, and the sociologist, Michael Cernea in 
the 1970s, based on their experiences in Africa and Latin America.109 Their research is 
illustrative of a socio-anthropological approach to the study of resettlement, which 
documents the far-reaching impacts of displacement on communities and the host 
populations of the relocated. Scudder and Colson’s seminal work focused on the involuntary 
resettlement of 57,000 people in the 1950s for the Kariba Dam, in the former Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, current day Zambia and Zimbabwe. One of the largest dams in the 
world, the Kariba Dam was the first mainstream dam on the Zambezi River and was partially 
financed by the largest loan provided by the World Bank until that time.110 What concerned 
them in their study before and after relocation, was the “subsequent community unravelling” 
to which resettlement contributed.111 The community endured multi-dimensional types of 
stress relating to anxiety about the resettlement process, abrupt shifts in livelihood 
opportunities, physiological and health effects, as well as socio-cultural stress relating to 
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loss of place and loss of control. All of these effects were experienced disproportionately by 
vulnerable members, especially children.112 
The physiological, psychological, and socio-cultural stress that accompanies resettlement is 
vividly presented in Scudder and Colson’s analysis. They argue that the first two years 
following resettlement were the most difficult for the Gwembe Tonga. The disruption of 
relocation led to important cultural rituals being discontinued during times when their 
stabilising effects were needed most.113 As Scudder, writes: “especially significant were 
changes in belief systems whereby misfortunes of any sort came to be increasingly blamed 
on witchcraft”.114 Kinship relationships also intensified during the resettlement time. These 
changes were considered to be “an attempt to maintain some control over existence by 
reducing, to the extent possible, further change and hence further stress.” 115 New types of 
sorcery emerged as people also drew on pre-existing meaning systems to explain calamitous 
events. Host-community conflict exacerbated the stress of relocation. Agricultural rituals 
which had previously seen whole neighbourhoods synchronising planting and harvesting 
were also no longer possible. 116  
In the case of the Gwembe Tonga, the community was resettled to land of poorer agricultural 
value where they had reduced access to water and forest products. Agricultural systems were 
not able to be reproduced in the new locations within a single year. Support offered by the 
government and the World Food Programme was not reliably provided at the “right place at 
the right time”.117 Exposure to different diseases, disease strains and other health hazards 
following relocation increased morbidity and mortality rates. Greater population densities 
also brought outbreaks of dysentery, measles and chicken pox, exacerbated by water 
supplies of poorer quality, as communities now sourced their water from wells and 
boreholes, rather than flowing rivers. Mortality rates tended to be higher among those people 
relocated to environmental habitats that were most dissimilar or furthest from their previous 
homes.118  
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Scudder also identified a tendency for resettlement impacts to begin many years prior to 
relocation, as government investment in the designated areas is deferred and/or funding for 
services is withdrawn. Individuals in designated areas also tend to be discouraged from 
improving their existing housing and landscapes. As Scudder writes:  
even before people become aware of what is about to happen to them 
they are being made worse off than their neighbours, especially in 
terms of such social infrastructure as schools and medical facilities, 
and of community-based development projects... 119 
An important aspect of Scudder’s later work is his emphasis on returning to resettled 
communities to understand how the impacts of resettlement change over time.120 The study 
began by Colson and Scudder has continued over at least four decades. While Scudder and 
Colson argue that the Gwembe Tonga’s situation improved over time, they maintain that the 
improvements were not sustained. Although the hardships endured by the Gwembe Tonga 
were bound up in other complex political and economic shifts in Zimbabwe and Zambia at 
that time, they argued that the prospects and opportunities of the Gwembe Tonga were 
inherently limited because they had been resettled to land of poorer agricultural quality and 
to areas which could not withstand the growing population over time.121  
Socio-anthropological studies, such as those by Scudder and Colson, generally approach 
resettlement as a dynamic process, which is context-bound and culturally specific. 
Nonetheless, anthropologists working across locations have attempted to capture common 
aspects of the resettlement experience in their writings. As Scudder suggests, the Kariba 
experience is instructive of the impacts experienced by resettled communities elsewhere, 
drawing on subsequent research in Sri Lanka (Mahaweli Project), China (Danjiangkou), 
India (Sardor Saravor), Lesotho (Highlands Water Project), Kenya (Kiambere), and Ghana 
(Volta and Kpong).122 As Scudder also maintains, these dynamics – reduced access to 
natural resources and livelihoods, increased disease, and poorly timed and implemented 
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external assistance – are inherent features of relocation and even the “threat of physical 
removal sets in motion processes that are similar regardless of the reason for removal.”123  
Indeed, other resettlement literature compiled by Oberai, identifies many similar 
resettlement challenges relating to diminished employment opportunities in new sites, 
second generation impacts on children, social tensions between settlers and indigenous or 
host communities. Other dynamics include the frequent abandonment of settlement areas by 
resettled communities, a range of barriers limiting the provision of social services, and other 
typical impacts, such as ecological problems resulting from shifting cultivation from one 
area to another, high resettlement costs proportionate to project costs, land tenure and 
management difficulties, and self-perpetuating patterns of “settler dependency” on formal 
assistance once communities have been relocated.124 
The importance of minimising the detrimental social consequences that stem from poor 
planning and implementation has been the focus of the influential sociologist, Michael 
Cernea. Cernea contributed to an institutional shift in understanding about the impacts of 
resettlement and the nature of vulnerability experienced by relocated communities. 
Influenced by Scudder and Colson, he is credited with introducing sociological and 
anthropological approaches to the World Bank’s policy framework in the 1970s, leading to 
the first World Bank resettlement policy in 1980, which is discussed further in the next 
section.125 One of the most significant features of early community relocations that Cernea 
identifies is the practice of “de-linking”; whereby the resettlement of communities was de-
linked (considered as a separate responsibility) from the planning of a project and the act of 
removing the community from the area subject to development. Essentially, he argued that 
separating these responsibilities had the effect of externalising the resettlement component 
of a project from the overarching project plan.126  
In the case of Brazil’s Sobradinho Dam, funded by the World Bank in 1974-1977, the de-
linking of responsibilities resulted in the late evacuation of 70,000 people living in the areas 
affected by the dam. Responsibility for resettlement was delegated to local Brazilian 
municipalities, but without local capacity to resettle a large population and limited oversight, 
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no resettlement plans were prepared.127 The inhabitants of four cities and thirty villages 
(11,853 families) were still living in the downstream area immediately prior to the dam’s 
impoundment. As the impending crisis became clear, the Catholic Church in Brazil led an 
international campaign to prevent the dam going ahead.128 Nonetheless, the project 
continued and water was released into the area where the communities remained. The 
population was eventually evacuated by the Brazilian army to nearby locations as a 
temporary solution, but with no plans for where the communities would live.129 The incident 
was reportedly embarrassing for the World Bank and the Brazilian Government as the media 
reported the events locally and internationally. Cernea termed the project a “social disaster”, 
providing partial impetus for ensuing debates about social safeguards within the World 
Bank.130  
Another of Cernea’s major contributions to the resettlement literature is a study of the risk 
patterns experienced by resettled communities, which led him to develop a Risks and 
Reconstruction Model.131 The model identifies eight impoverishment processes 
characteristic of displacement: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, 
increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property 
resources and services, and social disarticulation.132 First landlessness, or the expropriation 
of land, removes the foundation upon which “productive systems, commercial activities, and 
livelihoods are constructed.”133 Joblessness, or the loss of wage employment, continues well 
after physical relocation takes place, as planners often cannot recreate the local networks 
that support livelihoods. Homelessness, the loss of one’s physical home (whether temporary 
or ongoing), is common as only a proportion of resettled individuals successfully re-build 
their houses in new areas. Marginalisation results from resettlement, as individuals tend to 
lose or reduce their economic power and risk entering into a path of downward mobility in 
terms of economic and social status. 134  
Cernea also argues that increased morbidity and mortality, especially among children and 
the elderly, is caused by displacement-related stress, insecurity, psychological trauma and 
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greater exposure to diseases.135 Food insecurity stems from a sudden reduction in general 
crop or food availability and income unpredictability. Loss of access to common property 
resources and services can occur, as non-individual property assets are often not adequately 
compensated for by government schemes, such as land for agriculture, forested land, water 
bodies, and burial grounds. 136 The final aspect of Cernea’s model relates to social 
disarticulation, which results from relocation because it “tears apart the existing social 
fabric” through the loss of a group’s physical and cultural space.137 Relocation can disperse 
and fragment communities and kinship relationships, dismantling patterns of social 
organisation and interpersonal ties, leading to what he describes as the “unravelling of 
spatially-based patterns of self-organisation, interaction and reciprocity”.138  
One of the strengths of socio-anthropological studies is that they explore the differential 
impacts of resettlement on communities. Emblematic of resettlement is that while many 
households are negatively affected, there are also some individuals and families which 
emerge as beneficiaries of the cultural and physical re-organisation that movement 
creates.139 For example, some individuals benefited immediately from the opportunities 
presented in the Kariba dam context, as articulated by Scudder in later studies.140 Art 
Hansen, writing about Zambian villages in the 1980s, draws on the concept of “dislocation” 
to explain both the negative effects as well as the re-alignment of power that occurs between 
individuals being resettled as a group. He uses dislocation as a “general term that refers to 
shifts in peoples’ positions.” He states:  
These positional changes may be psychological, social, ecological 
and/or geographical, but they all include shifts in power as well as 
position.141 
Awareness of these disparities within the experience of resettlement is an crucial aspect of 
the socio-anthropological literature. One author, Holly High, has been notably iconoclastic 
on this issue, in that she has challenged established beliefs about internal resettlement in 
Laos. In her 2008 article, “The Implications of Aspirations – Reconsidering Resettlement in 
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Laos”, High contests the arguments made by other writers that state-supported resettlement 
from upland to lowland Laos is necessarily unwanted or un-supported by people who are 
relocated by these schemes.142 In drawing attention to the agency of resettled populations, 
High illuminates a central aspect of resettlement; that people respond to relocation 
differently. She proposes that resettlement from rural areas to locations closer to government 
services and lowland fields, taps into the aspirations of Lao residents for poverty reduction 
and involvement in “modernity”.143  
High’s argument challenges the prevailing view of resettlement in Laos among other 
anthropologists and geographers who have conducted empirical work in this region. 
Notably, her examples relate to resettlement in which communities were induced over long 
periods of time to move to more central locations through the withdrawal of services in 
remote locations and the promise of greater access to resources in the centralised areas, 
which contrasts to situations where communities are required to move within relatively short 
periods of time. Nonetheless, High’s argument and approach, while offering a critique of 
existing resettlement studies, is not typical of resettlement literature in Laos. For example, 
Baird et al argue that most of the research available in relation to internal resettlement in 
Laos points to the “significant harm caused to vulnerable ethnic minority and upland 
communities as a direct or indirect result of resettlement.”144 High has also been criticised 
for the quality of her empirical evidence and her selection of interview participants. 145  
2.4 Challenges in measuring resettlement outcomes  
The complexity of community responses to resettlement revealed in socio-anthropological 
studies raises the issue of how resettlement impacts are measured and reported. The 
empirical studies available suggest that even where there has been significant financial 
investment and oversight of project implementation, resettlement often results in further 
impoverishment for communities, or at least for their vulnerable members. Scudder 
examined multiple resettlements over three periods of time (before 1980, 1980-1990 and 
1991-2005), grouping them into categories determined by the resettlement approach 
employed, namely: “no policy”, “cash compensation only”, “restoration” and “restoration 
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with development”. He found that across all categories and time periods, there was no 
statistical evidence that outcomes for the majority had improved over time.146 A number of 
other researchers have also argued that the majority of those displaced remain impoverished 
for at least seven to ten years.147 Researchers also acknowledge that World Bank-financed 
projects – which were the original concern of many studies – now tend to be those which 
are subject to the most scrutiny and supervision both locally and internationally.148 
Notwithstanding this scrutiny, many of these projects still tend to exacerbate 
impoverishment, a trend acknowledgement by the World Bank itself.149  
There are few examples in the literature where resettlement is viewed favourably by large 
sections of the community being removed. Scudder identifies the Egyptian Nubians in the 
context of the Aswan Dam in the 1960s, although he argues that the community viewed 
resettlement favourably because they were continually experiencing livelihood impacts from 
earlier constructions of the dam which had taken place many decades prior.150 He also notes 
Sri Lanka’s Accelerated Mahaweli Project as one of the more successful World Bank 
projects, but he goes on to argue that: 
[t]oday, the majority of settlers are poor, while a significant 
proportion, and perhaps a majority, of those involuntarily relocated 
can be considered development refugees.151  
Recent case studies on development-related resettlement compiled by the International Red 
Cross refer positively to the resettlement of almost 185,000 people for the Xiaolangdi dam 
in China. Yet, the authors still report that only 80 per cent of the resettled population were 
able to restore or improve their living standards. The source of the research also makes it 
difficult to assess its credibility, as the outcomes were recorded by a self-evaluated World 
Bank project study.152 An interesting study by Connell and Tabucanon argues that the 
resettlement of Banabans from Kiribati to the Fijian island of Rabi in the 1940s, was 
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“relatively successful”.153 Notwithstanding these claims they also warn against the intricate 
challenges of resettlement across different cultural and political contexts. The studies also 
reveal how difficult it is to measure the impacts of resettlement on communities, as there are 
a range of factors to consider that are not limited only to household incomes. For example, 
at what point in time should impacts be measured after relocation? Early writings from 
Scudder reveal how there are many phases of recovery, and while people may initially be 
supported by compensation payments, these short-term financial circumstances are not 
indicative of long-term capacity for resilience and wellbeing, especially where people are 
relocated to areas of poorer land quality and reduced natural resources.154 Other critical 
issues are whether a relocation can be considered successful if it has impacted positively on 
the majority of people resettled? Or should its success be determined by how the resettlement 
scheme impacted and supported the poorest and most vulnerable in the community?  
While it is common for researchers to conclude that resettled people are worse off after 
resettlement, there are clear differences in the quality of different resettlement schemes, and 
the extent to which communities are consulted and involved in the resettlement process. In 
this way, planned community resettlement can be a battleground for articulating different 
values relating to the rights of individuals and the public good.155 As demonstrated in the 
next section, the articulation of these different values in resettlement debates is increasingly 
taking place within a rights-based framework.  
2.5 Rights-based or legal-advocacy approaches 
Over time, analysis of resettlement has gradually shifted towards a rights-based approach to 
understanding the impacts of resettlement and advocating for those being displaced.156 As 
Oliver-Smith definitively states: 
At some fundamental level, DFDR resistance is a discourse about 
rights. DFDR pits the rights of the state and, increasingly private 
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capital to develop against the rights of specific peoples targeted for 
displacement and possibly resettlement.157 
This body of work comprises academic literature examining the nature and scope of rights, 
the historical development of law designed to protect these rights, and a range of policy 
papers and articles canvassing the gaps and possibilities that exist for the protection of 
displaced communities.158 Much of this work has drawn on empirical research with 
communities about the impacts of land conflicts generally, including resettlement.159 Led by 
activists, academics, advocacy groups and other NGOs, the rights-based approach has 
prompted a re-framing of the way in which the experiences of resettled communities are 
interpreted and represented. Rights-based approaches tend to structure analysis of the 
experiences of affected communities by reference to the rights embodied in international 
law and policy.160 As explored further below, this literature is often focused on establishing 
compliance with international human rights law. There is limited exploration in this 
literature about how communities and other actors understand or try and make sense of these 
“rights” and accountability processes in their specific cultural and social contexts. 
One of the most significant international political and social shifts of the twentieth century 
was the emergence of the human rights movement. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights adopted in 1948 (UDHR)161 marked a fundamental change in the international 
discourse used to conceptualise and articulate human suffering and the responsibilities of 
nations to respond to humanitarian concerns outside their borders. Ratified in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, the UDHR demonstrates a commitment to affording all people 
protection of their human rights, without discrimination, by virtue of their humanity. As 
described in the preamble, the UDHR is:  
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.162  
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There are thirty articles in the UDHR intended to clarify the meaning of the words 
“fundamental freedoms” and “human rights” which appear in the United Nations Charter. 
These articles champion rights such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the 
right to an education, the right to particulate fully in cultural life, freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion.163 Complementing the UDHR are two covenants – the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (the “ICCPR”)164 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (the “ICESCR”).165 There are also numerous 
other international treaties which incorporate and develop various aspects of the original 
human rights instruments.166 All of these instruments are supported by legal interpretation 
and analysis exploring and limiting the application of these rights, acknowledging that, for 
the most part, they are not absolute human rights and are qualified in various ways.167  
Although human rights are deeply contested in many countries, these international 
instruments are can still be considered fundamental sources of norm-setting – or at least 
points of reference – for governments, corporations and trans-national organisations. As the 
World Commission on Dams report states: 
There is a globally accepted framework for setting universal goals, 
norms and standards. The foundations of the framework are the 
United Nations Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.168 
Human rights based approaches have developed in multi-faceted ways since the 1940s, and 
now influence the development of policy in many spheres.169 The evolution of rights-based 
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approaches has also occurred simultaneously with the growth of the NGO sector.170 The 
rights contained in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR have provided a framework for 
resistance by advocates of resettled communities and people affected by other types of land 
conflicts.171 They have also been used by NGOs as part of their advocacy campaigns to 
advocate for the right to adequate housing, right to an adequate standard of living, right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of property, the right to access information and meaningful 
consultation.172Advocacy campaigns have, in turn, generated a body of “grey” literature 
relevant to development-induced displacement. For example, UN Habitat has published a 
detailed report about how to apply the right to adequate housing in different contexts, 
including how these rights apply to specific groups, including women and children, and how 
they can be used to inform policy.173 
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (the “Guiding 
Principles”)174 and the lesser known Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on 
Development-Based Displacement 1997,175 which provide guidance on evictions in the 
context of development projects, are also important human-rights based instruments relevant 
to resettlement.176 The Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines led to the development of 
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement,177 
which are often cited in the context of forced evictions.178 These guidelines aim to assist 
states to develop laws and policies which prevent forced evictions from occurring.179  
Within this literature, tensions between different types of rights emerge. As McDowell 
agues, while humanitarian and human rights law prohibit forced movement of persons, the 
focus is on prohibiting “arbitrary” movement.180 Indeed, the Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement apply to:  
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acts and/or omissions involving the coerced or involuntary 
displacement of individuals, groups and communities from homes 
and/or lands and common property resources that were occupied or 
depended upon, thus eliminating or limiting the ability of an 
individual, group or community to reside or work in a particular 
dwelling, residence or location, without the provision of, and access 
to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.181 
The prohibition of forced evictions does not apply to evictions carried out both in accordance 
with the law and in conformity with the provisions of international human rights treaties.182 
Consequently, there are circumstances where displacement of populations by nation-states 
may be justified under international law. Walter Kälin, former Representative of the United 
Nations' Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, has stated 
that an arbitrary act is one which “contains elements of injustice, unpredictability and 
unreasonableness”, or “suggests a violation by state organs.”183 Pettersson explains that, in 
international law these competing considerations rest on interpretations of a “legitimate 
development project of overriding public interest”, (protected by the concept of national 
sovereignty), and a “human rights violation of concern to the international community.”184  
The tension between national development and the rights of individual people were 
encapsulated in the World Commissions on Dams report, referred to above. This is also 
another significant example of how human rights-based approaches have been used to 
defend the rights of displaced people. The process surrounding the World Commission on 
Dams report revealed major tensions between protecting the rights of those affected, and 
other national and political priorities. During the 1990s, influential anti-dam campaigns 
provoked discussions about the costs and benefits of hydro-power projects, leading the 
World Bank and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to sponsor the 
World Commission on Dams process. The Commission was mandated to:  
 review the development effectiveness of large dams, and assess alternatives 
for water resources and energy development; 
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 develop internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards for the 
planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation, monitoring and 
decommissioning of dams.185 
One of the conclusions of the report was that resettlement had resulted in impoverishment 
and disempowerment for many millions of people around the world.186 The report included 
detailed case studies of dams, including the Kariba Dam, Pak Mun Dam in Thailand, Tarbela 
Dam in Pakistan, and the Tucurui Dam in Brazil.187 The findings of the report emphasised 
the need for a human rights-based approach and argued that social and environment 
assessments should be carried out prior to the building of dams. The report also advocated 
that people who were displaced by dams, should become project-beneficiaries.188 As others 
have argued, the World Commission on Dams report also made the critical conceptual link 
of connecting concepts of rights to the risks associated with development projects by 
recognising the difference between “risk takers” and “risk bearers”. The report stated that: 
189 
Public and private developers of large dam projects have long 
understood that the sector involves managing risks of a technical, 
financial and even political nature. Decision-makers have not always 
acknowledged the differences between “taking risk” and “imposing 
risk” and between voluntary risk takers and involuntary risk 
bearers…The “involuntary risk bearers” who are forced to bear the 
risks include people to be displaced by the project…In these 
circumstances they often depend entirely on the capacity of 
government or the developer to manage the resettlement or 
compensation process on their behalf.  
As reflected above, human rights are often in tension with other fundamental values or rights 
propagated by governments and enshrined in separate international instruments. The right 
to development was enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD), and 
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adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986.190 As the World Commission on Dams report 
explains, the DRD also “marked a significant step by the international community in 
developing a normative framework that specifies responsibilities in applying a human rights 
approach to development”.191 The DRD aimed to provide clarity for the planning and 
implementation of national development projects in ways that protect human rights. 
Simultaneously, however, it enshrined a number of values in support of development which 
are potentially in tension with the rights of certain communities at risk of resettlement, such 
as:  
 the right to self-determination on behalf of nation-states; 
 
 the right of peoples to exercise full and complete sovereignty over all their 
natural wealth and resources; and  
 
 the primary responsibility of states to provide conditions favourable to the 
development of peoples and individuals.192    
The World Commission on Dams report offered a set of good practice guidelines, including 
a step-wise approach to support negotiated decision-making processes which would 
meaningfully involve affected people.193 One of the major issues in contest during the World 
Commission on Dams process was the issue of “Free Prior and Informed Consent” or 
“FPIC”. FPIC was perceived as particularly important for indigenous and tribal peoples 
affected by development projects.194 The approach promoted the idea that consent was more 
than a “one-time contractual event”, and instead needed to be a “continuous, iterative 
process of communication and negotiation spanning the entire planning and project 
cycles”.195 FPIC is considered best practice in the extractive industries, however the 
challenges of ensuring FPIC in circumstances where authoritarian governments are in 
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control need to be acknowledged. These challenges aside, the World Bank has been widely 
criticised for not adopting the FPIC framework.196  
2.6 Emergence of resettlement safeguards and accountability mechanisms  
In response to pressure from NGOs, activists and researchers about the treatment of resettled 
people, multilateral banks introduced “safeguard policies” into their internal operations. The 
World Commission on Dams mentioned above, contributed to this process in part. 
Safeguards aim to prevent or mitigate undue harm to people and their environment in the 
development process.197 They require certain processes and procedures to be followed where 
there is a risk that a development project has detrimental impacts to project-affected 
populations.  
The World Bank was the first institution to introduce an Involuntary Resettlement Policy in 
1980.198 At this time, no international organisation or government had in place a resettlement 
policy to protect communities from relocation. In its original form, the policy aimed to 
ensure that displaced persons benefited from the project, and that they would have their 
standard of living improved, or at least restored. According to Cernea, the policy evolved 
and became a “template” or model for similar policies adopted by other multilateral and 
some bilateral development agencies, followed later by private sector banks and 
corporations as part of the Equator Principles. The policy was revised and updated at least 4 
times within the World Bank: 1986, 1988, 1990 and 2001.199 It is also currently being 
reviewed again as part of an overarching safeguards review that began in 2012.200 Similar 
policies were adopted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in the Latin 
American region, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1995, the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) in 2003 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
in 2003. A similar resettlement policy was also adopted by Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1991 and ostensibly the Bilateral Aid Agencies 
of all of the 24 developed countries members in the OECD.201  
                                                 
196 Cariño & Colchester (2010). There has been some recent re-engagement with FPIC by the World Bank, see: World 
Bank (2013). 
197 World Bank (2015f).    
198 Cernea & Mathur (2011). 
199 Cernea & Mathur (2011, p. 3). 
200 World Bank (2015e); Von Bernstorff & Dann (2013). 
201 Cernea & Mathur (2011, p. 3).  
73 
 
Among other objectives, the current Involuntary Resettlement Policy of the World Bank 
mandates that: 
Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or 
minimized, exploring all viable alternative project designs;…  
Displaced persons be assisted in their efforts to improve their 
livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore them, in real 
terms, to pre-displacement levels or to levels prevailing prior to the 
beginning of project implementation, whichever is higher.202  
The current ADB involuntary resettlement policy, introduced in 1995 and refined in 2009, 
mirrors that of the World Bank, illustrating the norm-setting role of the World Bank in 
influencing the policies of other multilateral banks and institutions.203 The tendency for the 
ADB to mimic the World Bank is explored in detail by Park,204 who argues that the ADB 
imitates the World Bank as a result of “institutional isomorphism” or coercion, rather than 
genuine institutional support for change. Indeed, the equivalent section of the ADB 
safeguards policy is almost identical, stating the objective as:  
To avoid involuntary resettlement wherever possible; to minimize 
involuntary resettlement by exploring project and design 
alternatives; to enhance, or at least restore, the livelihoods of all 
displaced persons in real terms relative to pre-project levels; and to 
improve the standards of living of the displaced poor and other 
vulnerable groups.205 
These standards are not limited to people who are relocated or experience loss of shelter. 
They also apply to people experiencing loss of assets or access to assets, or loss of income 
sources or means of livelihoods, as a result of the involuntary taking of land for a Bank-
assisted project. This is regardless of whether affected persons must move to another 
location.206 National and regional resettlement policies have also been set up in various 
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places, including Vietnam, China, India, Sri Lanka and Laos.207 In Cambodia, the 
Constitution and the 2001 Land Law require compensation be paid to people whose land is 
expropriated, however the institutional framework required to support adequate 
compensation and livelihood restoration is not in place, as discussed further in Chapter 4 
and throughout the thesis.208   
The safeguards frameworks of the multilateral banks are not laws that can be directly 
enforced in domestic or international courts. As non-state actors, international organisations 
enjoy a type of legal immunity from action taken in foreign nations.209 With few exceptions, 
multilateral banks are not subject to local courts.210 Unless multilateral banks partially waive 
their immunity to engage in negotiation with affected parties, they are not required to abide 
by the laws of host-nation countries.211 Adherence to involuntary resettlement principles is 
dependent on internal and external pressure from shareholders and the public, support from 
host nation governments and the skills and concern of individual project directors, managers 
and implementers. 
To partially address this gap in accountability, a range of internal mechanisms have been 
established for project-affected people to make complaints. The World Bank was the first 
institution to establish a complaints mechanism in 1993, when it set up an Inspection Panel 
to investigate complaints from project-affected communities.212 The Inspection Panel is 
considered the first example of a so-called “citizen-based” accountability mechanism in an 
international institution.213 The Panel was created for the purpose of: 
providing people directly affected and adversely affected by a Bank-
financed project with an independent forum through which they can 
request the Bank to act in accordance with its own policies and 
procedures.214  
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The Panel comprises three permanent members who serve for five years. To increase the 
Panel’s independence, Panel members cannot serve in the World Bank in any capacity for 
two years preceding appointment, and can never work for the World Bank again following 
their term.215  
While claims to the Panel need to be framed in terms of a failure to comply with the World 
Bank’s operational policies and procedures, essentially the process sets up an opportunity 
for affected-persons to make rights-based claims – namely claims informed by international 
human rights norms – against these institutions. This has been made possible by the gradual 
inclusion of social safeguards and human rights norms into the World Bank’s operational 
practices over time – even where these “rights” are not explicitly stated in the World Bank’s 
policies as such. Hunter contends that the “original vision” for the Panel came from outside 
the World Bank, “from critics who were looking for ways to make the Bank more 
accountable to the communities they served.”216 As Hunter explains, the first step was to 
pressure the World Bank to adopt safeguards on environmental assessment, consultation, 
access to information, treatment of indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement. The 
next step was to advocate for an independent mechanism to enforce compliance, which was 
done through an alliance of “legislators in the United States, Switzerland and Germany”, 
along with NGOs such as the Center for International Environmental Law, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the Bank Information Center and Friends of the Earth.217    
The grassroots advocacy campaign surrounding the Sardar Sarovar hydropower project on 
the Narmada River in eastern Gujurat in India throughout the 1980s and 90s, was also 
influential in the World Bank’s decision to establish the Inspection Panel. The Sardar 
Sarovar project was a debacle for the World Bank.218 There are a number of studies which 
look at how this campaign affected the World Bank’s internal governance.219 As the largest 
hydropower project on the Narmada River, the Sardar Sarovar project was expected to 
displace hundreds of thousands of people, although no comprehensive social impact 
assessment was undertaken.220 For almost twenty years, campaigners protested against the 
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dam’s construction under the infamous mantra, “we will drown but we will not move”.221 
The campaign was supported by activists especially in Europe, Japan and North America. 
222 Following a “long march” in 1990 of campaigners across the three affected states in India 
and a hunger strike by six of the most prominent activists, the World Bank eventually agreed 
to an independent review. The review team, known as the Morse Commission, outlined the 
deeply flawed process underpinning the dam’s approval. While the conflict continued 
between the World Bank and protesters over the Sardar Sarovar project for many years, the 
independent review provided the antecedent to the Inspection Panel, established in 1993. 223  
Subsequently, six other multilateral banks also adopted their own accountability 
mechanisms which would provide avenues for project-affected communities to seek redress, 
namely the ADB, IDB, International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), EBRD and the AfDB.224 These mechanisms have varying levels 
of independence, transparency and powers of enforcement. Some of them focus more on 
mediation with communities than on inspection and compliance assessment. The ADB 
mechanism – which is relevant to this study – is comprised of an “Inspection Function”, 
established in 1995 and an “Accountability Mechanism” consisting of the Office of the 
Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) and the Compliance Review Panel (CRP) established in 
2003.225 Essentially, affected communities undergo mediation with the ADB first and where 
these issues cannot be resolved an additional compliance review function is available. The 
accountability mechanisms of the multilateral banks do not only relate only to involuntary 
resettlement, they address a range of complaints against the banks, especially environmental 
impacts.  
Since 1993, the World Bank Inspection Panel has considered 103 cases, 45 of which related 
to the issue of involuntary resettlement.226 The first case considered by the Inspection Panel 
was a dam in Nepal (Arun III Hydroelectric Project), which the Bank subsequently declined 
to fund.227 The ADB has registered 51 complaints to the OSPF since it established the 
Accountability Mechanism in 2003, 15 of which relate to land acquisition and/or 
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resettlement.228 The mechanisms are set up for project-affected people to make complaints 
directly, or through a local representative. In exceptional circumstances an international 
organisation acting as an agent for the affected persons may be able to make a compliant.229 
In practice, project affected people are usually represented by local or international agents, 
as is the case for the railway project in Cambodia. The development of these mechanisms is 
critical to understanding how events in Cambodia for the railway have unfolded, as project-
affected people were assisted by NGOs to file complaints to the ADB OSPF and the CRP. 
The diagram at Figure 4 depicts how the ADB Accountability Mechanism operates.  
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Figure 4: The ADB Accountability Mechanism230 
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It is pivotal to understand that these accountability mechanisms exist only within certain 
international institutions. Private companies operating overseas all have different systems 
set up to measure their own effectiveness, but there are few examples where companies are 
subject to legal regulation beyond that of the domestic law of the host nation.231 There are 
almost no examples of bilateral institutions involved in delivering aid having set up any 
mechanisms for accountability or complaints (e.g. USAID, United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID), or AusAID, now known as the “Australian Aid 
Program”). There were discussions taking place within the German Federal Enterprise for 
International Cooperation, or “GIZ”232 in 2011-2012 about establishing an accountability 
mechanism. This stemmed from GIZ being criticised for human rights abuses resulting from 
land reform programs in Namibia and Cambodia. The current status of whether an 
accountability mechanism is being introduced is unknown.233 It is also not clear what 
safeguards or accountability mechanisms the New Development Bank (NDB), formerly 
known as the BRICS Bank will have, if any.234 The same applies to the recently established 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).235  
There is an important literature which identifies the influential role of NGOs in establishing 
the World Bank inspection panel and bringing about other changes at a project and policy 
level for displaced people. Notable examples include work by Hunter,236 Bissel and 
Nanwani,237 Suzuki and Nanwani.238 Some of these writers document the early Inspection 
Panel cases. These articles provide informative case studies of the early experiences of the 
Panel and trace the evolution of norms. They convey the importance of some of these cases, 
especially where communities successfully halted or altered the course of large projects. 
Notwithstanding the obvious significance of these grassroots campaigns, there is also an 
inherent tendency within these writings to convey a romanticised narrative, in which project-
affected people are helped by advocates to assert their rights against multilateral giants. 
However, with few exceptions, these studies rarely include interviews or input from project-
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affected people in any systematic way. Most often they include research with other 
stakeholders or representatives of local and international civil society organisations, as a 
proxy for interviewing project-affected people directly.239 
Singh’s approach is slightly different. She explores community aspirations and participation 
in relocation processes in relation to Nam Theun 2, a major World Bank hydro-power 
scheme in Laos. A concession was awarded for the scheme in 1993, but it was then subject 
to an influential anti-dam campaign. Nam Theun 2 was intended to demonstrate the World 
Bank’s capacity to engage in socially and environmentally responsible development.240 
Exploring how the Bank worked with affected communities, Singh argues that in workshops 
and stakeholder discussions, villagers’ participation was a “negotiated performance” within 
tightly constrained parameters. It was not a “broad-based forum for open and well-informed 
discussion.” She also argues that villagers were selectively recruited, supported and/or 
intimidated by Lao government officials for and during certain “participatory events”. 241 
Importantly, Singh argues that the ideal of Nam Theun 2 being a socially and 
environmentally responsible project was being showcased by only a small number of people 
within the Bank.242 In this way, understandings of participation were not necessarily shared 
or consistent within the Bank, and workshops and consultation activities were an arena in 
which these contested understandings played out.  
Other authors, such as Bebbington et al., have also provided powerful ethnographic insights 
into the complexity of large multilateral organisations, shifting perceptions of these 
institutions as monolithic and operating according to rational and centrally-organised 
processes. Explorations of how social capital values emerged and were treated by different 
participants in the Bank since the 1980s are presented by Bebbington et al. as “a battlefield 
of knowledge” in which social values were championed by certain individuals.243 These 
individuals re-framed how projects were approached, but genuine appreciations of these 
values and the practices which supported them across the institution remained relatively 
unchanged.244 The diversity of norms and values within such organisations captured by these 
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writers is crucial to understanding how policy debates about resettlement are internally 
negotiated and enacted.  
There is also a different literature which explores how accountability mechanisms are an 
anomaly in international law.245 Accountability mechanisms are not courts of law, nor are 
they formal adjudication bodies organised by the State; they are internal bureaucratic 
processes designed to provide a degree of scrutiny and participation for affected people. As 
Hunter wrote in 1994 when the Inspection Panel was established, it “has no precedent in 
international law, outside of a few human rights tribunals.”246  
2.7 Towards an understanding of NGOs as intermediaries in resettlement  
The existing resettlement literature does more to confirm the influence of activists in these 
conflicts, than to understand advocacy experiences from a community perspective. This 
section explores the work of a small number of writers who have attempted to draw out these 
tensions in the context of resettlement. Much of the analysis available is in the context of 
hydropower projects, especially the infamous Narmada Campaign in response to the Sardar 
Sarovar Dam mentioned above. The work of Oliver-Smith, Fisher, Leslie, Whitehead and 
Guadalupe is particularly important in this respect.247  
Leslie provides an intimate account of the trials and tribulations of various “Gandhian” style 
campaigns surrounding the Narmada, as well as personal narratives of the anti-dam 
campaigns of South Africa and Australia.248 His writings capture the personalities involved 
in advocacy, richly describing firsthand accounts of characters such as, Medha Patkar, a 
leader of the Narmada campaign, who committed herself to drowning in the river rather than 
being relocated. He portrays the complicated negotiations between various international 
organisations, experts, local community members and the media, as well as tracing the 
responses of hydropower financiers and governments to advocacy efforts over time. These 
accounts are very real and messy and demonstrate the unpredictable nature of community-
advocacy interactions.  
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Similarly, Guadalupe provides an analysis of the Narmada campaign in a comparative 
examination of transnational advocacy networks in Brazil, Ecuador and India. 249 Whitehead 
also examines the Narmada campaign, analysing how it operated simultaneously at local, 
national and international levels. Drawing on the work of Sen,250 she explores how it 
redefined the nature of civil society in both India and overseas.251 She articulates the 
strategies used by activists, including the “politics of attrition” which saw bitter rifts emerge 
in the community as some families eventually accepted resettlement packages, while others 
continued to resist.252 She considers the internal complexities of the movement over sixteen 
years especially within the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), which was the “domestic 
wing of the international campaign”, arguing that: 
[d]espite its espousal of participatory politics and consensual 
decision-making, most of the important spokespersons in the NBA 
have been urban-based, middle-class activists...Adivasis in the 
struggle for their lands and livelihoods do not represent themselves, 
they are represented.253 
Whitehead also makes observations about trans-national linkages creating “a double-edged 
sword, producing unintended effects and consequences for civil society groups.”254 She 
explains how the ostensibly aligned values of environmentalism and social justice create 
competing tensions in local settings. She writes:  
From 1988 onwards, there emerged two streams of civil society 
organizations that were connected to different transnational 
organizations, constituencies and goals. On the one hand, ARCH-
Vahini in Gujarat allied with Oxfam-UK, a critical development 
organization that focused mainly on the social effects of poorly 
planned and badly implemented resettlement policies. On the other 
hand, the various organizations allied with the NBA became 
associated with international environmental organizations such as 
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the International Rivers’ Network, the Environmental Defense Fund 
and Greenpeace, all of whom possessed a distinctly “northern” 
perspective on environmental issues.255  
In a similar style, but drawing on examples from community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) in Southeast Asia, Li also describes the “strategic simplifications” 
used by advocates to argue for the right for communities to control their own resources.256 
Li deconstructs tensions between advocates and scholars in the context of CBNRM. 
Advocates, she argues, rely on strategic simplifications to advance the cause of CBNRM, 
whilst scholars have sought to highlight “inequities, or the mutability of identities and 
traditions, thus calling concepts such as community, custom, local knowledge and 
indigeneity into question.”257 Li also provides a useful analysis of “trusteeship”. She 
explores how different actors, including NGOs, position themselves as “trustees” 
responsible for developing the capacities of others.258  
Two authors, Oliver-Smith and Fisher, have explicitly set out to define a research agenda 
for resettlement studies which investigates its complex relationships with transnational 
advocacy campaigns.259 Oliver-Smith has been writing about resistance to development-
induced displacement since at least the 1990s.260 He argues that “NGOs have frequently 
been seen as catalysts through which local people could become participants in rather than 
objects of development efforts.”261 He also articulates how resettlement resistance 
movements tend to make contacts at four levels as they develop: “the local community, the 
project, the national political context and the international or global context.”262 He explains 
how “the organizational capacity of the movement to operate effectively at both local and 
national levels will prove important as the movement develops.” 263 Oliver-Smith considers 
the multiple repercussions of resistance at different levels: 
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In effect, communities and organizations in resistance evolve in 
response to and in turn oblige national governments and multilateral 
agencies to evolve.264   
Fisher has also explored how local experiences of displacement oblige communities to 
connect with transnational advocacy campaigns, the challenges involved in sustaining 
transnational collaboration and the potential for alliances to have “unintended impacts” on 
project-affected groups.265 Both of these authors also highlight how transnational alliances 
between NGOs and project-affected people have become pivotal to how “risk” is constructed 
by financiers of development projects requiring resettlement.266 The issue of risk, as it is 
relevant to the research, is explored further in the sections below.  
2.8 Inherent tensions in examining advocacy work  
Each of the authors above recognise that examining advocacy networks and transnational 
campaigns can be an uncomfortable area of research.267 The power dynamics between 
financiers of development projects and the communities they impact are so uneven, that at 
times it can seem inconsequential to focus on the role of advocates. Also, research relating 
to advocates requires a degree of reflexivity about one’s own field and values. As evident in 
the previous section, writers on resettlement regularly traverse multiple and overlapping 
roles as advocates and researchers. Fisher foreshadows some of these difficulties. In 
explaining the reasons for reflecting on how NGOs operate as brokers between locally 
affected populations and development institutions, he states that:  
This different and still evolving form of transnational politics offers 
benefits and poses dangers for local people and their interests. It also 
presents challenges to scholars and activists seeking to comprehend 
and influence these structures and forces in the larger world and the 
way they impinge upon the local people with whom we work.268 
Fisher continues to argue that: 
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addressing the complex problems of DFDR entails not just 
identifying best practices and penning new resettlement guidelines 
but also understanding and engaging the opportunities and hazards 
that arise with these evolving, transnational political processes.269 
The goal for Fisher is “neither to praise nor to criticize transnational advocacy efforts in the 
case of DFDR, but simply to understand what happens…”.270 Delving into the writings of 
Fisher, Oliver-Smith and others reveals that there is much to be gained from trying to 
elucidate the tensions and conflicts inherent in advocacy movements and resettlement 
resistance.  
2.9 Resettlement research in Cambodia  
In the Cambodian context, limited literature on resettlement exists outside the literature 
published directly by NGOs. Academics, such as Brickell, have documented the increasing 
involvement of women in protest movements against displacement in Cambodia.271 Springer 
has examined the discrepancy between local, customary understandings of land-holding and 
the written law in Cambodia, which he argues has made the dispossession of land possible.272 
Mgbako et al. have investigated forced evictions in Cambodia, comparing the experience of 
four communities facing displacement.273 Their research is primarily a legal analysis 
undertaken within a human rights framework, focusing on identifying the human rights 
abuses experienced by affected communities. Exploring resettlement in a very different 
context, there has been a recent proliferation of online media articles about Cambodia’s 
decision to resettle refugees.274 These media articles relate to refugee-related resettlement 
for people who have had their asylum claim processed in Australia, but who elect to move 
to Cambodia rather than remain in mandatory detention.  
In terms of research conducted by NGOs and consultants, there are a number of advocacy 
materials investigating infrastructure projects causing displacement and resettlement. A 
series of publications on land and property where compiled in 1999-2000 under the Oxfam 
GB Cambodia Land Study Project, which partially considered how emerging accountability 
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mechanisms could be leveraged by NGOs to assist affected communities.275 A best practice 
guide to resettlement was prepared by Baird in 2009, in anticipation of displacement in 
relation to the Lower Sesan 2 dam in Stung Treng Province, northeastern Cambodia.276 The 
report considered the policy and legal framework of Cambodia relating to resettlement, and 
included consultations with people who would be potentially affected, capturing their views 
on the proposed development and their preferences regarding compensation if they were 
displaced.277  
There are also a number of important publications relating to the Cambodian railway project 
itself, which are directly relevant to the current study.278 A significant study was undertaken 
by the organisation, Equitable Cambodia (formerly, Bridges Across Borders Cambodia), 
which published “DERAILED: A Study on the Resettlement Process and Impacts of the 
Rehabilitation of the Cambodian Railway in 2012.”279 The publication is a detailed study of 
the railway resettlement in its early stages, primarily assessing compliance with policy and 
legal instruments, human rights covenants, Cambodian law and the ADB safeguards on 
involuntary resettlement.280 This report is re-visited throughout the thesis as an important 
document setting out the advocacy position of the NGOs representing households affected 
by the railway project. The report provides in-depth information about the process of 
accessing relevant information, participating in consultations about the railway project, the 
resettlement process and the entitlements of those affected. It also made early findings about 
the outcomes of the resettlement at a mid-way point during the resettlement process between 
September 2010 and October 2011. Of the 200 households interviewed by Equitable 
Cambodia, they found that sixty percent perceived that their living conditions had been made 
worse by the railway project, or would be made worse in the future. Only 20 percent felt that 
their lives would improve. The remaining households perceived that the project would not 
make any material difference to their living standards.281 The report also found that the 
resettlement sites were too far from previous residences and urban centres, resulting in lost 
income, reduced access to schools, health centres and other facilities.282 The report also 
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concluded that none of the project-sponsored resettlement sites were fully prepared with 
services when resettlement commenced.283 This study is a powerful investigation and 
provides background for the current research, however its focus is on gathering data from 
communities in ways that fit within categories of international law and policy. In this way, 
it is an effective piece of advocacy which will be examined as part of the current study.   
There are also a number of smaller, yet similar, documents that have been released by NGOs 
on the railway project. For example, the publication by AidWATCH, entitled “Off the Rails 
– AusAID and the Troubled Cambodian Railways Project,” which outlines the impacts on 
the communities and the policy considerations relevant to whether Australian aid money 
should be used for such a project.284 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT) published a report 
detailing early problems with the railway project, reporting that inadequate and incorrect 
compensation amounts were offered to affected households.285 In 2013, STT also published 
“End of the Line” which assessed the impacts of resettlement on communities affected by 
the project in Phnom Penh.286  
One internal publication commissioned by Oxfam Australia, employs a different approach 
to the existing studies on the railway. The research is an evaluation of the resettlement 
process which occurred for the Highway One Project in Cambodia, which began in 2000. 
The Highway One Project was the first project in Cambodia to be implemented as part of 
ADB’s Greater Mekong Subregion initiative, the first project requiring a resettlement policy 
and also the first ADB project in Cambodia for which a complaint was registered with the 
OSPF of the ADB.287 The evaluation was undertaken many years after the resettlement 
began, but it investigated the support provided by one NGO, CDCam, to the resettled 
populations. Some of the findings are particularly relevant to the current study. Among the 
findings of the evaluation, it was reported that the use of the Accountability Mechanism 
resulted in a shift in focus by the NGOs from the broader community network, to the 
complaint.288 The Urban Poor Development Fund (UPDF), which had been working with 
the communities to re-build sources of self-reliant livelihoods, found the shift problematic, 
                                                 
283 Bugalski & Medallo (2012, p. 67). 
284 AidWatch (2012). 
285 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2011).  
286 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a).  
287 Pinto, Sarou & Sherchan (2011, p. 12). 
288 Pinto, Sarou & Sherchan (2011, p. 12). 
88 
 
as communities involved in the complaints began waiting for compensation from ADB 
rather than mobilising their own resources for recovery. 289  
The insights made in the report suggest that there is a much larger gap in knowledge relating 
to how civil society organisations engage with local communities than is readily apparent. 
An examination of the Cambodian railway project as a case study provides an opportunity 
to explore these issues further. It is also an opportunity to examine how the dynamics of 
civil society relations are reproduced at a number of scales – local, national and international 
– as different actors bring to the project diverse expectations about resettlement and the 
railway project’s value.  
2.10 Cross-cutting themes: NGOs, aid politics, accountability and risk  
This study also intersects a number of other relevant bodies of scholarship, including 
literature on civil society and NGOs, as well as literature on accountability, aid politics and 
risk. A significant literature exists in relation to each of these areas, and many of the authors 
already explored in this chapter have touched on these themes. For example, Section 2.6 
above examines the emergence of safeguards and accountability mechanisms within 
multilateral banks.290 Given the relevance of these intersecting themes, it is important to 
identify some of the key conceptual aspects of the literature in each area. Briefly, the sections 
below introduce the literature on NGOs, aid politics, accountability and risk respectively.  
These themes are also revisited throughout the thesis as relevant to the research.   
There is a large body of work critiquing the emergence of NGOs and non-state actors 
generally.291 This literature identifies the heterogeneous histories and internal processes of 
NGOs and examines the strategies used by NGOs to connect people’s local struggles to sites 
of national and transnational activism.292 NGOs are often understood in terms of (and 
sometimes conflated with) notions of civil society. The broad understanding of civil society 
provided by Smith is helpful in understanding how NGOs are only one aspect of a much 
larger assemblage of ideas. He writes that: 
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a connecting thread that runs through many different definitions is 
that civil society is the space of voluntary association and activity 
that exists in relative separation from the state and the market.293  
The literature on NGOs debates the various distinctions between civil society organisations 
(CSOs), NGOs, International NGOs (INGOs), grassroots support organisations (GSOs), 
government-organised NGOs or government-supported groups (GONGOs), quasi-
autonomous NGOs (QUANGOs) and more.294 This literature is useful in that it helps 
conceptualise “advocacy NGOs” in relation to other organisations. Advocacy NGOs can be 
distinguished by their promotion of a specific cause for which they seek to raise awareness, 
how they share information and lobby for change, rather than necessarily focusing on service 
delivery and project management. Advocacy is closely associated with activism, and with 
legal advocacy, in which a person is represented or defended by an advocate who pleads 
their case. The United States Institution for Peace describes the distinct nature of human 
rights advocacy NGOs:  
Organizations active in human rights are distinct from other NGOs 
in their style and their activities. Generally, their goal is to seek out, 
research, and address specific and general situations where 
repression occurs. Once abuses are found and documented, human 
rights NGOs tend first to encourage the voluntary correction of the 
abuse, then to pressure governments to change, and ultimately to 
publicly stigmatize the violator.295  
As Keck and Sikkink argue, advocacy networks devote considerable energy to convincing 
governments and other actors to change positions or to legislate on certain issues which may 
appear inconsequential in the short term. Once a government commits itself to a principle 
or policy, advocates can use these public commitments to leverage for action.296 They define 
transnational advocacy as “those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound 
by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”297  
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The work of Keck and Sikkink helps to conceptualise understandings of “accountability 
advocacy”, an idea that is returned to throughout the thesis. Keck and Sikkink describe the 
categorise the tactics that advocacy networks use, including:  
a) information politics, or the ability to move politically usable 
information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most 
impact; 
 
b) symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or 
stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is 
frequently far away…; 
 
c) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect 
a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have 
influence; and  
 
d) accountability politics, or the effort to oblige more powerful actors 
to act on vaguer policies or principles they have formally 
endorsed.298  
 
Many NGOs do not engage in overt advocacy as such, especially in human rights advocacy. 
The literature on NGOs in Bangladesh makes this comparison clear. Stiles argues in relation 
to Bangladesh, that NGOs such as BRAC,299 “are careful not to challenge the state directly, 
or especially the strong role of foreign capital in the country.”300 BRAC is the largest NGO 
in the world and offers many basic services to citizens of Bangladesh, including an “an 
extensive network of schools that provide more nonformal education than the 
government.”301 Thus, the composition of NGOs and other civil society groups in a given 
society, and their relationships with and functions they fulfil in relation to the state, vary 
enormously.  
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The NGO literature is also concerned with the politics of community representation. Fisher 
argues that NGOs are intimately “tied up with contested notions of what it means to ‘do 
good’…the process of deciding what it is and how to pursue it.’302 There is also an increasing 
literature critiquing NGOs for being unrepresentative and unaccountable to the “poor” in 
whose name they claim to work.303 This literature on NGOs is broadly connected to debates 
about “aid accountability”, especially accountability “from below.”304  
In Cambodia, the literature on NGOs emphasises the extraordinary growth of NGOs in the 
post 1993 period, following the end of Vietnamese occupation. Cambodia’s concentration 
of NGOs is among the highest in the world.305 Much of the literature identifies the 
problematic nature of dependency on foreign aid and NGO support.306 As Godfrey et al 
state:  
Cambodia's experience since 1993 suggests that most projects in 
such a situation are donor-driven in their identification, design and 
implementation, to the detriment of capacity development. 
Connected with this is the chronic underfunding of government in 
such an economy, which hinders implementation of projects and 
threatens post-project financial sustainability.307  
Hughes has made a significant contribution to research on NGOs, multilateral institutions 
and accountability in Cambodia.308 Her recent book co-authored with Rodan is a 
comprehensive analysis of accountability politics in Southeast Asia with selected chapters 
focusing on Cambodia.309 They analyse how different actors have tried to promote social 
accountability in Cambodia, especially the World Bank and certain NGOs. Hughes and 
Rodan consider the types of NGOs active in Cambodia and highlight the different social and 
political roles they play. The study draws on field research with Cambodian Government 
officials, articulating the tensions that exist in the Cambodian NGO sector, especially given 
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Cambodia’s turbulent political history.310 Importantly, they identify a well-established 
division in Cambodia among NGOs focused on community-development related work and 
NGOs working to highlight the abuse and exploitation experienced by communities, 
particularly in relation to land and natural resources.311  
Frewer’s study of NGOs in Mondulkiri province in Cambodia also illustrates the complexity 
of the NGO environment in Cambodia and the importance of recognising the different NGO 
agendas and their sources of support. He groups the different types of NGOs in Mondulkiri 
into: “Community development NGOs”, “Conservation NGOs”, and “Human Rights 
NGOs”.312 Other authors have argued that the involvement of foreign actors in Cambodia 
tends to “stifle active engagement” by its citizens.313 A number of writers have emphasised 
that “the politics of fear”314 combined with donor dependence shapes the way people engage 
with authority in Cambodia, and works to limit local support for social mobilisation or the 
evolution of civil society genuinely independent of the State.315    
Accountability is a central theme relevant to this research. The literature relating to the 
emergence of accountability mechanisms within multilateral institutions has already been 
explored above at Section 2.6. This literature explores notions of community-driven 
accountability in an international context.316 In the broader literature there are a number of 
different understandings of accountability. A helpful, practical interpretation is offered by 
Stapenhurst and Mitchell: 317  
The notion of accountability is an amorphous concept that is 
difficult to define in precise terms. However, broadly speaking, 
accountability exists when there is a relationship where an 
individual or body, and the performance of tasks or functions by 
that individual or body, are subject to another’s oversight, direction 
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or request that they provide information or justification for their 
actions.318   
Much of the accountability literature overlaps with civil society literature in various ways. 
For example, Kilby explores notions of “downward accountability” in relation to NGOs. He 
focuses especially on the conditions which foster greater “downward accountability” of 
NGOs towards their beneficiaries.319 Kilby conceives “downward accountability” to be the 
accountability of NGOs to their constituents or the intended beneficiaries of their work, 
arguing that downward accountability of NGOs is important in “their effectiveness as 
empowerment agents.” He also argues that values-based public-benefit organisations, such 
as NGOs, have few incentives to be accountable in this way.320  
A similar approach has been taken by authors who frame accountability in international 
development in terms of a “moral hazard”.321 A moral hazard is a concept from economic 
theory in the nineteenth century in which there is a “lack of incentive to guard against risk 
where one is protected from its consequences.”322 Limited formal accountability between 
international development actors (institutions, NGOs, individuals and other entities) can be 
understood as a type of moral hazard. Related to this discussion are the critical perspectives 
on aid politics and practices by authors such as Li, Mosse, and Scott, which are also broadly 
relevant to the current study.323 Their work provides insights into the socially constructed 
nature of aid, its recipients and donors. It interrogates the categories that aid organisations 
create and perpetuate. Much of this work is in the form of ethnographies revealing how 
attempts to assist “poorer” countries have been unsuccessful and often detrimental to the 
populations they intend to assist.324 This work provides valuable insights useful for 
interrogating notions of accountability in relation to resettlement.  
Risk is also a central concept, and has already been mentioned above in the context of the 
World Commission on Dams report, which articulated the relationship between “risk takers” 
and “risk bearers”. However, there is also a broader, relevant body of literature on risk. 
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Understandings of risk have evolved considerably in recent decades. A growing appreciation 
of the way risk shapes contemporary life and underpins political and economic relations has 
been largely brought about by the influential work of the sociologist, Beck.325 One of Beck’s 
central arguments is that the nature of risk has changed in modern society, so much so that 
the risks involved in a given action are now “unknowable”.326 Central to this idea is the 
notion that modern regulatory institutions are not well-suited to grappling with 
contemporary risks, as these risks are not geographically or institutionally confined to a 
controllable or calculable set of circumstances.327 Beck identified three aspects (spatial, 
temporal and social) which have implications for the incalculability of modern-day risk. He 
argues that contemporary risks have new spatial dimensions, in that they are not confined 
within nation-states or other political borders. They have complex temporal dimensions, as 
materials such as nuclear waste have a long latency period. The social dimensions of 
contemporary risk are also changing, as it is now so difficult to assign causes and 
consequences with a degree of reliability. He refers to the example of financial crises 
brought about by interconnected global markets.328  
Many authors have since elaborated on Beck’s work in various contexts.329 Wyatt has 
usefully drawn on Beck’s perspective to develop understandings of risk in the context of 
large-scale infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia.330 His work is particularly relevant to 
the current research. Wyatt undertook a detailed case study of Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
(BOOT) projects in the two transitioning economies of Laos and Vietnam. In a BOOT 
project, the private sector finances, builds and operates the infrastructure project, e.g. a 
hydropower investment, for an agreed period, and collects the profits of the enterprise during 
this period. Once the agreed period has ended, the investment is returned to the government 
at no cost.331 For these reasons, BOOT projects are promoted by International Financial 
Institutions and bilateral donors because they are perceived to overcome the constraints of 
limited public capital, thereby reducing risks. However, Wyatt’s research found that the 
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inherent complexity of BOOT projects, and the inexperience of dealing with international 
capital in the transitional economy context, essentially renders risks invisible. He writes that:  
the governmental BOOT knowledge deficit and inexperience with 
international capital that characterises the transitional economy 
context, combined with the BOOT project’s inherent structural 
complexity, disadvantages the state and other less powerful actors in 
their capacity to protect their interests… In the interplay between due 
diligence, the private incentive of profit and risk management, risks 
are rendered invisible, are shifted from powerful actors to actors with 
less power, and constructed by those able to control the definition of 
risks and their management. The process of attempting to manage 
increasingly complex technologies, systems and risks leads to the 
broadening of uncertainties.332 
Wyatt’s insights are significant because he articulates how risks become hidden in the 
structural complexity of the international arrangements surrounding infrastructure projects 
financed by multiple entities. The relevance of these insights will become clear throughout 
the following chapters, as the complexity of the arrangements surrounding the financing of 
the ADB co-financed railway project in Cambodia is explored in more detail.  
2.11 Chapter review 
There is a considerable body of literature that exists on resettlement. Expanding interest in 
resettlement reflects the growing importance of understanding and responding to 
displacement challenges in many different places and contexts. As argued above, the 
dominant approaches to resettlement studies are framed within either a socio-
anthropological approach or a human-rights based approach. The focus of most of these 
studies has been to document the extent of dislocation experienced by relocated 
communities. There is also a central tension that exists between these two bodies of 
literature, as socio-anthropological approaches tend to be concerned with local, embedded 
experiences, and the rights-based literature is often focused on assessing compliance with 
laws and other standards.   
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The chapter argues that while focusing on compliance is a key aspect of representing 
resettlement experiences, it can also obscure more reflexive questions about the nature and 
impacts of resettlement advocacy, changing local interpretations of the accountability 
process and the role of civil society organisations in representing the needs of communities 
being relocated.  
A small number of studies have attempted to grapple with some of the implications of trans-
national advocacy networks in the context of resettlement, but they are geographically and 
temporally limited. Many of these studies took place in India in relation to Narmada and 
relate to events that were occurring many decades ago when the accountability structures 
that existed at an international level were first being introduced and when many of the 
transnational advocacy groups were newly formed. They are also almost entirely in relation 
to the hydropower projects financed by the World Bank.  
Related literatures on NGOs, accountability, aid practices and risk intersect the research in 
multiple ways. This chapter situates resettlement within broader discussions about 
population displacement, land conflicts and changing land use. It also conveys how evolving 
resettlement standards and policies are increasingly intertwined with contested notions of 
accountability and aid practices, and bound up in debates about the role of NGO movements 
in these processes.  
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Chapter 3 
Building the conceptual framework: Legal 
geography and problems of scale in 
development  
 
[Legal geography involves a] pronounced suspension of 
belief in “The Law” as such and in its self-authorizing 
claims of unity and coherence.333 
3.1 Overview 
To deepen the conceptual framework for the research, this chapter canvasses insights from 
critical human geography and legal geography. Core concerns of these streams of 
scholarship include the spatial dimensions of justice, the inclusionary and exclusionary 
aspects of land regulation, concepts of scale and legal pluralism.334 Legal geography is 
concerned with how laws operate to influence or create the physical and spatial environment 
of specific places, including its social and cultural dimensions. It focuses attention on how 
global or international legal principles or processes are translated into local conditions, 
shaping communities, socially, politically and spatially. This process is sometimes referred 
to as the study of the “localisation of laws”.335 Simultaneously, legal geography is concerned 
with how the local adaptation, interpretation and understandings of law, may offer insights 
that require re-conceptualisation of law and policy at a global level. 336  
Legal geography is relevant to the current research because of the multiple and contradictory 
ways in which laws – domestic Cambodian law, local customary law, and international law 
and resettlement policies – have re-organised the railway communities in Cambodia. “Law” 
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in this chapter is understood not only as the formal laws inscribed in legislation, it is also 
the policies, regulations and informal, customary practices and traditions that govern a 
society.337 In this way, the chapter draws on understandings of “soft law”, which refers to 
norms or rules which may not be strictly enforceable in a traditional sense, but still work to 
inform and condition decision-making.338 The chapter also emphasises interrelated concepts 
of scale and space drawn from critical human geography, which enable layered 
understandings of how legal and policy processes are enacted. Together, with the literature 
examined in Chapter 2, these perspectives provide a conceptual framework for the research.  
3.2  Legal geography: an interdisciplinary lens 
Scholars debate whether legal geography is a sub-discipline of human geography or a “truly 
interdisciplinary intellectual project”.339 This study is less concerned about demarcating firm 
boundaries around certain fields, or with whether legal geography is a sub-discipline of 
either law or geography. Instead, it utilises legal geography as an inter-disciplinary lens, 
perspective or an approach, so that it provides a way of thinking about, analysing and 
approaching the research. The sections below outline the emergence of legal geography, its 
core concerns and assumptions, and its relationships with other important critical approaches 
in the social sciences.  
Legal geography fuses legal and geographical perspectives, taking “the interconnections 
between law and spatiality, and especially their reciprocal construction, as core objects of 
inquiry.”340 It is attuned not only to the often uneven social dimensions of law and 
regulation, but also to the spatial inequalities and impacts created or altered by law, and the 
physical implications of constructing legal, policy or regulatory categories. While these 
“legal” dimensions are often a product or expression of broader social, political and cultural 
tensions or values in a society – spheres that some might perceive as “non-legal” – legal 
geography sets out to illuminate the legal phenomena at work and to articulate how these 
categories are enmeshed. Like human geography scholarship, legal geography draws on 
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concepts of space and more recently, scale – focusing on their entangled relationships.341 In 
describing the starting point of legal geography, Blomley states: 
It begins with the argument that law – as a set of practices, discourses 
and forms of knowledge – frequently draws upon or helps to 
constitute spaces. A sidewalk, city, or maple tree is thus a legal 
product. These legal spaces, it is argued, matter. At a minimum, the 
ways in which space is imbued with legal meaning is very often 
significant, given the differentiated ways in which law operates 
within the spaces that it partially produces.342  
In this way, spaces (such as public land, development projects, international borders and 
resettlement sites) are not isolated places. They are “assemblages” of social and legal 
significance and which are mutually constitutive.343 According to Delaney, spaces “are the 
contingent products of pervasive cultural processes and forces associated with ideological 
projects.”344 As Blomley explains, spaces are “made meaningful through various forms of 
human practice, including that of legal actors”.345  
This relational view of how space is constructed and imbued with social and legal meaning 
has led to a focus on the so-called “microspaces” of law, such as restrooms and 
courtrooms.346 It has also lead to an examination of places where physical and social tensions 
coalesce, such as struggles over public space, land tenure security, property and land.347 
These struggles are manifested in the “right to exclude” people from land – an inherent right 
of property ownership which is in tension with other rights and expectations of access. Hall 
et al. discuss this tension in relation to land, arguing that exclusion is a process and a 
condition, and that “all land use and access requires exclusion of some kind.”348 Thus, 
studies of cities, urbanisation, property and land struggles fall naturally within the ambit of 
legal geography’s core concerns.  
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The dynamic relationship between space, law and scale becomes even more complex in 
contexts of legal pluralism, where spaces are subject to regulation from multiple legal 
regimes, as is the case in Cambodia.349 Legal pluralism in this context is taken to mean that 
more than one legal system is in operation over a defined area at once. It also means that 
there are multiple and overlapping jurisdictions occurring in the same place, discussed 
further in the sections below.350  
2.3 Assumptions and influences  
It is worth recognising that much of the legal geography scholarship is inspired by the work 
of post-structuralists, especially Foucault’s writings on the socially contingent nature of law, 
power and knowledge.351 In his early writings, Foucault also described the use of 
surveillance, punishment and theatre in the penal system, concentrating on the ways power 
is inscribed on the bodies of prisoners and the walls and floors of the prison. He famously 
describes the “Panopticon”, a mechanism architecturally designed for the potential of 
constant observation, and thus control. 352 Similarly, Foucault’s genealogy of biopolitics 
reveals the ways the state has gradually made “the body”, especially the female body, a 
subject of state regulation.353 Foucault’s other writings on discourse, discursive networks 
and the diffuse nature of power, align with much of the legal geography scholarship.354  
The even earlier writings of other theorists, such as Lefebvre, are also fundamental 
influences on legal geography and its evolving concern with spatial dimensions of 
inequality, power and access.355 In The Right to the City, first published in 1968, Lefebvre 
articulated the need to restructure the underlying power relationships that produce urban 
space and its inhabitants. Lefebvre’s spatialised right to the city has been taken up and 
extended by Mitchell and Harvey, who both focus on the exclusionary processes inherent in 
urbanisation – made possible and reinforced by law through the restriction of access to 
previously “public” spaces, criminalisation of behaviour central to survival and regulation 
of other aspects of everyday life.356 In recent years, the right to the city framework has 
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arguably come to embody more than merely contestations over urban space. Some have used 
it to support “calls for more substantive forms of citizenship”,357 which has immediate 
relevance for displacement conflicts in Cambodia and debates about the Government’s role 
in regulating, restricting and enabling access to private and public land. Stead uses the 
approach to explore the “possibilities and limitations of land rights discourse” for citizens 
of the newly formed Timor-Leste.358 While she focuses on the city of Dili, the right to the 
city framework is used as a motif for inclusion within the nation-state. Stead also uses the 
right to the city approach to locate forced evictions within the global context of rapid 
population growth, increasing land acquisition, infrastructure projects, real estate 
speculation and slum control or clearance. 359  
Similarly, Soja argues that all inquiry can be “advanced by adopting a critical spatial 
perspective.”360 In analysing the impact of a court decision that reoriented the Los Angeles 
public transport system in favour of the city’s poorest residents, he argues that the 
“spatiality” of justice is “an integral and formative component of how justice and injustice 
are socially constructed and evolve over time.”361 Soja also examines processes of coalition 
building which united diverse and disparate organisations in “cooperative struggles.”362 For 
Soja, it is “this coming together of activist groups and social movements where the spatiality 
of justice is most relevant.”363   
A critical aspect of legal geography is that it entails a rejection of legal positivism and 
requires an interrogation of the meaning and idea of “law” itself.364 Forsyth describes legal 
positivism as the “notion that law necessarily is the law of the State, is uniform and exclusive 
and is administered by state institutions.”365 She argues that this positivist framework can be 
critiqued for its assumption that the idea of law is universal, that the state has a monopolistic 
claim to determine the legitimacy of laws, and that laws are coherent and uniform.366  
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There are similarities in Delaney’s argument that legal geography is premised on a 
“pronounced suspension of belief in ‘The Law’ as such and in its self-authorizing claims of 
unity and coherence.”367 As Delaney states: 
[f]or legal geographers, as for socio-legal scholars more generally, 
law is less a thing – like a giraffe, say, than a dynamic, shifting, often 
contradictory, multi-point process – like the movement of a swarm 
of hornets.368  
Underpinning these insights is a shared appreciation of formal and non-formal sources of 
law. For Bartel et al., formal laws and institutions are only one aspect of the “rule-based 
architecture that structures and governs society.369 They argue that  
so-called “formal” laws interact with informal customs and lore, 
social conventions and norms, religion and dogma, as well as the 
economy.370  
Concepts of “hard” and “soft” law are also helpful to understand these debates. Hard law is 
often considered to be formal, binding laws, as expressed in legislation.371 Soft law is often 
thought to include the less binding, quasi-legal sources of law, which are not always directly 
enforceable, but still work to achieve compliance.372 For example, Boer et al. described the 
safeguards of the World Bank as soft law, or the Equator Principles adopted by commercial 
banks.373 As Boer et al. also argue, however, there is a longstanding tendency to 
underestimate the “hardness” of soft law, suggesting that these formal and informal systems 
are not so distinct.374  
At the same time as legal geography tries to draw out these overlapping formal and informal 
processes, it does not necessarily consider all forms of social control to be “law”. 
Distinguishing the legal from the non-legal is a fuzzy endeavour. One conventional 
understanding by Hoebel is useful, which is that a: 
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social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in 
threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual 
or possessing the socially recognised privilege of so acting.375 
However, others have more recently adopted more pluralist understandings of law. For 
example, Boer et al. argue that “many sorts of regulatory forms may be approached and 
analysed as law, beyond legislation, executive degrees, the rulings of state-sponsored 
tribunals…”.376 These approaches provide a foundation through which to perceive the legal 
dimensions of a broad range of legal and regulatory processes.  
Legal geography is not only a critique of legal positivism and the discipline of law, but also 
of human geography. Efforts to carve out legal geography in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
as a discrete field emphasised the limited engagement of social, political and economic 
geography with the legal dimensions of geographical inquiry.377 As Delaney has also 
recently stated, “For most of its professional existence human geography was essentially 
lawless.”378 For Delaney: 
the point is that many entities we take to be of central concern to the 
broader project of human geography are not a-, pre-, or extra-legal 
things or processes. Rather, entities such as the home, the 
corporation, the environment, along with “the city”, “the state”, “the 
citizen”, “the worker”, “the market”, “money”, “war”, “necessary 
suffering” and so much more including “law” itself, are legally 
constituted and reconstituted.379 
Underpinning legal geography is an appreciation of the incredibly powerful role of law, in 
all its forms, in regulating, shaping and constituting everyday life. It also appreciates the 
duality of law – as both an apparatus of power that can legitimise dispossession and 
exclusion, but one that can also operate as a protective force. The next section explores how 
these insights are most powerful when they are examined at various “scales” and in contexts 
where there are multiple, overlapping sources of law.  
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3.5  Law, geography and scale   
Considerable scholarship has focused on how “geographic phenomena interact”380 at 
different scales. At its most basic conceptual definition, scale refers to a “level of 
representation”381 but could also be considered a layered “unit of analysis”.382 Notions of 
scale have evolved from their early cartographic uses, in which they primarily depicted 
physical referents on maps, to encompass a range of social, legal, political and even temporal 
analytic units.383 Underpinning these efforts is an understanding of the social construction 
of scale.384 The scales investigated by human geographers often include the “local-global” 
or “micro-“, “meso-“ and “macro-scale”.385 Other continuums include “the self to the 
global”386 or “grass-roots to the global”387, and have been well suited to critiques of 
globalisation and even “glocalisation”.388 There have also been efforts to understand 
regional scales as sites or levels at which phenomena are analysed, recognising that “the 
region” is not a “fixed geographic scale” but a “relational and political construct.”389   
Writings on scale have described how certain phenomena can be understood as nested or 
enmeshed within larger phenomena.390 For example, local economies exist within regional 
and global economies. The more nuanced writings in this vein appreciate how local 
economies have potential to shape and influence regional and global economies and vice 
versa. Like economies, law is a scaled phenomenon designed to regulate life at various local, 
domestic and international levels.”391 Increasingly, however, scale is being perceived not 
only as nested, but also as networked within various relationships between and across 
different sites.392  
The inclination to think of scale in vertical or hierarchical terms has led to the concept being 
critiqued for privileging the “global” and thus supporting “top-down” approaches. Debates 
have revolved around whether using the language of scale – i.e. “local”, “regional”, “global”  
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successfully makes visible local experiences, or if it simply reinforces a hierarchy of scale.393 
Marston et al argue that “hierarchical scale comes with a number of foundational weaknesses 
that cannot be overcome simply by adding on to or integrating with network theorizing.”394 
To address the hierarchical tendencies of scalar language, they argue away from notions of 
scale towards “flat ontologies”. One of the reasons they give for this shift is that the “local-
to-global conceptual architecture intrinsic to hierarchical scale” pre-assigns a “cordoned 
register for resistance.”395 Instead of using the framework of scale, they propose that the 
interrelatedness between humans and objects should be examined across a “multiplicity of 
social sites”.396 Their justification for proposing a horizontal or flat ontology is that it:  
provides more entry points – conceived as both open multi-
directionally and unfolding non-linearly – for progressive politics, 
offering the possibility of enhanced connections across social sites, 
in contrast to the vertical model that, despite attempts to bob and 
weave, is in the end limited by top-down structural constraints.397  
What Marston et al.’s arguments seem to belie, is that scale – with its local-global language 
– is what has made it especially possible to shine attention on the “local” dimensions and 
impacts of economics, law, development, and many other processes that are otherwise 
largely invisible.398 While many writers are in agreement that there are intrinsically 
hierarchical tendencies to scale, and that some writers, such as Taylor,399 have privileged 
the “global” as the “ultimate” scale and the one that “really matters”, doing away with scale 
in its entirety, and replacing it with a flat ontology does not satisfactorily address these 
concerns. I am in agreement with the authors who have rejected these attempts to do away 
with scale.400 Hoefle, for example, has warned against flat ontologies as a “philosophical 
red herring”401 and Jonas has described it as creating a “false ‘site-versus-scale’ 
dualism”.402 Instead, Marston’s earlier writings on scale offer a more fruitful approach, 
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where she considers scale, like space, to be “relational” and socially contingent. As 
Marston described in 2000: 
…scale is not necessarily a preordained hierarchical framework for 
ordering the world – local, regional, national and global. It is instead 
a contingent outcome of the tensions which exist between structural 
forces and the practices of human agents.403     
Similarly, the work of Andrews and McCarthy is helpful. They argue that:  
while scale should never be treated as easily equivalent to levels of 
government nor should it be naturalized, many of our most deeply 
embedded and operative notions of scale do correspond to long-
established levels of government.404  
MacKinnon also rejects the notion of flat ontologies and proposes instead to think in terms 
of “scalar politics”, suggesting that it is “often not scale per se that is the prime object of 
contestation between social actors”.405 He focuses on specific processes and 
institutionalised practices that are “differentially scaled.”406 MacKinnon’s approach 
focuses on the “strategic deployment of scale” by different actors, institutions, movements 
and organisations.407  
Combining legal geography and scale has potential to illuminate the spatially uneven 
impacts of law. Through drawing on concepts of scale in the context of a waste 
development project, the in the rural Australian town of Molong, Jessup shows how 
regionally uneven developments can be constructed using the law. While the framing of 
the waste disposal facility by its proponents offered “regional” benefits, once examined it 
was clear that “One place [the city of Orange] would generate waste, the other [the town 
of Molong] would receive it and bury it, all the while suffering lasting effects.408 Jessup 
explains how: 
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the law that oversaw the assessment and ultimate approval of the 
Orange Waste Project constructed and prioritised particular spaces 
and scales. The community, and indeed the judiciary, had limited 
control over the scale of the assessment. The law…displaced and 
repositioned the conflict and the matters of concern to the 
communities involved.409 
Bartel et al. also capture the potential of combining legal geography and scalar approaches. 
As they explain: 
What is unlawful at one scale, for example, may be challenged by 
legislation at another scale, or established social norms at another 
scale, and this can generate imbrication and disjuncture between 
legal geographies at different overlapping scales.410  
This tension between understandings of law at different scales – potentially leading to 
“multi-scalar conflicts” – has considerable analytical potential. Similarly, legal geography 
and scale also have important intersections with political ecology, another significant stream 
of human geography scholarship. These are complementary rather than discrete traditions, 
and have much to offer when drawn on together. Andrews and McCarthy are proponents for 
greater engagement between these perspectives, arguing that legal geography has explored 
how various levels of governance “are imagined and produced” and have “tremendous 
power to shape material realities, particularly through law and other regulatory 
structures…”.411 Political ecology enhances this perspective, as it takes as its starting point 
“an emphasis on how ‘local’ dynamics cannot be understood without looking at their 
connections to other places around the globe …”.412 What Gillespie calls the study of the 
“localisation of laws”413 is an illustration of this combined approach. She argues that scale-
oriented approaches focus our attention on how global or universal legal processes (such as 
international law) are translated into local conditions and vice versa.414 
                                                 
409 Jessup (2013, p. 105). 
410 Bartel, Graham, Jackson, Prior, Robinson, Sherval & Williams (2013, p. 345). 
411 E. Andrews & McCarthy (2014, p. 7).   
412 E. Andrews & McCarthy (2014, p. 7).   
413 Gillespie (2012 ). 
414 Gillespie (2012b, 2013b).   
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Variations of these approaches have been taken by authors such as Hirsch and Vandergeest. 
In the Mekong region, Hirsch has analysed processes of “regionalisation”, in which national 
politics and resource tensions are recast into regional development agendas. In analysing 
how these processes take effect in the context of dams, he argues that the development 
agendas of organisations such as the ADB, provide national decision makers with 
convenient narratives in which to frame their local and national politics. Local decisions are 
“re-scaled” as regional and global ones, against which leaders can argue that “they have no 
alternative” but to participate.415                                        
Vandergeest has examined how similar processes take effect in Laos and Thailand in relation 
to tenure insecurity, where he argues that “development is inherently about reorganising 
space…”.416 He examines how recent land tenure reform agendas propagated by state and 
international aid organisations have displacing effects on communities at a local level, even 
where these land titling and reform agendas are motivated by poverty alleviation objectives. 
Vandergeest traces the way land reform programs conceived at a global, regional or national 
level fit uneasily with local customary land use, in ways that indirectly pressure Lao villagers 
to stop swidden agriculture, resettle and engage in more permanent cultivation. These 
policies have ethnic dimensions as they preference ethnic Lao groups. Vandergeest argues 
that while land reform of this type is part of the Lao Government’s agenda to reorganise and 
administer space within its national boundaries, it has been assisted by the agendas of other 
organisations at regional and international scales. He states:  
Today, the program is justified through managerial forms of 
environmental knowledge produced by (or more accurately, recycled 
by) newly greened development agencies such as the World Bank… 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). …What the international 
agencies have done is to help the Lao Government systemize this 
reorganization into a national program and rationalize it through 
combining scientific discourses around biodiversity, land 
classification, and watershed production.417                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                 
415 Hirsch (2001, pp. 237-251); Also see: Singer (1999). 
416 Vandergeest (2007). 
417 Vandergeest (2007, p. 145) Note that Vandergeest cites Goldman (2001); Evans (1999) in this section.  
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The re-scaling of local policies and agendas into regional and global frameworks (and vice 
versa) is a powerful influence on Southeast Asia’s development processes.  
Other authors, such as Dwyer418, Milne419 and Biddulph420, have drawn on similar 
approaches to analyse land conflicts in Cambodia. Dwyer explores the “formalisation fix”, 
which is a way of describing how land titling programs seek to resolve land conflicts and 
practices of “land-grabbing” through formalising ownership of land. In doing so, he 
illuminate the uneveness of these interventions in Cambodia and draws attention to patterns 
identified by a number of researchers in Cambodia, whereby land titling efforts (often driven 
by donors and at the national government level) have been systematically avoiding areas 
that are too complex, for example where smallholder tenure is insecure, where there are 
competing claims to land, forest areas and other contested places.421 Biddulph has described 
these patterns in Cambodia in terms of “geographies of evasion”.422 Milne has also 
developed a similar analysis of the uneveness of land reform interventions in terms of Prime 
Minister Hun Sen’s Order 01, or the “leopard skin policy”. Under the policy, households 
that were previously living on communally on state land would be allowed to create private, 
individually held farms, differentiated like a leopard’s spots on the landscape.423 Order 01 
is explored further in the next chapter (Chapter 4).    
To an extent, concepts of scale have already influenced Oliver-Smith and Fisher whose work 
was introduced in Chapter 2.424 This is revealed in Oliver-Smith’s insights about the 
transnational linkages established by resettled people: 
Resistance movements tend to generate contacts and linkages with 
social actors that operate at four levels: the local community, the 
project, the national political context, and the international or global 
context.425 
                                                 
418 Dwyer (2015).  
419 Milne (2013). 
420 Biddulph (2010).  
421 Dwyer (2015). 
422 Biddulph (2010).  
423 Milne (2013).  
424 See: Oliver-Smith (1994, 2010); Fisher (2009).  
425  Oliver-Smith (2010, p. 194).  
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In other publications Oliver-Smith has also argued against trying to establish a “natural 
history of resistance movements” and instead advocated for developing: 
a set of contexts or levels of analysis in which resistance movements 
must act and an array of variables which will affect the evolution of 
structure and action of a movement.426 
Oliver-Smith also perceives the legal significance of devising resettlement schemes. He 
argues that “the categories that are established [in resettlement] bring with them bundles of 
rights that are themselves attached to material and social benefits or costs.”427 The dynamic 
relationship between space, law and scale becomes even more complex in contexts of legal 
pluralism, where spaces are subject to regulation from multiple legal regimes, as is the case 
in Cambodia.428 
3.5 Scale, space and legal pluralism  
As already indicated throughout the chapter, legal pluralism has implications for this 
research. Legal pluralism is defined well by Griffiths as “the presence in a social field of 
more than one legal order.”429 Griffiths also explains how a situation of legal pluralism is:  
one in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable within 
one “system” but have their sources in the self-regulatory activities 
which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another, so 
that the “law” which is actually effective on the “ground floor” of 
society is a result of enormously complex and usually in practice 
unpredictable patterns of competition, interaction, negotiation, 
isolationism and the like.430 
The potential of legal pluralism to deepen understandings of local settings during field 
research is demonstrated by the work of Gillespie.431 Gillespie has investigated how the 
legally plural landscape of Cambodia affects the conservation management of Angkor 
Archaeological Park. Legal pluralism in this context is taken to mean that more than one 
                                                 
426 Oliver-Smith (1994, p. 197). 
427 Oliver-Smith (2010, p. 99). 
428 Gillespie (2011). 
429Griffiths (1986, p.1).   
430 Griffiths (1986, p. 39). 
431Gillespie (2011).   
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legal system is in operation over a defined area at once. It also means that there are multiple 
and overlapping jurisdictions occurring in the same place.432 In the context of Angkor, 
Gillespie identifies at least four systems which influence the regulatory landscape:  
 the existing, current legal regime of the post 1993 UNTAC period;  
 that of former (post-independence) regimes, such as that of Vietnamese 
occupation (1978-1989); 
 that remaining from French colonial rule; 
 more traditional, customary legal systems. 433  
In addition to these sources of regulation, the World Heritage listing of the Park means it is 
subject to a body of administrative policies and obligations under the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.434 Thus, the space of 
“Angkor Archaeological Park” is not only a local space but also an international one, 
demarcated and regulated by international law in ways that differ to other parts of Cambodia.  
Gillespie draws on the work of Benda-Beckmann et al.435 to argue that legal pluralism 
deserves more attention, because it is in these contexts where "alternative (and often 
conflicting) perceptions of the legal or normative significance of space and boundaries are 
most apparent.”436 In Gillespie’s study, local residents of Angkor perceived the new rules 
and regulations limiting their capacity to build and repair structures to be too draconian, as 
they “disallowed or prohibited what were perceived to be ordinary land usages.”437 
Legal ambiguity and “forum-shopping”, which are considered by some to be implications 
of legal pluralism, offer insights that relate to the Cambodian context.438 Unruh and Williams 
argue that legal ambiguity, particularly relating to land ownership, often emerges following 
conflict and has a clear link to tenure insecurity.439 In post-conflict and post-colonial 
scenarios there are often unclear rights of access over land and resources, and overlapping 
or inconsistently applied policies regarding land and property. “Forum-shopping” is 
presented by Unruh and Williams as a challenge of legal pluralism, whereby actors involved 
                                                 
432 Gillespie (2011, p. 3). 
433 Adapted from Gillespie (2010; 2011, p. 6). 
434 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (1972).  
435 Gillespie (2011, p. 3). 
436 Gillespie (2011, p. 3). 
437 Gillespie (2011, p. 19). 
438 Unruh & Williams (2013); Meinzen-Dick (2009, p. 3).  
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in a dispute will seek the forum (a preferred law, adjudication mechanism or other formal or 
informal dispute resolution process) that they believe will be more advantageous. While this 
enables flexibility and negotiation, it also generates conflicting land decisions and creates 
the pre-conditions for forum-shopping to be used as a means of legitimizing dispossession 
of land.440 Unruh and Williams also suggest that in a post-conflict setting, legal pluralism 
can sometimes be rationalised too quickly by introducing a single legal system for land 
governance which does not fit well with, align with or reflect the customary or everyday 
practices of communities subjected to a newly imposed, singular legal system.441 This 
potential misalignment of laws and ordinary community practices and land uses echoes 
Gillespie’s examination of the experiences of local residents in Angkor Archaeological Park, 
discussed above. Meinzen-Dick’s analysis of legal pluralism and forum-shopping also 
usefully articulates how property rights cannot be understood as deriving from statues or 
formal rules; rather they should be understood as negotiated outcomes. Furthermore, legal 
pluralism does not imply that all laws are equal or there is a hierarchy of laws. Instead, for 
Meinzen-Dick, each law is conceived as creating a certain type of “force-field” or influence, 
which may be stronger in some areas than others.442  
Legal geography, legal pluralism and political ecology have also provided fruitful ways to 
examine international legal processes, given the diffuse sources or norms, practices and 
systems shaping this arena. Pearson has examined the landscapes of international law, 
arguing that the “public space” of international law production centres on “global” cities, 
such as New York and Geneva, yet international law is manifested and can be found in many 
other unlikely places.443 One of the complexities of examining any project, process or event 
involving international law, is its amorphous nature. Johnstone describes the fluidity of 
international law well when he states:  
A distinctive feature of the international legal system is its 
decentralized character: there is no global legislative body, no central 
tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes, and no 
administrative body with overarching executive powers. 444 
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Braverman et al. refer to Santos’s work to describe the highly dynamic process of 
“interlegality”, to involve “different legal spaces [that] are non-synchronic and thus result 
in uneven and unstable mixing of legal codes.”445 Yet the presence of multiple laws and 
legal systems does not necessarily diminish the influence of law. Exploring the way that law 
operates, especially at an international level, Johnstone explains how international law is 
deployed through “the discursive interaction of relevant actors, usually in response to 
specific disputes or international incidents and often in international organizations.”446 In 
these specific contexts international law has normative effects even where it is not directly 
enforceable. For Johnstone, this is because “[t]he invocation of legal norms imposes limits 
on the style of argument or mode of deliberating.”447  
3.6 Implications for the research  
Conceptual approaches which take law to be a messy, often incoherent product of social and 
political relations especially when viewed at different “scales”, have enormous potential to 
enhance understandings of the Cambodian railway project. As the next chapters explore, the 
railway project is simultaneously a domestic project supported by the Cambodian 
Government. It is also an ADB Mekong Subregion project with significance for the Mekong 
region. For the Australian Government it is both an “aid” project and a strategic 
infrastructure project aimed at enhancing trade within the broader Asia-Pacific. For Toll 
Holdings, the Australian company with Cambodian affiliations responsible for operating the 
railway, it is a private investment.  
Multiple legal systems and expectations bear on the railway project. These include: the 
fractured Cambodian domestic legal system, in which oversight is limited and patchy at 
best;448 a legacy of post-conflict governance effects, as well as remnants of French and 
Vietnamese structures and customs; and local, long-standing “village” level systems and 
practices, often imbued with Buddhist beliefs.449 At the same time, the ADB is a regional 
organisation based in Manila in the Philippines, which has a set of regulations (largely 
adopted from the World Bank – a global institution based in Washington D.C. in the United 
States) which ostensibly govern its investments in borrower countries. To an extent, the 
                                                 
445 Braverman, Blomley, Delaney & Kedar (2014, p. 3) Also see: de Sousa Santos (1987). 
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448 See the discussion in Chapter 4.  
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Australian Government brings to bear influences or expectations based on Australian 
domestic law (based on the common law system of the United Kingdom) – as well as a range 
of aid policies, processes and broader public expectations – influencing its engagement. 
Human rights activists operating in Cambodia are largely trained in the United States, 
Australia and the United Kingdom (or are local activists trained and supported by 
international counterparts).450 Many of these actors take international doctrines of human 
rights law as their guiding ethical framework in a professional sense.451 The people impacted 
by the railway, many of whom have never travelled outside Cambodia, have their own 
personal histories of surviving the Khmer Rouge and are now governed by multiple local 
and external (and often contradictory) sources of law and expectations. 
3.7 Chapter review 
Legal geography, legal pluralism and scale offer powerful ways to analyse the multiple local, 
regional and international actors and sources of legal and regulatory authority in Cambodia, 
especially as they are implicated in the Cambodian railway project. These perspectives help 
to analyse the spatially uneven impacts of laws, policies and safeguards, and to understand 
how the “spaces” of the railway project (the railway tracks, the resettlement sites, the 
boardrooms where negotiations between the Government and ADB take place) may be 
influenced by multiple and conflicting legal, regulatory and cultural expectations. These 
approaches also help to understand how the local politics of the Cambodian Government 
may be re-scaled, and re-shaped by the agendas of international organisations (such as the 
ADB) working within its borders. It recognises that the resettlement dynamics of the project 
are not only comprised of local processes occurring in Cambodia. They are shaped by 
external actors, networks, events and decisions being made elsewhere. To contextualise and 
ground these perspectives further, the next chapter provides an overview of the central 
events shaping Cambodia’s recent history and its current development and investment 
landscape. 
                                                 
450 The background to the advocacy groups working in Cambodia is explored further in Chapter 4.  
451 This statement is not intended to be a comprehensive statement about the ethical frameworks of advocates working in 
Cambodia, it is merely intended to emphasise the influence of human rights approaches on the work of professional 
advocates. See for example: Inclusive Development International (2015b).   
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Chapter 4 
Setting the scene: Conflict, investment and 
displacement in Cambodia 
  
4.1  Overview  
Cambodia has a population of around 15 million people and is one of the poorest countries 
in Southeast Asia.452 Since French colonisation of Cambodia ended in 1953-54, it has 
experienced repeated eruptions of local violence, saturation bombing by the United States, 
a brutal revolution led by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s, followed by Vietnamese 
occupation and a United Nations transitional government.453 These events have important 
ramifications for understanding Cambodia’s history of forced relocation, its contemporary 
governance and accountability structures, fragmented land tenure system, as well as its 
relationships with external or foreign actors and other countries in Southeast Asia.   
The past two decades of relative political stability have seen a diverse range of international 
actors support different types investment in Cambodia, especially through co-financing 
arrangements set up by multilateral institutions, bilateral donors, and more recently through 
private investment.454 Infrastructure development has been a major focus of this activity,455 
however foreign and private investment partners have brought with them different sets of 
legal and cultural expectations about how these projects and activities should be undertaken. 
Cambodia’s history of violence and instability means that the domestic institutions which 
might support well-planned infrastructure development and regulate the influx of these 
different actors and influences, are not well established. This chapter provides an outline of 
the central events shaping Cambodia’s recent history, and identifies the multiple legal and 
institutional regimes, especially national laws and the safeguard policies of international 
                                                 
452 Cambodia is listed as a “Least Developed Country” by the United Nations based on several socio-economic indicators, 
see: < http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc_info.shtml> accessed 29 November 2015. Note that the 
population of Cambodia is also available via this link.  
453 For a broad overview of Cambodian history, see: Chandler (2008). 
454 See generally, Hughes & Un (2011); Grimsditch (2014); Fforde & Seidel (2010); Greenhill (2013) 
455 Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (2014, p. 2). 
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financial institutions, shaping its contemporary regulatory environment that are relevant to 
the current research.  
4.2 Conflict and regime change in Cambodian history  
Cambodian history is shaped conflict, foreign interventions and the legacies of colonialism. 
Cambodia’s geographical location between its two neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand has 
also long shaped its relationships in the region. The country identified as Cambodia today 
emerged from a much larger Khmer empire which flourished between the ninth and fifteenth 
centuries in the Angkorian era. The Angkorian Empire extended across most of the land 
known today as southern Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, and Cambodia.456 The 
legacy of this empire is embodied in the largest religious building in the world, Angkor Wat, 
which is part of a large complex of temples located near Siem Reap in north western 
Cambodia. Between the decline of the Angkorian civilisation in the fifteenth century and 
the arrival of the French in 1864, Khmer elites carefully balanced their alliances between 
Thailand and Vietnam.457 By 1794, most of the Khmer royal family was in exile, while the 
Siamese (Thai) or Vietnamese installed the various monarchs of Cambodia in their 
absence.458 In an attempt to secure Cambodia’s survival, the exiled Khmer King, Duang, 
appealed to the French in Indo-China, creating an unusual relationship between the Khmer 
and French colonisers from the outset. 459 In 1864, the French established Cambodia as a 
protectorate, partially constructing the current, but still disputed borders of present-day 
Cambodia.460  
Like many colonial regimes, the French in Cambodia left a legacy of psycho-social, political 
and legal impacts. The French wrote about the “inferior state” of Khmer governance. 461 
They systematically made derogative comparisons between the Khmer and the Vietnamese, 
whom they perceived to incorporate French laws and systems into their society 
comparatively easily. To compound these dynamics, the French recruited the Vietnamese to 
staff the colonial administration in Cambodia, even in some of the lowest positions.462 De-
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colonisation in Cambodia, like in many places, was a fraught and complex process, shaping 
the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge. 463  
Between 1975 and 1979, under the communist leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge 
initiated one of the most radical attempts at social engineering ever undertaken by state 
leaders.464 By 1979, an estimated 1.7 million deaths had occurred as a result of execution, 
starvation, forced labour and disease.465 Re-naming the country “Democratic Kampuchea”, 
the population of Phnom Penh was evacuated to the country-side where the Khmer Rouge 
tried to eradicate many cultural, educational, and political influences of the past.466 In an 
effort to create a self-sufficient agricultural collective, almost all diplomatic and trade 
relations with other countries were severed. The Khmer Rouge closed schools and hospitals 
and monetary currency was abolished. Basic elements of life were highly regulated 
including eating and marriage.467 The Khmer Rouge set out to destroy what they perceived 
as impure, bourgeois, foreign or colonial elements of society. Uneducated farmers were 
considered uncontaminated by colonialism and other foreign influences.468 Educated 
professionals who were unable to disguise their socio-economic backgrounds were often 
persecuted, and in many cases killed.469 Buddhist Monks were attacked and temples were 
dismantled.470 Minorities, including the Chinese, Cham Muslims, and the Vietnamese were 
also targeted.471 
A remarkable feature of Khmer Rouge policy was the reversal of power-relations between 
children and parents. The regime extolled children as untainted by colonialism, re-educating 
them for the purposes of producing a “pure” Cambodian society.472 Children were 
conscripted, armed with weapons, and encouraged to spy and inform on their parents, and 
often did.473 Doctors and pharmacists were persecuted, their responsibilities transferred to 
children of thirteen to fifteen years of age with very little medical training.474  
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Pol Pot’s ideology of turning Cambodia “back to year zero” was based on a vision of 
establishing a pre-Hindu, pre-urban, pre-colonial Cambodian society and an independent 
state, free from foreign interference or influence.”475 Destroying Cambodia’s “bourgeois” 
and “foreign” elements, including monetary systems and infrastructure, was considered 
necessary to locate the “Original Khmer”, extolled by Pol Pot.476 Pol Pot used this post-
colonial rhetoric to appeal to a devastated Cambodian countryside following the saturation 
bombing campaign by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, which was designed to 
weaken Vietnamese strongholds within Cambodian territory. It is estimated that this 
bombing campaign dropped over a million tonnes of explosives, estimated to “have the 
effect of 25 Hiroshima style nuclear explosions” on Cambodia.477 Some have argued that 
the saturation campaign left young people in rural Cambodia vulnerable to radicalisation by 
the Khmer Rouge.478  
It was not until the Vietnamese invaded in 1978 that the Khmer Rouge were removed from 
power in 1979, although they continued to wage war in the countryside well into the 1990s. 
Although the Vietnamese invasion ended the destruction of the Khmer Rouge, it was viewed 
by other foreign governments, especially the United States, in the context the Vietnam War 
and the Cold War more generally.479 During Vietnamese occupation the Khmer Rouge 
maintained control of sections of Cambodian territory and represented Cambodia at the 
United Nations until 1991.480  
The years following the removal from power of the Khmer Rouge saw various interventions 
from external actors. Cambodia experienced Vietnamese occupation between 1978-1989, 
before the United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC) was established 
between 1991-1993. UNTAC was the first occasion where the United Nations had taken 
over the administration of a member state, with the aim of restoring peace and civil 
government, holding “free and fair” elections and establishing the foundations for the 
rehabilitation of the country.481 While UNTAC resulted in elections which saw 89.5 percent 
of the population vote, the extent to which real change or transition occurred during this 
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period is generally debated. Biddulph argues that the UNTAC period demonstrates how 
national elites in Cambodia are able to co-opt external agendas for their own objectives.482 
He describes the UNTAC intervention as “emblematic of a tendency for international actors 
to promise transformation, but to effect change at only the most superficial levels.”483 While 
the period following UNTAC has been relatively stable politically – in the sense that Hun 
Sen has remained Prime Minister since he came to power through a coup in 1997 – the 
continued use of state violence to oppress opposition continues into the current day.484  
4.3 Land disputes, titling and exclusions 
Cambodia’s history has impacted on its contemporary land management systems in multiple 
ways.485 Prior to the arrival of the French, land essentially belonged to the King, but was 
available for use or for “acquisition by the plough”.486 The Land Act 1884 was one of the 
first statutes introduced by the French regulating land use, but was not fully implemented 
until the 1930s. 487 French colonisation also saw the introduction of the cadastral  system in 
1912, but it was the Civil Code of 1920 that is considered to mark the establishment of 
private property in Cambodia.488 Nonetheless, throughout the French colonial period and 
post-independence, limited progress in terms of formal land registration occurred. The 
systems that were in place were largely abolished by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s when 
private land was nationalised, and cadastral records were destroyed along with other 
boundary markers.489  
During the 1980s the process of re-claiming land after the Khmer Rouge was often 
haphazard and few people acquired documentation for their land.490 Since the early 1990s, 
the Cambodian Government has been gradually formalising land ownership across 
Cambodia.491 The currently applicable 2001 Land Law sets up a process for people to 
register title and ownership to land they have been continuously occupying for five years or 
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more. It recognizes “peaceful, uncontested possession” for no less than five years to land, 
so long as the possession took place prior to 2001 and the land can “lawfully be privately 
possessed”.492 In practice, reclaiming land and asserting ownership over occupied land has 
often been extremely fraught, resulting in numerous conflicts.493 As also illustrated 
throughout the examples that follow (see, especially the story of Dey Krahorm in Section 
4.6 below), the processes for resolving land conflicts are very varied depending on the type 
of conflict taking place.  
A particularly high profile land conflict centred around the World Bank’s support for the 
Cambodian Government’s land titling scheme. A multi-donor program primarily financed 
by the World Bank, known as the Land Management and Administration Program (LMAP) 
was established in 2002 to support land registration processes. Like many development 
initiatives, LMAP had ambitious goals and sought to reduce poverty, promote social 
stability, and stimulate economic development through improving land tenure security and 
efficient land markets.494 LMAP culminated in the dramatic conflict between local residents 
of Boeung Kak Lake in central Phnom Penh, the Cambodian Government and the World 
Bank. The residents claimed they were being excluded from land titling because of the high 
value and private interest in their land.495 Although LMAP was discontinued, Cambodia’s 
land registration program continued. By 2012, the Systematic Land Registration (SLR) 
process continued by the Cambodian Government had successfully registered more than 1.7 
million titles.496 Yet, there have been many examples of people being excluded from land 
titling, especially where they live on contested land or where the land is designated for a 
public purpose.497 More generally, land disputes and evictions have been particularly high 
in the capital, Phnom Penh.498 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, authors including Biddulph499 and Dwyer500 have 
articulated the unevenness of land titling interventions in Cambodia, such as LMAP. Their 
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work helps to highlight the spatial distribution of land reform initiatives in Cambodia; how 
the impacts of these policies manifest differently across the country. Biddulph’s thesis of 
the geographies of evasion articulates a practice of systemic avoidance, whereby land titling 
is not occurring in the areas where it may be needed most (contested areas, areas where 
community land rights are not well protected, forest areas etc.) Biddulph’s evasion critique 
identifies how, in the beginning, LMAP appeared to meet both Government and donor 
objectives, representing a “consensus between donors and a host nation government during 
the planning and approval of the intervention”, but which dissolved “into conflict during 
implementation” as it became clear that the Cambodian political elite was “systematically 
excising high value urban land” from the land title registration process.501 Both Biddulph 
and Dwyer acknowledge that land titling or formalisation of land ownership is often 
presented as a somewhat simple “fix” to a set of complex socio-political circumstances. 
Dwyer describes this as the “formalisation fix”, and identifies how formalisation of land 
ownership through land titling is employed selectively and unevenly in Cambodia and in the 
global South more generally. He argues for greater spatial transparency of property 
formalisation efforts, especially as it as being applied to unmapped state land.502  
The gradual alienation of communities from land and forest resources in Cambodia through 
large economic land concessions (ELCs) is also well documented, although it is difficult to 
get access to credible data on the extent of land conceded.503 ELCs involve the granting of 
state private land to private companies for agro-industrial development. The system for 
granting ELCs was formally set up under the 2001 Land Law. Since 2001, it is estimated 
that anywhere between 1.2 and 2 million hectares of land has been granted or transferred to 
over 117 private companies for commercial use.504 Conflicts stemming from communities 
affected by the granting of ELCs have been numerous. There have been reports of evictions, 
destruction of indigenous land and communities being restricted from accessing natural 
resources that they previously relied on to support their livelihoods.505 In May 2012, these 
conflicts led to the Cambodian Government issuing “Order 01”, which suspended the 
granting of all new ELCs and ordered a review of all existing concessions. Those ELCs 
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which did not comply with the law were to be seized or cancelled. This included 
concessionaires that had expropriated land from local or indigenous peoples.506 Order 01 
was also supported by a scaled up land titling scheme, for which “youth volunteers”, who 
were often university students, were recruited as part of a campaign to survey and issue 
private individual land titles to people living on state land, including forest land, ELCs and 
forest concessions, however this campaign ceased in 2013.507 As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5, Order 01 was known as the “leopard skin policy” because it granted private 
individual titles to families otherwise living on communally occupied land. Milne explores 
the painful dilemmas confronted by Indigenous villages as some families chose to take up 
private individual title and create privately owned farms, while other community members 
declined.508 Like Biddulph and Dwyer, Milne articulates an analysis of Cambodia’s land 
management system which is fragmented, often arbitrary and which potentially exacerbates 
pre-existing inequalities, especially for those left out of new initiatives.  
4.4 Development assistance, foreign and private investment post 1993  
As illustrated by the conflicts relating to ELCs, foreign and private investment in Cambodia 
has rapidly increased since the post UNTAC period of the 1990s. There are various figures 
reported for these financial flows and it is difficult to find precise, consistent and reliable 
information on this topic. Foreign investment approved by the Council of Development of 
Cambodia reportedly increased from USD 2.3 billion dollars in 1995 to USD 10.89 billion 
dollars by 2008.509 More recent figures from the World Bank indicate foreign investment 
amounted to USD1.44 billion in 2012, reducing slightly to USD 1.34 billion in 2013.510 
Development assistance or “aid” has also flowed into the country from a variety of sources. 
Since 1993, there have been at least 35 official donors and hundreds of NGOs providing aid 
to Cambodia.511 On average Cambodia received around USD 600 million a year in the 
decade prior to 2008.512 In 2013, the amount of development cooperation finance disbursed 
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in Cambodia, including concessional loans, reached USD 1.46 billion.513 The main sectors 
supported by aid in Cambodia include health, agriculture and rural development, 
governance, education and infrastructure, especially transportation. Since 2012, the 
infrastructure sector has received the most external support, particularly roads, rail, water 
and air transport.514 Recently, there has been an increase in concessional loan financing 
(such as loans from ADB and World Bank). Thus rather than grants or aid, which do not 
require repayment from the borrowing country, concessional loans are extended with 
interest rates and terms that are substantially lower than market rates.  In 2013, concessional 
loans to Cambodia were greater than development aid for the first time, a trend which is 
predicted to continue.515 This shift is particularly significant because if the projects 
organised and driven by external development partners and supported by loans are not 
successful, then the burden of repayment rests on the borrowing country. In this way, 
concessional loans shift a large portion of the burden of financial risk onto the borrowing 
country government.  
The shift towards concessional lending, rather than aid, especially for infrastructure building 
is also reflected at a regional level. The recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) has seen a renewed focus on lending for infrastructure and other 
productive sectors in Asia.516 In 2010, the ADB  also published a report anticipating demand 
in the Asia-Pacific region for USD 8 trillion of investment to support infrastructure 
development between 2010-2020, presumably to be financed at least in part by ADB 
loans.517 The anticipated demand for investment is primarily in the energy, transport and 
telecommunications sectors within the region.  
While the ADB has published scoping studies on infrastructure investment needs in 
Cambodia,518 other sections of the Bank  have written extensively about Cambodia’s weak 
governance mechanisms and its “limited tradition of accountability for performance through 
either financial oversight or political mechanisms”.519 The ADB has identified legislative 
gaps, weak mechanisms for complaints and appeals, major shortcomings in the judicial 
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sector (in terms of police, prosecutors and courts) and has also stated that “corruption 
remains significant and difficult to mitigate in the short term.”520 Thus, it is possible to 
identify a push towards financing large infrastructure projects through concessional lending 
in countries such as Cambodia, even though domestic institutions, public financial 
management skills and capacity to manage loans and large projects are weak. 
Cambodia’s aid, investment and development sectors are also highly fragmented and de-
centralised.521 Like many countries, one of the critical pressures shaping its development 
landscape is a tension between the country’s “ownership” over its domestic development 
agenda and its “accountability” to donors and investors, as well as the Cambodian public. 
Both country ownership and accountability have been promoted equally as important aid 
effectiveness values by the donors which played a significant role in Cambodia’s immediate 
reconstruction post-1993.522 This tension between “ownership” and “accountability” 
underpins relationships particularly between the Government and so-called “traditional” 
donors. So-called traditional donors include, the World Bank and country members of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC).523 Non-traditional donors, sometimes referred to as “emerging 
donors”, include China and India, and also broadly refer to the new BRICS Bank and the 
AIIB. Terms such as “emerging donors” and “traditional donors” have been questioned by 
researchers who argue that both China and India have been providing aid since the 1950s.524 
This way of referring to donors is only useful in so far as it conveys broad traditions,  cultures 
and requirements attached to certain lenders or donors. 
The sometimes competing values and principles of accountability and local ownership have 
been re-affirmed numerous times in various international agreements. For example, in 2005, 
OECD countries committed to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which 
emphasises five central pillars of aid delivery: “ownership”, “alignment”, “harmonisation”, 
“results” and “mutual accountability”.525 Accordingly, the Cambodian government and 
other governments in receipt of development assistance, are simultaneously encouraged to 
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“take control” of the design and implementation of their development programs, at the same 
time as being “accountable” to the priorities and requirements of donors.  
Partly as a result of these conflicting pressures, the Cambodian Government’s interest in 
working with traditional donors is thought to be decreasing.526 Multiple donor requirements 
have many practical and bureaucratic implications for the Cambodian Government. As 
Chanboreth and Hack explain: 
Due to a large number of donors, the Royal Government of 
Cambodia (RGC) has to spend a lot of time on meeting and reporting. 
The costs of aid fragmentation in Cambodia include the 
establishment of about 100 parallel project implementation units, the 
existence of 400 donor missions, reviews, and studies per year, and 
the provision of duplicated technical cooperation and funding.527  
Greenhill argues that China has been a major support to the Cambodian government in terms 
of enabling it to be more assertive in dealing with traditional donors.528 Large amounts of 
the financial flows moving from China to Cambodia are in the form of private investment. 
Of the cumulative Foreign Direct Investment between 1995 and 2008, China’s share was 
the largest at 23.97 percent, directed mostly at resource development, rubber and tourism. 
China was followed by Korea (at 10.68 percent) and other major sources were from 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand, primarily directed at garment industries.529 
Chinese development assistance has also increased from less than USD 6 million in 2002 to 
USD 114 million in 2009.530 In 2013, China also reportedly offered Cambodia USD 2.5 
billion in development assistance, investments and concessional loans.531 Writers, including 
Biddulph and Hughes, have also argued that the narrative of Cambodia’s reliance on aid 
(from traditional donors) is misleading.532 Grimsditch explains the current tension well: 
[T]he Cambodian Government has become increasingly frustrated 
with “traditional” donors and the perceived conditionalities attached 
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to their lending. Chinese aid and investment has the potential to bring 
significant benefits to Cambodia, and has injected much needed 
resources into its long neglected infrastructure. However, this also 
poses new and interesting challenges for those working to encourage 
donor accountability, corporate social responsibility, and adherence 
to social and environmental safeguards.533  
Aid from non-traditional donors is often not conditional on many of the same accountability 
measures that govern traditional forms of aid and lending.534 The involuntary resettlement 
standards required by the World Bank and the ADB are examples of this, as these standards 
are not necessarily required by other donors in relation to infrastructure projects.535 Non-
traditional donors may of course have other requirements and obligations they expect the 
Cambodian Government to respect. Greenhill describes this environment as an “age of 
choice”536, which is much like Fforde’s description of Cambodia as a “donor playground”537 
and also resonates with the idea of “forum-shopping” which emerges in legally plural 
environments, as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.538 The proliferation of NGOs in 
Cambodia has also contributed to this pluralistic environment, as already explored in detail 
in Chapter 2, Section 2.10. 
Understanding the different financial flows and pressures shaping Cambodia’s development 
and investment landscape helps to understand the circumstances surrounding the ADB 
financed railway project in Cambodia and the associated community resettlement process. 
They also help to conceptualize the different spaces that different donors and lenders 
influence, depending on the bounds of a given project and the requirements attached to 
individual lending and donors agreements. As this thesis develops, this idea of a spheres of 
influence that are shaped and constructed by different donors and lenders is developed into 
the idea of “islands of governance”539, referring specifically to the resettlement sites as 
physically demarcated areas where ADB safeguards requirements apply. These islands of 
governance are mutually constructed through a negotiated process between the Cambodian 
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Government and the ADB where various conflicting standards and expectations are battled 
out imperfectly, but ultimately produce areas or spaces (such as the resettlement sites) where 
ADB policies and standards awkwardly take precedence over pre-existing local practices 
and policies.    
4.5 Displacement in Cambodia  
In the post-UNTAC period, the Cambodian Government has welcomed investment to 
support development in a range of spheres. As many authors have identified and NGOs have 
publicised widely, there have been numerous land disputes and conflicts with communities 
who have been affected by these efforts.540  
Accurately accessing the numbers of people displaced by private investment,  infrastructure 
development and urbanisation processes in Cambodia is very difficult. There is no central 
government ministry or organisation which collates or publicises displacement data. The use 
of data relating to displaced communities is highly sensitive and there are limited reliable 
records of who is being displaced and where they move. NGOs have attempted to quantify 
the number of people affected by land conflicts and displacement, and different figures have 
been quoted in the media and the literature. Focusing only on Phnom Penh, the local urban 
NGO Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT) has released statistics documenting the eviction of 
29,715 families in the capital between 1990 and 2014.541 In 2008, Amnesty International 
estimated that at least 150,000 Cambodians were known to be at risk of displacement as a 
result of land disputes and development projects.542 More recently, LICADHO registered 
10,625 families, or an estimated 49,519 individuals, who were newly affected by land 
conflicts in 2014 alone.543 Others have documented the impacts of land concessions, 
although specific data on the estimated number of people displaced is not readily 
available.544 Often only examples of direct displacement are recorded by NGOs as indirect 
or secondary types of displacement are more difficult to capture. The various statistics 
gathered by NGOs are also based on different methodologies and tend to be based on 
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disputes reported in the media or to an NGO, and it can be assumed that many more go 
unrecorded.545 
4.6 Legal framework relating to displacement 
The legal avenues available to protect people from displacement in Cambodia are weak, and 
tend to depend on the circumstances driving the displacement.546 The Cambodian 
Constitution recognises the right to private ownership, that ownership should be protected 
by law, and that confiscation of private property may only occur when it is deemed to be in 
the public interest, with fair and just compensation.547 These rights and protections are also 
reflected in the 2001 Land Law.548 The 2001 Land Law was formulated in the context of 
significant pressure from NGOs in Cambodia to improve the land law regime during the 
drafting of the law.549 It was also a product of initial technical support from the ADB, who 
encouraged the inclusion of provisions to create a foundation for land and housing rights 
protections.550 Substantial external technical assistance also supported the preparation of 
Cambodia’s Constitution during the UNTAC period, which recognizes the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants and conventions related to human rights.551  
By extension, this includes the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, which 
sets out the right to adequate housing.552 
At various points in time, different external actors have worked with Cambodian 
Government ministries to develop specific legislation to protect citizens from arbitrary 
displacement. For example, in May 2010, with the support of the German Federal Enterprise 
for International Cooperation (GIZ),553 the Cambodian Government passed Circular 03 on 
the “Resolution of Temporary Settlement on Land Which Has Been Illegally Occupied in 
the Capital, Municipal, and Urban Areas”.554 For the first time, a process was set up within 
Cambodia’s legal framework to convert “illegal” occupation of state land into legal 
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occupation or ownership. The Circular also set out a basic framework for resettlement for 
those who cannot be upgraded on-site. However, the Circular is a brief document and has 
not been fully implemented.555 There have also been other examples of external partners 
working with different agencies within the Cambodian Government to develop the 
institutional and legal framework around displacement. During the Highway One project 
(discussed below) and even more recently during the current Cambodian railway project, 
the ADB has worked with the Government to develop its involuntary resettlement policy. 
The recent initiative aims to “enhance the capacity” of the Cambodian Government to 
implement resettlement activities, however the degree to which different actors within 
Government have adopted or supported these reforms is unclear.556 
Thus, the Cambodian Government has formal legal obligations in place to protect the rights 
of citizens at risk of displacement, regardless of whether their tenure status is “legal” or 
“illegal”, and to comply with decent resettlement standards. Yet, in numerous cases where 
communities have been threatened with eviction, the legal system has proved inaccessible. 
For example, in Dey Krahorm, in Phnom Penh, community members had tried to apply for 
land titles for many years in order to formalise their land claims. When community members 
applied for land titles, the authorities refused to provide application forms. Finally, after 
application forms were obtained, the land department refused to accept the completed title 
requests. The community had lived under the threat of eviction for several years before 
eventually being moved by police and private security guards in 2009.557 There are 
numerous similar stories, especially in Phnom Penh, including the community of Group 78, 
evicted in 2009, who also had land title applications rejected. In this case, community 
members filed a complaint in 2006 to the Cadastral Commission, which hears disputes over 
unregistered land. The Commission finally issued a response in July 2009, stating that it had 
no competence to resolve the issue. The response came after the residents had been forcibly 
evicted.558 These two cases illustrate the limited enforcement of legal protections in practice, 
as well as the limited influence or “force field”559 of the existing law in spaces that are (1) 
of high financial value and (2) where an international actor is not involved. In both cases, 
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the land in question was valuable inner-city real estate which had been sold to well-
connected local companies.560  
The protections available to communities are different when multilateral banks, such as the 
World Bank or ADB, are involved in an infrastructure project requiring relocation, revealing 
how this involvement opens up space for the influence of international norms relating to 
rights and protection to operate in certain confined spheres. In these circumstances, local 
legal frameworks are supplemented by institutional safeguards and mechanisms developed 
at international forums or scales (Bissell and Nanwani 2009). As a 2014 document prepared 
by the ADB explained:  
In dealing with externally-financed projects, the [Cambodian] 
Government has adapted on a project-by-project basis, the 
resettlement policies of donors. Projects supported by external 
agencies are governed by the resettlement policies of donors and 
relevant laws and government regulations not consistent with donor 
policies are waived.561 
The statement above reveals how, in reality, a plethora of different resettlement norms and 
standards have emerged in Cambodia. The conditions attached to relocation, such as the 
quality of resettlement packages, compensation, transparency and the availability of 
complaints mechanisms, are often dependent on the particular alignment of donors, private 
investors or local actors involved in a given project.562 While an Inter-Ministerial Committee 
on Resettlement exists in Cambodia to oversee resettlement, in reality resettlement is carried 
out by many different actors in different ways. Multilateral banks, private investors and the 
Government can have very different standards and processes for relocation, and there is no 
central government agency which regulates this process. In circumstances where the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) are involved, formal grievance mechanisms are 
in place for affected people to seek redress for harm resulting from poorly implemented 
projects.563 Local grievance mechanisms are otherwise weak. Additionally, bilateral finance 
from countries such as China does not currently come with stringent requirements related to 
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resettlement and relocation, and compensation issues are generally handled according to the 
policies of the Cambodian Government, without imposition of external standards.564 
Consistent with the implications of legally plural environments presented in Chapter 3, it is 
possible to see how legal ambiguity emerges from this project-by-project approach. The 
authority for ADB policies and safeguards to take precedence over relevant domestic laws 
and regulations comes from inclusion of this commitment in an ADB contract with the 
Government. Thus, the agreement to waive relevant domestic laws and regulations it is not 
necessarily inscribed into Cambodian legislation or the constitution, consequently its legal 
authority is tenuous at best and in practice, dependent on the negotiation that takes places 
between the Cambodian Government and ADB once problems arise. It is noteworthy that 
Unruh and Williams argue that legal ambiguity, particularly relating to land ownership, often 
emerges following conflict and has a clear link to tenure insecurity.565 
Determining standards, rights and protections according to a project-by-project approach, 
also echoes the strategies described by Ong,566 who has analysed how Southeast Asian states 
make exceptions to their governance practices in response to foreign demands. Through 
ethnographic case studies, Ong articulates how Southeast Asian states use various neoliberal 
strategies to position themselves to compete in the global economy, resulting in many 
spheres of life being politically re-engineered as relationships, expectations and practices 
are reconfigured. She argues that the rights afforded to people and the governance practices 
that emerge in these spaces are developing in accordance with market-demand, and not 
applied consistency across the nation-state. One dimension of the changes underway that 
Ong identifies is that these places of exception open up spaces for NGOs to advocate for the 
human rights of those excluded from the potential benefits that new neoliberal engagement 
and emerging governance practices offer.   
While resettlement practices are a somewhat different context to Ong’s focus of enquiry, 
there are resonances with notions of exceptionalism. In recent years, there have been a 
number of examples of NGOs in Cambodia using both the formal complaints mechanisms 
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of the multilateral banks and the media to advocate on behalf of affected communities, as 
explored in the next section.  
4.7 Contesting displacement  
There have been a series of high profile, large-scale relocation events in Cambodia which 
have been contested by affected communities with the support of local and international 
NGOs. In some cases these events have involved international financiers and/or developers, 
which has opened additional avenues for NGOs and communities to campaign than if only 
domestic investors were involved. In the examples explored below, NGOs successfully 
publicised the impacts of relocation and assisted affected communities to use the 
accountability and complaints mechanisms of the World Bank and the ADB, illustrating 
how NGOs can act as conduits, connecting actors across different scales (local to global). 
Similar dynamics emerged in many of these relocation events, including the impoverishment 
of displaced communities immediately after relocation, highly uneven impacts and then 
gradual improvements over time once advocates succeeded in publicising community 
experiences.567  
The Highway One Project, approved in 1998 and then commenced in 2000, was the first 
infrastructure project requiring the Cambodian Government to comply with resettlement 
standards set by an international institution. It was also the first ADB project in Cambodia 
in which affected communities made a complaint to the ADB’s Accountability 
Mechanism.568 The ADB approved a USD 40 million loan to the Cambodian Government 
to improve a 105 km section of Highway One, from the east bank of the Mekong River at 
Neak Loeung to the Cambodian-Vietnam borderlands.569 The road was to be widened, raised 
and repaved, affecting around 1,200 households (approximately 6,000 people) living 
alongside the road. In the early stages, the Cambodian Government did not have laws or 
policies in place relating to involuntary resettlement. Thus, the ADB’s Safeguard Policy on 
Involuntary Resettlement 1995 (since updated) was the only framework which offered 
detailed protections.570 As stated earlier, the aims of the ADB policy were to minimize 
resettlement wherever possible. Where displacement was unavoidable the policy required 
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that affected people be compensated for lost assets, income and livelihoods, assisted to 
relocate, provided with appropriate land, housing and infrastructure, in such a way that “their 
economic and social future” would be generally “at least as favourable with the project as 
without it”.571 The 1995 Policy also specified that lack of formal legal title was “not a bar to 
compensation”, so that protection was offered to a range of informal dwellers, land users 
with traditional or customary rights, or those with adverse possession rights but no formal 
legal title to land and assets.572  
Notwithstanding the ADB policy, numerous problems emerged. The ADB did not set up 
adequate monitoring mechanisms, communities were not informed of the ADB Safeguard 
Policy, compensation was ad hoc and inadequate, and local authorities were accused of 
arbitrarily depreciating the value of assets so as to avoid the costs of compensation. Initially, 
none of the families were provided with replacement land, meaning that they were displaced 
with nowhere to resettle.573 The “right of way” extended 30 metres from the centreline of 
the highway, which meant that people living next to the road were deemed “illegal 
squatters”.574 The communities made complaints to the ADB Accountability Mechanism, 
supported by NGOs, resulting in a decade-long battle. An ADB audit of the resettlement 
process validated the community complaints.575 A resettlement site was not allocated to the 
communities until 2003, although many people were not accommodated in the site until 
2006.576 From April to October 2006, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement, 
delivered compensation, allowances and additional cash assistance to approximately 1,000 
affected people. As of 2011, 11 years after the project began, there were still approximately 
137 compensation cases unresolved or not addressed by the IRC.577   
Different dynamics unfolded in the infamous displacement conflict relating to the Boeung 
Kak Lake development in central Phnom Penh, affecting over 20,000 people. The conflict 
began when a 99-year lease was granted to private developer Shukaku Inc. over a 133-
hectare area covering the lake and the surrounding villages. It was made more complex by 
its interactions with the concurrent land-titling scheme described earlier, which was a multi-
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donor program primarily financed by the World Bank (LMAP).578 LMAP aimed to stimulate 
economic development by improving land tenure security through land-titling across the 
country.579 LMAP was prematurely cancelled due to the dramatic conflict between local 
residents of Boeung Kak Lake and the World Bank. The residents claimed they were 
excluded from the titling process because of the high value and private interest in their land. 
As the developers began filling the lake with sand, residents were gradually flooded out of 
their homes. A complaint was made to the World Bank Inspection Panel by the NGO Centre 
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) on behalf of the families in the Boeung Kak 
Lake area threatened with eviction. The complaint alleged that by arbitrarily excluding the 
area around the lake, the program had the effect of weakening the residents existing land 
tenure, which subsequently facilitated their displacement.580 The World Bank Inspection 
Panel investigated and confirmed the complaints. In turn, the Bank put pressure on the 
Cambodian Government to remedy the problems identified with LMAP in the Inspection 
Panel report. The Cambodian Government responded by cancelling the project, stating that 
the Bank attached too many “difficult conditions”.581 The World Bank then suspended 
further lending to Cambodia indefinitely in response to the Cambodian Government’s failure 
to address the problems that had emerged. The conflict seemed to result from the inclusion 
of a land titling adjudication area within an area where a land concession had been granted. 
Drawing on Biddulph’s geography of evasion thesis582 to analyse the event, this would be 
an example of land titling not evading a contested area, but as a result, creating far-reaching 
consequences for the land titling scheme and for the Government’s relationship with the 
World Bank.  
Both the Highway One project and the LMAP/Boeung Kak lake conflict provide context 
against which to understand the Cambodian railway project. They both involved a 
multilateral bank and illustrate past attempts to utilize international complaints structures in 
Cambodia to influence displacement events occurring locally.  
Reflecting on the patterns of displacement, tenure insecurity and community protest that 
have emerged in Cambodia, especially when considered against the legal geography theory 
                                                 
578 See: Inclusive Development International (2015a); World Bank (2002). 
579 Grimsditch, Kol & Sherchan (2012). 
580 Details of the complaints are available on the World Bank Inspection Panel Website: 
http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=7.  
581 See the summary in: Grimsditch, Kol & Sherchan (2012, p. 21). 
582 Biddulph (2010; 2014).  
135 
 
presented in the previous chapter, a number of dynamics are revealed. The leopard’s spots 
analogy583 used to describe how the land of some farmers is carved out and transformed into 
individually titled private farms, within parcels that are otherwise state land or communally 
occupied, presents a patch-work type picture of Cambodia’s land titling process. As does 
Biddulph’s geography of evasion thesis,584 which articulates how land titling schemes evade 
certain contested, high value spaces, especially those where land concessions have been 
awarded, even though these are the areas where clarity over land ownership might be needed 
most. As such, land titling tends to occur in some spaces, and land concessions to 
commercial interests in others. Similarly, resettlement safeguards apply to certain spaces 
(and the families living within them) as negotiated by influential actors in Government and 
the ADB, and do not apply to others. While there may be clear project rationales for the 
inclusion and exclusion of certain pieces of land within project areas, the impact of these 
different policies and schemes, as experienced by community members, is highly arbitrary. 
In many instances, as is the case with the Cambodian railway project, legal ambiguity585 – a 
product of legal pluralism – pervades interactions between community members and the 
Cambodian Government and exacerbates tenure insecurity. 
Following Pearson’s586 argument that international law (in various forms) can be found in 
many unlikely places, the influence of international protection norms, as manifested in the 
form of ADB resettlement safeguards, can be found in project locations spotted on the 
Cambodian landscape. Resettlement standards within the ambit of ADB project sites stand 
out as places of exception or islands of governance, where the rights and benefits that may 
be provided to affected people (if the safeguards are enforced) are significantly higher than 
what may be provided without the involvement an international actor. This resonates with 
the arguments of Ong, presented above, who has described how Southeast Asian states make 
exceptions to their usual practices of governance in response to external demands in order 
to participate in the global economy.587  
The patterns also reveal a type of wilful blindness on the part of international financers in 
Cambodia, whereby in the initial phases of planning the needs and objectives of donors, 
                                                 
583 The “Leopard skin” policy refers to Order 01, discussed above in Section 3.5 and 4.3. See Milne (2013).  
584 Biddulph (2010).  
585 Unruh & Williams (2013). 
586 Pearson (2008).  
587 Ong (2006).  
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lenders and the Government appear to align, but which disintegrates into conflict upon 
project implementation. Biddulph588 has made this argument in the context of LMAP, and 
as the following chapters sharply reveal, a similar type of blindness features in the trajectory 
of the railway project.  
4.8 Chapter review 
Displacement is inherently bound up in Cambodia’s uneven economic development, efforts 
to attract foreign and private investment, and ongoing struggles over natural resources, 
private land ownership and enjoyment of public space. Tensions between country 
“ownership” and requirements for “accountability” shape many of these relationships, but 
these dynamics are changing as non-traditional donors play a more significant role. The past 
fifteen years has seen large numbers of people displaced in Cambodia to make way for 
infrastructure projects, urban beautification, private development and land speculation.  
Although Cambodia has a land registration program, which has issued land titles to several 
million households, weak dispute resolution mechanisms and exclusions from the system 
leave many exposed to chronic tenure insecurity. This is exacerbated by limited transparency 
and accountability in urban planning decisions. It is also aggravated by a weakly 
implemented legal framework that provides uneven protections to citizens. The rights 
afforded to displaced people are ambiguous, and depend on the alignment of financiers and 
actors involved in driving the relocation.  
This chapter has helped to conceptualise the spaces and scales at which aid, advocacy and 
resettlement politics operate. It has emphasised how multilateral banks, such as the ADB, 
are simultaneously interested in financing large-scale infrastructure development in the 
region, at the same time as recognising that the necessary local institutions and 
accountability structures required to support these projects are not in place. The next chapter 
turns specifically to the ADB co-financed railway project in Cambodia, which is the focus 
of this study.  
                                                 
588 Biddulph (2014).  
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Chapter 5 
The Railway Rehabilitation Project in 
Cambodia  
 
5.1 Overview  
This chapter explains the Cambodian railway project in detail. The precise name of the 
project is the “Greater Mekong Subregion Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia”. For 
simplicity it is referred to variously as the Cambodian Railway Project or simply, the railway 
project. The chapter provides background about the original vision and rationale of the 
project and the history of the railway network. It introduces the parties to the loan 
agreements, the various contractors and consultants involved, and the community 
resettlement plans that were prepared. In doing so it provides a basic timeline of project 
implementation, which is also visually depicted in the timeline of events at the beginning of 
the thesis.589  
A critical part of the chapter is that it sets out the information available publicly to 
understand how the USD 141 million railway project due for completion in 2009, was 
delayed and eventually cancelled in 2014. At cancellation, there were more than 300 km of 
approximately 650 km of railway tracks yet to be repaired,590 although the Cambodian 
Government will still need to repay around USD 81.1 million, with interest, to the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) for the partly finished project.591 Before the project was 
cancelled in 2014, resettlement costs for the project had grown from USD 3.8 million in 
2006, to USD 7.6 million in 2009, to at least USD14.6 million in 2014.592 Over the course 
of the project, more than fifty detailed economic, financial and technical proposals, 
feasibility studies, resettlement plans, technical assessments, social and environmental 
                                                 
589 See the “Timeline of events” included in the thesis immediately before Chapter 1 (Introduction).  
590 There are slightly different distance approximations in the various documents. For example, compare: Asian 
Development Bank (2006, p. ii) and Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 1).  
591 These sums have been calculated based on the information in Asian Development Bank (2014h). See Section 5.4 below 
for details of the loan agreements and applicable interest rates.  
592 The evolving project costs are detailed throughout the project reports uploaded to the ADB project website: 
http://adb.org/projects/37269-013/activities. 
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monitoring studies had been prepared by various consultants, ADB staff, the Cambodian 
Government and others. In July 2015, the Cambodian Government announced it would 
commit USD 33 million to complete the project, in the absence of continued donor support, 
however the viability of these recent plans remain unclear.593 
The purpose of setting out the detail behind the project in this way is to convey the 
complexity of the loan arrangements, and the institutional and commercial trans-national 
agreements in place to support infrastructure projects of this kind. It helps to understand the 
internal contradictions of such projects, the scales and spaces at which different types of 
laws and regulations operate, the different cultural expectations brought to bear from 
different actors, as well as how risk is assessed and mitigated by multilateral banks, such as 
the ADB. The chapter also conveys how there was an awareness of the need to address 
various risks in the railway project from the outset, including resettlement impacts on 
communities. Notwithstanding this awareness, the safeguards and checks and balances that 
were put in place were not able to protect the project from these known risks during 
implementation. 
The chapter first provides a brief project history and rationale, before explaining the roles 
of different stakeholders and turning to the risk assessments, resettlement plans and then the 
advocacy surrounding the project. The final section explains the current status of the project 
as at December 2015.  
5.2  History of the rail network  
Cambodia once had a functioning railway system which fell into disrepair during the Khmer 
Rouge conflict in the 1970s. Construction of Cambodia’s railway network began during 
French colonisation. The first railway line was built in the 1930s forming the Northern line, 
a stretch of railway approximately 386 km in length, connecting the capital, Phnom Penh, 
to Poipet near the Cambodian-Thai border.594 In 1942, under Japanese occupation, the 
Northern Line was extended beyond Poipet and linked with Thailand’s rail network. 
However, the connection did not operate beyond the end of the 1940s due to a political 
impasse between Cambodia and Thailand and other security-related issues.595 The Southern 
                                                 
593 Zsombor (2015a).  
594 Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
595 Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
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Line, linking Phnom Penh to the coastal and port town of Sihanoukville through a line of 
around 264 km, was built in the 1960s with financial support from the Australian, French, 
West German and Chinese Governments. 596 The railway is described as operating well until 
the Khmer Rouge gained control of Cambodia in the 1970s.597 One source describes how 
between 1969-1970 there were 37 trains per day operating at a speed of 60 km an hour. 598  
Throughout the 1980s the railway was severely damaged and partly destroyed, with sections 
dangerously laid with landmines. The last 48 km of the railway line between Sisophon and 
the border near Poipet was almost entirely destroyed, referred to throughout ADB 
documentation as the “missing link”.599 The managerial aspects of the railway were also 
impacted during this period. As the concept paper prepared for the railway rehabilitation in 
2009 stated, “During the 1970s, the link was lost both physically and institutionally.”600 In 
the 1980s, the rail service resumed limited operations and gradually increased in the 1990s 
as Cambodia’s security situation improved and international organisations and investment 
began to flow into the country.601 However, due to increasing physical deterioration and 
competition from road transport, by 2008 the passenger service had ceased completely and 
only a freight service continued on the Southern Line.602  
Plans to restore the railway began in 2002 following a Technical Assistance project on the 
transport sector undertaken by ADB in Cambodia.603 The 2002 report found that access to 
efficient railway transport would be economically beneficial for Cambodia, and that the 
railway could become commercially viable if rehabilitated.604 Two further technical 
assistance studies were conducted which reportedly confirmed the conclusions of the first 
report.605 These studies are repeatedly cited throughout ADB’s project documents as 
                                                 
596 Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
597 Moly (2008, p. 5).  
598 Moly (2008, p. 5); Also see the discussion in Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
599 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 3). 
600 AusAID (2009b, p. 6). 
601 Open Development Cambodia (2015). Note that analysis of the railway’s history in ADB project documents is limited. 
It has been difficult to find a comprehensive history of the railway network, hence the reliance on Open Development 
Cambodia (2015) and Moly (2008).  
602 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 3); Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
603 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 3). 
604 Asian Development Bank (2002); The 2002 report is repeatedly cited throughout ADB’s project documents as providing 
the initial research in support of the railway rehabilitation. For example: Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 3); Asian 
Development Bank (2009a, p. 3).  
605 COWI (2004); Canarail Consultants Incorporated (2004). At the time of conducting the research these studies were not 
available on the ADB website.  
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providing the initial research in support of the railway rehabilitation. As the 2009 ADB 
Report and Recommendations of the President to the Board of Directors, states: 
 These studies confirmed sufficient future demand to make 
rehabilitation of the railway economically, financially, and 
commercially viable for the private sector once its infrastructure had 
been rehabilitated.606   
On this basis that the ADB provided a loan to the Cambodian Government for the railway 
rehabilitation.607 A map prepared by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) 
depicting the proposed railway rehabilitation indicating the “missing link” between Poipet 
and Sisophon is provided below.  
Figure 5: Map of the railway to be rehabilitated608 
 
                                                 
606 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 3). 
607 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 3). 
608 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia (2012). 
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5.3 Railway rehabilitation: vision and rationale  
Plans to restore Cambodia’s existing railway network formed part of a much larger vision 
of transport and connectivity in Cambodia and the region.609 Its stated aim was to improve 
economic opportunities for Cambodians by integrating Cambodia into the regional railway 
network of the Western Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). The GMS is an economic area 
designated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and includes the six countries situated 
on the Mekong River: Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam with a 
combined population of 326 million.610  In 1992, with support from ADB, the six countries 
committed to a program of subregional economic cooperation, “designed to enhance 
economic relations among the countries.”611 The program focuses on investing in transport, 
telecommunications, energy, environment, human resource development, trade, tourism, 
private sector development, and agriculture. The ADB GMS strategy describes the vast 
natural resources of the GMS region – oil, gas, water and coal – as largely underutilised and 
positions the Mekong as “the new frontier of Asian economic growth.” 612 A map of the 
GMS and its economic corridors as designated by the ADB strategy are depicted below, 
indicating how connectivity is central to the strategy.  
  
                                                 
609 Asian Development Bank (2009a).  
610 Asian Development Bank (2015c). 
611 Asian Development Bank (2015c). 
612 Asian Development Bank (2015c). 
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Figure 6: Map of the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Corridors613 
 
 
 
In 2008, at the third GMS Summit in Laos, the six countries reaffirmed their commitment 
to integrating transport and trade in the region, notably through expanding the GMS corridor 
network through “multimodal linkages”, including the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link.614 A 
                                                 
613 AmCHAM Vietnam and Asian Development Bank (2015).  
614 Asian Development Bank (2008a, p. 5).  
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multimodal form of transport requires an integrated economic system and set of agreements. 
It is defined as: 
the carriage of goods by at least two different modes of transport on 
the basis of a multimodal transport contract from a place in one 
country at which the goods are taken in charge by the multimodal 
transport operator to a place designated for delivery situated in a 
different country.615  
Cambodia’s road transport system was considered inefficient because of its “inadequate 
modal and route competition.”616 Rehabilitation of the Cambodian railway was promoted as 
an early realisation of the ADB GMS program and the commitment made at the 2008 
Summit to expand the economic corridor network through multimodal links. Once the 
Cambodian railway was restored, the plan was for a new agreement to be made between 
Cambodia and Thailand, which would provide Cambodia with an alternative means of 
transporting containers and bulk commodities across the border. 617  
The ADB also argued that the railway project in Cambodia contributed to ADB's Strategy 
2020, because it pursued “inclusive growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and 
regional integration.”618 At this early stage, the potential to offer passenger services on the 
railway was still being canvassed. The ADB 2006 proposal explains how increasing the 
diversity of transport options would give “shippers and passengers alternatives to existing 
routes and modes of transport”.619  It continues with the following rationale: 
Rail can be a highly competitive option, because its cost structure 
differs substantially from transport by road and sea. The differences 
in cost structure would make it difficult to establish and maintain 
cross-modal collusion between road and rail transport operators. 
Geographically, rail would also be an efficient competitor because 
the railway runs parallel to the country’s busiest highways—
National Roads 3, 4, and 5—and serves two international connection 
                                                 
615 United Nations (1980) (Article 1).  
616 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 4). 
617 AusAID (2009b, p. 6). 
618 Asian Development Bank (2008b); Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 9). 
619 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 4).  
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points—one at the Sihanoukville port and another at Poipet on the 
border with Thailand. The railway is also connected to the Mekong 
River via the river port in Phnom Penh. These links would enable 
multimodal integration that could form the basis for efficient 
distribution of bulk commodities to northeastern and northwestern 
Cambodia. The scope for additional railway traffic is substantial.620  
The significance of the section reproduced above will become increasingly clear, as the 
controversies surrounding the railway are gradually explained in the later sections of this 
chapter.621  
The Cambodian railway project also had a number of additional aims, including improved 
safety by reducing the transport of bulky, hazardous cargo on the road and reducing road 
traffic through populated villages. It also aimed to reduce overall transportation costs, reduce 
road maintenance costs through reduced heavy truck traffic, and to improve access to import 
and export markets via the Thai border in Poipet.622 
The plan complemented other railway plans in Cambodia and the region. For example, in 
2011 the ADB described widespread interest in building a railway from Thailand to Vietnam 
to connect with rail lines in China. The 2011 ADB transport assessment stated that:  
To achieve the link to Viet Nam, a new railway line must be built 
through Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City. A feasibility study for 
this line will be finished by 2012 and private financing of $500 
million–$600 million will be sought to pay for it. All of this proposed 
construction aligns with the GMS railway strategy… 623 
There have also been numerous reports in the local and international media that Chinese 
companies are interested in investing in the railway network in Cambodia and Lao PDR. In 
January 2013, Reuters published an article titled “Chinese firm plans $11 billion rail, port 
and steel projects in Cambodia”, which set out plans by two Chinese companies to build a 
400 km rail line that would link a steel facility in northern Preah Vihear to a port at the 
                                                 
620 Asian Development Bank (2009a, pp. 4-5). 
621 Also cross-reference with Chapter 8, Section 8.5. 
622 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. ii). 
623 Asian Development Bank (2011, p. 6). 
145 
 
southern island of Koh Kong.624 The formal details of these plans have not yet emerged. 
Nonetheless, restoration of the Cambodian railway was seen as contributing to a much larger 
set of projects supported by a range of different investors in the region all aimed at enhancing 
economic integration, transport and trade within and beyond Cambodia’s borders.  
5.4 The loan agreements  
5.4.1    The first loan agreement 2007 
The first loan agreement for the railway project was signed between the Kingdom of 
Cambodia (the borrower) and the ADB on 5 March 2007 for 28,277,000 Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR)625 equivalent to around USD 42 million.626 The OPEC Fund for International 
Development (OFID) provided a loan of USD 13 million to jointly finance the civil works 
component with the ADB. The original project also included a grant “in kind” from Malaysia 
in the form of reclaimed railway lines to the value of USD 2.8 million. The Cambodian 
Government agreed to provide USD 15.2 million, comprising the costs of project 
administration, taxes, clearance of unexploded devices (landmines), compensation of 
railway staff in connection with restructuring, and resettlement and land acquisition. The 
first ADB loan is repayable over 32 years, including an 8 year grace period. An interest rate 
of 1.0 percent applies during the grace period and 1.5 percent over the remainder of the loan. 
The loan from OFID is repayable over 20 years including a five year grace period, with a 
fixed interest rate of 1.0 percent per year and a fixed service charge of 1.0 percent per year.627 
The total investment for the original project totalled around USD 73 million, depicted below.  
Table 1: Original project financing plan628 
Source Total (USD million) Percentage of total project costs 
ADB 42.0 57.0 
OFID  13.0 18.0 
Government of Malaysia 
(grant in kind) 
2.8 4.0 
Government of Cambodia  
15.2 21.0 
Total 73 100 
                                                 
624 Prak (2015). 
625 Asian Development Bank (2007).  
626 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 6). 
627 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 6). 
628 For details of calculations and assumptions, see: Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 10).  
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A further breakdown of the details of how the finances would be used is set out below in 
Table 2.  
Table 2: Summary of estimated costs of original project629 
Item Purpose Amount USD million 
A.  Base Cost 
 
 
Civil works 52.9 
 
Equipment 2.8 
 
Land acquisition, resettlement, social mitigation 3.8 
 
Restructuring costs 0.7 
 
Consulting services 3.4 
Subtotal A.  63.6 
B.  Contingencies 7.9 
C.  Financing charges during implementation 1.5 
Total (A+B+C) 73 
 
The first loan was for rehabilitation of 594 km of existing railway tracks and associated 
structures, passing loops and spur lines, as well as reconstruction of the 48 km destroyed 
section (the “missing link”) of the railway line from Sisophon to Thailand. The loan was 
also for construction of direct access to the container terminal in the port of Sihanoukville 
and for the costs associated with restructuring the railway subsector, assisting employees 
following redundancy and providing for project monitoring, engineering design and 
supervision of civil works. External funding was not used for the community resettlement 
costs, this was financed by the Government of Cambodia.630  
The railway tracks were to be “meter gauge” as this was perceived to be “consistent with 
the railway networks in neighboring countries”.631 The ADB proposal explained the 
significance of choosing meter gauge as follows:  
The gauge of a railway is the distance between the inside of the rails 
constituting the track. Meter gauge refers to rails spaced 1.0 meter 
                                                 
629 These figures are taken directly from the ADB documentation. For additional financial details and assumptions, see: 
Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 6).  
630 See Appendix E.  
631 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 5).  
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apart. Other common gauges are standard gauge (about 1.4 meters 
spacing), which is used in the PRC, North and South America, and 
most of Europe and Australia; and broad gauge (about 1.5 meters) 
which is used in the Russian Federation, Central Asia, South Asia 
and parts of Europe. Trains constructed to operate on one gauge 
cannot operate on another gauge without modification. Meter gauge 
is the common railway standard in Southeast Asia, which means that 
trains from various national railways can interoperate.632 
In parallel to the negotiations for the loan, arrangements were underway to select a 
concessionaire to rehabilitate and operate the railway.  
5.4.2   Public-private partnership arrangements  
The state-owned railway enterprise, Royal Railway of Cambodia (RRC) established in 2002, 
was the main institution responsible for operating the railway until 2009.633 ADB provided 
technical assistance to the Cambodian Government to establish a concession agreement to 
operate the railway commercially. Management of the railway rehabilitation was the 
responsibility of the Cambodian Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) with 
technical assistance and support from the ADB (the “public sector component”). A 
commercial operator was to be selected to operate the railway (the “private sector 
component”).634 In this respect, the arrangements differed from the Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT) model that has been used in Southeast Asia previously, described by Wyatt 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis.635 For the Cambodian railway project, the infrastructure 
rehabilitation was to be done by the public sector (the Cambodian Government), financed 
primarily through loans from the ADB, and then operated by the private sector.636 Poor 
maintenance, lack of funds, train delays and cancellations by the state-owned enterprise were 
ostensibly the reasons why the Cambodian Government agreed to the privatisation 
arrangements.637 
                                                 
632 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 3).  
633 Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
634 These arrangements were eventually clarified through written correspondence with the ADB, see Appendices D and E.   
635 Wyatt (2004); See Chapter 2, Section 2.10.  
636 See Appendix E.  
637 Open Development Cambodia (2015). 
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Selection of the private operator was a “condition for loan effectiveness” as stated in the 
ADB proposal for the railway rehabilitation.638 A 30 year concession was granted to the 
Australian company, Toll Holdings, in 2009 to operate the railways once they were 
rehabilitated. Toll Holdings was to be the majority partner with a 55 per cent share in the 
investment. The private Cambodian company, Royal Group, committed to a 45 per cent 
stake.  The plan was for the two companies to jointly operate the railway as Toll Royal 
Railways.639  
The Technical Assistance provided by ADB in relation to the concession was twofold: (1) 
advice to the Cambodian Government on how to restructure the railway and how to develop 
and negotiate the long-term concession agreement for private sector operation of the railway, 
and (2) strengthening capacity of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) to 
manage the concession and provide regulatory oversight for the railway subsector.640 The 
Canadian consulting firm, Canarail, was also to provide capacity building to the MPWT to 
manage the concession agreement.641 
Advice on the restructuring of the railway was provided in January 2006 by ADB via various 
consultants, and the concessionaire (Toll Holdings) was selected in 2007 after an 
“international competitive bidding” process.642 Toll Holdings is an Australian company 
working in 50 countries around the world, already had pre-existing operations in Cambodia 
in the banking, telecommunications and media sectors. Royal Group is run by the well-
known Cambodian businessman and former refugee to Australia, Kith Meng.643 Meng 
attended university in Australia and since returning to Cambodia has become the Chairman 
of Royal Group. Meng also owns a majority stake in Cambodia’s leading television and 
telecommunications networks, Cambodia Broadcasting Corporation and CamGSM.644 The 
concession agreement between the Cambodian Government and Toll Holdings was signed 
on 12 June 2009.645 The legal status of the RRC was terminated and the Department of 
Railway was created within MPWT.646 The 2009 ADB documentation describes Toll 
                                                 
638 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. ii). 
639 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 4). 
640 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 6).  
641 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 2). 
642 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 7). 
643 Toll Holdings Limited (2009).  
644 Crispin (2007).  
645 Toll Holdings Limited (2009).  
646 Open Development Cambodia (2015).   
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Holdings as “a large international logistics firm that operates worldwide.” It also describes 
how the: 
[C]oncessionaire's business plan aims to develop railway traffic, as 
well as support the integration of the railway into a seamless 
subregional, multimodal transport system… Achieving hub status 
could create significant additional long-term development prospects 
in Cambodia...647  
Thus, the concession agreement between the Cambodian Government, Toll Holdings and 
Royal Group was seen as a key aspect of the project’s future success. The ADB was not a 
party to the concession agreement and did not finance the concession. There is no 
information available publicly about the specific financial arrangements in place between 
the concessionaire and the Cambodian Government.648 It is clear that the Cambodian 
Government took on the financial burden of the ADB loans as well as contributing additional 
finances to undertake the rehabilitation component.649    
5.4.3   The civil works contractors 
While Toll Holdings was to be the private concessionaire and operate the railway, different 
contractors were hired to undertake the civil works to physically rehabilitate the railway. 
The process of contracting out various aspects of the work was to be managed by the MPWT 
with technical assistance and support from the ADB. The National Committee for the 
Singapore-Kunming railway link was also designated as the Steering Committee for the 
project.650 Companies, TSO-AS and Nawarat, were selected as a joint venture to be the 
construction contractor for both the Northern and Southern lines.651 An agreement was made 
between the MPWT and TSO Company’s representative in Phnom Penh on January 11 
2008.652 TSO is a French company founded in 1927 and specialises in the construction, 
renewal, laying and maintenance of railway tracks for railways and urban networks.653 
                                                 
647 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 4). 
648 This information is to the best of my knowledge. I attempted to contact Toll Holdings for an interview a number of 
times throughout the research.  
649 See Appendix E.  
650 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. iv). 
651 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2014, p. 2). 
652 Royal Embassy of Cambodia in Washington D.C. (2008).  
653 TSO (2015).  
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Nawarat is a Thai company, established in 1976 as Nawarat Patanakarn Public Company 
Limited, is one of Thailand’s largest construction firms.654 The Japanese company, Nippon 
Koei CO LTD in association with the Japan Railway Technical Service (JARTS) were 
selected as the design and construction “supervision consultants”.655 Nippon Koei Co Ltd 
was responsible for supervising and monitoring the construction of works of TSO-AS and 
Nawarat and was required to provide regular Environmental Monitoring Reports. As at 
March 2015, there were thirty-seven Environmental Monitoring Reports prepared by 
Nippoen Koei uploaded to the ADB website for the railway.656  
5.4.4   The “supplementary loan” or second loan agreement 2010   
Once the original railway project gathered momentum, it became clear that the original cost 
estimates were inadequate. Pressure grew for ADB to provide additional finance. The 
reasons for requiring additional finance were explained in a concept paper prepared by 
AusAID: 
Partly because the railway has deteriorated substantially since the 
original rehabilitation studies were done, but more so because the 
railway operator had presented a business plan that would, with 
additional financing for the rehabilitation operation, greatly increase 
the effectiveness of the railway in the country’s transport space, 
additional financing is required.657 
The concept paper also detailed how the process of selecting the concessionaire had been 
more complicated than anticipated and that in the three years that had elapsed since the 
original project was approved, there had been numerous changes in the project’s scope and 
so in cost.658 Additional financing was also sought to establish a new freight and rolling 
stock maintenance facility at Samrong, 10 km west of Phnom Penh which would enable 
multimodal transport. The additional financing would also contribute to upgrading and 
strengthening parts of the main line and establishing sidings to terminals to facilitate 
multimodal services and connectivity.659 The new expanded project promised to increase 
                                                 
654 Nawarat (2013).  
655 The Terms of Reference for the supervision consultants is set out in: Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 38) 
656 Asian Development Bank (2015a). 
657 AusAID (2009b, p. 5). 
658 AusAID (2009b, p. 5). 
659 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. ii). 
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the regional integration of the railway and expand its “national development impacts”.660 As 
the Report and Recommendations of the President to the ADB Board of Directors states:  
The impact of the modified project…will be increased domestic and 
regional trade movement on the railway, thereby supporting 
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. This will be 
achieved by developing the railway in Cambodia into a provider of 
logistics services in Cambodia and neighboring GMS countries.661  
In 2009 the ADB agreed to a supplementary loan, signed and dated 2 March 2010, for an 
additional SDR 26,408,000, equivalent to USD 42 million. The Government of Australia 
also agreed to provide a grant of USD 22 million that would be managed and administered 
by the ADB, explained in the next section. The Cambodian Government agreed to provide 
an additional USD 5.1 million. The total revised cost was USD 141.6 million, including 
taxes and duties of around USD 14.9 million. The revised cost plan was almost twice the 
amount originally estimated. The ADB supplementary loan has a thirty-two year maturity, 
including an eight year grace period. The annual interest rate is 1.0 percent during the grace 
period and 1.5 percent over the remainder of the loan. The documentation also states that 
the financing charges during the implementation of the loan will be capitalized.662 The costs 
of the modified project are set out at Table 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
660 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 7). 
661 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 8). 
662 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 11). 
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Table 3: Combined loan costs for the modified project663  
 Original loan 
 
Supplementary loan Modified Project 
 
Source 
USD 
million 
Share of 
total 
(%) 
USD 
million 
Share of 
total 
(%) 
USD 
million 
Share of 
total (%) 
ADB 42.0 57.6 42.0 61.2 84.0 59.3 
Government 
of Australia  0.0 0.0 21.5 31.3 21.5 15.2 
OFID  13.0 17.8 0.0 0.0 13.0 9.2 
Government 
of Malaysia 
(in kind) 2.8 3.8 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.0 
Government 
of 
Cambodia  15.2 20.8 5.1 7.4 20.3 14.3 
Total 73 100 68.6 100.0 141.6 100.0 
 
The revised break-down of costs is below at Table 4. The estimated costs of land acquisition, 
resettlement and social mitigation increased from USD 3.8 million in 2007 to USD 7.6 
million 2010. The supplementary loan would also increase the technical assistance provided 
by the ADB for outcome monitoring and procurement review.664 The project was originally 
expected to be completed by May 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
663 These figures are taken directly from the ADB documentation. For additional financial details and assumptions, see: 
Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 12). 
664 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 14). 
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Table 4: Revised project investment plan665 
  USD million 
 
Item Purpose Original  
Supplementa
ry Modified Project 
A.  Base Cost    
 Civil works 52.9 50.0 102.9 
 Equipment 2.8 3.2 6.0 
 
Land acquisition, 
resettlement, social 
mitigation 3.8 3.8 7.6 
 Restructuring costs 0.7 0.1 0.8 
 Consulting services 3.4 2.5 5.9 
 
Institutional support 
and capacity building 0.0 3.0 3.0 
 Project administration 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Subtotal A.  63.8 62.8 126.6 
B. Contingencies 7.7 4.8 12.5 
C. 
Financing charges 
during 
implementation 1.5 1.0 2.5 
Total (A+B+C) 73 68.6 141.6 
 
5.4.5   Additional grant from Australia 
In 2009, the Australian Government, through the agency then known as AusAID, agreed to 
provide USD 22 million for the modified project which would be administered and managed 
by the ADB.666 AusAID support for the railway project was positioned within the overall 
context of promoting economic growth in the region, good infrastructure being essential for 
growth. Support for the project was also framed within the dynamics of the Global Economic 
Crisis, as investing infrastructure development within Cambodia was an opportunity to 
generate employment in Cambodia.667 A 2009 AusAID concept paper estimated that the 
project would provide employment for around 1,200-1,500 employees either directly or 
indirectly over four years and subsequently during the operation of the railway.668 It argued 
                                                 
665 These figures are taken directly from the ADB documentation. For additional financial details and assumptions, see: 
Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 11). 
666 AusAID (2009b, p. 6). Note that in 2012 after a change in Government in Australia, AusAID was subsumed into the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and has since been referred to as the Australian Aid Program.  
667 AusAID (2009b, p. 6). 
668 AusAID (2009b, p. 7). 
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that the project was convergent with a number of objectives of the Australian aid program, 
explaining that:  
…the Project presents strong economic and financial viability. It lays 
the foundations for a far more integrated transport and logistics 
network for Cambodia than the country possesses at present. It 
moves the operations and management of a major public asset from 
the public sector, where it is poorly performing and rapidly 
deteriorating, to a private sector operator that has a sound and 
practical plan for restoring it to  former central place in the country’s, 
and the region’s transport system. 669 
The concept paper relied on information gathered through a number of exercises: (1) an 
economic and financial procurement review commissioned by AusAID, (2) a fact-finding 
mission undertaken by ADB in July-August 2009 and (3) the inputs of a report from a 
monitoring and evaluation/social development consultant engaged by AusAID. These 
reports were attached to the original report as appendices but are not available in the online 
version.670 The allocation of Australian Government funding (to be administered by the 
ADB) is presented in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Allocation of Australian financing (USD)671 
Activity Amount AUD 
1. Construction works 18.45 million 
2. Capacity building assistance to MPWT  3 million 
3. 
Technical assistance (For outcomes monitoring and 
procurement review) 400,000 
4. 
Resettlement advisory services (Support to ADB and 
Australia for oversight of project’s resettlement program) 150, 000 
 Total 22 million 
 
A stakeholder map depicting the key stakeholders involved in the railway project is set out 
below. As depicted in the map, ADB was responsible for administering all external grants 
and contributions.  
                                                 
669 AusAID (2009b, p. 7). 
670 AusAID (2009b, p. 4). 
671 AusAID (2009a, p. 3).  
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Figure 7: Railway stakeholder map 
 
Source: Author’s illustration   
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5.5 Projected benefits of the project  
Significant financial benefits (both commercial and public) were forecast to result from the 
restoration of the railway. The 2009 ADB proposal described the activities covered by the 
supplementary financing as “technically feasible, institutionally sound [and] economically 
viable…”.672 The report estimated that the economic internal rate of return would be 20.7 
percent, and that the financial internal return of about 9.2 percent.673 In 2011, an ADB 
Transport Sector Assessment and Roadmap, explained how the principal goods to be carried 
by rail once the modified project was implemented would be cement, petroleum, and 
containers. The assessment estimated that: 
rail traffic is expected to grow by 7%–12% per year to 2030, with a 
projected increase in locomotives from the current 4 to 30. Railways 
are also expected to reduce the load on the road network.674  
Some of the factors which might reduce the economic viability of the project were 
canvassed, including (1) possible failure to reconnect with the railway in Thailand; (2) 
forecast demand for railway transport, especially the schedule for bringing the planned new 
cement factories in Kampot Province into operation; (3) the efficiency of the future railway 
operator; (4) the future price for oil which has been volatile in recent years and (5) possibly 
higher project implementation costs if yet unidentified weaknesses in the existing railway 
infrastructure were identified during detailed design. A Sensitivity Test and a Risk Analysis 
was applied using a number of these variables, which concluded that there was a 96% 
probability that the project would achieve an estimated economic internal rate of return 
(EIRR) of 12 percent or more. 675  
The Economic Analysis prepared in 2006 considered the distributional benefits of the 
project, noting that one third of Cambodians fall beneath the poverty line and 90 percent live 
in rural areas.676 The benefits of the project were expected to flow to poorer households in 
three ways:  
                                                 
672 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 9). 
673 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 9). 
674 Asian Development Bank (2011).  
675 Asian Development Bank (2006, pp. 50-60). A sensitivity analysis was undertaken, see: Asian Development Bank 
(2006, p. 50). 
676 Asian Development Bank (2006). 
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 direct benefits from reduced personal transport costs;  
 indirect benefits from lower costs of transport for staple commodities; and  
 economic activity that could create additional income generation and 
employment opportunities.677  
The analysis explained that most of the benefits would flow from reducing the costs of 
transporting people and basic commodities. 678 This was predicted to have a positive impact 
on the cost of living, trade and economic growth. 679 Cumulatively, these benefits were 
considered to be “a strong catalyst for overall poverty reduction.” 680  
However, passenger services were not considered economically viable without significant 
subsidies from the Cambodian Government. Based on a number of assumptions, the 2006 
assessment concluded that ticket revenues could cover around 50 percent of the capital costs 
attributable to passenger traffic, resulting in an annual revenue shortfall of $0.6 million in 
the first year of operation, which would increase to $3.1 million in 2030.681 Projected deficits 
were estimated to grow exponentially after 2020, on the basis that passenger frequency 
would increase first on the Northern Line and then on the Southern Line.682 This Economic 
Analysis, which clearly sheds doubt on the viability of passenger services, was buried in 
Appendix 14 of the 2006 ADB proposal. The updated Economic Analysis prepared in 2009 
was not attached to the publicly available version of the proposal for the Supplementary 
Loan.683 In the finalised plans for the railway, no passenger service was included.684  
5.6 Risks and safeguards  
The ADB proposal documents contain varying assessments of the severity and likelihood of 
risks relating to social and environmental impacts, fiduciary risks, contractor non-
performance and economic loss.685 According to the AusAID concept paper, the risk of non-
                                                 
677 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 60). 
678 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 60). 
679 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 60). 
680 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 61). 
681 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 61).  
682 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 61). 
683 Asian Development Bank (2009a).  
684 Note that in the late stages of finalising this thesis, the Phnom Penh Post reported that the Cambodian Government had 
revitalised the idea of operating the passenger service, starting with the Sihanoukville line, see: Crane (2016).   
685 The Environmental Assessment for both the original and modified project classified the investment as “Category B”, in 
that it is not expected to have any permanent adverse environmental effects. The social risks related to resettlement were 
not explicitly categorised in the risk summary, see: Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. i). The CRP Report prepared in 
2014 assesses the project was Category A in relation to resettlement, see: Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. iv).  
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performance by any of the contractors was not considered significant. Toll Holding’s 
business plan and corporate logistics history were considered credible.686  
The risk of delay or difficulties on behalf of the contractor was also not considered 
significant, or at least could be mitigated by various measures. Evident in the 2009 AusAID 
concept paper is a limited understanding of the complexity of the work to be undertaken. It 
states  (emphasis added):  
Delayed completion of the rehabilitation works – This risk would 
arise from non-performance by the selected civil works contractor. 
It has largely been mitigated by the selection of a competent 
contractor, and by the relatively simple nature of the works 
themselves.687 
Notwithstanding the assessment that there was a 96 percent probability that the project 
would achieve an EIRR of 12 percent or more, certain measures were considered critical to 
ensure this was the case. The Economic Analysis prepared in 2006 set out the strategies to 
avoid or mitigate loss, including the commercialisation of the railway operator, scheduling 
rehabilitation so that the sections with high economic potential would be rehabilitated first, 
and securing assurances from the Thai Government that the border crossing could be re-
established.688  
The social and environmental risks posed by the project were downplayed in the Executive 
Summaries of the proposal documents. However the full reports provide more detailed 
considerations. It is noteworthy that the assessment describes the responsible Cambodian 
Government department (MPWT) as having previously implemented internationally 
financed projects well. The Executive Summary of the 2009 proposal states the following 
(emphasis added):  
The modified project is not expected to be subject to any significant 
technical, environmental, or social risks. The MPWT has performed 
satisfactorily in implementing internationally financed projects. The 
modified project has been formulated to reduce potential economic, 
                                                 
686 AusAID (2009b, p. 17). 
687 AusAID (2009b, p. 17).  
688 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 53). 
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financial, and social risks…The economic risks are minimized by the 
involvement of a private railway operator that will realize the 
modified project’s benefits by providing railway services on a 
commercial basis. The social risks include resettlement, the possible 
spread of HIV infection during construction, and the retrenchment of 
redundant railway staff in connection with restructuring. Appropriate 
mitigation measures are included in the resettlement plan and the 
social safety protection program.689  
The body of the report analyses the potential risks in more depth. In relation to resettlement 
risks, the proposal explains that the project would permanently clear a 7 metre corridor-of-
impact, centred on the middle of the railway line. The proposal also explains how the 
corridor of impact is narrower than the railway’s right-of-way to minimize resettlement 
impacts. The initial assessment estimated that around 2,630 households would be affected 
by the Project, of which about 965 households (about 4,150 people) would be displaced and 
about 1,660 households (about 7,140 people) would experience “minor impacts” caused by 
the loss of secondary structures (wells, fences, etcetera) and trees.690 Importantly, the report 
made the following assessment about the impoverishment risks facing the households 
(emphasis added):  
Displaced households and businesses face the risk of losing access 
to their sources of income if they are moved too far away from their 
current residence, thus resettlement sites have been identified close 
to current places of occupancy. Resettlement is most significant in 
Poipet, on the border with Thailand, where large numbers of people 
have settled on the railway’s currently unused land. About 635 
households (about 2,730 people) will be displaced in Poipet, 
equivalent to 66% of total displacement. The area required for 
reconstructing the Poipet station has been reduced from 6 hectares to 
3 hectares to minimize displacement.”691 
                                                 
689 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. v). Similar statement included in original proposal: Asian Development Bank 
(2006, p. v).  
690 Asian Development Bank (2006, pp. 13-14). 
691 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 14). 
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Both the 2006 and 2009 proposal documents also mention anticipated impacts to “bamboo 
transport operators”. The bamboo transport operators were operating an informal transport 
system along sections of the railway tracks, using a small motorised trolley made mostly 
from bamboo. In some villages there was no road access and the bamboo rail transport 
service was the only means of transport. It was predicted that the bamboo operators would 
lose their livelihoods once the railway was rehabilitated and the tracks began operation. The 
census conducted revealed that there were 189 operators, 12 of whom were women. Plans 
were made to compensate the bamboo operators with funds to enable them to switch from 
rail to road transport providers. Access roads that were planned for the railway project would 
be left in place after the project to ensure access to the remote communities affected by the 
loss of the bamboo transport system would still be possible.692  
The 2009 ADB proposal identified resettlement impacts to an additional 232 households at 
Samrong in Phnom Penh, because of the new freight facility.693 The proposal explains that 
the 2006 Resettlement Plan, already prepared, would be adjusted to include the additional 
affected households at Samrong, explained further below. The Cambodian Government was 
required to comply with ADB’s social and environmental safeguards. The loan agreements 
placed the following obligations on the Cambodian Government extracted below  
(emphasis added). This extract clearly conveys the requirements placed on the Cambodian 
Government within the bounds of the project.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
692 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 14). 
693 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 17).  
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Box 3: Excerpt from Supplementary Loan Agreement 2 March 2010 between the ADB and 
Kingdom of Cambodia (the borrower).  
(emphasis added) 
B: SAFEGUARDS AND OTHER MATTERS 
Environment and Social 
4. The Borrower shall ensure that all Works contracts under the Project incorporate provisions to ensure 
that contractors (i) comply with the Borrower’s environmental regulations, ADB’s Environment 
Policy (2002), the environmental management plan and the Initial Environmental Examination for 
the Project; (ii) comply with all applicable laws and regulations of the Borrower, including ratified 
international treaty obligations; (iii) do not employ child labor and provide safe working conditions 
for male and female workers; (iv) do not provide male and female workers with different wages or 
benefits for work of equal value to the extent that it is applicable to contractors; and (v) carry out 
training programs and awareness campaigns on the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) at campsites and in communities along the railway lines. 
The MPWT shall monitor compliance through the Project consultant which has been recruited for 
independent monitoring of compliance with safeguard requirements. 
Resettlement 
5. The Borrower shall ensure that IRC updates the Resettlement Plan after detailed project design based 
on a detailed measurement survey of losses. The assignments of the independent monitoring agency 
and the Project consultant’s resettlement specialists already engaged for the initial project shall be 
expanded to also include monitoring and supervision at Samrong. The update shall be prepared in 
full consultation with affected persons and shall be disclosed to them through relevant commune 
offices. The updated Resettlement Plan for any section of the railway shall be submitted to ADB 
for review and approval before commencement of any land acquisition and relocation activities for 
that section. IRC shall implement the approved, updated Resettlement Plans in accordance with the 
Borrower’s laws, regulations, and procedures and ADB's Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1995). 
In the case of discrepancies between the Borrower’s laws, regulations, and procedures and ADB's 
policy, ADB's policy shall prevail. 
6. The Borrower shall ensure that Works contractors are not issued a notice of possession of the 
pertinent section of railway until (i) the satisfactory completion of compensation payments and 
relocation to new sites for that particular section; (ii) the agreed rehabilitation assistance is in place; 
and (iii) the particular section is free from all encumbrances. 
7. The Borrower shall ensure that if people in the remaining right-of-way beyond the corridor of impact 
are resettled in the future, the resettlement shall be carried out in accordance with the standards 
established for the Project. 
8. The Borrower shall ensure the timely provision of counterpart funds for resettlement to meet any 
unforeseen obligations in excess of the resettlement budget estimates to satisfy resettlement 
requirements and objectives 
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The other risks identified in the reports and proposals related to gender inclusion, potential 
HIV risks, financial risks, environmental risks, and other uncertainties relating to whether 
the Thai Government would agree to re-establish the cross-border connection near Poipet.694 
The HIV risks stemmed from the potential spread of HIV/AIDS infection during 
construction due to the influx of workers in the railway area. To address this the civil works 
contractors were required to develop and implement an awareness and prevention campaign 
during the construction period for both workers and nearby communities.695 Other 
mitigation measures were also detailed in the proposal. For example, gender concerns were 
integrated into the project so that both male and female representatives of affected 
households in each commune would be involved in the resettlement working group. Gender-
sensitivity training was to be provided to MPWT personnel and the working group through 
a resettlement specialist. Project indicators and monitoring data was to be disaggregated by 
gender. Negotiations regarding the cross-border railway connection with Thailand were to 
be re-opened by the Cambodian Minister of Public Works and the ADB committed to 
providing technical assistance support through its resident missions in Cambodia and 
Thailand. 696 
The original ADB Project Report and Recommendations prepared in 2006 identified 
financial risks relating to the MPWT that were minimised in the later 2009 report. The earlier 
2006 report stated that (emphasis added): 
MPWT's capacity to handle ADB-financed projects has improved 
considerably in recent years... but certain aspects need 
improvement. Earlier loans, both closed and ongoing loans, 
encountered delays in relation to procurement, resettlement and 
compensation, and counterpart fund payments. The key lessons 
from these loans were that there was a need to ensure that (i) 
procurement approval is delegated to the project management unit; 
(ii) processes for approving bid documents and awarding contracts 
that are applicable to ADB-financed contracts under a loan are 
                                                 
694 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 16). 
695 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 16). 
696 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 16). 
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clarified at the outset; (iii) satisfactory resettlement plans and 
frameworks are in place before loans are approved; (iv) specific 
environmental requirements, including documentation and 
reporting requirements, are included in loan covenant and bidding 
documents…697 
The 2006 proposal framed the project as an opportunity to further develop the capacity of 
the MPWT in relation to social and environmental safeguards. It acknowledges that MPWT's 
dependence on consultants was high under earlier loans, especially with respect to 
procurement, social and environmental studies, and project performance monitoring. The 
plan was that MPWT’s capacity would be enhanced the railway project by “involving 
MPWT staff in all stages of project implementation”.698 
Instead of identifying these shortcomings and potential risks, the 2009 proposal for the 
modified project instead states that, “MPWT has a long-standing record of satisfactorily 
implementing ADB projects.” It referred back to the 2006 report, stating that the “financial 
management capacity of the executing agency was assessed during preparation of the 
original loan and remains valid.”699 It was anticipated that there would still need to be 
substantial support from national and international consultants in almost all aspects of the 
project, including supervision of construction works, capacity building within MPWT, 
financial management, resettlement, gender sensitivity training, monitoring of the project 
(including of construction, resettlement, environment and gender components). The original 
2006 project budgeted around USD 3.43 million for consultants.700 An additional USD 2.5 
million was added to the estimated cost of consultants in the 2009 proposal, bringing the 
total estimated cost of consultants to USD 5.9 million. The Cambodian Government was 
required to select consultants in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of 
Consultants (2007).701 Consultants would also be required to supervise and train MPWT 
staff in the processes and standards that need to be met in the procurement of consultants 
process.  
                                                 
697 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 6).  
698  Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 6). 
699 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 17). 
700 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 33). 
701 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 13). 
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Both the 2006 and 2009 proposal required the Cambodian Government to undertake specific 
assurances and conditions. These related to railway law reform, undertakings that all 
contractors comply with ADB’s safeguards, in particular the resettlement safeguards, 
anticorruption policies, the gender sensitivity strategy, and project monitoring, including 
establishing baseline target values for all indicators prior to the commencement of the 
project. These assurances included:  
 preparation of a detailed measurement survey (DMS) of losses resulting from 
land acquisition;  
 provision of compensation, assistance, and suitable alternative land before 
displacement;  
 assistance to the poorest and most vulnerable people to improve their 
socioeconomic status;  
 capacity-building programs to help with the impacts of resettlement;  
 timely provision of funds for resettlement to meet any unforeseen obligations 
exceeding the resettlement budget estimates. 702 
The resettlement plans are explained further below. The 2006 ADB proposal included a 
number of other frameworks and assessments designed to mitigate any potentially negative 
impacts of the project. These additional plans are set out below to convey that there was 
extensive documentation of various aspects of the project and the risks they posed. These 
plans and documents included:  
 The Design and Monitoring Framework (Appendix 1); 
 Sector Analysis (Appendix 2); 
 External  Assistance (Appendix 3); 
 Outline of the station in Poipet and port access in Sihanoukville (Appendix 4); 
 Policy Letter from the Government to the Asian Development Bank (Appendix 5);  
 Detailed Cost Estimates (Appendix 6); 
 Implementation Schedule (Appendix 7); 
 Procurement Plan (Appendix 8); 
 Terms of Reference for the Supervision Consultant (Appendix 9); 
                                                 
702 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. vi). 
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 Benefit Monitoring (Appendix 10); 
 Summary Poverty Reduction and Social Strategy (Appendix 11); 
 Summary Resettlement Plan (Appendix 12); 
 Financial Analysis (Appendix 13); 
 Economic Analysis (Appendix 14); 
 Summary Initial Environmental Examination (available on request) (Appendix 15); 
 
Many of the frameworks and assessments were updated in the 2009 proposal, and some 
additional plans were included such as: 
 Development coordination (Appendix 2);  
 Summary Resettlement Plan for Samrong (Appendix 4); 
 Scope of work for Capacity Development Assistance to the ministry of Public Works 
and Transport (Appendix 6); 
 Technical assistance for outcome monitoring review and procurement review 
(Appendix 10); 
 Governance Framework (Appendix 11);  
 Status of Loan Covenants (Appendix A);  
 Summary Environmental Examination for Samrong (Appendix B).703 
 
AusAID also prepared a risk assessment of the project. The AusAID concept paper identified 
a number of risks relating to resettlement, HIV/AIDs, and potential impacts on women. It 
focuses primarily on the resettlement risks and states that there is a “potential reputational 
risk for AusAID and ADB” if the involuntary resettlement program is not well-managed and 
the people affected by the project are not able to restore their pre-project livelihoods.704 In 
particular it focuses on the impacts of resettlement. It explains that years of conflict and 
neglect of the railway have resulted in “severe encroachment” of the railway right-of-way 
by “formal and informal communities”. The original right-of-way was forty metres wide, 
but the concept paper acknowledges that “it is no longer possible, nor is it necessary to 
entirely recover this” and that, in accordance with ADB’s involuntary resettlement policy, 
                                                 
703 Note these appendices are not included in this thesis – they refer to the appendices of the Updated 2009 proposal.  
704 AusAID (2009b, p. 8). 
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land clearance will be limited so that involuntary resettlement is minimized to the extent 
possible. 705  
The concept paper continues to re-state that the project’s resettlement program is being 
implemented in accordance with ADB’s policy on involuntary resettlement, and reiterates 
the strength of the processes, noting that the full resettlement plan was uploaded to the ADB 
resettlement website prior to approval of the original project loan. 706  
Noteworthy in the analysis is the comments that the IRC is experienced in undertaking 
resettlement work and is familiar with ADB’s safeguard requirements. The concept paper 
states:  
The program is being implemented by the Inter-Ministerial 
Resettlement Committee (IRC), under the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. The IRC has done this work on many earlier ADB, 
World Bank, and other donor financed projects, and is very familiar 
with policy requirements. They will be assisted by the Project 
consultant’s international and domestic resettlement specialists, and 
the program will be monitored for compliance with the resettlement 
plan by an independent monitoring agency. This agency, engaged 
by the Government, is already in place. ADB’s Manila and Phnom 
Penh based resettlement specialists will also monitor the 
program.”707 
The concept paper also explains that AusAID will allocate a portion of its funding to support 
an international resettlement specialist to provide ADB and AusAID with the assurance that 
the resettlement plans are being implemented as intended. 708 
The AusAID concept paper also noted “the presence of a large body of NGOs interested in 
land and settlement matters” and suggested that ADB and AusAID take a “pro-active 
approach” to monitoring the resettlement program. 709 The remainder of the AusAID concept 
                                                 
705 AusAID (2009b, p. 8). 
706 AusAID (2009b, p. 9). 
707 AusAID (2009b, p. 9). 
708 AusAID (2009b, p. 10). 
709 AusAID (2009b, p. 10). 
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paper mostly re-states the analysis provided in the ADB proposals and re-states the specific 
assurances and risk mitigation measures that the ADB had in place.  
5.7 Resettlement plans  
The Cambodian Government, through the IRC, was responsible for resettlement and for 
monitoring resettlement activities in accordance with ADB’s policies and requirements. 
Consultants were engaged to supervise and build capacity within the IRC, which initially 
included one international resettlement specialist, one national resettlement specialist, and 
one national gender specialist.710 The IRC established a working group (IRC-WG) for the 
project, which was intended to work closely with the Provincial Resettlement Sub-
Committee (PRSC) in each province to implement the resettlement plans.711 
The first Resettlement Plan was agreed between the Government of Cambodia and ADB in 
2006.712 Since the original 2006 Resettlement Plan, five updated Resettlement Plans were 
also prepared for each section: Missing Link, Northern Line, Southern Line, Phnom Penh 
Station and Poipet Station. In addition, in July 2009, during the preparation of 
Supplementary Loan for the Project, a Resettlement Plan for Samrong Estate in Phnom Penh 
was agreed between ADB and the Government. The consultants, Redecam Group and then 
Nippon Keoi Co Ltd in association with Jarts, were the primary consultants involved in 
preparing the Resettlement Plans.  
The households required to relocate were those with residences, structures and other assets 
within the railway corridor of impact, which is a narrow area of 3.5 metres on either side of 
the railway centreline. With the exception of households in Samrong, Phnom Penh, very few 
of the affected people in the corridor of impact had legal documents which confirmed their 
right to residency and the Cambodian Government viewed them as illegal settlers or 
“squatters”. Some residents of Samrong Estate did possess legal documentation establishing 
ownership, which became the subject of an ongoing dispute. Thus, for most affected 
households, the Resettlement Plan did not provide compensation for loss of land, however 
their lack of legal status did not preclude them from receiving other project entitlements. 
The resettlement assistance package offered compensation for loss of houses, businesses and 
                                                 
710 Asian Development Bank (2009a, p. 48). 
711 Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS 
(2008, p. 15). 
712 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 47). 
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other assets, and basic services in the new sites, explained further below. Resettlement was 
to be guided by the principle that “all those affected, irrespective of their tenure status” 
would be able to “restore or improve their socioeconomic conditions.”713  
Efforts were made to minimize displacement. Only people living within 3.5 metres of the 
centreline were required to move. Initially, this varied slightly depending on the location. In 
rural areas the corridor of impact was initially up to 5 metres, whereas in the densely 
populated and urban areas the corridor of impact was 3.5 metres on either side of the 
centreline.714 The 2006 Resettlement Plan outlined three options for affected households: 
(1) reorganize themselves within the remaining right of way and be allowed to remain there 
for at least five years, (but not receive land title in the right of way); (2) move outside the 
right of way to the resettlement sites which were to be “in close proximity (3 km to 5 km) 
to their previous locations”, where they would receive land title if they resided for five years 
or more, or (3) receive cash assistance for loss of land use and make their own arrangements 
for relocation.715  
“Partially-affected” households were to be compensated if their assets and structures were 
partially within the corridor of impact. They were required to move back from the area past 
the 3.5 metre point so that they were fully within the right of way and not in the corridor of 
impact. Partially affected households were not provided with land title in the areas beyond 
3.5 metres, however they were guaranteed that they would not be evicted for a period of five 
years. No new permanent structures were allowed to be built in the right of way once the 
households had moved back from the corridor of impact, and partially affected households 
were told that after the five year period they may also be relocated in accordance with the 
terms of the 2006 Resettlement Plan and the Government’s legal framework.716 The 
minimum land size viable for households to reorganise in the right of way was 30m2. Thus, 
if a household had less than 30m2 remaining once the corridor of impact was cleared, they 
would be considered wholly affected and required to move either to the resettlement site or 
                                                 
713 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 47). 
714 Over time, references in ADB documents to 3.5-5 metres from the centre line as the corridor of impact became only 3.5 
metres.  
715 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, pp. i-v. ). 
716 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 41). 
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to make their own arrangements for relocation.717 Figure 1 (from Chapter 1), is presented 
again below.  
Figure 1 (from Chapter 1): Railway line depicting corridor of impact 
 
Source: Author’s illustration  
The distribution and location of project-affected households are presented in the table below.  
Table 6: Distribution and location of affected households718 
Location/identification of households  Affected households Relocating households 
Poipet 1094 588 
Northern Line and Missing Link 
(Battambang and Pursat) 1165 51 
Southern Line (Sihanoukville) 206 30 
Phnom Penh 1289 169 
Bamboo rail transport operators*  189 52 
                                                 
717 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 41). 
718 These numbers have changed multiple times in the ADB documentation. This table is based on information on the ADB 
Website in 2013, however it appears to have been removed from the website. The numbers are broadly consistent with 
those included in the various resettlement plans, see: Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei 
Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010); Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank 
& Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010); Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian 
Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co Ltd in association with JARTS (2009); Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 
Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2008). Inter-Ministerial Resettlement 
Committee Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007). 
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Addendum to the Updated RP for Phnom 
Penh (Additional affected households)   248 
Samrong Estate (Phnom Penh) 231 62 
Total 4174 1200 
* Bamboo rail transport operators in all sections.  
 
Although the railway project did not take effect until 30 January 2008, and households began 
the relocation process in 2010, the compensation provided to households was based on the 
entitlement matrix set out four years earlier in the 2006 Resettlement Plan. The Resettlement 
Plan included a Detailed Measurement Survey (DMS) which included a census of people 
affected and inventory of losses. Compensation for land use and assets was to be at 
replacement cost. A Replacement Cost Study was undertaken of all structures, land and other 
assets for purposes of arriving at the valuation of assets impacted by the project. The study 
was undertaken by the local resettlement consultant.719 The DMS was undertaken again in 
2008-2009, during which time field staff compared and verified the data collected for the 
2006 DMS.720 
5.7.1   Compensation packages 
The compensation assistance package developed in 2006 was intended to include the 
following:  
 compensation for land used within the corridor of impact and station area 
irrespective of tenure status, including permanent loss of agricultural land 
use and loss of land for residential and commercial purposes; 
 
 compensation for non-land assets affected by the project – including 
payments for partial and/or fully affected structures (house, 
shops/businesses), and crops, trees, open wells and fences; 
  
 compensation for relocation and loss of income or sources of livelihood, 
including  transportation allowance, living allowance, rental allowance, 
                                                 
719 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 73). 
720 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 2). 
This issue is discussed further in later sections of the chapter.  
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relocation of business, cash compensation for lost wage by employees of 
affected businesses, loss of income for the Bamboo Rail Transport 
Operators, and special assistance to vulnerable groups; 
 
 compensation for private land acquired for individual/group resettlement 
site(s) at current market value or replacement costs, cash compensation 
against loss of land use rights within corridor of impact for “self-
relocation”, onsite relocation within the available right of way and project-
sponsored sites with security of tenure.721  
The entitlement matrix in the 2006 Resettlement Plan explains that all affected persons 
moving out of the right of way to a resettlement site would be provided with compensation 
for loss of livelihoods comprising 20 kg of rice, per person, per month for three months for 
houses made with light materials and wooden houses. For people with concrete, brick and 
large wooden houses, they would receive 20 kg of rice, per person, per month for six 
months.722 However, different information is provided in various places in the 2006 
Resettlement Plan and there was confusion about whether the rice entitlement was per 
person or per five-person household.723  
Vulnerable households, such as those who were female-headed households, elderly, or 
disabled, very low income earners (below USD 20 per month), were to receive special 
assistance by way of 20 kg of rice, per person, per month for six months.724 Affected 
households relocating out of the right of way would receive a USD 70 transportation 
allowance irrespective of the distance to the resettlement site.725 Those households 
relocating to the resettlement sites would be provided with a plot of land approximately 7m 
x 15 m.726 The cut-off date for eligibility for entitlements was the completion of the census 
and Inventory of Losses in June 2006. During preparation of the Inventory, identification 
                                                 
721 Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS 
(2008, p. 10). 
722 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 44). 
723 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 46). 
724 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 46). 
725 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 44). 
726 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 11).  
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cards were posted on all affected houses. This was to intended to avoid new “encroachers” 
into the right of way.727  
A Public Information Document was prepared and distributed to affected households 
explaining what they would receive. The English version is reprinted in Appendix K.728 
Compensation for loss of land use in the right of way was costed at a standard price of USD 
0.50 per m2 throughout the project areas (including Phnom Penh). Thus, regardless of where 
the land was located and whether the land use was residential, commercial or agricultural, 
the same rate of compensation applied. The rationale for providing a standard compensation 
rate reveals early tensions in the resettlement arrangements between Government practice 
and ADB standards. The 2006 Resettlement Plan states:  
The main reason for establishing a single uniform price for loss of 
ROW [right of way] land use, regardless of differences in the market 
price of unencumbered land outside the ROW in these vicinities, is 
that this is regarded by both APs [Affected Persons] and Government 
as adequate and fair for their loss of promissory land use, given that 
they cannot be “compensated” for loss of public land. In accordance 
with ADB Policy, they will be compensated for loss of non-land 
assets (structures) and loss of income. They will be resettled to 
locations within the vicinity of the current location so that they will 
not lose their jobs or other livelihood base. The landless will be 
provided with replacement land. All will be assisted to restore pre-
project conditions. The poor and vulnerable will be assisted to 
improve pre-project conditions. 
The Updated Resettlement Plans prepared in 2009-2010, reiterated that the cash 
compensation rate for loss of land use was USD 0.50 per m2 for all locations.729 By way of 
comparison, the estimated land value of the surrounding areas in Phnom Penh where the 
railway residents were living was USD 150 per m2 in the Updated Resettlement Plan for 
                                                 
727 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007). See “Definition of Terms”.  
728 Note the Public Information Booklet was updated in 2010, see Annex: Ministry of Public Works and Transport 
Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010).  
729 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 11). 
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Phnom Penh.730 The Entitlement Matrix annexed to the 2010 Updated Resettlement Plan 
restated that the compensation package and other entitlements were “as per agreed” in the 
2006 Resettlement Plan.  
Income restoration was considered central to the resettlement strategy. The 2006 
Resettlement Plan reiterated the importance of developing an income restoration plan and 
canvassed a range of ideas that would potentially assist affected households, including a 
draft terms of reference for the strategy.731 However, it explained that a “detailed income 
restoration strategy will be finalized during implementation, according to the actual need of 
APs [affected persons].” The strategy was to be based on affected people’s preferences, level 
of preparedness to participate and economic viability. Further details were provided in the 
updated resettlement plans, which included a finalised Terms of Reference agreed with ADB 
for an NGO or consulting firm to be hired to finalise the income restoration plan.732 
Potential locations for the resettlement sites were canvassed in the resettlement plans but not 
finalised. As stated, resettlement was originally to be “in close proximity (3 km to 5 km) to 
their current locations so that incomes will not be affected”.733 The 2006 Resettlement Plan 
explored options within this range, however as the project progressed these distances 
changed. In Phnom Penh, for example, the resettlement site was later moved in 2010. The 
justification provided in the Updated Resettlement plan for Phnom Penh was as follows:  
[I]t was found than [sic] no  large land (2.5 ha) was available around 
the affected area and that price of land in Phnom Penh urban area 
was too high (150 USD/m2) around the affected areas and not 
affordable. Therefore, the RS [resettlement site] has to be located in 
the outskirts of the City. We should note that most of the relocation 
sites built by Phnom Penh municipality are located at least 15 km 
from the center of the City.734  
                                                 
730 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 14). 
731 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007) see Annex 3.  
732 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 15). 
733 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, pp. i-v. ). 
734 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 14).  
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Thus, the final selection of resettlement sites took place after the bulk of the formal 
community consultation process had already taken place and were located further away than 
originally intended or agreed, especially in the case of Phnom Penh. 
5.7.2   Community consultation and disclosure 
The Resettlement Plan stated that “the DMS surveys were conducted in full consultation 
with AHs [affected households] and affected villages/communes leaders.”735 Details were 
provided of a series of community meetings, public meetings and village discussions with 
affected people and local officials. A list of the early meetings is provided below.  
Table 7: ADB community consultations in Poipet736  
Timing Consultation for disclosure of Resettlement Plan 
3 April 2006 
 
Public consultation in Poipet – 2 half day sessions for villages 
Kbal Speaen, Baleley, and Kilometer 4. 
4- 12 April 2006 
 
Village discussions with census and inventory team members in 
Poipet. 
24 April 2006 
 
Public consultation for Environmental and Social Impacts held in 
Phnom Penh – with attendees from Poipet/Banteay Meanchey, 
Northern Line and Southern Line AP’s and local officials, national 
agency, NGO, and international development organization 
representatives.  
 
17 May 2006 
 
Discussion with Ms. Tundra Tan, village chief of Domnak Smach 
village, Northern Line. 
 
19 May 2006 
 
Community meeting in Battambang affected village near the rail 
way station. 
 
20 May 2006 
 
Community meeting in Veal Rinh village in Sihanoukville, a 
Southern Line affected village. 
 
20 May 2006 
 
Community meeting in Phum Bei village in Sihanoukville, a 
Southern Line affected village. 
 
25 May 2006 
 
Community meeting in Beaung Saloung village, a Phnom Penh 
affected village. 
22 May - 20 
June 
 
Village discussions with census, inventory, and socioeconomic 
survey team supervisors and members for “missing link”, 
Northern Line, Phnom Penh, and Southern Line.  
                                                 
735 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 3). 
736 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 48). 
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Further meetings were carried out throughout 2009-2010 with affected households. 
Meetings or consultations with affected households tended to be held in large groups where 
details of the project were announced followed by opportunities for affected people to ask 
questions and express concerns. Individual and small group meetings were conducted with 
severely affected and vulnerable households.737 A summary of community concerns 
provided in the 2006 Resettlement Plan listed some of the issues raised by participants. 
These concerns are excerpted below:  
 May lose their homes especially those near the tracks;  
 May not be properly compensated if impacts cannot be avoided; 
 May affect their businesses if they are to be relocated; 
 Households do not have land certificates and claim that they are landless; 
 Residual ROW land may not be available to some households, and 
therefore cannot shift back;  
 Type of assistance to poor renters and if they will also be given housing and 
other forms of assistance; 
 May take time to relocate and re-establish themselves in a new location, 
hence, may disrupt their time for making a living; 
 May take time to integrate with host communities if moved to another 
location; 
 Women and other vulnerable households may experience more difficulty. 
 They said female-headed households and disabled may need to pay more 
money to help them relocate and rebuild their houses; 
 The new relocation site may be too far from school. 738 
Participants were also favourable towards the railway project for the following reasons:  
 Improved railway will provide faster means of transportation;  
 Better railway is an indication of the country’s development; 
 Road travel is good but travel via train is more comfortable; 
                                                 
737 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 49). 
738 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 48). 
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 Riding trains gives them more security and therefore less worries; 
 Train fares are expected to be cheaper than other land transportation.739 
It is noteworthy that the affected households describe the potential benefits of the railway as 
providing cheaper, safer, faster and more comfortable transportation. This suggests that at 
the time the meetings were held it was either still considered feasible that the rehabilitated 
railway would operate as a passenger service or it was not disclosed to the affected 
households that the railway was not intended to be a passenger service. 740 
A grievance mechanism was set up for the project. The Resettlement Plans describe how 
affected people were also made aware of their rights to complain to the ADB. The ADB’s 
Accountability Mechanism (2003) Policy field guide was translated into Khmer and was 
reportedly distributed to affected persons together with the public information booklet.741 
The legal and policy framework for compensation and resettlement were also set out in the 
resettlement plan. The project was to be governed by the “relevant laws and regulations of 
the Government of Cambodia” and the ADB’s policies on Involuntary Resettlement (1995), 
Indigenous Peoples (1998), Gender and Development (2006), Accountability Mechanism 
(2003), and Public Communications (2005). In the event of any discrepancies between the 
laws of the Cambodian Government and the ADB, the plans clearly state that “ADB’s 
policies and requirements will prevail.”742 
Resettlement for the project began in 2010, first along the Northern Line in Pursat, 
Battambang and Poipet. According to ADB records, the concessionaire originally wanted to 
pursue rehabilitation of the Northern Line from Phnom Penh to the Thai border in Poipet 
first, but changed its mind while resettlement was taking place in the north and requested to 
rehabilitate the Southern Line instead. Resettlement then went ahead in the south in 2011 in 
Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh. 743   
                                                 
739 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 48).  
740 Note that in the late stages of finalising this thesis, the Phnom Penh Post reported that the Cambodian Government had 
revitalised the idea of operating the passenger service, starting with the Sihanoukville line, see: Crane (2016).   
741 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007); Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 17). See Appendix K of this thesis.  
742 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 47). 
743 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 3). 
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5.8 Advocacy and the railway project  
The most prominent NGOs working on advocacy in relation to the railway were Equitable 
Cambodia, Inclusive Development International (IDI), and Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT). 
Some of the NGOs involved began as international NGOs and gradually “localised”. 
Equitable Cambodia, formerly Bridges Across Borders Cambodia (BABC) is now run by 
Cambodian citizens and works on local campaigns relating to land and housing. IDI supports 
Equitable Cambodia and works trans-nationally to increase the accountability of business 
and development actors mostly through legal advocacy. STT is an urban NGO which does 
not describe itself as a human rights-based organization, but does draw on human rights 
frameworks in its work.744 The Housing Rights Task Force Cambodia (HRTF) also worked 
on railway advocacy, which began as a coalition of local and international NGOs in 2003 
and localised in 2010. Other NGOs involved included the independent aid monitor, 
AidWatch, Urban Poor Development Fund (UPDF) based in Cambodia and NGO Forum on 
Cambodia, which represents 88 NGOs.  
NGOs began informally warning AusAID and the ADB about the potential and actual 
impacts of resettlement during the early stages of the railway project. In May 2010, two 
children died in the Battambang resettlement site shortly after they were relocated. News of 
the children’s deaths featured in the international media. The Age newspaper in Australia 
reported that there was no clean drinking water at the site and that the children were 
attempting to get water from the only available source, a deep muddy pond.745  
Following the events in Battambang, NGOs began working in a range of different ways to 
support communities in the relocation process and to draw attention to the project’s impacts. 
STT published a report in 2011 which detailed early problems with project, especially that 
inadequate and incorrect compensation amounts were being offered to households.746 A 
letter co-signed by STT, BABC, NGO Forum and HRTF was sent to the Australian 
Government and ADB.747 The Cambodian Government responded sharply to these events. 
Newspapers reported how the Minister of Economy and Finance wrote to the Prime Minister 
requesting him to “take immediate action” to stem NGO activities and requested him to “not 
                                                 
744 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a, p. 73).  
745 Baker & McKenzie (2010).  
746 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2011).  
747 Lei Win (2011).   
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allow foreign NGOs to do advocacy work”.748 A Cambodian radio station repeatedly 
broadcast an interview with Government officials who identified a group of NGOs that were 
“composed of foreigners” believed to be exploiting “affected people” to make their 
careers.749 The NGOs were warned in a formal letter from the Government and were called 
to a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. STT was suspended from operating as an 
NGO for five months for allegedly inciting villagers to protest.750  
In 2012, BABC released “Derailed” based on almost two years of research.751 The report 
assessed the extent to which the project met human rights obligations and ADB safeguard 
policies, identifying many aspects of the process which constituted serious violations. It also 
reported that of the 200 households interviewed by BABC, sixty percent felt that their living 
conditions had been made worse by the Railway Project, or would be made worse in the 
future. Only 20 percent felt that their lives would improve.752 Derailed was released at a 
forum jointly hosted by Monash University and Oxfam Australia, in February 2012.753 A 
series of media releases referenced the more detailed research reports and were circulated 
with headlines such as: “Cambodian railway development causes human rights abuses – 
AusAID complicit”754, “Families displaced by Cambodian railway project seek justice from 
the Asian Development Bank”,755 and “Resettled to poverty”.756 Simultaneously, BABC 
made recommendations to AusAID to adopt an involuntary resettlement policy. Experts 
from a range of organizations worked with AusAID to prepare guidelines for AusAID which 
became operational in October 2012.757 Concurrently, AusAID appointed an Independent 
Advisor to monitor the project and committed an additional AUD 2 million to address 
problems in the relocation sites. ADB also sent a full-time safeguards specialist to Phnom 
Penh.  
                                                 
748 Strangio (2011). 
749 Strangio (2011). 
750 Bridges Across Bordess Cambodia (2011, p. 5). 
751 Bugalski & Medallo (2012).  
752 Bugalski & Medallo (2012, p. 66).  
753 Oxfam Australia was not directly involved in advocacy surrounding the railway but provided financial support to 
conduct the research for the “Derailed” report. 
754 Equitable Cambodia (2012a).  
755 Equitable Cambodia (2012b) 
756 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013b).  
757 The policy was updated in 2014: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affiars and Trade (2014), and again 
in 2015, see: Australian Department of Foreign Affiars and Trade (2015a). 
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Pressure from NGOs in 2012 also led the ADB to appoint the resettlement expert, Michael 
Cernea, as an independent consultant to report on the impacts of the project.758 This resulted 
in a major controversy when the body of Cernea’s report was not publicly released by the 
Cambodian Government and the ADB.759 By this stage, relationships between NGOs, the 
ADB and the Cambodian Government had deteriorated significantly and were highly 
polarised, reflected in a series of media headlines, including: “Cambodia Resettlement 
Debacle Cover Up: ADB Conceals Critical Expert Report.”760 The ADB began compiling 
good news stories about the resettlement sites, profiling families that had benefited from the 
project, including a short video and “photo essay” titled “Moving on to Better Lives in 
Cambodia” explaining improvements to the resettlement sites and the ways the project had 
improved people’s living conditions.761 This provoked outrage from NGOs, prompting 
media releases titled “Propaganda mill at full tilt” and descriptions of the ADB video as “a 
piece of propaganda that would make Goebbels blush.”762 Relationships between the NGOs 
and the ADB became increasingly fraught; with some personal tensions emerging. For 
example, while the ADB was still holding consultative meetings with the NGOs, ADB staff 
members issued warnings at the beginning of meetings requiring NGO participants to 
control their body language and etiquette.763 In 2013, STT also released “End of the Line” 
focussing specifically on impacts experienced by communities in Phnom Penh, providing 
empirical evidence of how communities has been impoverished by the project.764  
5.8.1   Community complaints 
Affected households also made a series of formal complaints to both the ADB’s Office of 
the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) and the Compliance Review Panel (CRP), which 
comprise its Accountability Mechanism. In November 2011, BABC made a complaint on 
behalf of 155 households to the OSPF arguing that the ADB failed to comply with its own 
safeguards during the resettlement process, resulting in significant harm.765  
                                                 
758 See the summary report released: Cernea (2013). Also cross-reference this section with the discussion in Chapter 8, 
Section 8.3.  
759 See: Inclusive Development International (2013). 
760 Inclusive Development International (2013). 
761 Asian Development Bank (2012b). 
762 Bugalski (2012). 
763 Meeting and information update with NGOs at ADB, Phnom Penh, 19 February 2013.  
764 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a).  
765 Bridges Across Bordess Cambodia (2011). 
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The complaint was considered eligible by the OSPF in January 2012, which mediated the 
complaints throughout 2012-2013 and produced a Final Report in April 2014. The initial 
155 complainants were reduced to 116 after verification in the field and the withdrawal of 
some complaints. The nature of the complaints focused on the level of compensation, 
inadequate facilities in the resettlement sites and indebtedness, among other issues.766 Three 
other complaints were made to the OSPF however they were not deemed eligible primarily 
because they had not used the local grievance mechanisms and formally complained to the 
IRC/Cambodian Government before complaining to the ADB.767 In October 2012, an extra-
territorial complaint was also submitted to the Australian Human Rights Commission by IDI 
and Equitable Cambodia on behalf of 30 affected families, alleging that the Australian 
Government failed to uphold its international human rights obligations by funding the 
project without sufficient measures in place to safeguard the human rights of those affected. 
This is the first time an extra-territorial human rights complaint has been filed with the 
AHRC in relation to the impacts of Australian aid overseas.768 
The OSPF review began in 2012. The OSPF has a problem-solving function under the 
Accountability Mechanism and its role is to mediate rather than draw firm conclusions about 
ADB compliance.769 The process involved individual household mediation with the 
complainants, as well as assessment workshops from November 2012 through to January 
2013 to investigate the problems and attempt to resolve them through a “multistakeholder 
problem-solving process”. 770 The mediation also attempted to resolve issues relating to the 
access roads to the various sites, availability of fresh water especially in Battambang, and 
flooding in the resettlement sites. 771 In the Final Report, the Special Project Facilitator stated 
that: “There was broad acknowledgement that the complaint issues were legitimate and 
should be addressed.”772 The Facilitator recommended several courses of action, including 
additional compensation for most of the households that had made the complaint as their 
                                                 
766 Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 1). 
767 OSPF complaints can be viewed on the ADB website at: http://www.adb.org/site/accountability-mechanism/problem-
solving-function/complaint-registry-region.  
768 See: Inclusive Development International & Equitable Cambodia (2012). Unfortunately, information about the 
complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission is not available publicly. I contacted the Commission for an update 
but was told that no information could be shared with people who were not party to the complaint. There is also no decision 
available online, which suggests it may have been deemed ineligible.  
769 See the discussion and diagram of the ADB Accountability Mechanism in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.  
770 Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 6). 
771 Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 6). 
772 Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 6). 
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original compensation amounts had been calculated wrongly.773 Two of the 116 households 
were from Samrong and their concerns were postponed to be addressed at a later date as 
they had not yet relocated. Of the 114 households remaining, 75 received additional 
compensation. The number of households receiving additional compensation is depicted 
below in Table 8.  
Table 8: Results of the individual sessions to resolve compensation issues774  
Resettlement 
Site 
 
Offered 
additional 
compensation  
Rejected 
offer 
Moved to 
Resettlement  
Site 
Correct 
compensation  
Total  
Poipet 3 2 0 3 8 
Battambang 3 0 0 0 3 
Sihanoukville 3 0 0 0 3 
Phnom Penh 66 17 13 4 100 
Total  75 19 13 7 114 
 
The Facilitator also sought to address other issues in the resettlement sites, especially 
relating to infrastructure. By February 2013, committees were established in all resettlement 
sites to manage local infrastructure works. It was agreed that AusAID would finance most 
of the infrastructure works and would engage an engineer to oversee these works.775 
Notwithstanding these developments, a formal complaint was made by 22 households to the 
CRP of ADB for compliance review on 28 August 2012. Eligibility was granted on 24 
October 2012, which meant that compliance with safeguards was then investigated across 
the whole project, and was not only isolated to the 22 households which had complained. 
The investigation process began in October 2012, however the field visit was made a year 
later as part of the review in October 2013.776 (It is important to note that the fieldwork for 
this PhD took place in 2012 and 2013 prior to the CRP mission, as explained in the 
methodology in the next chapter).  
The complaint to the CRP raised numerous issues. Some of the most pertinent complaints 
included, insufficient compensation for loss of property and income, inadequate transition 
allowances, the distant location of three resettlement sites and inadequate basic services, 
                                                 
773 Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 8). 
774 Adapted from Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 8). 
775 Asian Development Bank (2014e, p. 9). 
776 Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
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such as water, electricity, waste disposal, roads, health facilities, and schools, at all sites. It 
also provided evidence that residents had been threatened and argued that human rights 
violations had occurred, contra to the rights guaranteed in the Cambodian Constitution and 
laws, and under international treaties ratified by Cambodia. 777 
The CRP findings presented in January 2014 “found major design flaws” in the original 
2006 Resettlement Plan.778 It found that there was inadequate consultation with affected 
households, a lack of provision for “inflation-indexed compensation”, no provision for 
replacement housing of a minimum standard, inadequate planning and a weak capacity 
building for government entities involved in the project.779  
It also found that compensation paid in 2010 and 2011 was based on the 2006 rates and did 
not take into account price increases over the intervening 4-5 years.780 The CRP report 
provided a detailed analysis of the failings of the project and identified several lessons for 
the ADB Board to consider. It was unequivocal about the need for change within ADB, 
stating that (emphasis added):  
First, there is a need for an urgent, firm, and clear message to ADB 
Management that resettlement, environmental, and public 
disclosure and consultation issues should be taken seriously and 
accorded the priority consideration they deserve. ADB operational, 
sectoral, and regional staff must undergo a mind shift in the 
treatment of resettlement, environment, and public disclosure and 
consultation. Their perspective must be based on the recognition 
already existing in ADB’s safeguard policies that involuntary 
resettlement is a development opportunity, intrinsic to achieving the 
developmental goals of projects.781  
It also made the significant comment that: 
In a post-conflict situation, such as that in Cambodia, where a 
country is emerging from decades of civil war, donors need to 
                                                 
777 As summarised in the Final CRP Report: Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. iv). 
778 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. vi) 
779 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. vi). 
780 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. vii). 
781 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. viii). 
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proactively engage with the government and provide it with support 
at a much higher level and intensity than was provided by ADB in 
this case.782  
A set of recommendations were made by the CRP, the majority of which were adopted by 
the ADB Board. Some of the key features included:  
 The establishment of a remedial action program to compensate affected 
households to the value of an additional USD 3-4 million for families that 
had been relocated; 
 Improve the functioning of the grievance redress mechanism;  
 Develop a program to build capacity within the IRC; 
 Establish a debt workout scheme to help highly indebted families repay 
their loans.783  
Note that the additional compensation payments were to be made only to people who were 
relocated. Progress reports uploaded to the ADB website confirm that the IRC commenced 
the additional compensation scheme in January 2015, starting with affected households 
along the Southern Line and Poipet sections.784 Thus, a series of additional compensation 
payments have flowed to into the resettlement sites since the project’s inception.  
At the same time as complaints were being made about the resettlement aspects of the 
project, serious problems emerged in relation to the civil works and rehabilitation 
components. From at least early 2012 onwards, the supervision consultants hired to oversee 
the rehabilitation, Nippon Koei Co Ltd, began reporting that the contractors, TSO-AS & 
Nawarat, were in serious breach of health and safety requirements for workers along the 
railway line. The issues included crowding and poor provision of basic services to workers, 
including fresh water in the workers’ camps. The use of safety equipment was also lacking. 
The reports also alleged that TSO-AS & Nawarat also failed to submit monthly 
environmental reports on the status of works, and how risks were being mitigated.785  
                                                 
782 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 5). 
783 Asian Development Bank (2014f, 2014d). 
784 Asian Development Bank (2015e). 
785 Nippon Koei Co Ltd (2012); These issues were also catalogued the website Cambodia Trainspotter: 
https://cambodiatrainspotter.wordpress.com/tag/tso/. 
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5.9 The railway project on hold 
Challenges surrounding the project escalated in March 2012 when a letter was leaked from 
Toll Royal Railways to the Cambodian Government informing them that it would suspend 
operations on the railway because the delays and problems had made it unprofitable.786 In 
2014, Toll Holdings confirmed that the railway project was on hold indefinitely. The 
contractor for the Northern Line stopped the work in June 2012 and negotiations to resume 
the works failed. The remaining funds (from ADB, OFID and AusAID) were deemed 
insufficient to complete the rehabilitation of the Northern Line and Samrong freight 
facilities.787 The Director of the MPWT explained to the media that the project had run out 
of money and were postponing operations until further funds could be found.788 
At this point, the Southern Line had been completed and trains were running intermittently 
from Phnom Penh to the port in Sihanoukville. A section 42 km between Poipet and 
Sisophon had been repaired and another section of 23 km from Sisophon running east was 
finished, however, more than 300 km of tracks were still to be repaired. Works on the 
Northern Line had been abandoned entirely. 789 In December 2014, Toll Holdings sold its 
stake in the railway to Royal Group, citing poor revenue from the Southern Line and a series 
of delays and setbacks that made the investment unprofitable.790 An article in the Cambodian 
Daily on 11 March 2015 stated that the ADB would not provide any more money to 
rehabilitate the railways. It estimated that at least USD 75 million is required to finish the 
railway lines.791  
The events that transpired raised major questions in the Australian media about Australia’s 
role in financing infrastructure developments overseas, and about how lines of 
accountability for expenditure of overseas aid can and should be drawn.792 AusAID staff 
members were repeatedly required to appear before Senate Estimates Committees to explain 
why Australia had financed a project which displaced large numbers of people, and why the 
project was experiencing so many challenges. An excerpt of a Senate Estimates Hearing in 
                                                 
786 Philip Heijmans & Tom Hyland (2012). 
787 Asian Development Bank (2014g) 
788 Phorn Bopha (2014). 
789 Phorn Bopha (2014). 
790 Morton (2014). Note, it remains unclear precisely how much money was invested by Toll Holdings in the railway 
project, however the available documents suggest Toll’s investment was confined to managing and operating the railway 
once it was rehabilitated.  
791 Zsombor (2015b). 
792 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.  
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2011 is included as Appendix L. In the midst of the ongoing controversies, in 2013 federal 
elections were held in Australia which resulted in a change of government. The centre-right 
Liberal/National coalition were elected, defeating the centre-left Labor Party. Consequently, 
AusAID was merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, thereafter referred 
to as the Australian Aid Program, and no longer was a separate identifiable entity. The media 
surrounding the railway project somewhat eased after these events, although not completely, 
as the government responsible for approving the project was no longer in power.793  
5.9.1   Status of the loans  
In September 2014 the ADB announced a major change in scope to the railway project and 
the existing loans were amended. At this time, 78.416 percent of the loan had been disbursed. 
As of 14 July 2014, the cumulative actual contract awards totalled USD 97.6 million, 
however actual disbursements were USD 81.1 million.794 The ADB initiated discussions 
with the Government to cancel the remaining uncontracted amount. Any further unutilized 
amount was automatically cancelled at loan closing, which was 31 December 2014.795  
The changes listed in the “major change” document were:  
 a reduction in track rehabilitation of the Northern Line by 318 km against 
the original plan; 
 cancellation of new freight and rolling stock maintenance facility at 
Samrong; 
 exclusion of passing loops and a station in Poipet with facilities for the 
border crossing; and 
 exclusion of a rail link to a second dry port in Phnom Penh.796 
The reasons for the project’s disintegration can be gleaned through a detailed reading of the 
major change document. It outlines a number of problems that were encountered throughout 
the project. It explains how Toll Royal Railway refused to formally take over the operations 
of the Southern Line on the basis of “insufficient technical performance”. The Cambodian 
Government requested the contractor, TSO-AS and Nawarat, to rectify defects however the 
                                                 
793 See Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussed of these issues.  
794 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 2).  
795 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 4). 
796 Asian Development Bank (2014h). 
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contractor had stopped works. The supervision consultants, Nippon Koei Co Ltd, provided 
contract specialists to assist in ensuring that the tracks meet the minimum line standards as 
specified under the civil works contracts.797  
Numerous problems stemmed from inaccurate feasibility studies and assessments conducted 
prior to the beginning of the project. For example, it was found that the “extent and nature 
of repair and rehabilitation works was significantly different from what had been assumed 
at appraisal.”798 The ADB documentation explains that the original Project Preparatory 
Technical Assistance (PPTA) consultants had not done their due diligence well.799 It states 
(emphasis added):  
The PPTA consultants assumed that most bridges only required 
repair of the superstructure and no provisions were made for 
substructure works except for a few cases where the substructure 
clearly was missing. The preliminary design also assumed that no 
new culverts were required. In reality about 46 new culverts had to 
be built on Southern Line alone. Eventually, it turned out that the 
PPTA consultants had never reviewed the residual carrying 
capacity of the bridges on the two lines, i.e. whether they were 
indeed capable of carrying the line design axle load (15 or 20 tons) 
at the design speed (average of 50 km/h) or not.800 
In addition, the PPTA consultants apparently “based their preliminary design on reusing the 
existing wooden sleepers on the assumption that about 70% of these would be reusable.”801 
They had proposed concrete sleepers for the remainder not considering that concrete sleepers 
require a wider embankment compared to wooden and steel sleepers, increasing the 
earthworks costs. Further, apparently closer inspection of the old wooden sleepers at a later 
date revealed that only about 3 percent of the original 70 percent were reusable anyway.802 
                                                 
797 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 3). 
798 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 4). 
799 A letter was sent to ADB requesting confirmation of the name of the PPTA consultant firm. While the response provided 
some detail, it did not explicitly answer this question. See Appendices D and E.  
800 Asian Development Bank (2014a) 
801 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 3). 
802 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 3). 
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The major change documents describe a litany of these sort of challenges creating substantial 
cost increases. The costs on the Southern Line alone increased from USD 38.34 million to 
USD 61.8 million. Consulting services increased from USD 5.29 million to USD 8.7 million. 
Materials increased from USD 6 million to about USD 10 million.803 These developments 
are said to have “soured the relationship between the Employer, Engineer and the 
Contractors”.804 The Employer was the Cambodian Government (via MPWT), the Engineer 
was Nippon Koei, and the civil works Contractor was TSO-AS and Nawarat.805 To aggravate 
this situation, USD 12.869 million was disbursed under the Northern Line contract that could 
not be recovered. The Analysis of Cost Increase describes “gross negligence” on behalf of 
the Engineer, stating that (emphasis added):  
The performance security and advance payment security under N-
Line contract expired in May 2012. Though it is the Contractor’s 
responsibility to extend these securities until the works are 
completed, the Engineer, as representative of the Employer, or the 
Employer himself, should have ensured that those did not lapse. 
Due to this gross negligence by the Engineer, the Employer will not 
be able to recover the $3.9 million that has been paid to the 
Contractor as advance, and will not be able to encash about $2.5 
million under the performance security if the contract eventually is 
terminated, thus a total loss of about $6.4 million to the 
Employer.806 
Arbitration has been initiated by the Contractor through a letter sent on behalf of the 
Contractor by the international Court of Arbitration, Paris, on July 4 2014 to the Cambodian 
Government. The Government responded on 1 August 2014 “disputing the process”.807 
There is very limited specific information available beyond what is included in the Major 
Change document, hence many questions remain unanswered about what occurred. 
In July 2015, the media reported that the Cambodian Government had decided to forge ahead 
and finance the remainder of the project so that it could be completed. They have reportedly 
                                                 
803 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 2). 
804 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 4). 
805 This was eventually established through correspondence with ADB, see Appendix E.  
806 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 5). 
807 Asian Development Bank (2014a, p. 4). 
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allocated USD 33.5 million towards re-building the Northern Line, of which more than 300 
km remain to be repaired. Only around 63-65 km of the Northern Line had been completed 
when the project ceased. A deputy director of MPWT, Chreung Sok-Tharath, is quoted in 
the article explaining how the ADB will not finance the project further because of its 
resettlement impacts, stating:  
The government process takes a long time, and we tried to negotiate 
with the [ADB] but it said no because of the resettlement 
problems.808  
The deputy director of MPWT also acknowledged in the article that even if the railway was 
rehabilitated, trains are expected to travel at around 15 km per hour, not the 50 km per hour 
originally envisioned.809  
5.10 Chapter review 
Weak project management, coordination, quality control and oversight seems to have beset 
the project in relation to both the resettlement and civil works components. The extensive 
documentation reveals that many risks were known and understood prior to project 
implementation. Financiers were optimistic at the beginning, yet were ultimately unable to 
control the risks present in the project. Mitigation plans and safeguards frameworks sought 
to make the risks rational, knowable and controllable. Notwithstanding the technical 
assistance, consultant and supervision costs, which amounted to more than USD 8.7 million, 
and more than fifty detailed economic, financial and technical proposals, feasibility studies, 
resettlement plans, technical assessments, social and environmental monitoring studies, the 
project was abandoned. Over the next thirty or more years, the Cambodian Government will 
be required to repay the USD 81.1 million disbursed under the loan – with interest – for the 
partly finished project. There is a possibility that the project will be completed using funds 
from the Cambodian Government or from other willing donors and financiers, however the 
commercial viability of the railway as an alternative transportation mode to road transport, 
even if it is completed, is uncertain. The passenger service component of the project was 
also abandoned relatively early in the project, limiting the project’s public value to the 
                                                 
808 Zsombor (2015a). 
809 Zsombor (2015a). 
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Cambodian population if it is to be completed.810 This chapter provides the technical 
background necessary to understand the different components of the railway project, as well 
as the safeguards and resettlement plans in place. It conveys the practical, technical 
dimensions of the interface between development, displacement and resettlement and 
provides a foreground against which deeper analysis of stakeholder dynamics can take place. 
The next chapter outlines the methodology for the research. 
                                                 
810 Note that in the late stages of finalising this thesis, the Phnom Penh Post reported that the Cambodian Government had 
revitalised the idea of operating the passenger service, starting with the Sihanoukville line, see: Crane (2016).   
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Chapter 6 
 
Methodology and fieldwork 
 
6.1 Overview  
The methodology for this research set out to investigate the operation of resettlement 
safeguards at a number of scales: at the local community level, at the institutional level 
within organisations, and at regional and international levels where decisions about 
community resettlement were being made. At the community level, it also aimed to capture 
local experiences at a “sub-project scale”, to understand the different ways the communities 
navigated and made sense of the policies in each of the five resettlement sites. To this end, 
the methodology employed a multi-scaled, qualitative, case study approach, explained 
further below.811 It also advances the idea of an “iconic case study”,812 recognising that the 
research is not a case study of resettlement in Cambodia per se; it is not necessarily 
representative of all displacement taking place in Cambodia. Rather it is a case study of 
resettlement in Cambodia involving an international financier. It is “iconic”, because it has 
come to represent a set of irreconcilable tensions and pressures that are produced in high-
profile resettlement events, which occur in settings where national standards and processes 
for resettlement are significantly different to international project-specific safeguards and 
requirements.  
The lens of a researcher is shaped by many layers of influence that exist prior to field work: 
cultural and familial value systems, gender, areas of personal interest, sensitives, normative 
perceptions of how things should be done, especially pre-conceptions of the standards and 
expectations of rights and protections built up in one’s own country and culture, among other 
factors. Once reaching the field, the research experience and knowledge developed is again 
shaped by those who assist us, especially our interpreters and the participants we encounter 
– their personal backgrounds, values, interests and ways of relating to external visitors or 
                                                 
811 Also see the discussion in Hay (2010, pp. 81-97). 
812 Iconic case studies have been conceptualised by Smits (2013, pp. 50-60).  
191 
 
“outsiders”. These influences were forefront in my mind while preparing for the research, 
but even more so as the fieldwork got underway.  
Undertaking research is not a perfect process, and doing research in Cambodia on a 
controversial project like the railway was no exception. Approaches to fieldwork by authors 
such as Turner813 and Scott et. al. 814 encourage researchers to articulate these personal 
challenges and reflect on how they influence their work. As a female, Australian researcher, 
who had been living and visiting Cambodia in the years prior to the research, I had 
established many personal friendships with people working in civil society organisations 
and within AusAID. During the formulation of the research project, I also established 
connections with people working at the ADB. These relationships had pros and cons. They 
provided me with a behind-the-scenes understanding of the dynamics, tensions and conflicts 
that were taking place, but also placed me in a fundamentally fraught and sometimes 
agonising position when deciding how to deal with information conveyed to me 
confidentially, especially with information that could not be easily verified, or about how to 
present certain viewpoints in the text, about what obligations I owed various people who 
had confided in me, and most of all how to make sense of the often very different value 
positions and accounts of the events taking place. Trying to get to the “bottom of things”, to 
understand what was really going on, often felt incredibly fraught.  
The writings of Salemink815 resonate with how I sometimes felt about the consequences of 
being pulled in many directions and not being able to describe people (especially those 
working with NGOs, AusAID and ADB) or events in intimate detail, because of the need to 
anonymise participants and organisations during the research. He describes doing 
ethnographic research in the Central Highlands of Vietnam with communities and explains 
how in order to shield them from unwarranted scrutiny, he needed to anonymise the 
descriptions so much that the ethnography became almost “bland”. This tension between 
providing enough information to describe the tensions fully, and not unduly revealing 
information about individuals or their distinctive identifiable features, was a genuine 
challenge during the research, especially relating to my interviews and conversations with 
NGOs and donors. Many of these tensions were never resolved, but rather they were partially 
                                                 
813 Turner (2013, p. 1).  
814 S. Scott, Miller & Lloyd (2006). 
815 Salemink (2013).  
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managed through reflection and through trying continuously to present a balanced view of 
events that took place. I also made a decision to convey a broad understanding of 
resettlement tensions, rather than to try and capture individual personality clashes and 
conflicts, of which there were many. 
The interpreters who worked with me during the community-based research need to be 
acknowledged from the outset. It was only through their assistance and translation that I was 
able to reach the communities affected by the project and to gain some level of 
understanding about what they were experiencing. I worked with two researchers during the 
fieldwork. One was a male, aged 21 years, who was currently attending the University of 
Phnom Penh, studying media and communications. The other was a female aged around 24 
years, who had recently graduated from a degree in Social Sciences. Both were originally 
from outside Phnom Penh, but not from areas where the fieldwork for the railway project 
took place. Neither interpreter was familiar with the railway resettlement and its related 
conflicts in any significant detail prior to the research. They had not been working with the 
NGOs who had been involved in advocacy for the railway, although over the course of the 
research both became increasingly interested in the plight of the households affected by the 
project. Of course, these interpreters brought their own views, pre-conceptions and 
positionality to the interviews with households, which most likely shaped how they 
translated the discussions to me. As explored below, following each day of interviewing, I 
spent time with the interpreter who had joined me on that day to try and deconstruct the 
interviews that had taken place with community-members and to explore the interpreter’s 
point of view on the information we had both learned.  
This chapter first outlines the multi-scaled conceptual approach to the research in more 
detail, and then discusses the fieldwork technique and process. In summary, the method 
primarily involved field-based research, using in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
affected populations, local and international advocacy NGOs, representatives of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), Australian and Cambodian Governments, as well as 
resettlement and safeguards specialists from the World Bank. This was complemented by 
ethnographic research based in Phnom Penh with NGOs and project financiers throughout 
2011-2013. During this time I was embedded at Oxfam International in Phnom Penh to 
193 
 
facilitate access to a range of NGO networks.816 The fieldwork also included two months in 
Washington D.C. in the United States during the World Bank 2013 “Spring Meetings”.817 
The Spring Meetings are an annual event held by the World Bank attended by international 
financers, ministers of finance and development, private sector representatives, and 
academics. A civil society stream is held alongside the Spring Meetings each year which 
provides an opportunity for civil society to engage with the multilateral banks over issues of 
concern. In the 2013 Spring Meetings, the issue of multilateral safeguards was a core agenda 
item. A substantial review of documentary materials was also conducted to analyse the texts 
produced by different resettlement stakeholders.818 
Prior to the fieldwork, an analysis of the different actors and stakeholders involved in the 
railway was undertaken, which assisted to establish the scope of the interviews, explained 
in the following sections.819 The primary locations for the interviews were Cambodia 
(Phnom Penh, Poipet, Battambang, Sihanoukville and Pursat), and other critical sites of 
decision-making, such as Australia (Canberra where the Australian Government is based) 
and the United States (Washington D.C., where the World Bank and other resettlement and 
safeguards specialists are situated). Representatives of the ADB were interviewed in Phnom 
Penh. Significant preliminary scoping work was carried out in a series of trips in June-July 
and December in 2011 and between June-August 2012. Formal fieldwork was conducted 
over six months in 2013. Community-based interviews were carried out with the assistance 
of Cambodian interpreters. Overall, 144 community members were interviewed for the 
research, and 22 interviews were conducted with additional stakeholders. The interview 
participants are included in Appendices B and C of the thesis. The limitations of the research 
are discussed throughout this chapter as relevant to different aspects of the thesis, rather than 
brought together in one section. They are also referred to again in the Conclusion at Section 
9.4.  
                                                 
816 By “embedded” I mean that I was given an office space at the Phnom Penh office, and discussed the advocacy issues 
surrounding the railway regularly with staff. Oxfam was not directly involved in the advocacy for the railway at the time I 
was there, but had facilitated the railway advocacy in the earlier stages of the campaign. I did not do paid work for Oxfam 
during this period. Also see discussion in Section 5.8.  
817 For details of the Spring Meetings, see: http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2013/.  
818 See Chapter 5 for the analysis of railway related documents. The literature review supporting the thesis is presented in 
Chapters 2,3 and 4.  
819 See Section 6.4 below. 
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6.2 The iconic case study  
The research is founded on a case study methodology, which is best understood as a 
conceptual approach, rather than simply a method for undertaking research.820 Case study 
approaches can be framed in many ways. They can be oriented around a community, project, 
process, idea or concept, so long as they explore how the various elements of a subject 
interact with one another “intensively and holistically”.821 Case studies also have different 
objectives, they can be theory testing, aim to elucidate rare or unusual circumstances, be 
representative or typical of certain processes, or aim to capture change over time through 
longitudinal research.822  
Contemporary case study approaches were pioneered by the Chicago School of Sociology 
in the 1920s.823 Early studies in the Chicago School tradition involved rich ethnographic 
accounts of human experience steeped in conceptual detail, however they were often 
perceived as being dense and inaccessible.824 Case study methodologies have evolved over 
time to incorporate a range of perspectives. They have been adopted by human geographers 
to explore contextualised meanings ascribed to physical spaces in innovative ways. 
According to Hay, case study methodologies are appealing to human geographers interested 
in: 
the manifestation of various phenomena in “places” imbued with 
contextualised meaning rather than contextualised simply as 
“locations”.825  
Case studies are also compatible with legal geography and human ecology approaches, 
which as Andrews and McCarthy argue, tend to rely on “deeply empirical and field-based 
knowledge.”826 This knowledge is often of the type “that is typically only accessible through 
intensive, qualitative, often semi-ethnographic research – the type of information that does 
not appear in official documents.” 827 This last statement captures the approach applied in 
this thesis.  The nature of the research was semi-ethnographic, dependent on gaining a deep 
                                                 
820 Hay (2010, pp. 81-97); Also see: Lijphart (1971); Levy (2008).   
821 Hay (2010, p. 85).   
822 Smits (2013, p. 50); Yin (2009).  
823 Hay (2010, pp. 81-97).  
824 Hay (2010, pp. 83-84).  
825 Hay (2010, pp. 83-84). Also see Tuan (1977).  
826 E. Andrews & McCarthy (2014, p. 2). 
827 E. Andrews & McCarthy (2014, p. 2). 
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understanding of context through personal familiarity with stakeholders and seeking to 
understand “off-the-record” complexities underlying official documents that were released. 
It also required investigating community dynamics directly and not relying on reports or 
descriptions of community needs and circumstances produced by either the ADB or by 
NGOs working with these communities.   
Important philosophical assumptions underpin case study methodologies. The primary 
guiding assumption, according to Hay, is that an: 
in-depth understanding about one manifestation of a phenomenon (a 
case) is valuable on its own without specific regard to how the 
phenomenon is manifest in cases that are not studied.828  
As such, case studies are considered valuable in themselves, in terms of what they can reveal 
about a specific problem, as well as what they can reveal about the manifestation of a broader 
phenomenon in other contexts.829 This research aims to investigate the case study of the 
railway resettlement process as a phenomenon in itself, but also in such a way that provides 
insights into the dynamics of resettlement advocacy that may be occurring in other contexts. 
This requires drawing out concepts concretely in ways that have multiple levels of relevance 
beyond the immediate problem being analysed. As revealed in Chapter 5, in the case of the 
Cambodian railway, themes emerge which relate not only to resettlement, but also to notions 
of risk, accountability, trans-national advocacy networks, legal pluralism, and the 
governance of large-sale infrastructure projects.   
The notion of an “iconic case study” as explored by Smits,830 is particularly useful in this 
setting. Smits argues that an iconic case study is one that is not only reflective of certain 
phenomena, as would be the case for “typical” case studies, but is also constitutive of 
phenomena beyond their immediate locality and beyond their “proportional contribution” to 
the sum of their parts.831 The use of the iconic case study here bears resemblance to how the 
term is ordinarily understood: To be iconic is to be “very famous or popular, especially being 
considered to represent particular opinions or a particular time” 832 or emblematic, symbolic 
                                                 
828 Hay (2010, p. 82).  
829 Hay (2010, p. 86). 
830 Smits (2013, p. 55). 
831 Smits (2013, p. 55). 
832 Cambridge Dictionary (2015). 
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or representative in a way that is renowned or infamous. The Cambodian Railway is iconic 
for a number of reasons. Its highly publicised notoriety encapsulates the “local”-“global” 
conflicts that have come to shape Cambodia’s contemporary relationship with foreign 
investors, aid and development partners. The Cambodian railway resettlement followed a 
series of other high-profile resettlement events in which international expectations about 
resettlement were not met.833 Yet, notwithstanding these previous events, the railway project 
again fell subject to what could be called a “classic” set of challenges that have plagued 
development partners working in Cambodia for years and do not seem to be abating. Thus, 
through a case study approach, the study seeks to understand the cyclical way in which 
donors and international financial institutions again presumed that accountability challenges 
in the context of resettlement could be met through contractually obligating the Cambodian 
Government to comply, and then proceeding to monitor compliance in a relatively non-
intensive way until NGOs alerted them to emerging problems.834  
The research approach is also primarily qualitative in nature, in that it aims to understand 
the production and effect of social structures and processes in relation to certain places and 
events.835 Drawing on an approach to qualitative research adopted by Gillespie, I focus on 
understanding the meaning people give to their world in different contexts and the wide-
ranging accounts they provide of their situations.836 Gillespie refers to the meaning of 
qualitative research as described by Labuschagne: 
The word qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings 
that are rigorously examined… (they) typically produce a wealth of 
detailed data about a much smaller number of people and cases. 
Qualitative data provide depth and detail through direct quotation 
and careful description of situations, events, interactions and 
observed behaviours.837 
Adopting a qualitative approach to the study provides a way of exploring how different 
stakeholders make sense of the railway project and its impacts, recognising that they bring 
different value systems and expectations to bear on the discussion. Consistent with this 
                                                 
833 See the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.7 about the Highway One Project and the Boeung Kak Lake conflict.  
834 See Asian Development Bank (2014f).  
835 Hay (2010, p. 5).   
836 Gillespie (2010, p. 172).  
837 Labuschagne (2003, p. 100) ; Gillespie (2010, p. 172) 
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approach is that the study is founded on what could be called a “constructivist 
epistemology”.838 “Epistemology” is understood here as “the nature of knowledge, its 
possibility, scope and general bias.”839 In this context, “constructivism” is based on an 
understanding of the world in which “[m]eaning is not discovered” as if it is a fundamental 
truth, it is “constructed” and therefore culturally and socially dependent.840 In this way, 
“meanings” are made by human beings through interaction and they are contextually 
contingent. Thus, underpinning the study is the assumption that international, globally 
circulating concepts, such as “resettlement”, “risk”, “rights” and “accountability”, will have 
specific, unpredictable and heterogeneous expressions in local contexts.  
6.3 A multi-scaled ethnographic lens  
One of the most powerful ways to capture and understand the different value systems and 
expectations influencing different groups is to do ethnographic research. At the outset, I 
want to make clear that I have not undertaken ethnographic research with the affected 
communities, but I have approached the research with NGOs, donors and financiers with an 
ethnographic lens. One understanding of ethnography is that it aims to capture the social 
meanings and ordinary activities of people in “naturally occurring settings” commonly 
referred to as “the field”. 841 For Geertz, the resulting field study reflected the knowledge and 
the system of meanings in the lives of a cultural group.842 Ethnography is understood today 
to be a reflexive process, where the ethnographer reflects on their relationship to “the other” 
or to those they are setting out to understand, as well as the many layers of meaning systems 
that the researcher brings to their interpretation of events and observations, which operate 
like filters.843 
Traditionally, ethnographies are based on extended periods of fieldwork (years) in which a 
researcher lives with the community being studied.844 In the context of this research, the 
“communities” being studied are not conceived in the conventional way, i.e. only as the 
Cambodian communities living in the resettlement sites and along the railway, they are also 
within the NGOs, the ADB, World Bank and the Australian and Cambodian Governments. 
                                                 
838 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see: Crotty (1998).  
839  Hamlyn (1995, p. 242); Also see: Crotty (1998, p. 8).  
840 Crotty (1998, p. 9).  
841 Brewer (2000, pp. 10-11).  
842 See generally, Geertz (1973, pp. 3-30). 
843 S. Scott, Miller & Lloyd (2006) 
844 Hay (2010, p. 12 and 375). 
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The study considers these groups to have their own language and meaning systems which 
bind them, culturally in various ways. An in-depth ethnography of each of the various 
cultures was not logistically possible. Instead, an “ethnographic stance”845 was adopted 
which was sensitive to the values of ethnography and aimed to understand the social 
structures, behaviour and meaning systems of each of the groups or interview participants 
in their accustomed settings. Tania Li’s description of the powerful potential of the 
ethnographic stance is helpful:  
An ethnographic stance enabled me to explore how subjectivities 
were produced in the complex conjunctures where multiple powers 
coincide, how critical practices emerged, and how they provoked 
new attempts to govern. By expanding the study of government to 
incorporate the rich insights of people at the receiving end of 
governmental schemes, I avoided attributing to these schemes a 
coherence they do not have…846 
Writers, such as Bebbington et al., have explored similar approaches, extending traditional 
notions of “the field” within human geography.847 Their study of social capital debates 
within the World Bank aims to turn the ethnographic or research stance “upwards” and 
“inwards” to understand, for example, the environment within the World Bank as new policy 
was developed, circulated and debated within the organisation. This approach is also 
consistent with Foucault’s approach to discourse analysis, whereby every document, 
conversation, policy response is a “text” in which discursive meanings can be found.848  
Both the field work in Washington D.C. in April-June 2013 (in which I participated in the 
Spring Meetings civil society stream) and being based at Oxfam International in Phnom 
Penh for a total of seven months, made it possible to develop an understanding of the values 
and priorities of the different stakeholder groups involved in resettlement conflicts. During 
the thesis, I also undertook a consultancy for the Bank Information Center, a Washington 
D.C. based civil society group, which aims to influence the actions of multilateral 
institutions. The consultancy centred on the new World Bank lending modality known as 
                                                 
845 Li (2007, p. 282) 
846 Li (2007, pp. 282-283) 
847 Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson & Woolcock (2004). 
848  See generally: Foucault (1972).  
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“Program-for-Results” or “P4R”. It required me to  travel to Vietnam in April 2014 and 
required an extensive analysis of safeguards documents and approaches that were broadly 
relevant to my thesis research.849 Living in Cambodia for an extended period of time also 
provided many opportunities to debate the safeguards and resettlement issues surrounding 
the railway project with many different people who lived and worked in the country. This 
aspect of the field work is explained further below. The challenges these experiences posed 
relating to positionality have already been acknowledged in beginning of this chapter at 
Section 6.1 and are further elaborated at Section 6.10 below.  
6.4 Entering the “field”: Practicalities and challenges 
Community resettlement involves inherent dynamics explored earlier in the literature 
review, which had clear implications for the fieldwork method. An awareness of scale was 
fundamental – of the local community level, as well as national, regional, international and 
institutional levels. It also required thinking about project and sub-project levels – and how 
the project related to other program objectives of the ADB and other stakeholders. The field 
work aimed to explore the research questions at these different scales, to draw out the 
perspectives of communities, the NGOs, the Cambodian Government and the project-
financiers. Wherever possible, the research also aimed to gather the perspectives of related 
actors who were able to provide insights on safeguards and resettlement.  
Broad groups of actors – or stakeholders – who were involved or implicated in the railway 
project were identified as relevant to the research. The term stakeholder is used here to refer 
to any group or person who may be impacted by the project, who has a “stake” in its 
outcomes, who has influence or power over its trajectory, and who has knowledge of or who 
can shed light on its inherent tensions and processes. In using the term stakeholder I 
recognise that not all “stakes” are equal and that the affected communities had far more to 
lose or gain from the resettlement process than other actors. 850  
The different actors who were relevant to the research, were identified through a set of core 
questions: 851 
 Who is intended to benefit from the railway project?  
                                                 
849 See:  Jessie Connell & Grimsditch (2014, p. 49). 
850 This approach was inspired by Phirun, Khiev & Whitehead (2011, pp. 10-18).  
851 See the stakeholder approach described in Phirun, Khiev & Whitehead (2011, pp. 10-18).  
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 Who controls or can make decisions which influence the outcomes of the 
project?  
 Who may be potentially impacted by the project, directly or indirectly?  
 Who has rights and responsibilities stemming from or relating to the project?  
 Who may have knowledge, experience or expertise who can shed light on the 
project dynamics and their broader significance and implications? 
This section should also be read in conjunction with the previous chapter where an extensive 
discussion about how different actors related to one another in the railway project, especially 
regarding the affected communities at Section 5.7 and the NGO sector in  5.8. A stakeholder 
map was also presented at Figure 7, in Section 5.4.5. However, it is important to note that 
the stakeholder map and discussion in Chapter 5 focused considerably on the broader 
commercial actors and contractors involved in the railway. These actors were always 
considered relevant to the broader context, but they were never the core focus. As the thesis 
aim relates to understanding resettlement tensions, priority was given to those who were 
impacted most directly (the affected communities); those who were most directly able to 
influence the resettlement outcomes (NGOs, financiers, the Cambodian Government), and 
those who were able to shine a comparative light on the resettlement dynamics (resettlement 
practitioners within ADB and the World Bank, including those who were not necessarily 
directly involved in the railway project, but had broad understandings of multilateral 
safeguards). 
On this basis, five broad categories of stakeholders or research participants were identified 
for the in-depth, contextualised interviews: 
1. Community members affected by the railway project in the five 
resettlement sites (and after fieldwork began, this extended to 
community members who remained living in the previous locations 
along the railway, see the discussion in Section 6.5); 
 
2. Representatives of international financial institutions (ADB and 
World Bank), including safeguards specialists, ADB Accountability 
Mechanism staff, Work Bank Inspection Panel staff, social 
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development specialists;  
 
3. Representatives of the Australian Government, from AusAID and 
DFAT, and contractors working on the railway; 
 
4. Representatives of the Cambodian Government (such as the Inter-
ministerial Committee on Resettlement, Provincial, District, 
Commune and village level officials, where this was practically 
possible;852 and     
 
5. Local and international NGOs, focusing on those involved in the 
railway project.   
First the practicalities of the community-based fieldwork are explained, before turning to 
the research with other participants.  
6.5 Deciding who to interview  
The first challenge encountered in the fieldwork was that there was a very large number of 
people at the “community” level whose views were considered relevant to understanding 
the project. Thus, a key methodological and conceptual issue for this study was how the 
relevant population for the community-based research should be defined. There were a 
number of distinct population groups which were expected to provide different perspectives 
on resettlement processes. ADB estimates of the affected households have varied over the 
course of the project. According to recent documentation, a total of 4,174 households fell 
within the ambit of “affected households” under the ADB Resettlement Plans.853 
Approximately 1,200 households were totally affected and have been required to relocate. 
At the time of field work, 150 relocated households had made a complaint to the Office of 
the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) and then later to the Compliance Review Panel (CRP) 
within the ADB. Thirty households had made a complaint to the AHRC in Australia.854 It is 
                                                 
852 See the discussion in Section 6.11, where it is acknowledged that a limitation of the research was that I was not able to 
engage in-depth with representatives of the Cambodian Government, especially at the provincial level.   
853 Estimates of the number of households affected have varied over the course of the project. ADB’s website materials 
and formal reporting of the numbers of affected households also differ. The ADB in Cambodia calculates average 
households size as 4.7 people. See: Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
854 Inclusive Development International & Equitable Cambodia (2012); Asian Development Bank (2014e); Asian 
Development Bank (2014f). 
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important to note that the ADB planning documents consider affected persons by 
“household” rather than as individuals, which had implications both for the individuals 
themselves and also for the research.  
As stated earlier, the affected households who were required to relocate were those with 
residences, structures and/or other assets situated within the corridor of impact of the railway 
line or on land required for the construction of stations, depots or other project-related 
infrastructure.855 The corridor of impact extended 3.5 metres on either side of the centreline 
of the tracks. A corridor of impact approach was used by the ADB to reduce the number of 
household relocations, allowing people to continue living as close as 3.5 metres from the 
railroad depending on their situation. Community relocations began in mid-2010. As of July 
2012, the corridor of impact had almost been completely cleared of residents.  
The initial proposal was to interview roughly 10 percent of resettled households at the 
railway resettlement sites (approximately 120 households). This was partially a way of 
sampling the community, and to ensure that the research was broadly representative. 
Following initial contact with the communities, this approach was refined as it became clear 
that the relevant “population” was not only those people who had been relocated. It needed 
to include people who were impacted by the development who were not considered in (or 
were excluded from) relocation, i.e. the people who lived outside the 3.5 metre area who 
were not given the option of resettlement, but who were expected to be experiencing changes 
as a result of the railway project. Many of these people were still considered to be “project 
affected persons”, as they were still living in the larger railway right of way area (a minimum 
area of 20 metres on each side of the railway centreline). As the ADB project documentation 
revealed in Chapter 5, some of these people had been provided with small amounts of 
compensation where their structures partially extended into the corridor of impact.  
The initial contact with people who remained living along the railway in the right of way 
suggested that they had significant views about how the resettlement and compensation 
processes unfolded. Thus a number of distinct groups were identified as being directly 
relevant to the community-based research, depicted below in Table 9. Following these 
                                                 
855 See Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007); Asian Development Bank 
(2006); Inclusive Development International & Equitable Cambodia (2012) at para 16.  
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adjustments, the field research set out to interview as many of these people from the different 
groups as possible in the research period, as explained below.  
 
Table 9: Different types of affected households 
 
Type of population group No. of 
Households 
Total project-affected households assessed by ADB 4,174 
Resettled households 1,200 
Household complainants to the OSPF (ADB) 150 
Household complainants to the CRP (ADB) Unknown 
Household complainants to the AHRC (Australia)  30 
Other affected households not considered in ADB plans Unknown 
 
 
While people were affected all along the railway, the areas where people were “wholly 
affected” and required to relocate, tended to be in clusters. These clusters were in five 
provinces: Poipet, Battambang, Pursat, Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. At least two study 
sites were identified in each province, so that interviews could be conducted both with 
people living in the resettlement sites and people who continued to live along the railway in 
each location. Figure 2 (from Chapter 1) is presented below, depicting a map of the five 
locations and indicating the resettlement sites.  
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Figure 2 (from Chapter 1): Map of railway project identifying resettlement sites 
 
 
The Table below (also included in Chapter 5) shows the distribution and location of project-
affected households. The “bamboo transport operators” identified in the table lived in all 
locations. They were considered to be affected by the project because their livelihoods were 
expected to be diminished as the new train service would prevent them from operating their 
established businesses along the railway lines.856 While the bamboo operators would no 
doubt have offered an interesting perspective on the railway project, a decision was made 
early on to focus on households who were to be physically displaced or those who lived 
immediately near them in the previous locations, so as to concentrate on the relocation 
dynamics of the resettlement process.  
 
 
                                                 
856 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 14).  
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Table 10: Distribution and location of affected households857 
  
Location of households  
 
No. of affected 
households 
 
No. of relocating 
households 
Poipet 1094 588 
 
Northern Line and Missing Link 
(Battambang and Pursat) 1165 51 
 
Southern Line (Sihanoukville) 206 30 
 
Phnom Penh 1289 169 
 
Bamboo rail transport operators*  189 52 
 
Addendum to the Updated RP for 
Phnom Penh (Additional affected 
households)   248 
 
Samrong Estate (Phnom Penh) 231 62 
 
Total 4174 1200 
* Bamboo rail transport operators in all sections.  
 
6.6 Finding the communities   
A major initial barrier to the community-based research was the lack of transparency 
surrounding the details of the project and the remoteness of some of the resettlement site 
locations. Access to the communities was only possible due to the significant scoping time 
invested in preparing for the fieldwork and networking in the Phnom Penh community. 
While the ADB published the map above on its website (at Figure 5), further details about 
the locations of the resettlement sites were extremely difficult to attain. When ADB staff 
were asked directly about how to access the communities, they were not able to point to any 
detailed maps or able to provide specific locations. Eventually, one of the ADB interview 
participants offered to put me in contact with a local driver who had accompanied their 
visits. Without this contact, it would only have been possible to interview the communities 
                                                 
857 These numbers have changed multiple times in the ADB documentation. The numbers included in the table were 
available on the ADB website for the railway project until recently. Other, slightly different numbers are included in various 
other ADB documents, for example: Asian Development Bank (2014f). The numbers of people expected to be affected 
changed as the project evolved and adjusted its scope.  
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who had been relocated to the peri-urban area immediately outside Phnom Penh, as the 
NGOs were familiar with and willing to share the details of this location with me.  
Using the same driver as an ADB employee raised the issue of how I might be perceived in 
the community upon arrival. Aware that it might be possible that community members 
would perceive me to be associated with the ADB, I spent considerable time reiterating to 
the community leaders and other members of the community that I was an independent 
researcher doing my PhD research and was not in any way associated with the financiers of 
the project or the NGOs who had previously visited them. These introductions and 
discussion were carried out with the assistance of interpreters, explained further below.  
Some of the locations were considerably remote, particularly the Pursat resettlement site, 
which was approximately 45 km off the main highway (National Highway 5), mostly via a 
dirt road towards Kaun Barok Village, in Krakor District. It was considered particularly 
important to reach these groups, as these were the people with the least contact with NGOs 
who are mostly based in the capital, Phnom Penh. 
6.6 Community interviews   
Over the course of 2013, in-depth interviews were conducted with 144 community members 
across the five provinces: Poipet, Phnom Penh, Battambang, Sihanoukville and Pursat. Each 
person was allocated a participant number, as set out in Appendix B. These community 
members interviewed represented approximately 105 households in total. Almost half of the 
interviews were conducted with participants who remained living along the railway in each 
of these locations. As depicted below, 68 of the participants lived along the railway, 
compared to 73 who lived in the resettlement sites. These participants were from 43 railway 
households and 59 resettlement households.  
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Figure 8: Total participants by settlement type (n=144)858 
 
 
Figure 9: Total households by settlement type (n=105) 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews were held in the communities, usually in people’s homes. The 
interviews were conducted with the assistance of Cambodian interpreters, who translated 
                                                 
858 “Other” refers to 3 people who were either living in the resettlement sites or along the railway, but had moved to the 
community at a later date or did not fall within the definition of project-affected person for one reason or another, e.g. one 
was a construction worker living in the resettlement site in Poipet, one was a self-appointed community leader and another 
was the Village Chief of the host community.  
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questions and responses during the interviews (see Section 6.1 above and Section 6.8 below). 
As mentioned earlier, the Cambodian interpreters were living in Phnom Penh. One was a 
male university student and the other was a female recent university graduate. Interviews 
were around 45 minutes to 1 hour in length, often longer where more than one person was 
present. In Pursat particularly, especially along the railway, informal group interviews were 
held instead of individual interviews. These group interviews came about as people joined 
the individual interviews. While these were not focus groups in the planned sense that may 
be conducted by a social research firm, they did function as a type of informal focus group. 
In Appendix B, those participants who were interviewed in groups are identified.859 Repeat 
visits were made to some of the communities (Poipet, Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville) over 
a six-month period, which was an important way of establishing trust and familiarity. Some 
community members were interviewed more than once, especially if a significant period of 
time had lapsed since the last visit. These interviews helped to understand how the 
experience of resettlement was changing over time, discussed further at Section 6.9. 
The number of interviews in each area was roughly proportionate to the number of people 
affected in each area. As presented below in Figure 10, 41 community members were 
interviewed in Poipet, where the project affected the most people; 36 people in Pursat; 25 
people in Sihanoukville; 14 people in Battambang and 25 people in Phnom Penh. The 
interviews were accompanied by detailed visual assessments of the sites, people’s houses 
and living conditions, identification of nearby schools and discussions with community 
leaders in each area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
859 Appendix B only identifies group interview where more than 3-4 people were present. Interviews where up to 3 people 
were present were conducted in a one-on-one style where individuals were able to explain their circumstances and 
responses in turn.  
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Figure 10: Participants and households interviewed by location 
 
During the interviews, community members were asked to tell the story of their experience 
with the railway project. They were asked about project’s impacts, both positive and 
negative, what they valued and what their aspirations were for themselves and their families. 
Throughout the interviews, people were also asked about their surroundings, sources of 
livelihood, whether their children were going to school and who they went to when they 
needed support. For those who had made formal complaints to the ADB, they were asked 
what they understood about the process, whether they thought the mediation process was 
“fair”, what it was like working with the NGOs involved and what could be improved. 
Others who had not made complaints were asked whether they knew that they could make 
a complaint and the factors they considered in deciding not to complain. People were also 
asked whether relationships across the community had changed as a result of the project or 
the complaints process. Approximately one-third of those people interviewed had been 
involved in making a making a formal complaint to the ADB, as depicted below in Figure 
11.  
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Figure 11: Participants who made an ADB complaint (n=144) 
 
As indicated in Figure 12 below, the research participants were overwhelmingly female. 
Seventy-eight of the participants were female, compared to 42 who were male. Twenty-four 
were not recorded, as they were involved in the informal focus groups and did not participate 
in an extended individual interview where their particular characteristics could be recorded. 
As mentioned, a number of the interviews along the railway turned into informal focus 
groups, as people from the community joined the discussion. There were often logistical 
issues during the community interviews that prevented all the information about each 
member being recorded systematically e.g. people’s children would begin crying and they 
would leave the interview or group. Or one family member would be replaced by another 
when they returned home.  
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Figure 12: Sex of Participants (n=144) 
 
 
 
 
This gender balance was not intentional, however visiting people in their homes during the 
day meant that there was a greater likelihood of being able to incorporate women’s voices 
in the research. Women were often working at home and looking after children during the 
interviews. Being a female researcher also made it easier to bond with the women who were 
present in the community. There were a number of times when the men left the room when 
I arrived, leaving the women to answer my questions. If I had held a workshop in a location 
outside the communities, i.e. not in peoples’ homes, it is possible that the gender balance of 
the research participants would have been different. Children were not interviewed directly 
during the research, however, they were discussed in the interviews with older participants 
and observed where they were present in the interviews with parents.  
A basic questionnaire was developed to guide the discussions with communities, included 
as Appendix F. The questionnaire was designed so that the discussion could be relatively 
unstructured, but also so that certain basic questions were covered in relation to the 
circumstances of the communities. The questionnaire was reviewed by certain stakeholders 
involved in the railway, namely a representative of the Australian Aid Program and a contact 
within one of the NGOs. Yet while this review process was informative, it also meant that 
the questionnaire became very long and unwieldy by the time it was finalised.  
Ultimately, the questionnaire was a helpful guide and a useful reminder of the core subjects 
of concern, but it was not helpful or productive to try and conduct every interview strictly 
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using its format.860 There are a number of reasons for this. First, capturing seemingly 
straight-forward “data” (for example, in relation to incomes) using the questionnaire was 
not straight-forward or simple at all. People reported incomes very differently – some of the 
variables included reporting incomes in Cambodian riel, in US dollars, calculating per day, 
per week or per month, per household (which included up to 25 people in one household) or 
per person. Very often people did not know precisely how much they earned or they did not 
have sources of livelihoods that they were able to predict with any certainty. People were 
also in a state of transition, especially amongst the relocated communities. Many people’s 
lives were in a state of turmoil – some in gradual recovery and others in crisis. This degree 
of variability was similar for a lot of the questions included in the questionnaire as 
“background”, including debt levels, and travel and housing construction costs.  
Indeed, the ADB and the NGOs were also experiencing difficulties in these respects. At one 
point, disagreements between the NGOs and the ADB about how much people were earning 
in the Phnom Penh resettlement site became a huge public controversy, resulting in two 
different reports recording significant income differences. The ADB report claimed the 
households were earning up to three times as much as what was being reported by the 
NGOs.861 For these reasons, the questionnaire was used a guide during the interviews, but 
for the most part, each interview participant was encouraged to tell their story in a relatively 
unstructured way which focused on the issues that were important to them on their own 
terms.  
The approach taken during the interviews was very much consistent with how Scott et al. 
describe doing field research with communities in Vietnam, in which they “highlight the 
need for a negotiated, adaptive, and flexible approach, and one that is sensitive to the 
changing research context.”862  
6.7 Ethical considerations and initial contact with communities  
The University of Sydney Ethics Committee required that Participant Information Sheets, 
Discussion Guides and Consent Forms be prepared and translated into Khmer prior to 
commencement of the research. These are included as Appendices G, H, I and J. This 
                                                 
860 See Turner (2013, p.1) for a useful discussion about the messiness and compromises of fieldwork.  
861 See: Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a, p. 30); The 2013 ADB update on incomes in the Phnom Penh resettlement site is 
no longer available on the website.   
862 S. Scott, Miller & Lloyd (2006, p. 38).  
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documentation was given to the Village Chief or Community Leader upon arrival in each 
community and was received very well. It was clear that written documentation was 
appreciated in the community and considered valuable to people. This appeared to be the 
case even where the research participants were not able to read the documents themselves. 
During the interviews, community members showed me numerous documents they had kept 
from ADB and other sources over the course of their lives that had been meticulously 
maintained over many years. One community leader read my research proposal out loud, 
word-for-word to a group of interested residents.  
Participation in the interviews was voluntary and this was reiterated numerous times to 
community members. Community members were extremely willing and interested in 
participating in the research. With their consent, most interviews were recorded. Consent 
was attained verbally, rather than in written form. Written consent (or consent by thumb 
printing as is custom in Cambodia) has a number of negative historical associations for 
Cambodian communities. Thumb printing for people who are illiterate has especially been 
used in the past to fraudulently dispossess people of land in Cambodia. This issue was 
submitted to the Ethics Committee in advance of the fieldwork and it was agreed that verbal 
recorded consent would suffice. Interview participants were not paid for the interviews, 
however I brought food as gifts to the communities – usually a bag of green apples – which 
was given to each household on arrival.  
As a female non-Cambodian researcher, there were many limitations in terms of 
understanding the subtleties of the conversations, but it also had advantages. People 
sometimes stated that they felt safer talking to a foreigner about human rights, corruption 
and other similar issues. Being a woman also seemed to make it easier for me to join the 
discussions among women at home during the day time, although it may have also accounted 
for why, overall, men were more difficult to engage during the research and tended to defer 
to their wives to complete the interviews.  
6.8 Interpreter-researcher relationships  
As mentioned, two Cambodian interpreters assisted me during the fieldwork. The 
interpreters were briefed about the research project over a series of days before 
accompanying me on the field trips, and de-briefed afterwards to reflect on the research. As 
Scott et al. argue in their article about doing field research as early career researchers in 
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Vietnam, the researcher-interpreter relationship is an central influence on the data 
gathered.863 Scott et al.’s starting point is helpful in itself, which is that “[n]otions of research 
being objective and value-free have been radically changed by feminist theorists…”864. 
These theorists have explored how relationships between researchers, interpreters and 
informants shape “how knowledge is interpreted and represented”. 865 For this research, the 
interpreters not only provided translations of the interviews, they provided invaluable 
insights and reflections on the interviews during debriefs. They also helped to develop 
strategies for approaching certain groups and provided on-going advice about cultural 
appropriateness, nuance and safety.  
At the same time, the interpreter-researcher relationship was sometimes challenging, as the  
interpreters would often re-shape the questions I posed according to what they thought was 
useful. It was often possible to decipher that this was occurring using the small amount of 
Khmer that I had developed. In many instances this re-shaping of my questions was a 
necessary process of trying to communicate my questions in ways which made sense to the 
interview participants. In other situations, it also came from me not explaining enough 
information in advance about why a certain question was relevant. We would often spend 
time after the interviews discussing these issues, the importance of different questions and 
pieces of information so that slowly we could come to a shared understanding of why and 
how certain topics should be approached during the interview. Notwithstanding some of 
these challenges, the presence of the interpreter as a travel companion, someone to develop 
ideas with and analyse the meaning of certain interviews, was a very rich aspect of the field 
work. 
6.9 Evolving views and perspectives: the observer effect?  
An important feature of research with communities affected by the project was the evolving 
nature of their views, perceptions and aspirations, especially in relation to the relocation 
process. Very early in the field research it became clear that community views were 
changing over the course of the project and that they would continue to evolve long after the 
initial resettlement process occurred. Most of the field research was conducted throughout 
the first half of 2013, which for most of the families, was around 18 months after relocation 
                                                 
863 S. Scott, Miller & Lloyd (2006, p. 36). 
864 Scott et al. refer to a number of feminist theorists in their article, see: S. Scott, Miller & Lloyd (2006, p. 36).  
865 S. Scott, Miller & Lloyd (2006, p. 36).  
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had taken place. Perceptions of loss, or of what will be lost, as well as aspirations for the 
future fluctuated as conditions changed and as new information became available about 
opportunities or risks in the resettlement sites as compared to the communities of origin. The 
aspirations and fears of those left behind also changed as remaining residents watched their 
neighbours adapt to resettlement conditions or be adversely affected by them.  
The potential for me as an “outsider” and researcher to influence the community views on 
resettlement (through the interview process) was apparent. There were also opportunities for 
me to shape the behaviour of the advocates and ADB (by feeding back information to them). 
This operated as a type of “observer effect”, in which the nature of the subject being studied 
was and could be changed once it became subjected to analysis.  
There was also a type of “advocacy effect” occurring over the course of the study, in which 
community views on resettlement changed as the advocates achieved certain results or 
changes in policy through their public campaigns. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8, 
Section 8.4. For example, the amount of compensation people received for relocation 
increased a number of times, which meant that the appeal of resettlement started to increase 
in the communities left behind. These were all ethical issues that needed to be confronted 
during the research. I dealt with this issue mostly through trying to be aware of these 
temporal dimensions. This means that the research was only able to capture the views of 
people at a certain time and place, and these views can be expected to change over time. I 
was cognisant that the community views were not fixed and that they were responding to 
the advocacy taking place and then in turn to the changes in policy being made. This is an 
issue that resettlement advocates and researchers need to be aware of in their work, and is 
explored further in the findings chapters that follow.  
6.10 Positionality  
Positionality was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, however it warrants further 
attention. The original motivation for this research came from hearing reflections from 
people within the NGO sector about doing advocacy work. This came about through 
working in Cambodia in 2010-2011 on a separate project, during which time I became 
familiar with the organisational landscape of the NGOs, including some of the key 
personalities involved in land rights advocacy. At this time, the focus of advocacy efforts 
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was primarily on the Boeung Kak Lake conflict.866 Being familiar and known to the NGOs 
on a personal level created many opportunities for interesting discussions, as well as 
personal challenges in terms of how the findings of the current research should be framed. 
This was a difficult experience. Like the advocates, I was motivated by a concern for the 
people impacted by the railway project. In a tense advocacy environment there is pressure 
not to put information into the public domain which contradicts or weakens the efforts of 
advocates working towards a certain cause. Ultimately, this had to be overcome, with an 
acknowledgement that social research is messy and community information does not always 
fit within neat boundaries. Every effort has been made to present the findings of the research 
without these advocacy pressures in mind, but these challenges need to be acknowledged.  
During the field research period, I was fortunate enough to be based at the Oxfam 
International office in Phnom Penh. Oxfam was not directly involved in advocacy relating 
to resettled communities, but it was working closely with the advocates who were most vocal 
about the railway project. Being based with Oxfam facilitated access to a range of NGO and 
organisational networks to conduct interviews and was extremely helpful by providing a 
desk and computer space during the field work period. It also provided a supportive 
environment in which I could freely discuss the emerging research.  
6.11 In-depth contextualised interviews at other scales 
An additional 22 interviews were carried out with representatives of NGOs, the Australian 
and Cambodian Governments, the ADB and the World Bank, as set out in Table 11 below. 
Due to the sensitivities of the railway project and that many of the people interviewed 
expressed a desire for their identities to be concealed, a decision was made to de-identify all 
interviewees. These interviewees were allocated a participant number, included in Appendix 
C. The stakeholders are presented below in groups, so that it is not easily possible to deduce 
their identities. Throughout the research discussion, individuals are only identified when 
they explicitly expressed a desire to be identified. Where individuals are not identified, 
wherever possible there has been an attempt to contextualise these interview participants’ 
perspectives without revealing their identities.  
 
                                                 
866 See Chapter 4, Section 4.7.  
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Table 11: Interviews with other research participants 
 
Stakeholder group, indicating organisations  
No. of 
participants 
interviewed  
Approached 
and declined  
 
Cambodian Government and Australian Government 3 3 
 
ADB (staff and consultants) 3 3 
World Bank 5 1 
 
Local and international NGOs, including former and current 
employees of Equitable Cambodia, Inclusive Development 
International, Oxfam, STT, Habitat for Humanity, Earth 
Rights International, Bank Information Center, NGO Forum 
on Cambodia.  11 0 
Toll Holdings   2 
 
Total 22 9 
 
The most difficult stakeholders to access were the Australian Government, Toll Holdings 
and the Cambodian Government. The Australian Government required a detailed contract 
to be signed in which they would be able to review and edit the research findings prior to 
them being released into the public domain. After many months of negotiations in 2013, I 
decided not to enter into the contract. Instead, the interviews I have conducted with 
Australian Government former and current employees were in a personal capacity. A similar 
situation existed for the ADB and representatives of the Cambodian Government, for whom 
the railway project was a highly sensitive issue. In terms of the Cambodian Government, I 
was unable to engage with representatives of the Government significantly beyond the 
central level. This is a limitation of the research that needs to be acknowledged. My 
reluctance to actively approach government representatives at the provincial, district and 
commune level was primarily driven by a concern that the research would be stalled or 
prevented in some way if I drew attention to myself. These concerns were confirmed through 
discussions I was having with NGOs and ADB staff during this time. It is worth noting, 
however, that two of the community participants interviewed were also Village Chiefs,867 
                                                 
867 These government officials have been included in Figure 10 with the community participants and not included in Figure 
11.  
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although they have not been explicitly identified in the interviews throughout the empirical 
chapters. This is primarily because their identity would be revealed if information about 
these individuals was provided and because the perspectives they shared were critical of the 
project and its impacts. A further limitation is that while I interviewed some ADB staff 
members from headquarters who were present in Phnom Penh, I was not able to visit the 
ADB headquarters in Manila in person, primarily because the financial resources for the 
project had been exhausted and because I had already gathered considerable material.  
A series of interviews were also undertaken in Washington D.C. with World Bank 
representatives, in order to capture the broader history of involuntary resettlement in 
Cambodia at other pivotal sites of decision-making. These interviews took place during the 
World Bank’s Safeguards Review in April 2013. Most of the interviews with World Bank 
representatives were with current or former members of the Inspection Panel who had direct 
experience in investigating the Boeung Kak Lake case in Cambodia, described in Chapter 
4. These additional interviews provided perspective on the functioning of community-driven 
accountability mechanisms (such as the World Bank Inspection Panel and the ADB 
Accountability Mechanism). They also provided insights into how resettlement advocacy 
was being received and understood by project financiers and implementers inside and 
outside Cambodia.  
6.12  Chapter review 
The thesis is founded on qualitative, field-based research at multiple scales and sites to gain 
a situated understanding of the perspectives and priorities of  different groups of people, as 
shaped by their environments. Investigating concepts of resettlement, risk and accountability 
at different scales enables an understanding of how concepts and norms developed in an 
international or global forum or setting, are translated into local conditions. This chapter has 
also outlined some of the conceptual and logistical challenges encountered, including 
difficulty getting access to certain stakeholder groups due to the sensitive nature of the 
research. It has also emphasised the challenges associated with capturing evolving 
community views over the course of the research. The next two chapters explore the 
perspectives of people interviewed for the research, first at a community and sub-project 
level in Chapter 7, before turning to governments, financiers and NGOs at other scales in 
Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 7 
 
A tale of five cities: 
Community perspectives of the railway 
project 
 
Everyone has problems like living away from the market. 
There are some elderly people who cannot do anything. 
Before in the family almost everyone earned, but when we 
came here only one person could earn.868 
If we move we will die.869 
Why not me? I want to have my own land. I want a safe 
place for my children to play. If school is a bit far then I can 
get a moto-taxi.870 
We should all receive the same compensation together.871 
 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter explores community perspectives of the railway project in Cambodia. It focuses 
on capturing people’s experiences of resettlement, their aspirations and coping strategies, as 
well as the factors that shaped their decisions about how to navigate resettlement. The 
chapter draws primarily on qualitative research to understand the responses of people in both 
                                                 
868 Interview with older couple in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2015. (Participants 91A and 92A). These 
comments were made by the woman in the couple. Quotation paraphrased.   
869 Older woman interviewed at Battambang railway, 6 March 2013 (Participant 99A), aged 72 years. 
870 Woman interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 39A), aged around 25 years.  
871 Woman interviewed at Poipet railway, 5 March 2013 (Participant 130A), aged around 45 years.  
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the resettlement sites and the communities who remained living along the railway in each of 
the five locations: Phnom Penh, Pursat, Sihanoukville, Battambang and Poipet.  
In-depth interviews and informal focus groups with 144 people reveal the differences that 
emerged between the Phnom Penh resettlement site and the more remote resettlement sites, 
particularly Poipet and Pursat in the north. Resettlement impacts were highly uneven at a 
sub-project level, shaped to a large extent by the micro-geography of each resettlement site.  
The timing of the field research was a crucial aspect of contextualising the stories and 
experiences of resettlement described by community members. As additional compensation 
was provided and services and infrastructure improved in the sites, so did the appeal of 
resettlement for many community members who were left behind. This research was 
conducted after the first round of complaints was made to the ADB in 2012 and after 
intensified investment was focused on the resettlement sites, but before the third round of 
compensation from the additional USD 3-4 million scheme began in January 2015. The point 
in time in which the field visits took place appeared to influence how people formed their 
perceptions of relocation, their views on what was possible in the future, and the types of 
barriers they needed to overcome.  
In exploring community experiences of the project, the chapter addresses two questions for 
the research:  
 How did the actions and responses of the parties involved in resettlement 
processes for the railway (financiers, governments and NGOs) align with 
project-affected people’s aspirations and concerns? 
 
 Has the experience of involuntary resettlement faced by displaced 
communities been mitigated by NGO advocacy, and in what ways? 
 
The chapter first introduces the different communities affected by the project. It describes 
their locations, distance from markets and urban centres and provides maps of each 
resettlement site in proximity to the railway line. The maps have been made using the best 
available information. The chapter then describes the experience of relocation and 
conditions in the resettlement sites, as observed during the field visits and as described by 
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the community members themselves. It examines the significance of using the ADB 
complaints mechanism, through drawing on interviews with the small number of people who 
were able to make a complaint. The chapter then moves to exploring the experiences of 
people who were not relocated. In doing so it compares the perspectives of those who moved 
and those who continued to live along the railway in the five locations. The chapter 
concludes by drawing out a number of conceptual and overarching themes emerging from 
the field research, which are developed further in Chapter 8 using a thematic analysis of the 
interviews with other stakeholders, including the Cambodian and Australian Government, 
ADB and the NGOs.  
Throughout this chapter, it is important to bear in mind that there are many inconsistencies 
in the formal documentation available from the ADB and the Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport (MPWT) about the households affected and the reality of what was encountered 
in the communities (e.g. different estimates of people affected, different locations cited as 
to where people were living previously, different resettlement site locations, as they changed 
a number of times). As much as possible, information was verified during visits to the 
communities, however there have been many changes and developments in the project over 
time and not all inconsistencies can be explained or resolved. When changes were made to 
the project, a rationale for the change was often documented by the ADB (as evidenced in 
Chapter 5), but many changes or anomalies were also not explained. To an extent, this 
reflects the complexity of trying to manage a complex process such as resettlement. But as 
the ADB Compliance Review Panel (CRP) also found in 2013, there were many omissions 
and mistakes made, especially in the early resettlement plans and documents.872 One 
omission was that the project lacked detailed mapping of the affected communities’ previous 
locations and the new resettlement sites. Although a Detailed Measurement Survey (DMS) 
was carried out to assess losses and to record the socio-economic status of affected 
households, detailed GIS mapping was not conducted or was not included in the resettlement 
plans available publicly. While it is possible to locate the resettlement sites, it has been 
especially difficult to piece together precisely where people lived previously. The 
information used in this chapter to identify previous locations and distances to the 
resettlement sites, has come from triangulating the fragmented information available in the 
                                                 
872 See generally: Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
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Resettlement Plans, with community descriptions of where people lived previously, as well 
as informal discussions with either consultants or employees of ADB working on the project.  
7.2 The communities  
People were deemed to be affected by the project all along the railway line. This was 
described in Chapter 5 at Section 5.7. However, those who were wholly affected and 
required to relocate were largely in clusters near town centres in five locations: Phnom Penh, 
Pursat, Sihanoukville, Battambang and Poipet. Resettlement sites were established in each 
of the five places. The map depicting the five resettlement sites is reproduced below for ease 
of reference.  
Figure 2 (from Chapter 1): Map of railway project identifying resettlement sites 
 
Only those people who lived within the corridor of impact, which was a 3.5 metre area on 
either side of the railway centreline were required to move and given the option of relocation. 
Those who were partially living in the corridor of impact were generally required to move 
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back and re-organise their homes in the railway right of way, where there was sufficient 
space to do so. They were not given the option to move to the resettlement sites. See Chapter 
5, Section 5.7 for details of the arrangements. People who were required to relocate to the 
resettlement sites were promised that after five years they would receive full land ownership 
and land titles for the plots of land that they had been allocated. In the intervening period 
they were given a type of temporary or interim documentation relating to the land.  
Critical to understanding the resettlement impacts of the project is an appreciation of the 
micro-geography of the resettlement sites, especially the different distances that people were 
relocated from their former residences. In this context, “micro-geography” refers to the 
social, cultural and environmental features of the sites, the resources available in or near the 
sites, proximity to markets and in some cases international borders (as is the case in Poipet), 
availability of affordable transport, relationships with other community members and pre-
existing host communities, potential economic opportunities and other variables. Some 
communities were relocated much further away from their previous locations than others 
(see the Figure below). The Phnom Penh resettlement site is in a peri-urban location 
approximately 20 kms from the city by road, and far from where the affected households 
lived previously. The Battambang site is approximately 5-7 kms away, the Sihanoukville 
site is 10 kms away and the Poipet site is 4-5 kms away. The Pursat site is only around 400 
metres from most former residences, which is close enough for the families who remained 
along the railway in Pursat to see the new houses of families who had moved. Thus, only 
two of the resettlement sites eventually selected (Poipet and Pursat) squarely met the criteria 
in the original Resettlement Plan prepared in 2006, which required that all resettlement sites 
be “in close proximity (3 km to 5 km) to their current locations so that incomes will not be 
affected”.873 The Figure below shows the approximate distances people moved from their 
previous locations once the resettlement plans were finalised. 
  
                                                 
873 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, pp. i-v). 
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Figure 3 (from Chapter 1): Approximate distances people moved from their previous 
residences 
 
Figure 13, below is a comparative diagram, depicting maps of each community indicating 
the different distances people were relocated from their previous locations, to convey the 
variation of the sites. Further explanation and maps of each site are also provided later in the 
chapter.  
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Figure 13: Comparative map of resettlement sites and previous locations 
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To an extent, these distances were a function of the size of the relevant city or town and the 
availability of nearby land, since the initial residences were generally close to the centres of 
each town, discussed further below. Many of the households affected by the project in each 
location were already very poor prior to relocation. The original 2006 Resettlement Plan 
estimated that half of all affected households belonged to poor and vulnerable groups and 
that poor female-headed households accounted for 22.3 percent of all affected households. 
In the 2006 Resettlement Plan, 50 percent of the people who were required to relocate were 
considered to be “landless”, 23 percent were “female-headed”.874  The poverty line used by 
the Cambodian Government’s Ministry of Planning was also used in the resettlement 
planning and was set very low. People were considered to be living below the poverty line 
in if they earned an average of USD 0.45 per day (around USD 15 per person per month). 
875  
In the 2006 Resettlement Plan, between 5-14 percent of the households assessed were 
considered to be living below the poverty line (earning less than USD 15 per month, per 
person). However many more affected households were very poor, with around 69 percent 
of households earning less than USD 200 a month.876 An average household is considered 
to be 4.7 people by the ADB in Cambodia.877 In the interviews for this research, people 
explained how they had lived along the railway for many years, some up to 20-30 years, 
especially those that had settled there immediately after the Khmer Rouge period ended. 
Most had moved into the railway right of way after the railway fell into disrepair. Generally, 
people explained that they had chosen to settle along the railway in town centres because 
they had nowhere else to go and also because it was available, centrally-located land where 
                                                 
874 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 23). The Resettlement Plan 
was prepared in 2006 and released early in 2007.  
875 The poverty line varies by region in Cambodia: In 2005 it was USD 0.59 per person per day in Phnom Penh, USD 0.49 
per person per day in other urban centres, and USD 0.45 per person per day in rural areas. See: Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 22); The poverty line was revised by the Ministry of 
Planning in 2013 to USD 1.53 per day in Phnom Penh, USD 1.05 in other urban areas and USD  0.84 in rural areas: Asian 
Development Bank (2014b, p. 5). Confusingly, ADB documents sometimes describe the poverty line as USD 15 per person 
per month and at other times refer to USD 30 per person, per month, compare p. 22 and p. 12 of: Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007).  
876 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 22). Note that ADB 
documents refer both to individual and household income and it is not always clear how calculations have been made.  
877 This household size has been calculated using demographic data, see: Asian Development Bank (2014b, p. 1). The 
average urban household (4.8 members) is slightly larger than the average rural household (4.6 members). Note that in the 
Updated Resettlement Plan for Samrong in 2009, the average household size used was 5.56, but no rationale for the change 
was provided, see: Ministry of Public Works and Transport (2009, p. ix).  
227 
 
they could not be evicted by other residents. Houses built along the railway were typically 
made from wood, corrugated iron, thatch and in some places they were made from concrete, 
although this was unusual. The basic features of each of the five locations are set out below 
with an accompanying map indicating how far communities moved from their previous 
locations.  
7.2.1 Phnom Penh 
Phnom Penh is the capital of Cambodia with a population of more than 1.69 million.878 The 
city has grown particularly quickly over the past decade resulting in new tensions and 
uncertainties involved in urban residence.879 Intense conflicts over high-value land have 
been frequent, exacerbated by increasing real estate prices and rising inflation.880 The spatial 
dynamics of these conflicts have already been analysed in Chapters 3 and 4, drawing 
particularly on Dwyer’s discussion of the formalisation fix and Biddulph’s geographies of 
evasion thesis.881 Phnom Penh has also become a popular tourist destination internationally, 
increasing competition over well-positioned land in the inner city.882 The ADB railway 
project initially planned to rehabilitate the railway line in central Phnom Penh, but as plans 
progressed an additional railway freight facility and cargo facility were also proposed nearby 
in the communes of Kakab and Samrong. As explained in Chapter 5, these plans were 
eventually abandoned in 2014, but this was after some people were cleared from these areas.   
The precise number of people considered to be affected by the railway project in Phnom 
Penh has changed many times, due to adjustments in the project’s scope, and different 
assessments of the impacts being carried out over time by different consultants. This process 
has been very confusing for the communities involved and for those who might be 
potentially affected. It has also been confusing for researchers and organisations working 
with the communities, and by all accounts also for ADB staff and the Inter-Ministerial 
Resettlement Committee (IRC) working on resettlement.  
In the 2010 Updated Resettlement Plan for Phnom Penh, there were a number of different 
community groups that were considered affected. The first group was 1,289 households who 
                                                 
878 Asian Development Bank (2014b, p. 1). 
879 Simone (2008); Sidaway, Paasche, Woon & Keo (2014); Cf. Jessie Connell & Connell (2014).   
880 There is limited high quality analysis of these issues, however it is explored indirectly in Grimsditch, Kol & Sherchan 
(2012); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2012).  
881 Dwyer (2015); Biddulph (2010; 2014). See Sections 3.5, 4.3 and 4.7.   
882 See generally: Knight-Frank (2015). 
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lived along the dilapidated railway (approximately 6,058 people based on an average 
household size of 4.7 people per household). There were 127 affected households that were 
considered to belong to “vulnerable groups”, in that they were very poor, female-headed or 
elderly or had other circumstances meaning that they might “suffer disproportionately” from 
the project’s impacts.883 The Resettlement Plan anticipated that a total of 774 households 
would either lose their houses entirely or partially. 169 households were entirely affected 
and required to move. 161 were considered landless and were eligible for relocation to the 
resettlement site, while eight others opted to self-relocate in the residual area of the right of 
way in an adjoining village. Residents who owned land elsewhere were not eligible for 
relocation to the resettlement site.884 The other 605 affected households were considered 
able to re-organize their partially affected houses and stalls behind the corridor of impact in 
the residual right of way. Another 502 households were affected by the total or partial loss 
of secondary structures and/or trees, while 13 “renters” who were renting from families with 
affected structures, were required to “find a new place to stay”. 885   
Following revisions to the original railway project proposal, more people were identified for 
relocation due to the additional freight and cargo facility proposed, referred to as the 
“Samrong facility” or “Samrong railway estate”. This involved repossessing land previously 
owned by the Royal Railway of Cambodia in the 1950s, although it resulted in a complex 
legal battle in relation to ownership of the land.886 Although the plans to build the freight 
and cargo facility were eventually abandoned, the Updated Resettlement Plan for Phnom 
Penh identified an additional 248 families that were fully affected by the development and 
required resettlement. Of these, 105 families chose to move to the resettlement site, whilst 
others were apparently discouraged by the distance from the resettlement site to the city 
where their sources of livelihoods were located and went elsewhere.887  
                                                 
883 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. i). 
884 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 1).  
885 It is not clear what the circumstances of these additional “renters” were and there is very little information available in 
the Updated Resettlement Plan for Phnom Penh, however there is some suggestion in the plan that they would be assisted 
to find accommodation, see: Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei 
Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, pp. i, 6 and 9).  
886 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 11).   
887 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 6). Only 79 of the 105 households who were due to move in the second wave had 
actually relocated to the site as at October 2013.  
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Resettlement in Phnom Penh happened in stages. The fieldwork for the current research took 
place in early 2012 after most of the first wave of residents had moved (people who lived 
along the railway), but before the next phase of residents from Samrong had been relocated. 
The resettled households interviewed for this research were people who had relocated from 
the railway line in Russey Keo District (Kilomet 6 and Tuol Sangkae Communes) and in 
Prampir Meakkara District (Mittakpheap Commune). The research also involved interviews 
with people who still remained living along the railway in Russey Keo District (Kilomet 6 
and Tuol Sangkae Communes) and in Prampir Meakkara District (Mittakpheap Commune). 
These communes are relatively close to the centre of town near the “Riverside”, which is a 
popular, tourist area of the city (see the map in Figure 14 below).888 
Initially, when the project was first proposed, communities were to be relocated no more 
than 3-5km from their previous residences.889 The Updated Resettlement Plan for Phnom 
Penh, prepared by Nippon Koei and Jarts consultants and approved by the ADB, explains 
that this was not possible because the cost of land in Phnom Penh was too high. The Updated 
Plan also explains that it is standard practice of the Phnom Penh municipality to relocate 
communities at least 15 km from the city. It states:    
…[I]t was found than [sic] no large land (2.5 ha) was available 
around the affected area and that price of land in Phnom Penh urban 
area was too high (150 USD/m2) around the affected areas and not 
affordable. Therefore, the [Resettlement Site] has to be located in the 
outskirts of the City. We should note that most of the relocation site 
built by Phnom Penh municipality is located at least 15 km from the 
center of the City.890  
A resettlement site was then chosen which was located 15-20 km from the communities’ 
previous residences, in Samrong Krom commune, in Dangkor District, next to the 
community of Trapeang Anhchanh.891 The Phnom Penh resettlement site that was eventually 
selected is in an isolated, sparsely populated peri-urban setting with few livelihood 
                                                 
888 Also see the administrative map of Phnom Penh, available at: 
http://www.stat.go.jp/info/meetings/cambodia/pdf/12com_mp.pdf.  
889 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, pp. i-v. ). 
890 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 14). 
891 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 15). 
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opportunities available locally. The Resettlement Plan describes the location as near to an 
area “which will be an axis of industrial development in the future” [emphasis added].892 
Travel from the previous residences at the railway to the resettlement site takes 
approximately 1-1.25 hours in a tuk, depending on traffic.893 Closer to the resettlement site, 
as the land becomes more agricultural and the roads are no longer paved, the terrain is 
difficult for tuk tuks or motor bikes, which is how most residents travel to and from the site. 
The terrain in the last couple of kilometres is more appropriate for four-wheel drive vehicles. 
These access conditions were similar in a number of the resettlement sites at the time of 
fieldwork.  
The Phnom Penh resettlement site is located next to Trapeang Anhchanh community, which 
is comprised of households who were resettled there many years earlier, after being evicted 
from Sambok Chap in the centre of Phnom Penh. This was viewed as a positive factor in 
terms of integration. The Resettlement Plan explains:  
We should note that the nearby village, Trapeang Anhchanh…is 
occupied by 500 families evicted from Sambok Chap in Phnom Penh 
Center. The population of this village is similar to the 161 
[households] to be relocated by the railway project. Therefore, the 
integration with this community should not be a problem.894 
The land at Samrong Kron, where the resettlement site is located, was previously agricultural 
land and was purchased by the Government from land owners who were described in the 
Resettlement Plan as “land speculators” who “live in Phnom Penh City”.895 The approximate 
locations of these communities are depicted at Figure 14.  
 
 
 
                                                 
892 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 15). 
893 As measured by the author.  
894 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 15) 
895 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association 
with JARTS (2010, p. 15). 
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Figure 14: Map indicating previous locations and resettlement site in Phnom Penh896  
 
                                                 
896 Note that most people relocated from the areas approximately 20km away.  
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7.2.2 Sihanoukville  
Sihanoukville or “Kompong Som” is a coastal town located south-west of Phnom Penh with 
a population of approximately 100,000 people.897 Sihanoukville city is the capital of 
Sihanoukville province and has become a popular beachside tourist destination in recent 
years. A total of 206 households or 892 persons were expected to be affected by the Southern 
Line, which stretched from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville Port. Of these, 46 households were 
considered to belong to vulnerable groups.898 Initially, 52 households were “fully affected” 
and were going to be relocated to the Sihanoukville resettlement site. This later was reduced 
to 42 in an addendum to the Resettlement Plan due to re-assessments and slight changes in 
project plans over time.899 Eventually this became 33 households, of which only 6-7 
households had relocated in 2012, with another five households planning to move in 2013. 
According to the ADB documentation, another 13 of the 33 families who were designated 
for relocation had sold their plot of land in the resettlement site (using the documentation 
that could eventually be used to gain full land title) and moved back and rented near their 
original locations closer to the sources of their livelihoods.900 This was generally confirmed 
during the interviews with people in Sihanoukville resettlement site.   
Most of the households affected by the railway project in Sihanoukville previously lived 
near the coast in Sangkat I, Khan Mittapheap. One household lived in Sangkat Samrong 
Khan Prey Nop.901 Sangkat I, Khan Mittapheap is adjacent to the harbour. People in this 
area live along the harbour separated from the coast by a busy road. Many people in these 
communities derived their livelihoods from fishing or from the fishing sector more 
generally.902 The railway in this area had already been repaired in 2012 when the fieldwork 
took place, and trains were running through the remaining community.  
                                                 
897 Census population data is available by province and urban centre, which provides an approximate population for the 
main cities in each province in 2008, see: National Institute of Statistics (2008, p. 8); Growth rates in each province were 
estimated in 2013, see: National Institute of Statistics (2013, p. 18) 
898 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co Ltd in association 
with JARTS (2009, p. v). 
899 Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 31). 
900 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 6). 
901 Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 12). Also see the 
Administrative map of Sihanoukville, available at: http://www.stat.go.jp/info/meetings/cambodia/pdf/18com_mp.pdf. 
Administrative maps are not available for all of the resettlement site areas.  
902 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 5). 
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Originally, a resettlement site was selected 2 km away from the coast where people were 
living,903 however this was later changed to a site in Phum Mouy, Sangkat Mouy, Krong 
Preah Sihanouk, Preah Sihanouk province. One of the Environmental Monitoring Reports 
described the location as 6 km from Sihanoukville town and 1.5 km from the National 
Highway No. 4,904 however the site is approximately 10 km by road from where most 
households were living previously as they lived to the north of the town near the port, 
depicted at Figure 15.   
  
                                                 
903 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co Ltd in association 
with JARTS (2009, p. 9). 
904 Redecam Group & Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee Cambodia (2013, p. 8). 
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Figure 15: Map indicating previous locations and resettlement site in Sihanoukville 
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7.2.3 Battambang 
Battambang city is the capital of Battambang Province and is situated to the north-west of 
Phnom Penh. Battambang city has a population of around 250,000.905 Households that 
relocated to the Battambang resettlement site came from Battambang city near the railway 
station in the centre of town. These households were included in the Resettlement Plan for 
the “Northern Line and Missing Link”. A total of 1,165 households were considered affected 
by the Northern Line and Missing Link, which is a stretch of 338 km from Tbaeng Khpos 
in Kampong Chhnang Province to Sisophon and the Missing Link which meets the town of 
Poipet near the Cambodian-Thai border.906  
Of the 1,165 households affected by the Northern Line and Missing Link, 134 households 
were considered vulnerable households (earning less than USD 15 per month, landless, poor 
female-headed households, disabled or elderly with limited and/or no means of support.)907 
The DMS assessment identified households along 17 km of the railway line that would be 
impacted in clusters.908 Most households were “partially affected” and did not require 
relocation.909 However, around Battambang Railway Station in Battambang city, 51 
households were “fully affected” and were required to relocate. This was later reduced to 48 
households.910  
The Resettlement Site selected is approximately 5-7 km from Battambang Railway Station 
where the households lived previously.911 The Battambang Resettlement site is particularly 
significant as it is the location where two children died shortly after moving to the site in 
May 2010, reportedly whilst searching for clean water.912 A map is included at Figure 16, 
indicating the area of Battambang Railway Station where the households lived previously 
                                                 
905 Various population estimates are available. Google city data estimates Battambang city to have a population of 
250,000, see: https://www.google.com.bd/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-
8#q=battambang+city+population. For the population of Battambang province see: National Institute of Statistics (2008); 
National Institute of Statistics (2013).  
906 Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS 
(2008, p. 5). A separate Resettlement Plan was prepared for Poipet.  
907 Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS 
(2008, p. iv). 
908 Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS 
(2008, p. iv). 
909 Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Asian Development Bank & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS 
(2008, p. 10). 
910 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 131). 
911 The Resettlement Plans describe the site as being 4 km away, however there was a general consensus in the interviews 
with ADB and NGOs that the distance, by road, is closer to 5-7km. 
912 Baker & McKenzie (2010).  
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(described as “previous location” on the map) and the approximate location of the 
Battambang resettlement site. 
Figure 16: Map indicating previous locations and resettlement site in Battambang 
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7.2.4 Pursat 
Pursat City has a population of around 30,000 people and is the capital of Pursat Province.913 
A total of 227 households were affected in Pursat province, of which 30 households were 
“fully affected” and required to relocate. People affected in Pursat were included in the 
Resettlement Plan for the “Northern Line and Missing Link”, discussed above. 
Almost all of the 30 households that required relocation in Pursat lived near the railway in 
a cluster in Bamnak village in Krakor District, approximately 45 kms from Pursat city. The 
Bamnak site is the most remote and difficult to travel to of the five resettlement sites. 
However the Bamnak/Pursat resettlement site differs from the other sites in that most 
affected people moved only 400 metres from their original locations, as the resettlement site 
is located within Bamnak village. There were a few households that were meant to relocate 
from further away (approximately 10-15 km), however other community members 
explained during the interviews that these households sold their plots of land in the 
resettlement site and went elsewhere, some to Bangkok. As explained throughout the 
chapter, people “sold” their plots of land even though they had not yet lived in the 
resettlement site for five years and attained formal ownership. Sales were done usually 
through an informal system through the Village Chief. The proximity of the former 
residences to the Bamnak/Pursat resettlement site is depicted in Figure 17. The “proposed 
railway” refers to the existing dilapidated railway that was to be rehabilitated under the 
project. Of the 33 families selected for relocation, 26 had settled on the site as at October 
2013.914 The map is in a different format to the other maps because google maps data was 
not available at the required level of detail for the town of Bamnak.  
  
                                                 
913 This is an estimate based on a number of sources, see: National Institute of Statistics (2008); National Institute of 
Statistics (2013); Also see google city data at: https://www.google.com.bd/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=pursat%20city%20population.  
914 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 6). 
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Figure 17: Map indicating previous locations and resettlement site in Pursat 
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7.2.5 Poipet 
Poipet city is located on the Cambodian-Thai border in the north of Cambodia in Banteay 
Meanchey Province. Poipet has grown rapidly from a population of 43,000 in 1998 to almost 
90,000 in 2008, partly due to a large influx of people migrating to the city from other parts 
of Cambodia.915 The Poipet-Aranyaprathet border-crossing is an important border for people 
travelling from Cambodia to Thailand and for trade in various types of goods. Poipet is also 
known for gambling in the “special economic zone” inside Cambodian territory. Gambling 
is illegal in Thailand, making the casinos situated in the economic zone a popular 
entertainment destination for wealthy Thais.916 As one of Cambodia’s largest towns on the 
border, migrant workers travel to Poipet from all over the country, using it as a launching 
pad to enter Thailand.917 
The Poipet resettlement site is the largest of the resettlement sites. The entire railway line in 
Poipet went “missing” during the war in the 1980s.918 A large number of people moved into 
the areas where the tracks previously existed, especially around Poipet railway station. A 
total of 1,094 households (4,578 people) were considered to be affected by the rehabilitation 
of Poipet station, including the 6 km of railway tracks that needed to be re-built. Of these, 
211 affected households were considered vulnerable.919 Of the 1,094 affected, 588 
households (2,440 people) were totally affected and were required to relocate.920 A 
reassessment included an additional group of families, bringing the number to 601 
households who were required to move. As of October 2013, around 378 households had 
moved to the resettlement site.921 ADB documentation suggests that 91 households 
informally sold their plots of land in the resettlement sites and went elsewhere.922 The Poipet 
Resettlement site is located in Kilolek Boun village,923 approximately 4-5 km from the area 
where most of the people previously lived.  
 
                                                 
915 Yagura (2013, p. 116). Also see generally: National Institute of Statistics (2008); National Institute of Statistics (2013). 
916 Yagura (2013, p. 121). 
917 Barron & Chhay (2014).  
918 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. iii). 
919 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 5). 
920 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 5). 
921 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 7). 
922 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 7). 
923 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in association with JARTS (2010, p. 5). 
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Figure 18: Map indicating previous locations and resettlement site in Poipet 
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7.3 Experiences of resettlement 
The initial relocation process was handled in 2010-2011 by the Inter-Ministerial 
Resettlement Committee (IRC). Minimal infrastructure was provided in the resettlement 
sites in the early stages. Toilets had been built in the resettlement sites and plots of land for 
people to re-build their houses had been allocated. Water and electricity services had not 
been connected prior to the first movement of people. In all locations people had received 
extremely small amounts of compensation. Most people interviewed received well under 
USD 1,000 in the initial compensation process, generally not enough to build adequate 
housing in the resettlement sites.924 It was common for people to have spent most of their 
compensation money on transport during the moving and re-building process. Some people, 
including elderly people, had lived in these conditions for months. Reports of intimidation 
from government officials were common, and usually involved threats to demolish houses 
along the railway without compensation if people refused to move. Similarly, there were 
accounts of compensation entitlements being systematically reduced, i.e. some people were 
initially only compensated for one level of their house or people’s ages were incorrectly 
recorded so as to avoid paying the additional allowance required for older people.925 As one 
woman in the Phnom Penh resettlement site explained:  
I can grow mangos but I don’t have enough to eat. I still have to buy 
food. I am disappointed about the way that compensation was 
decided…one whole floor of my house was not compensated for. I 
don’t want to complain again. I cannot read or see clearly. They just 
tell me to thumbprint, so I thumbprint. They said I had signed for 
USD 300.926 
The relocation phase was also badly timed so that people were without shelter during the 
rainy season. Many people, including older people and children, had slept under plastic 
tarpaulins during the rainy season while they re-built their homes. An older woman aged 66 
                                                 
924 The 2013 ADB Compliance Review Panel also confirmed this was the case during their investigation. They found that 
the average compensation amounts provided by the IRC in Phnom Penh were USD 947.50, Poipet USD 874.63, 
Battambang USD 862.23, Sihanoukville USD 558.46 and Pursat USD 512.03:Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 56).  
925 These accounts were also confirmed in ADB’s own investigation by the Compliance Review Panel, see: Asian 
Development Bank (2014f, p. 55 and 71). 
926 Interview with woman in Phnom Penh resettlement site, aged 57 years, 21 February 2013 (Participant 14A). 
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years who lived in the Phnom Penh resettlement site described how she stayed on her own 
sleeping under a plastic cover in the rainy season:  
I used a plastic cover between the two toilets…I stayed here about 
for about one month. During this time I didn’t have very much food. 
I also had to get water from the rice field because at that time there 
was no drinking water here....927 
Another family of five, including three young children who also lived in the Phnom Penh 
resettlement site, explained how there was nowhere for them to sleep when they first moved: 
“We slept on the floor in a tent…for three months…it was rainy season.”928 
The impacts of relocation were most extreme in the Phnom Penh site, which is located 
around 20 kms from the previous residences of the households that were relocated. In the 
interviews, people described how relocation resulted in family separations (as men left the 
resettlement sites to find work), high levels of unmanageable debt and a general inability to 
re-establish pre-relocation incomes. Where people were able to maintain their incomes or 
stayed working in their previous jobs, they spent most of their incomes on travelling to and 
from the resettlement sites. The situation in the Phnom Penh site, in particular, was 
consistent with patterns of impoverishment identified by writers such as Cernea, who has 
argued that compensation-centred responses rarely enable the re-establishment of 
livelihoods following displacement.929 A photo of the Phnom Penh resettlement site is 
included in Figure 19. The photo in Figure 19 was taken by the author in late 2012. This 
photo is taken of the plots of land that had recently been prepared for the second wave of 
residents to move in 2013. The small white and blue concrete structures are toilets built by 
the ADB. The households that had already relocated were living adjacent to this section of 
the resettlement site. 930 This photo represents what people would have seen when they first 
moved to the resettlement site.  
 
                                                 
927 Interview with woman in Phnom Penh resettlement site, aged 66 years, 18 February 2013 (Participant 8A). 
928 Interview with family in Phnom Penh resettlement site, 21 February 2015 (Participants 10A and 11A). 
929 Cernea (2003). 
930 The ADB has uploaded more recent photos on its website, depicting a new community centre that has been built in the 
Phnom Penh resettlement site. See: The Cambodian Railway Tracker at http://www.adb.org/news/photo-essays/moving-
better-lives-cambodia.  
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Figure 19: Plots of land, Phnom Penh resettlement, prior to second wave of movement 
 
Similar, but less severe impacts occurred in Battambang and Sihanoukville, where the 
resettlement sites were a considerable distance outside the city centre beyond most local 
income-generating opportunities. One couple interviewed in Battambang described how 
difficult it was to earn money in the resettlement sites:  
Everyone has problems like living away from the market. There are 
some elderly people who cannot do anything. Before in the family 
almost everyone earned, but when we came here only one person 
could earn.931 
In Battambang, many people had not moved to the resettlement sites but had gone elsewhere. 
A similar situation existed in Sihanoukville.  
7.4 Debt-levels post-relocation  
When the research was conducted in 2013, almost all people interviewed who had moved to 
the new resettlement sites were in debt as a result of the relocation process. The Phnom Penh 
community was the most affected, especially because they had moved far from their 
                                                 
931 Interview with older couple in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2015. (Participants 91A and 92A). These 
comments were made by the woman in the couple. Quotation paraphrased.  
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previous homes. The plots of land provided were around 7m x 15m in size and not large 
enough to grow agricultural produce on any scale, which may have provided a means of 
subsistence for families or a way of supplementing income. The photo below at Figure 20 
depicts the farmland that surrounds the Phnom Penh resettlement site, but is not available 
for use by resettled residents. It conveys how far out of the city the resettlement site is and 
helps to explain why resettled residents have had difficulty re-establishing their urban-based 
livelihoods in this setting. 
Figure 20: Photo of agricultural area near Phnom Penh resettlement site  
 
While some of the debt that people had incurred enabled them to build better houses, debt 
in the Phnom Penh resettlement site was usually to private lenders and was unmanageably 
high, often between USD 1,000-2,000. One person reported being USD 7,000 in debt. In the 
Phnom Penh site the interest rates were around 7-10 percent, whereas in the other sites it 
was much lower, around 1-2.5 percent. People in all of the sites were using their land 
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documentation as collateral for loans, though they had not yet secured formal land title.932 
As they were having difficulty re-paying loans they were at risk of losing possession of their 
land documentation, and consequently their right to claim title to the land when the 
mandatory five-year residence period ended. As one woman said:  
I am afraid the money lender will come and take my house. That's 
why I'm afraid I haven't got the official land title yet, because my 
land title is with the private lender.933  
Those interviewed in the Phnom Penh resettlement site described their post-relocation 
income levels to be between USD 1-5 per person, per day.934 People in this situation were 
visibly in distress about how to make repayments. All those interviewed stated that they 
were not in debt prior to the relocation. People interviewed in all sites, especially in Phnom 
Penh, described how their incomes had been severely affected by loss of access to small-
scale networks and livelihood options.  
7.5 Aspirations for resettlement  
An important aspect of this study is that interviews were conducted both with people who 
were relocated to the resettlement sites and with people who were not relocated and instead 
remained living along the railway right of way. A critical feature of the project not captured 
in the media reports of the project were the differences that had emerged between the Phnom 
Penh communities and the remote communities, particularly Poipet and Pursat in the north. 
While people in Phnom Penh had relocated 20 km outside the city, people in Poipet had 
relocated 4-5 kms and in Pursat people mostly moved only 400 metres. Partly as a 
consequence of these different circumstances, many people in the more remote resettlement 
sites described either wanting to stay in the resettlement sites, or if they had not been 
relocated, they described wanting to move. Figure 21 below sets out the preferences 
expressed by people in both the resettlement sites and the railway locations.  
 
 
                                                 
932 ADB records also support this conclusion. In 2013, in the Phnom Penh site, as many as two-thirds of all households 
were indebted, see: Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 6).    
933 Interview with woman aged around 30 years in Phnom Penh Resettlement site, 16 February 2013, (Participant 5A).  
934 Note the previous discussion surrounding the difficulty of assessing incomes in Chapter 6, Section 6.6.  
246 
 
Figure 21: Preferences of people by location and settlement type in 2013 (n=141) 
 
The importance of securing land was central to both people in the resettlement sites and 
those people interviewed who remained living along the railway. Of the 141935 people 
interviewed (at both railway and resettlement sites), 92 people expressed a preference for 
living or moving to the resettlement sites (65 percent). These percentages were much higher 
in Poipet, with 38 of 41 people (93 percent) stating a preference for the resettlement sites. 
Similarly in Pursat, 32 of 36 people (88 percent) either wanted to stay in the resettlement 
sites or if they were still living near the railway, they wanted to relocate. Of the 68 people 
interviewed who remained living along the railway in all locations, 51 people (75 percent) 
stated that they wanted to move to the resettlement sites. Yet, in Phnom Penh, only one of 
25 people interviewed (from both the railway and resettlement site) expressed a preference 
for the resettlement site, three others were not sure.  
The preferences expressed by interviewees need to be interpreted bearing in mind that by 
the time the interviews were conducted, the railway project had received considerable media 
attention and community members (at least in Phnom Penh) had been visited regularly by 
NGOs, which may have begun to influence how people framed their needs to outsiders 
entering the community. Thus, the testimonies of those interviewed may or may not have 
been altered or adjusted to suit the politics of the situation, i.e. of course some people may 
have perceived there to be some benefit from expressing dissatisfaction with the sites, others 
                                                 
935 Note that 3 of the 144 people interviewed were categorised as “other” in the charts included in the methodology at 
Figure 8 (Chapter 6). These people were removed from the calculations when assessing their preferences under the project.  
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may have felt that there was something to be gained by expressing a desire to move to the 
sites. It was explained to the interviewees by my interpreters that I had no connection to the 
project, and had no bearing on its outcomes. Overall, when observing the conditions and 
locations of each site respectively, the preferences expressed by community members for 
relocation or for staying in initial locations made sense and seemed to be based on a very 
pragmatic consideration of the pros and cons of each resettlement site in each location.   
The main reasons people wanted to move to the resettlement sites were for reasons of land 
security and the prospect of better services in resettlement sites, which had gradually begun 
to improve as additional money and support was provided to the people in the resettlement 
sites. In this respect, the experiences of people who had relocated to the Phnom Penh 
resettlement site in the peri-urban outskirts of the city, (which was the focus of many of the 
media and NGO reports), did not reflect how the railway project was being experienced in 
other areas of Cambodia.936 The timing of the interviews was also significant, as numerous 
improvements had been made to the resettlement sites since people had first moved in 2010-
2011.  
An additional consideration was that many people who still resided along the railway line 
were living in a state of uncertainty about what would happen to them when the train started 
operating. They also described how access to land title would improve their prospects by 
providing them the tenure security they needed to upgrade their houses and access credit. 
Answers to questions about preferences were often qualified. For example, many people 
who lived along the railway stated that they would only move if they were given land and 
similar compensation amounts as their former neighbours (who had already moved). 
It needs to be conveyed that people in the resettlement sites did not say that relocation had 
been easy or that they had been treated well or fairly in the relocation process. The families, 
especially in Poipet, expressed how difficult the process was, but that they wanted to secure 
land at almost any cost. Whilst maintaining livelihoods was vital, finding somewhere to live 
without an immediate threat of eviction had also been a long-standing concern. People were 
going to extreme lengths to make life in the resettlement sites work and to manage their debt 
levels. Many households had left the sites entirely and some had sent family members to 
                                                 
936 See for example: AidWatch (2012); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2011); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a); Bugalski & 
Medallo (2012).  
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work in in other provinces or in Thailand so they could send remittances home, as discussed 
further below.937   
The situation in Poipet contrasted most acutely with Phnom Penh. The Poipet resettlement 
site is the largest of the sites, supporting at least 378 relocated households. During the 
interviews with people in the Poipet resettlement site, people still described experiencing 
financial stress, but the degree of debt burden and manageability of the debt was not as 
extreme as the other sites. Many people who moved to the Poipet site had upgraded their 
homes and built large cement houses in the resettlement sites, encouraged by their newly 
found tenure security. A number of factors seemed to have assisted people in the relocation 
process in Poipet, including closer proximity of the resettlement site to markets and the 
households’ former locations, a critical mass of people moved together to the Poipet site (at 
least 378 households), and a greater range of livelihood options, in part due to the proximity 
of Poipet to the Thai border.  
Residents who were not relocated in Poipet and who remained living at the railway without 
tenure security, described wanting to move to the resettlement site. Visits were made to the 
area immediately south of Poipet railway station during the fieldwork, where approximately 
30 households remain who were not been given the option of relocation. Conditions in this 
area along the railway for the remaining residents were very poor at the time of fieldwork, 
and there were limited options for the community to adapt in situ. Most of the houses along 
the railway corridor were dilapidated and built right up to the area of the railway corridor of 
impact. The Poipet railway corridor in this area was the narrowest of any of the railway areas 
visited, hedged in on either side by a concrete wall and pond. In Poipet, the corridor where 
the railway was to be rehabilitated is also the access road for water and electricity services 
for the community. At the time the interviews were conducted, the access road was the only 
means of delivering water and maintaining electricity to these households. In the interviews, 
people asked what would happen to them once the railway was built and how they would 
access water. A sketch of the Poipet railway area in proximity to the resettlement site is 
presented at Figure 29, later in this chapter in Section 7.9.  
There was also a lot of confusion among Poipet railway residents about why their 
community had been “split”, with some families moving to the resettlement sites and some 
                                                 
937 Cf. Jessie Connell & Connell (2014). 
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staying behind. As one woman said about all of the families living along the railway line, 
“we should all receive the same compensation together.”938 Numerous Poipet railway 
residents explained that they had initially been told several years ago, in 2006, that they 
would also be moved to the resettlement sites, but when relocation occurred they were left 
behind. People were initially given yellow cards to indicate that they were affected. One 
man explained what had occurred in 2006:  
First IRC and some foreign people come. They give everyone yellow 
cards. The first time they said everyone was affected, then the second 
time they tried to make sure as few people as possible were affected. 
In 2006, when they first measured, they said that every house here 
was affected. Then they come back. Even myself and others thought 
we would get land. Then later they said that they would give me only 
USD 200 and no land.939  
The community leader who had moved to the Poipet resettlement site explained how 
everyone from the railway wanted to move there. He said: "Here is better. They really want 
to move here and always ask me".940 It was common for Poipet railway residents to visit 
their old neighbours at the resettlement site, and they could list the various entitlements 
received by those who were resettled. One man in Poipet described going to the resettlement 
sites daily. Another woman’s daughter and grandchildren had been relocated while she was 
not, which had separated the family.  
Poipet railway residents also described regular visits from government officials who accused 
them of “encroaching” on the railway corridor. Accusations of encroachment meant that 
people living in these areas did not want to reinforce their household structures to prepare 
for the rainy season. There were also reports from some residents about how they had 
initially been refused relocation and then eventually managed to get a plot of land in the 
resettlement site. One woman who had recently moved to the Poipet resettlement site had 
initially been ordered to move back from the railway as her house had extended onto the 
railway corridor of impact by one metre for which she was initially offered USD 75 
                                                 
938 Woman interviewed at Poipet railway, 5 March 2013 (Participant 130A), aged around 45 years. 
939 Second interview with man aged around 45 years at Poipet railway who was in the process of moving to the resettlement 
site, 5 March 2013 (Participant 128A). 
940 Interview with community leader in Poipet resettlement site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 103A).  
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compensation. She had been supported by the NGO Equitable Cambodia to challenge the 
decision through an ADB complaint and had received a plot of land in the resettlement site. 
As a result of the complaint she also received an additional USD 726 for the loss of her 
house. While the compensation money had not been enough to re-build a house on the new 
site, she was visibly upset during the interview when she described how she had received a 
chance to move while the others were forced to stay behind. According to her estimates there 
were at least 40-50 families who were still living along the Poipet railway corridor who also 
wanted to move. “Everyone wants to move here... but they already thumb-printed,”941 she 
stated. Thumb-printing is how Cambodian villagers typically sign official Government 
documents. She said that some people along the Poipet railway had accepted compensation 
amounts as low as USD 10 to move their houses back from the railway making it difficult 
to make another complaint at a later date. Families who moved their houses back from the 
railway were not provided security of tenure in the railway right of way, however they were 
guaranteed that they would not be evicted for at least five years. This woman was staying 
with her sister in the resettlement site until she was able to save enough money to build a 
house on the new plot of land.   
The photos at Figure 22 and 23 below depict houses in the Poipet resettlement site. These 
houses are some of the better houses in the site, and not all houses in the site were made 
from concrete, however the photos convey the different living conditions between those in 
the resettlement site and those who remain along the railway right of way in Poipet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
941 Interview with woman aged around 35 years in Poipet resettlement site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 112A).  
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Figure 22: House in Poipet resettlement site 
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Figure 23: Poipet resettlement site 
 
 
Figure 24 and 25 below depict the Poipet railway corridor of impact. The photo at Figure 24 
shows the narrow corrridor between the brick wall and the wooden houses where the railway 
line was going to be built. Figure 25 is a photo of women who were interviewed at the Poipet 
railway corridor of impact while they mended clothes for sale in Thailand. These women, 
along with many others in this area, want to move the resettlement site. 
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Figure 24: Corridor of impact, Poipet railway 
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Figure 25: Women mending clothes for sale in Thailand at Poipet railway  
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A similar situation existed in Pursat, where affected people were moved only 400 metres 
away from their previous residences. Those who remained living along the railway described 
the process of watching their neighbours move and they could name the precise amounts of 
money that certain vulnerable groups, such as older people and women who were pregnant, 
received as compensation or assistance. Those who wanted to move in Pursat were explicit 
about only moving if they received the same support as those who had already relocated. 
Below is a sketch of the resettlement site at Bamnak village in Pursat, depicting how close 
the resettlement site is to the railway line.  
Figure 26: Sketch of Bamnak village, Pursat resettlement site 
 
 
Source: Author’s sketch 942  
 
                                                 
942 Drawing not to scale 
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In Sihanoukville, where the resettlement site is approximately 10 kms away from previous 
residences, most of the people along the railway also wanted to move (6 of 9 people 
interviewed). When combining the preferences of the railway and resettlement residents, 
around half of all people (or 12 of 25 people) either wanted to move to or stay in the 
resettlement sites. Some of the women who remained living along the railway in 
Sihanoukville were the most adamant about wanting to leave. In Sihanoukville, the railway 
had been fully restored and the train had already started passing through the community. 
The women who were interviewed as a group were very clear about wanting to move away 
from the railway line to the resettlement site, as indicated by the quotes from the different 
women below:  
Why not me? I want to have my own land. I want a safe place for my 
children to play. If school is a bit far then I can get a moto-taxi. 943 
Living here, I am afraid my children will face danger from the 
train.944 
I want to move too because there are a lot of children as well. 
Because it is dangerous here for the children. Living here is very 
difficult because [it’s ] even [hard getting] water. There is no 
infrastructure in this village. There is rubbish.945  
If anyone gives me land to live I will go.  I don’t want to live here, it 
is dangerous. I would feel very happy if I got my own land. I just try 
very hard to work. 946 
An older woman who was the grandmother of one of the women quoted above said that: 
If my daughter wants to move then I also want to move. I am a 
widow. They are telling me that they have a strong feeling that they 
want to go to the new place. It’s ok if we have difficulties there – we 
have no choice, we have to fight it. We know it.947   
                                                 
943 Woman interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 39A) aged around 25 years.  
944 Woman interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 40A) aged around 30 years.  
945 Woman interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 41A), aged around 25 years.  
946 Woman interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 42A), aged around 25 years.  
947 Woman interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 38A), aged 56 years. 
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Not everyone along the railway in Sihanoukville wanted to move. The community leader 
wanted to stay living near the railway, although she acknowledged most of the other 
residents wanted to move. Some of the men interviewed along the Sihanoukville railway 
were more ambivalent about moving, as they were concerned about how they would earn 
money if they lived in the resettlement site. As one man explained:  
I want to stay here because it is close to my work place. I heard some 
information about people who have to move. But it’s not for me. If 
it is, then they will tell me…I don’t think that those people will be 
better. I heard some information that they [are] struggling…I’m a 
fisherman so I want to be close to the sea.948 
Another man worried about both his children’s safety and his income:  
Sometimes it is very difficult but I have no choice. I worry about my 
children near the railway. It is dangerous by the railway. This 
problem is that I have to consider my income.949 
In Sihanoukville resettlement site, one woman explained the significance of receiving land 
title. She expected to receive land title after she resided on the land for five years, as required 
by the resettlement scheme. These comments were indicative of how many people felt about 
land tenure and the types of sacrifices they needed to make to enable it:   
When I moved I was very nervous. I didn’t know what to do…I 
didn’t have land title then. I felt very happy that I would get land title 
in the near future. But I had to sell my boat to get money to build this 
house – so I lost my job. Mostly my husband goes to fish.950  
The comments also reveal the conflicting demands people were experiencing between trying 
to balance the need to earn an income (livelihoods) with the desire and need to secure assets 
(in the form of land).  
                                                 
948 Man interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 44A), aged 56 years. 
949 Man interviewed at Sihanoukville railway, 25 February 2013 (Participant 45A), aged 23 years.  
950 Woman interviewed in Sihanoukville resettlement site, 24 February 2013 (Participant 36A), aged 42 years.  
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In Battambang, (where only a small number of people who were still living along the railway 
were interviewed), people were evenly divided about whether they wanted to move.951 The 
resettlement site was further away from the railway (approximately 6 km) than in Poipet and 
Pursat. People living along the Battambang railway were also not yet experiencing any of 
the immediate amenity impacts that were affecting people along other parts of the railway, 
especially as the trains had not started operating yet. One older woman living along the 
Battambang railway said she would “die” if she had to move, as she had built a large house 
and business and had lived along the railway since 1979.952 Her comments illustrate the 
different responses of community members to the idea of resettlement, as well as the 
possible relevance of life-stage in contemplating prospects for the future. Her son, who was 
present during the interview, stated that he was interested in moving to the resettlement site 
as the improved tenure security of the relocation site offered greater opportunities for his 
family’s future.953   
Strong preferences for resettlement in the more remote areas were diametrically opposed to 
the situation in the capital, Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh residents in the resettlement sites were 
experiencing hardships that would most likely take many years to overcome, 
notwithstanding the additional support being offered post-2012. Residents of the Phnom 
Penh resettlement site also explained how they experienced hostility from the host 
community that had been living in the area prior to 2010. These earlier residents had also 
been relocated from Phnom Penh many years earlier, but apparently under even worse 
circumstances.954 As one woman explained:  
It is very difficult living here. We don't have enough food.  There is 
nothing we prefer about the new site. The children's education is bad. 
No healthcare. We don't have jobs here. We cannot do business here. 
                                                 
951 In Battambang, interviews were conducted with four people from different households who still remained living along 
the railway, and ten people in the resettlement site. It was more difficult to find and identify relevant remaining railway 
households in Battambang, than it was in other locations (e.g. Sihanoukville), as many people were not home at the time 
of the visit. As explained in the method, the railway interviews were additional to the interviews in the resettlement sites 
as planned in the original field work methodology (see the discussion in the method in Section 6).  
952 Older woman interviewed at Battambang railway stated that “If we move we will die”, 6 March 2013 (Participant 99A), 
aged 72 years. 
953 Interview with the son of Participant 99A at Battambang railway, 6 March 2013 (Participant 100A).  
954 This relocation was described in the original resettlement documents, see Section 7.2.1 above in this chapter.  
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The local authorities discriminate here. The village chief doesn't care 
about our situation because we are new.955 
According to the newly relocated residents, they felt that the host community and Village 
Chief resented them because they received higher amounts of compensation and had better 
facilities built for them than the community that had been relocated from Phnom Penh many 
years earlier.956  
7.6 Significance of using the ADB accountability mechanism  
The field work took place after affected households had been relocated, after many had 
received the second round of compensation and after the problems in the resettlement sites 
had begun to be addressed by the ADB and Cambodian Government. Immediately before 
the fieldwork, certain households had been assessed by the ADB’s Office of the Special 
Project Facilitator (OSPF) and given a small amount of additional compensation. Of the 
people interviewed, 39 households had made a complaint to the ADB and 18 had received 
additional compensation. In some circumstances the additional compensation was much 
more than the original amount they had received. See Table 12 which compares the first and 
second round payments of the interview participants, but only includes interviewed 
households who made a complaint and received additional compensation in the second 
round of payments. Many people did not receive any additional payments in the second 
round, but may receive another payment from the third round of compensation from the 
additional USD 3-4 million compensation scheme agreed to in late 2014.957 
Table 12: Compensation amounts in USD first and second round payments 
 
Household 
Compensation 1st 
round 2010-11 
 
Additional 
compensation 2nd 
round 2012-13 
Difference increase 
as % of original 
amount 
1 $ 1300 $ 2000 150 %  
2 $ 600 $ 1000 160 %  
3 $ 570 $ 1300 230 %  
4 $ 500 $ 954 190 %  
5 $ 815 $ 1670 205 %  
6 $ 697 $ 900 130 %  
7 $ 470 $ 770 163 % 
8 $ 870 $ 300 34 % 
                                                 
955 Interview with woman aged around 30 years in Phnom Penh Resettlement site, 16 February 2013, (Participant 5A).  
956 These residents had being evicted from Sambok Chap in central Phnom Penh years earlier, see Section 7.2.1 above.  
957 The status of the third round of payments is unclear, as it is currently being negotiated between the ADB and Cambodian 
Government. See the Afterword included at the end of the thesis.  
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9 $ 700 $ 100 14 %  
10 $ 700 $ 100 14 % 
11 $ 500 $ 1000 200 % 
12 $ 650 $ 1000 150 % 
13 $ 2158 $ 660 30 % 
14 $ 446 $ 84 20 % 
15 $ 89 $ 461 520 % 
16 $ 75 $ 726 986 % 
17 $ 200 $ 500 250 % 
18 $ 150 $ 500 33 % 
 
While most people interviewed in this group felt that they still had not received enough 
compensation, the opportunity to make a complaint had been important. For some people 
the experience of “being heard”, albeit on a small-scale, appeared to improve how they 
viewed their new circumstances. One man in Poipet described in detail the experience of 
making a complaint, explaining how in the beginning other community members thought he 
was strange for dressing up to go to Phnom Penh to visit the complaints office, but how now 
people in the village viewed him differently and were impressed. He stated:  
It was really difficult. I am poor and sometimes I get embarrassed. 
They [the community] say to “hi” to me and ask why I dress-up in a 
different way. People tell me not to go [to Phnom Penh to complain] 
because they didn’t go, and because they didn’t believe that they will 
get anything. [It cost] USD 10-15 to go all the way to Phnom Penh. 
Inside it’s really painful, but I had to do it.  Now, they [other 
community members] are happy for me. They feel guilty. I went 
there to share information. They regret that they were not like me. I 
complain for them. After I was educated by Bridges [NGO] I feel 
more confident. I help people…no corruption.958  
Not everyone could recall their experiences with NGOs, as sometimes in the remote areas 
this contact had been brief. However, there were many who could describe their encounters. 
These people were either neutral about their experience or very positive about being assisted 
by the NGOs. With the exception of one household, there were no complaints about working 
with the NGOs. As the man quoted above in Poipet said about the NGO, Bridges Across 
                                                 
958 First interview with man who was aged around 45 years who was in the process of moving to the Poipet resettlement 
site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 128A).  
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Borders: “Bridges is helpful and is independent and working to help the people.” 959 One 
woman in the Phnom Penh resettlement site talked about working with Equitable Cambodia, 
(formerly Bridges Across Borders South East Asia or BABSEA), stating that: 
BABSEA is a very good organisation. [They] did a lots of useful 
activities for the village…BABSEA taught us how to be brave, not 
to be afraid and to be aware of our rights.960 
There was one woman who was unhappy about working with the NGOs during the 
complaints process, however once the detail of this story emerged, it became clear that she 
was mostly unhappy with the community leader and indirectly with the NGOs. She felt that 
she had been excluded from making a complaint because the community leader made the 
decision with the NGOs about who should complain without consulting all of the 
households. Her claims cannot be verified easily, but regardless of whether this information 
is accurate, her comments reveal insights about the politics of the complaints process at a 
micro-level. This woman said:  
I didn’t have the information about how to make a complaint. The 
people who got additional money they had to keep it a secret. There 
are more than 10 families relocated here, only 3 got compensation so 
[it is] not fair. It is a type of corruption because it was unfair and they 
kept it secret – they did not share the information. All [these families 
are] the same, no one worse than the other. I don’t have any 
information about how to complain.961 
Another woman from the same resettlement site said that: 
Only the community leader was invited to the meeting. Maybe those 
people who got extra money they went to the meeting, but usually 
the community leader went.962 
                                                 
959 Second interview with man who was aged around 45 years at Poipet railway who was in the process of moving to the 
Poipet resettlement site, 5 March 2013 (Participant 128A).  
960 Interview with woman aged around 30 years in Phnom Penh Resettlement site, 16 February 2013, (Participant 5A).  
961 Interview with woman aged 42 years, February 2013. Details of the resettlement site are not included here as they may 
identify the participant and community leader.  
962 Interview with woman aged 25 years, February 2013. Details not included here, as above.  
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By all accounts, the ADB complaints process was a long and complicated process. One 
woman in the Phnom Penh site explained how the complaint took a long time and that she 
experienced threats from local authorities during this time:  
I was told not to tell anyone. I forget when this was. After I made the 
complaint it took more than one year for the result…people came and 
told us not to complain…people from the local authorities…Those 
who work in the IRC were involved in some kind of corruption and 
they tried to resist the process of the complaint. The complaint to 
ADB took one year because of resistance from those people who 
were involved in corruption.963 
As reflected in these comments, people were not shy about directly identifying corruption 
in the resettlement process. One man in Poipet explained how there was so much money 
been spent on the railway project, yet so little of it went to “the people”. He said:  
What this project does is that it pushes people down. Makes people 
worse and worse – it is going against the policy. The donor expects 
the [money to go to the people] but only 15 percent goes to the people 
and 80 percent goes to corrupt people… The power belongs to the 
Government.964 
Some people could not distinguish between the ADB and the NGOs, presumably because 
ADB representatives had recently visited the resettlement sites, and it was clear to the 
community that these trips had resulted in additional compensation and other improvements. 
However, people clearly distinguished between the Cambodian Government on the one 
hand, and the ADB, international donor and NGO community on the other. One woman in 
Phnom Penh who was involved in making complaints via other human rights organisations 
and NGOs about the railway process explained how she felt protected by the international 
donor community. She stated:  
When we file a complaint to the UN I want to go straight to Thailand, 
not the UN in Cambodia. At that time, the Thai UN OHCHR [Office 
                                                 
963 Interview with woman aged around 30 years in Phnom Penh Resettlement site, 16 February 2013, (Participant 5A). 
964 Second interview with man aged around 45 years at Poipet railway who was in the process of moving to the Poipet 
resettlement site, 5 March 2013 (Participant 128A). 
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of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] put some pressure on. 
The UN works very slowly. The donors did something to protect us. 
Most of the donors have money in ADB. Eighteen countries – they 
put donor pressure on the Cambodian government to protect the 
community…965  
Another man in Poipet also explained how the training they had received from both the ADB 
and NGOs had given them confidence and a greater sense of protection:  
Before when we didn’t have land, we felt scared, we couldn’t get 
land. But after the ADB came and worked with us, we got the house. 
We had training which made us able to speak like this.966 
A different person in Sihanoukville made similar comments, stating that: 
I think the Bridges organisation is a very good organisation…they 
made me feel comfortable to make the complaint…OSPF [from the 
ADB] also came to interview us. OSPF is also a good organisation. 
They came to explain to us about the compensation. They asked, “Is 
it enough for you or not?”967  
These kinds of comments were not uncommon. Some people had tried to complain to 
Village Chiefs, the IRC and local authorities in the beginning before the ADB complaints 
process was activated, but most people considered this to be a fruitless exercise compared 
to the ADB OSPF  complaints process, which had resulted in a number of changes. One 
woman in the Phnom Penh resettlement site had complained about losing her land 
documentation to private lenders who took the documents as collateral for her loans. She 
said:  
The first time I made the complaint I didn't want anything. I didn't 
expect anything. I didn't expect land title. I wanted the title back from 
the private lender. I got it back.968 
                                                 
965 Interview with a woman who was assisting the community in the Phnom Penh resettlement site to make complaints, 16 
February 2013 (Participant 2A). 
966 Man interviewed in Poipet resettlement site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 115A). 
967 Man interviewed in Sihanoukville resettlement site, 24 February 2013 (Participant 33A). 
968 Interview with woman aged around 30 years in Phnom Penh Resettlement site, 16 February 2013, (Participant 5A). 
264 
 
A significant feature of the interviews was how little people expected from the Cambodian 
Government. People explained how they had low or no expectations. One woman in 
Battambang resettlement site explained how, despite the ordeal she was enduring, she 
already felt that so much had been done for her. She explained: "I can’t complain anymore 
because they [ADB and IRC] already do so much."969  
Another critical issue that emerged during the interviews was the time-bound or temporal 
nature of the assistance people were receiving from the ADB. People interviewed were 
aware that once the ADB project finished and the agreed contract period ended, then there 
may be no further assistance and that there was no clear way of holding the Cambodian 
Government to account after this point. People asked about this issue in the interviews. A 
man in Poipet asked: “Who will I complain to once project ends?” 970 Another woman in 
Battambang site stated that: “The IRC say that they are only responsible for 5 years. We can 
complain during the 5 years. After that I don’t know who I will complain to.” 971 It is still 
unclear how, or for how long, affected households can enforce the ADB policy once the 
ADB contract ends. One reason this is significant is that most residents of the resettlement 
sites will need to apply for formal ownership of their land and land title after the mandatory 
residence period of five years ends, which is after the ADB project has finished.   
As illustrated in a number of the quotes above, people in Poipet, Battambang and Pursat, 
spoke about learning more about their “rights” under the project from NGOs, especially 
Bridges. In Pursat the language used by community members was different. In Pursat, where 
people had moved only 400m, there were still a number of problems experienced during the 
relocation process. The community had been involved in a conflict with the IRC about 
supplying water to the resettlement site and because the IRC had tried to reduce the number 
of people who could move to the resettlement site, by suggesting people move back into the 
right of way next to the railway instead. One woman who talked about this experience in 
detail said that “NGO forum helped us from behind”.972 When asked what she meant, the 
interpreter explained that NGO Forum had negotiated “behind the scenes” to get more 
assistance from the IRC to connect the water. The comment from the woman indicates the 
different strategies used by the NGOs to assist communities. In some places, assistance was 
                                                 
969 Interview with woman aged 32 years in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 95A).  
970 Interview with community leader in Poipet resettlement site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 103A).  
971 Interview with woman aged 32 years in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 95A).  
972 Woman speaking during group interview in Pursat resettlement site, 7 March 2013 (Participant 54A).  
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framed in a language of rights and the complaints process played out in the media.973 In 
others, such as in Pursat, assistance took the form of more informal, negotiated support. The 
same woman described a meeting of all community members and the IRC in which she stood 
up and complained to the deputy of the IRC:  
The first time I was told that I just had to move back [from the 
railway] and not get any land. I did not complain – but on the day 
when they [the IRC and NGO Forum] came to the meeting about 
compensation, in front of a lot of people – I accused the deputy – 
then I explained that my house was more affected [than they had 
assessed]. I complained to the IRC. 974  
The woman said that she would not have complained if it were not for the NGOs, explaining 
that:  
If there were no NGOs, I would just live on it because I had signed. 
I would not complain. I would just live. We have no confidence 
because we are just normal citizens. 975  
A feature of the interviews was that people carefully kept all kinds of written documentation 
that they received, even where they were not able to read the documents because they were 
in English or they were not literate. During the interviews people could produce all sorts of 
immaculately maintained pamphlets and receipts they had received from the ADB and local 
authorities many years earlier. There appeared to be a widespread appreciation for 
documentation and a growing awareness of the power of documents in negotiations about 
land and compensation.  
These experiences of using the ADB Accountability Mechanism to make complaints and 
resolve grievances relating to compensation are significant in terms of the legal geography 
of resettlement, especially in relation to legal pluralism. As explored in Chapter 3, certain 
legal geography approaches focus attention on how global or international legal principles 
or processes are translated into local conditions. Legal pluralism, in this context, is taken to 
mean that more than one legal system (whether formal, informal, local, national or 
                                                 
973 Such as in Battambang resettlement site, see: Baker & McKenzie (2010). 
974 Woman speaking during group interview in Pursat resettlement site, 7 March 2013 (Participant 54A).  
975 Woman speaking during group interview in Pursat resettlement site, 7 March 2013 (Participant 54A).  
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international) is in operation over a defined area at once.976 People who were being resettled 
for the railway were subject to multiple legal regimes and practices. As the ADB was the 
financier of the railway project, people could appeal to its quasi-judicial grievance processes 
and have their claims assessed. This would not have been possible had the ADB not been 
involved. At the same time, it was a highly exclusive right; it was only available to “project-
affected people” who fell within the railway area bounded by the project, both physically 
and possibly temporally, as discussed above. It is not a right available ordinarily to 
Cambodian citizens displaced by other means.  
7.7 Land titles or livelihoods: the dilemma of relocation 
While many people wanted land in the resettlement sites, the prospect of relocation created 
an almost impossible dilemma for many families. Moving to the resettlement sites offered 
the potential for land ownership, a long sought after asset that enables access to credit. It 
also reduces the chances of being repeatedly displaced, or at least provides more certainty 
of compensation if displacement occurs again. Despite the serious financial stress of 
resettlement experienced in all the sites, people emphasised how access to land title (enabled 
by resettlement) could improve their prospects by providing them with the tenure security 
needed to upgrade their houses and access credit. However, as many families had taken out 
loans secured against their land that they were incapable of repaying, resettled people faced 
a predicament; they needed to occupy their land in the resettlement sites (so they could 
receive full land title after the five year period ended), whilst also needing to earn an income, 
most easily found elsewhere. Moreover, the cost of building houses in resettlement sites had 
increased the need for additional income. This was especially so for those who wanted to 
build cement homes, which are more comfortable and provide better protection from flood 
than wooden structures.  
This predicament, or variations of it, was experienced by almost all of the people interviewed 
who lived in the resettlement sites (73 people). People had to navigate these competing 
demands in the absence of information from the Government or ADB about what was 
required to receive land title, consequently piecing together fragments of information shared 
locally through rumours, guesswork and informal assurances from community leaders and 
                                                 
976 See Chapter 3, Sections 3.2 and 3.5.  
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Village Chiefs. In these new environments, mobility – being able to travel in search of work 
– became an means of balancing these conflicting demands.  
7.8 Coping mechanisms: mobility, migration and networks in resettlement sites 
The fieldwork revealed the importance of livelihood strategies tied to multiple locations. 
These patterns broadly mirrored coping strategies used by people in Southeast Asia, 
identified by writers such as Rigg.977 Migration, involving different types of mobility, was 
being used in all five resettlement sites to increase household incomes and secure land-based 
assets.978 While some resettled households remained at the resettlement sites, trying to 
establish income sources nearby, such as opening small stores, growing vegetables and 
raising livestock, many households benefited from additional income received from 
elsewhere. A range of mobility strategies were being used, including returning daily to the 
previous locations to continue work (at great expense), travelling to other provinces or to 
Thailand (with or without passports) while “renting out” the plot of land back at the 
resettlement site, or splitting up the household so that family members were living between 
two locations. Thus some family members were earning income from renting back in the in 
the railway area and working, whilst others moved to the resettlement sites to claim and 
occupy the plots of land. The types of work people engaged in when they travelled elsewhere 
predominantly involved construction work, moto-taxi driving, garment factory work or 
continuing with small retail businesses established near their old residential locations.  
The use of mobility as a coping strategy was also documented by a local NGO, Sahmakum 
Teang Tnaut (STT), which completed a study with people resettled to the Phnom Penh 
resettlement site. Of the 143 households who moved to the Phnom Penh resettlement site, 
STT identified only 68 households who were regularly resident at the site (resident for at 
least 4 nights a week). Twenty-eight were considered “irregular” residents, in that they had 
constructed a small structure on the land and continued to work in Phnom Penh or elsewhere, 
and were therefore renting and/or working close to their previous residential locations in 
Phnom Penh.979 Figure 27 below is a photo taken in 2013 of a small structure built by one 
                                                 
977 Rigg (2006). 
978 Cf. Jessie Connell & Connell (2014). 
979 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2013a, p. 12). 
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of the families to claim the land in the Phnom Penh resettlement site, whilst they travelled 
and worked elsewhere.  
 
Figure 27: Photo of small structure in Phnom Penh resettlement site 
 
 
 
The degree to which people were able to use mobility in an adaptive or empowering way to 
take advantage of the resettlement process varied greatly. Figure 28 below indicates the 
different types of mobility being used by 36 participants who were directly interviewed. The 
interviews suggested that the number of people dependent on mobility was much higher, as 
evident in the discussion that follows. 
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Figure 28: Main type of mobility across all resettlement sites (n=36 participants whose 
livelihood was dependent on mobility) 
 
Nine households who were highly dependent on mobility were selected as examples and are 
profiled in Table 13 below. The table describes the key features of the households to help 
convey the various ways people used mobility strategies, including international migration. 
In all but one case, those who migrated to Thailand stressed the “push” factor of 
resettlement, rather than any other factor, as their motivation for migration. While this does 
not necessarily mean that broad conclusions can be drawn about the impact of development-
induced displacement on triggering migration per se, it does indicate interesting dynamics 
that would be worth investigating on a larger scale.  
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Table 13:  Mobility in resettlement sites 
No.  Partic. Location Destination  Reason for migration 
1.   Male, 28 
years  
Sihanoukville 
resettlement 
Site  
 
Nakhon Pathom 
City (West of 
Bangkok), 
Thailand 
 
Husband and wife. Both working in Thailand 
because they needed to find money to pay for his 
mother-in-law’s debt, incurred while building a 
house in resettlement site. 
2.  Female, 
48 years  
Sihanoukville 
resettlement 
Site  
Bangkok, 
Thailand  
Debt in resettlement site from borrowing USD 
2,500 to feed animals. Sold house in resettlement 
site because could not pay back debt. 
 
3.   Female, 
31 years  
Sihanoukville 
resettlement 
Site 
Bangkok, 
Thailand 
 
Spending too much money on travel to resettlement 
site. Husband lost job as moto-taxi driver. In debt 
USD 2,000. Sold house in resettlement site because 
could not pay back debt. She sends money back to 
sister-in-law who takes care of her two children. 
4.   
Female  
Sihanoukville 
resettlement 
Site 
Renting back 
near old location 
at Sihanoukville 
railway 
She is renting her house in resettlement site to a 
relative. She rents back near the railway because 
she is a “fisher person” and needs to be near the sea.  
5.   Female, 
32 years 
Sihanoukville 
resettlement 
Site   
 Thailand 
 
Her mother is living back in resettlement site. She 
had difficulty in the new community because she 
could not work. 
 
6.   Male, 19 
years 
Battambang 
resettlement 
site 
Thailand. He has 
been there for 2 
years  
 
The land in the resettlement site belongs to his 
mother. He sends money back to his mother 
through his employer in Thailand. Family 
separation pre-dated resettlement, although 
resettlement was described as exacerbating the 
poverty experienced by the family. 
 
7.   
Family  
Phnom Penh 
resettlement 
site 
Phnom Penh 
railway (Russeo 
Keo District) 
 
Sister takes care of house in the resettlement site 
“because someone needs to take care of it for 5 
years”. The land is in their mother’s name. Mother 
is sick with diabetes so wants to stay back at 
railway because it is closer to the city. Resettlement 
site not developed yet so they leave the sister to 
take care of it. Do not have money to send their kids 
to school in resettlement site. 
 
8.   
Female, 
40 years 
and male, 
39 years.  
Battambang 
resettlement 
site 
Chon Buri, 
Thailand  
No business in resettlement site. 
9.  
Male 
Poipet 
resettlement 
site 
Daughter in 
Thailand 
 
Upgrading the house in resettlement site cost USD 
20,000. He is in debt USD 4,000. Daughter sends 
money back from Thailand. 
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As these examples indicate, resettlement stress and inadequate incomes led people to engage 
in diverse, innovative and sometimes risky strategies to earn enough income to support their 
families and repay their loans. While some families were able to use the income earned in 
other places to increase the quality of their housing in the resettlement sites, others were 
being exposed to additional risks, had not been able to hold onto their land assets, and had 
no option but to sell. When people “sold” their land in the resettlement sites, they were doing 
it informally through the Village Chief, as they had not yet attained full land ownership. 
People used their temporary land documentation to sell their allocated plots of land. Informal 
land transfers or “sales” at the village level are common in Cambodia. There are low rates 
of so-called “subsequent registration” of land transfers with District Chiefs and Commune 
Councils, especially in more rural areas outside the main cities. There have been attempts to 
change these local practices to formalise Cambodia’s land management system, but village-
level land transfer practices remain widespread.980 Thus, people in the resettlement sites 
managed to sell their land using local village level channels, even though they had not yet 
attained full ownership or land title. These dynamics are another illustration of the legally 
plural and legally ambiguous landscape in which resettlement for the railway was taking 
place, within which both informal and formal legal systems operated. The land transfer 
practices described by community members resonate with the work of other authors in 
Cambodia, particularly Gillespie, whose legal geography work examined how local 
residents of Angkor are subjected to regulations that are largely out of sync with their 
ordinary land usages and practices.981 
Discussions with community members in the Battambang resettlement site gave insights 
into the mobility coping strategies of the households. One interviewee estimated that at least 
one family member from almost all the households living in Battambang resettlement site 
(around 38 households), including himself, returned to their previous residences to work 
each day, only travelling to the resettlement site to sleep at night. A number of families were 
renting homes and sleeping at their previous locations for work and to enable their children 
to study. As a community member stated, “We rent a house at the old place because our kids 
need to study and here is far. We don’t have any transportation.”982 Of the 48 households 
given the option of relocating to the Battambang resettlement site, only 38 moved there, of 
                                                 
980 For a detailed discussion of these practices, see: Grimsditch, Kol & Sherchan (2012, pp. 92-93). 
981 Gillespie (2011, p. 19). 
982 Interview with woman at Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 93A).  
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which approximately 8-10 households built structures on the land, but then chose to reside 
elsewhere. Even though only a small number of people were interviewed in Battambang, at 
least two examples were given of families who had built structures in the resettlement sites 
and then moved to Thailand, returning only a few times each year. As one interviewee stated, 
“They build houses here, but they can’t earn incomes so they go to Poipet or Thailand.”983  
Informal agreements with relatives, neighbours and community leaders to look after land 
while people went elsewhere were common. When asked whether the people who left felt 
confident about their land being kept for them, he stated: 
The people who go to Poipet and Thailand know the land will be 
theirs. They come back every 3-4 months. Some come back only 
once a year.984 
Similar arrangements existed in other resettlement sites. In Sihanoukville, 33 families were 
required to leave the railway, yet only six moved to the resettlement site, while five others 
were in the process of building their houses there.985 The remaining households, including 
13 households who sold their land, had chosen to rent accommodation closer to their old 
locations and sources of livelihood.986 The interviews also revealed that at least four of the 
33 households designated for relocation in Sihanoukville had either moved to Thailand or 
sent family members to work there. 
One woman with a plot of land in Sihanoukville resettlement site who was renting a house 
close to the coast where she lived previously, described her husband and herself as “fisher 
people”. 987 They could not stay in the resettlement site because they needed to fish to earn 
an income. She therefore had a relative staying in her house at the site who was paying rent 
and looking after her land. She intended to keep the land for when she was old, because she 
wanted a “proper place to live”, unlike most of the houses along the railway in Sihanoukville 
which she thought were unsuitable, as they were small wooden structures. As this woman 
felt confident about her future tenure security in the resettlement site (partly because she had 
a relative minding it for her) she had built a much larger concrete house there. Her situation 
                                                 
983 Interview with woman aged 50 years in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 89A).  
984 Interview with man aged 55 years in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 90A).  
985 Asian Development Bank (2014f, p. 6). 
986 Asian Development Bank (2014f). 
987 Interview with woman in Sihanoukville resettlement site, July 2013 (Participant 50A).  
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revealed the importance of being able to rent one’s property in the resettlement site to others 
as a way of generating income. Not being able to rent one’s land to others contributed to the 
need to sell it. Those buying vacant land in the resettlement sites were said to be doing so 
speculatively, believing it would eventually increase in value. Thus, land in the resettlement 
sites had a future value for those with enough capital to invest or hold on to the land, but 
limited immediate value as an asset unless it could be sold, since being able to rent out 
houses in the resettlement sites to generate income was rare.988 
Being mobile had a number of practical disadvantages. For those people who had built small 
structures on their land but worked and resided in other places, it was difficult to participate 
in community meetings at the resettlement sites. They were also absent when utilities service 
workers came during the daytime, making it difficult to get water and electricity connected, 
and to be involved in a savings program set up by the ADB and the Australian Government, 
specifically for people in the resettlement sites.989  
7.9 Borderland coping strategies in Poipet-Aranyaprathet  
The Poipet resettlement dynamics warrant further discussion. The photos presented earlier 
at Figures 22 and 23, depict how people upgraded their houses once they moved to the 
resettlement site in Poipet. The fieldwork suggested that short-range mobility and the 
proximity of the nearby border with Thailand were particularly significant for the livelihoods 
of people resettled in Poipet. Like many parts of Cambodia, people living in Poipet face 
severe pressures from poverty, land shortages, poor urban planning and very limited support 
from local, provincial or national governments. Yet, the city has grown rapidly in recent 
years. The Poipet-Aranyaprathet border-crossing is a source of jobs for people living in 
Poipet and for Cambodian trade with Thailand. Forty-five percent of Cambodia’s imports 
from Thailand pass through this border-crossing and 14 percent of exports to Thailand.990 
The cross-border checkpoint is open from 7.00 am to 8.00 pm each day. Within the zone 
between the Cambodian checkpoint and the Thai checkpoint there are numerous casinos that 
can be visited from Thailand without formally entering into Cambodian territory, generating 
employment for an estimated 10,000 people and attracting around 1.2 million Thai 
                                                 
988 During the fieldwork one family was renting a plot of land in Poipet resettlement site to engage in construction work 
near the site. They had built a temporary shelter from wood and corrugated iron on the land.  
989 This was called the Expanded Income Restoration Program (EIRP).  
990 Yagura (2013, p. 118).  
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customers per year.991 A large market, Rong Kluea Market, is also situated within the special 
economic zone selling many non-food essential items, such as clothes. Residents of Poipet 
can obtain a border pass for around USD 5 for seven days to enter Thailand in the areas 
immediately beyond the border (Sa Kaeo and Phrachin Buri Provinces). Cambodian 
nationals from any province can visit the Rong Kluea Market within the border zone.992  
Interviews with people living in the resettlement sites and back along the railway revealed 
the significance of the nearby “special economic zone” that existed along the border in 
central Poipet. Figure 29 below depicts the location of the Poipet resettlement site and its 
proximity to the Thai border.  
Figure 29: Sketch of Poipet resettlement site indicating proximity to Thailand 
 
 
Source: Author’s sketch993  
                                                 
991 Yagura (2013, p. 121).  
992 Yagura (2013, p. 120).  
993 Drawing not to scale.  
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Access to higher incomes and livelihood options enabled by proximity to the borderlands 
area appeared to increase the appeal of resettlement. Greater confidence about income 
sources meant that families in Poipet were able to take advantage of the land offered in the 
resettlement sites in ways that were not possible in other parts of the country. People were 
still highly indebted and some had resorted to selling their land, however many others had 
upgraded their homes and built large cement houses in the resettlement sites. Since the 
Poipet site is close to the Cambodian-Thai border, most people engaged in some sort of 
small scale trade or business that benefited from being near the border. Making daily trips 
across the border to neighbouring Thailand, a few kilometres away, to sell items in the 
market, or purchase items that could be sold back in Cambodia, was a relatively low-risk 
way of earning money. Even small-scale mobility from the site enabled settlers to earn 
incomes, made possible by the strong social and financial networks that exist around the 
border, and are typical of trade across international borders in Southeast Asia.994 This trade 
had enabled people to significantly upgrade their houses in the Poipet resettlement site as 
they already had access to reliable income sources and felt re-assured by the improved tenure 
security of their new land. Thus, often, this short-range movement was a continuation of 
pre-existing livelihood strategies in this area, and was not new or necessarily a consequence 
of resettlement.995Although households in Poipet were still in debt, most could service their 
debts. Relocated families in Poipet were thus able to leverage their existing resources and 
mobility networks to mitigate the effects of relocation to a much greater extent than those in 
resettlement sites further from the international border. The community leader of the Poipet 
resettlement site explained how many people did not sleep in the resettlement sites but were 
residing elsewhere, yet finding ways to hold onto the land. He estimated that: 
300 out of 400 families are not sleeping [in the resettlement 
sites]…some of them sell the lands and some stay at the old place… 
and 50 families rent the place near Kbal Spean  near the head of the 
bridge…They earn money near the border and in Thailand….They 
wash shoes at the Thai market, [drive] motor taxi[s] in Poipet, or are 
hired by Thai sellers to sell fruit in the market and transfer luggage, 
                                                 
994 Phadungkiati & Connell (2014) 
995 Note, people using this short-range strategy are not the people who were profiled in the case studies in Table 13 above.  
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fruit or vegetables at the border from Thailand to Cambodia and vice 
versa.996 
There were also people travelling further into Thailand to work and earn money to send back 
to families building houses in the resettlement sites. One older man explained how his 
daughter had gone to Thailand to work, which had enabled him to build a large cement house 
in the resettlement which cost around USD 20,000.997 As the community leader also 
explained: “Some of them are travelling to Thailand…They are in Rong Kleua market and 
Krung Teb [Bangkok] as construction workers and [as] other workers.” 998 
People in the Poipet resettlement site were often continuing their previous occupations - 
regularly travelling to the border area to engage in small-scale trade, currency exchange, or 
sewing clothes that could be sold in Thailand. Construction work was also more readily 
available to people in Poipet, as the city is expanding and the resettlement site is close to 
where this activity is taking place.  
7.10 Family separation resulting from resettlement and migration  
Whilst mobility was being used adaptively by some households to increase incomes, there 
were many examples of mobility also causing family fragmentation and separation. Family 
fragmentation, including separation from young children, was both temporary and more long 
term, especially when parents went to work in Thailand. One woman in Sihanoukville was 
minding the very young baby of her sister, who had left to work in Thailand two months 
earlier and was sending money home.999 Another woman in Sihanoukville had also left her 
two children (aged 5 and 12 years) with her sister-in-law while she went to Thailand to earn 
money following financial difficulties in the resettlement site. She described wanting to 
come home to take care of her youngest son because he was often sick.1000 A similar situation 
existed in Battambang, with one family in the resettlement site minding two young children 
of another family, while their parents worked in Thailand. The husband explained that: 
                                                 
996 Interview with community leader in Poipet resettlement site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 103A).  
997 Interview with man in Poipet resettlement site, July 2013 (Participant 117A).  
998 Interview with community leader in Poipet resettlement site, 3 March 2013 (Participant 103A).  
999 Interview with woman aged 25 years in Sihanoukville resettlement site, 23 February 2013 (Participant 32A).  
1000 Phone interview with woman in Thailand who had left family in Sihanoukville resettlement site, July 2013 (Participant 
52A).  
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“They leave the kids with my wife…The parents send home USD 50 per month for their 
kids.”1001  
Married couples were also sometimes separated. In one instance, a woman who had been in 
Bangkok for two months had left her husband in Sihanoukville.1002 She described debt as 
her reason for going to Thailand, after her attempts at animal husbandry in the resettlement 
site had not generated enough income. She sent around 7,000 Thai Baht (USD 216) home 
to her husband each month, but eventually sold the plot of land in the resettlement site 
because she had not been able to cover the debt. Her daughter, who had been allocated 
separate land in the resettlement site, had also sold her land for the same reasons and 
migrated to Thailand in search of work. They used the money from the sale to pay back their 
debts and buy passports. 
A range of other family agreements had been made, with migration arrangements embedded 
in existing social and familial relationships, rather than through formally organised schemes. 
One woman in Sihanoukville had organised with her daughter and son-in-law that they 
would go and work in Thailand and send home money so that she could build a house in the 
resettlement site.1003 Another woman in Battambang had sent her two older sons to Thailand 
to work so that she could pay various costs, including for the house in the resettlement 
site.1004 The older son was 19 years old at the time, and had already lived in Thailand for at 
least two years, having travelled illegally and without a passport across the border with 20 
other people. In Thailand he was allowed only limited movement in certain areas as part of 
an agreement with his employer. These households are included in Table 13 above. Figure 
30 below indicates the number of people who were interviewed who were experiencing 
some kind of family fragmentation as a result of engaging in livelihoods dependent on 
mobility.  
 
 
                                                 
1001 Interview with man aged 55 years in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 90A). 
1002 Phone interview with woman living in Bangkok who sent money to husband in Sihanoukville resettlement site, July 
2013, (Participant 46A).  
1003 Phone interview with man aged 28 years living in Nakhon Pathom City in Thailand who sent home money to 
Sihanoukville resettlement site, July 2013 (Participant 49A). 
1004 Phone interview with 19 year old man in Thailand who sent money back to Battambang resettlement site, July 2013 
(Participant 97A).  
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Figure 30: Family separation due to mobility dependence (n=36 participants whose 
livelihoods were dependent on mobility) 
 
The experience of those travelling to Thailand without passports differed from those who 
had passports. For illegal workers the early months in Thailand were particularly stressful; 
migrants did not speak Thai, had no bargaining power when choosing employment and, 
years later, were still having to pay Thai police around 500 baht per month (USD 15) to 
reside there. Those with passports had easier experiences, were treated comparatively well 
by employers and able to earn more money than those without documentation. Workers in 
Thailand were in regular contact with their families back in the resettlement sites, keeping 
in contact at least weekly by mobile phone, but only returning home annually for special 
celebrations, such as Cambodian New Year or Pchum Ben, an important holiday of ancestral 
worship. People who were interviewed by phone or skype while they were in Thailand were 
particularly keen to be interviewed, as no one had previously contacted them to ask about 
their experiences of the resettlement. 1005 
                                                 
1005 Eight participants were contacted by phone or skype. Multiple calls were made over a number of weeks to clarify 
family details and connections.  
No family 
separation, 
18
Family 
separation 
due to 
resettlement, 
15
Family 
separation pre-
dated 
resettlement, 3
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7.11 Impacts on children  
Children appeared to disproportionality experience the negative effects of resettlement and 
livelihoods dependent on travel. This is consistent with early anthropological studies on 
resettlement by authors, including Colson1006 and Scudder.1007 There were many stories of 
schooling being highly disrupted by the move. The Resettlement Plans described how the 
new resettlement sites were close to schools, however it appears there were no attempts to 
assess the capacity of those schools to absorb higher numbers of children into their 
classrooms. In Phnom Penh many households explained how there was no room in the local 
school for their children. Stories of discrimination against new children were common. 
Parents also said that they were being asked to pay additional payments or “bribes” to 
receive school handouts. Some children were simply not going to school or had taken a break 
of many months while the family relocated.  
In the resettlement sites, parents were leaving children as young as six months old alone 
with very young siblings for up to twelve hours per day to travel and work in factories. 
During one of the interviews in Phnom Penh resettlement site, a young baby aged 1 year old 
sat on the road crying. The interview paused as it became clear there was no one who could 
come to assist the child. When the interview participant was asked about the situation she 
said:  
The child who was crying was 1 year old. There are four siblings in 
total. The oldest is 11 years old. The parents go to work at 6am-7pm. 
The children cook by themselves. 1008 
When she was asked how many people leave their children while they go to work each day, 
she estimated that around 100 families leave their children to be looked after by other 
children. The woman also explained that “lots of husbands have left their wives and families 
here” suggesting that there had been a number of family separations following relocation.  
                                                 
1006 Colson (1960; 1971). 
1007 Scudder (1993). 
1008 Interview with woman in Phnom Penh resettlement site, 16 February 2013, (Participant 6A).   
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7.12 Uneven impacts and the constraints of distance  
The micro-geography of each site was critical in shaping experiences of resettlement. The 
distance of the resettlement sites from previous residences was an indicator of whether 
people wanted to move to the resettlement sites and whether they were able to adapt during 
the transition. It was not the only consideration, but it was a strong determinant as it related 
to the potential for livelihood restoration. People in the Phnom Penh site were particularly 
disadvantaged by distance, with many having effectively abandoned it as a place for 
livelihood generation or even residence, since so few livelihood activities were available so 
far from the city centre. Relocation to the new site meant that small businesses previously 
operated out of people’s homes were no longer viable. For those who worked in factories, 
most of their wages were now spent on transportation. Being away from the sites made it 
hard to access support services that had been set up for relocated households. By contrast, 
people in Poipet who had moved a relatively short distance were able to access border 
trading opportunities and relatively easy access to Thailand. In Pursat, the community was 
impacted less by resettlement because they were relocated nearby, however they were still 
experiencing high levels of debt because of the costs of relocation and because they were 
now able to use their land-based assets as collateral for loans. As mentioned above, people 
were using their new land as collateral for loans, even though they had not yet lived in the 
sites for five years and received full land ownership. The other two sites were intermediate, 
although those resettled from Sihanoukville were disadvantaged in having to give up, or 
move away from, coastal livelihood activities.1009  
In every site income generation was more difficult than it had been in the original high-
density railway settlements. There were even examples in Pursat of people finding it more 
difficult to walk to the market and sell goods, although they had moved only 400 metres. 
Debts and financial stress had increased and some people and even whole families had 
engaged in new long-distance migration to elsewhere in Cambodia or to Thailand. At various 
scales new forms of mobility had emerged, as people sought out the “urban” jobs that had 
characterised their original railway settlements and employment.  
Paradoxically, although people were experiencing much greater mobility on a daily or long-
term basis, one of the aims of the resettlement policy was to encourage families to stay in 
                                                 
1009 Cf. Jessie Connell & Connell (2014). 
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the resettlement sites for five years,1010 to develop the sites, promote an attachment to place, 
and re-establish livelihoods by having a critical mass of people in or near the resettlement 
sites. At the end of that period, it was intended that they could obtain land titles if they could 
demonstrate continuous residency, however many people had simply built a structure on the 
land and left it for others to mind.1011 Also paradoxically, when people were asked whether 
it was fair to require people to stay in the sites for five years to receive land title, almost all 
said that it was. As one explained, “If they give them land title straight away the people will 
sell it and go back to living like before.”1012 Requiring people to stay in the resettlement sites 
was also intended to prevent them returning to squat on land they had previously occupied. 
Demonstrably permanent resettlement had not happened, nor were the other objectives 
achieved. Mobility had become the key coping strategy.  
The community experiences of resettlement presented in this chapter resonate with the work 
of legal geography theorists presented in Chapter 3,1013 and with writings of other authors in 
Cambodia, especially those who have written about the asymmetry of land titling and land 
formalisation schemes.1014 The anguish experienced by community members when making 
decisions about how to survive in resettlement sites and about leaving former neighbours 
behind, is not unlike the painful deliberations described by Milne,1015 taking place in villages 
in response to Order 01 which provided the opportunity for individual land title on state land 
previously occupied communally.  
Biddulph’s1016 theory of the geography of evasion also seems to apply in this case, as it 
would seem that the right of way along the railway – an area of high value land yet of 
ambiguous legal status – was not being included in the adjudication area of existing land 
titling schemes. While this may be simply because the right of way is designated state public 
land and thus a decision has been made that it cannot be individually titled, the ambiguity 
of the future of long-term residents living on this land has not been resolved. In this case, 
the ADB safeguards policy has also evaded addressing the tenure security or futures of the 
families living within the right of way, drawing on a rationale formulated at another scale 
                                                 
1010 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, pp. i-v. ). 
1011 This process was explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.7. Also see Section 7.8 above.  
1012 Interview with woman aged 50 years in Battambang resettlement site, 6 March 2013 (Participant 89A). 
1013 Especially Gillespie (2012); Hirsch (2001);  
1014 See: Dwyer (2015); Milne (2013); Biddulph (2010; 2014).  
1015 Milne (2013). 
1016 Biddulph (2010;2014).  
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and space (the minimizing resettlement principle originating from World Bank safeguards 
frameworks formulated in Washington D.C. and adopted by ADB headquarters in Manila). 
The product of this “unstable mixing”1017 of different policies and rules formulated at 
different scales seems to confirm the link drawn by Unruh & Williams,1018 between legal 
ambiguity and tenure insecurity. The resulting impact of the ADB resettlement policy is that 
it seems to have created spaces – like the leopard’s spots, also like pockets or islands of land 
where ADB resettlement standards apply – notwithstanding the shared circumstances and 
tenure concerns of people living in the right of way and of those previously living in the 
corridor of impact. The notion that the resettlement sites of multilateral bank projects are 
“islands of governance” was a theme in the interviews with policy-makers and resettlement 
experts and is developed in the next Chapter. It also builds on the work of Ong,1019 who has 
analysed places of exception created in Southeast Asia, as spaces that are carved out to 
comply with foreign demands, practices and expectations.   
7.13 Chapter review 
It appears that as additional compensation was provided and services and infrastructure 
improved in the sites, so did the appeal of resettlement for community members who were 
left behind. This research was conducted before the third round of compensation from the 
additional USD 3-4 million scheme began in January 2015, even though other activities of 
the ADB project relating to the railway had ceased. It can be reasonably inferred that the 
dynamics between people left behind along the railway, and those who were resettled would 
only intensify after another round of compensation was paid to people in the resettlement 
sites, especially in Poipet and Pursat.  
The legal geography of the resettlement scheme critically influenced people’s experiences 
and determined the rights and benefits available to them under the project. The precise 
location of a household prior to resettlement, i.e. proximity to the centreline of the proposed 
railway and corridor of impact, determined a wide range of benefits provided under the 
project, including a household’s right to complain and have grievances re-assessed by the 
ADB Accountability Mechanism. Those who lived within the 7 metre corridor of impact 
received land, and those who lived outside its bounds did not. While many did not want to 
                                                 
1017 See, Braverman, Blomley, Delaney & Kedar (2014, p. 3) Also see: de Sousa Santos (1987). 
1018 Unruh & Williams (2013). 
1019 Ong (2006).  
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leave their homes along the railway, especially in Phnom Penh, many others felt the process 
for allocating land and compensation was arbitrary. This can be understood as a localisation 
of laws1020 process, as manifested by the local application of the ADB resettlement policy, 
which resulted in arbitrary decisions about how relocation was determined, guided by the 
strict 3.5 metre corridor of impact. Other administrative decisions also seemed to have 
enormous significance for the communities affected, such as the decision to move the Phnom 
Penh resettlement site from a nearby location to a site located much further away outside the 
city well after the community consultation process had finished; a switch in policy that was 
to have profound ramifications for the lives of affected residents. 
Many challenges were experienced by those who relocated in all of the resettlement sites, 
even those who relocated only short distances. High levels of household debt quickly 
emerged as people used their newly acquired land-based assets as collateral for loans to 
cover the costs of relocation and in some cases to upgrade the quality of their housing. In 
the new environments of the resettlement sites, mobility – being able to travel in search of 
work – became a critical adaptation strategy. New types of mobility also had disadvantages: 
the fragmentation of families, separation from young children, difficulty retaining reliable 
and sustainable jobs, disruptive and costly travel, safety and other social issues, especially 
when family members left to work in Thailand. Mobile residents also tended to not be 
present in the resettlement sites to access support and social assistance as it gradually 
increased, and had less involvement in local community issues. Increased mobility also had 
advantages with some people able to continue their previous occupations and new incomes 
being generated from remittances. Thus, for some mobility was an adaptive strategy, 
whereas it increased the vulnerability of others. Land title in the resettlement sites was a 
major attraction, hence even the most mobile remained connected to the resettlement sites 
through relatives and social networks wherever possible. They were sending home 
remittances and returned home regularly. Those who were not able to manage their newly 
acquired debts and sold their plots of land, did so reluctantly as the future potential of the 
land value was seen as a desirable and for some it was their only financial asset.  
The ADB resettlement policy and the advocacy strategies used by NGOs and the media 
aligned and misaligned with affected peoples’ concerns in various ways. Once advocates 
                                                 
1020 Gillespie (2012). 
284 
 
drew attention to the project’s negative impacts and the ADB responded by improving the 
resettlement sites and providing additional compensation, the dynamics between relocated 
households and those who were not provided with land began to change. This was not 
necessarily the case in Phnom Penh or Battambang where residents who remained near the 
railway still did not want to move to the resettlement sites because they were too far away. 
However, it was often the case for residents left behind in Poipet and Pursat, as the 
resettlement sites were close enough for them to envisage how they may make the difficult 
transition given the incentive of land tenure security and the social supports in place after 
2012-13. Consequently, the blanket principle of minimising displacement was no longer 
sensible or equitable in these local contexts, especially in Poipet or Pursat, where the 
communities living along the railway had been split arbitrarily by the corridor of impact 
determined for the project. The conditions became highly inequitable between those living 
with tenure insecurity along the railway in Poipet and their former neighbours who had been 
relocated. This was especially the case in Poipet, as the large majority of community 
members had relocated. Upon returning from fieldwork for this study, these issues were 
communicated informally to representatives of the ADB and Australian Government, 
however it was made clear that additional money from donors was only to be allocated to 
the resettlement sites. If the remaining railway residents are relocated at a later date, the 
agreement between the ADB and the Cambodian Government requires that they receive the 
same compensation and supports as those relocated earlier, however ADB monitoring of 
these standards will not continue indefinitely.1021 It is currently unclear what resettlement 
standards will apply to the remaining residents if they are relocated at a later date. The 
ambiguity of the law in this legally plural setting contributes directly to the tenure insecurity 
of the residents who remain in the railway right of way.1022  
For many individuals, the railway project was the first time they had been exposed to or 
involved in advocacy with NGOs. The support offered by NGOs was a significant 
experience for the community members interviewed for the research. However, while 
advocacy was grievance-driven, the ways that NGOs could represent people were often 
shaped or constrained by ADB’s safeguards policy and the grievance redress mechanisms 
available. Effective advocacy was more difficult for grievances which did not fit or align 
                                                 
1021 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 14). 
1022 See: Unruh & Williams (2013). 
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with policy commitments or undertakings made previously by the ADB. Local avenues for 
dispute resolution, i.e. making complaints to the Village Chief, local government or IRC, 
were not fruitful in most cases and many people felt that this option was not open to them. 
These processes could be understood as a type of forum-shopping1023 as community 
members and advocates tried to use different forums to resolve disputes.   
The research also revealed how households used their own networks and resources to 
overcome the difficulties experienced during resettlement. The resettlement policy set up a 
difficult dilemma for affected households who wanted to demonstrate continuous residence 
to ensure they could formalise their land ownership at the end of the mandatory five year 
period. The need to remain in place or at least have some connection to the resettlement site, 
had to be balanced with the need to travel in search of work. Different types of mobility had 
become essential to many household coping strategies. The significance of mobility in 
people’s adaptation strategies was most pronounced in Poipet resettlement site, however in 
Poipet this type of mobility was consistent with pre-relocation livelihood patterns and was 
mostly short-range.  
The research suggests a number of local factors which may enable certain households to 
cope with the impacts of resettlement schemes. Households with pre-existing assets – 
savings, diversified livelihoods, larger household size and physical proximity to strong 
economic and social networks – may be able to take advantage of a resettlement package 
which includes land title. This was not established in the research, but there was some 
anecdotal evidence indicating that these households may have more resources available to 
endure the financial stress of resettlement and cover repayments on loans secured against 
their land. Larger families may also have the capacity for greater mobility. There were many 
examples of family members leaving the resettlement sites and sending back remittances to 
family members who remained to take care of the land. These household factors require 
further investigation in future studies. 
At the same time, aspects of the research suggest features of resettlement planning which 
may expose people to increased impoverishment and vulnerability. Families without these 
pre-existing assets and support tended to be driven further into impoverishment, revealing 
how the process of relocation can exacerbate inequalities. Although some households were 
                                                 
1023 See: Unruh & Williams (2013); Meinzen-Dick (2009, p. 3). 
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able to use mobility to enhance their options and secure land-based assets, others were not 
able to hold onto land-based assets and were forced to sell their land. In addition, the risks 
of increased mobility include family fragmentation, separation of children and parents, 
increased travel costs and vulnerabilities to exploitation, especially when travelling without 
a passport. Absence from resettlement sites also made it difficult for some households to 
participate in community meetings and other programs designed to support people in the 
resettlement sites.  
The uneven impacts of the resettlement policy demonstrates how laws and policies drew 
new lines of social organisation among the railway communities. As with Order 01, the 
leopard skin policy, which painfully re-organised indigenous communities, as described by 
Milne, 1024 the resettlement policy also had a patchwork effect. The end of the chapter 
described this effect in terms of creating “islands of governance”, where the resettlement 
sites have been carved out as exceptional spaces where ADB safeguards apply; an argument 
that is developed in the next chapter. 
The community-based fieldwork highlights the heterogeneous nature of community interests 
in resettlement and the ways in which international policies are brought to bear in local 
contexts. The next chapter explores the major themes and questions which emerged from 
the community-based fieldwork. It draws on interviews with project financiers, NGOs and 
other stakeholders to explore these tensions further.  
  
                                                 
1024 Milne (2013).  
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Chapter 8 
 
Resettlement safeguards and  
“islands of governance”: Perspectives from 
financiers, policy makers and NGOs  
 
If I stick to the rule book, and I do everything by the rules, 
then I should be safe.1025 
I think we got ourselves into a terrible bind when we 
adopted these safeguards because what we needed to do was 
to say, “right, are we really sure, how practical is this? 
Where is the capacity within the countries? Where is the 
capacity within the banks? Where is the money? Can we 
actually do this? And I think often the case is “no”.1026 
We are advocates after all, not sociologists trying to 
establish a comprehensive record of the overall resettlement 
process. However, our advocacy has been firmly grounded 
in evidence of negative social and human rights impacts, 
and it is those experiencing negative impacts whom we have 
worked to support...1027 
                                                 
1025 Former senior ADB official speaking in a personal capacity, describing safeguard approaches within ADB, November 
2014 (Participant 4B).  
1026 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, talking about the railway, 19 December 2014 
(Participant 12B).   
1027 International NGO representative discussing advocacy in Cambodia, correspondence after interview via email 25 June 
2013 (Participant 8B).   
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8.1 Overview  
The previous chapter explored the experience of resettlement and resettlement safeguards 
from the perspective of the different communities affected by the Cambodian railway 
project. This chapter turns its focus to how the resettlement safeguards are perceived, 
experienced and managed by critical actors at other scales. It draws on interviews with senior 
policymakers, consultants, safeguards and resettlement specialists within the ADB, World 
Bank and Australian Government, as well as interviews with NGOs and community 
advocates (see Appendix C). It also draws on experiences in Washington D.C. during the 
Spring Meetings in April 2013, when the World Bank held a series of consultations with 
civil society groups about reforming its social and environmental safeguards policy.1028 
Many of the contributions from interview participants are reported anonymously given the 
sensitivity of the topics discussed.  
Using the best information available, the chapter presents insights from these stakeholders 
about relationships between bilateral and multilateral donors, the process of financing 
infrastructure projects overseas and the effectiveness of resettlement safeguards. The chapter 
also explores debates about the nature and role of advocacy in shaping and changing the 
direction of policy. In particular, the interviews reveal the challenges of encouraging local 
country “ownership” of resettlement processes on the one hand, and international standards 
and requirements for “accountability” on the other. As the chapter argues, this tension often 
manifests itself in so-called “islands of governance”, especially where there is a significant 
disparity between national government standards and international project-specific 
resettlement policies, as was the case in the railway. This argument builds on the ideas of 
Ong,1029 who has explored the idea of exceptionalism in the context of Southeast Asia, 
regarding how Governments make exceptions to their usual practices of governance so as to 
position themselves favourably towards foreign investors and trade partners. As explored in 
Chapters 3,4 and 7, it also resonates with the uneven geographies of land interventions in 
Cambodia described by Milne, Biddulph and Dwyer.1030  
                                                 
1028 I was based in Washington D.C. for 2 months in early 2013 and attended the Civil Society Stream of the Spring 
Meetings, and the consultations with civil society on the safeguards review. During this time I also interviewed a number 
of social safeguards specialists working on the review and members of the World Bank Inspection Panel. For details of the 
Spring Meetings, see: http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2013/. For details of the World Bank safeguards review, see: 
https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies). 
1029 Ong (2006). See Chapter 4, 4.6. Also see Johns (2015).  
1030 Milne (2013), Dwyer (2015), Biddulph (2010;2014). See the analysis in Sections 3.5, 4.3 and 7.12.  
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The aim of the chapter is to articulate the major tensions shaping contemporary resettlement 
safeguards and policy at a number of scales. It addresses the third research question guiding 
the study:  
 What are the implications of using international safeguards and 
accountability mechanisms to influence resettlement processes in a country 
in which domestic legal systems are not well established? 
The chapter is shaped around four major themes or issues which emerged during the research 
and deals with each of them in turn. The first is the debate about “islands of governance”. 
The second is the importance of formal grievance mechanisms and independent advocacy, 
which are separate from the internal monitoring systems in place at a project level. The third 
is the tension between inflexible resettlement principles and divergent community needs and 
aspirations. The fourth is the issue of commercial interests and the “public interest” test, 
focusing on how the Cambodian railway project unfolded. The chapter draws particularly 
on interviews with senior decision-makers within the ADB and Australian Government to 
explore the factors they considered when deciding to finance the railway project in 2009, as 
well as reflections from these stakeholders about the project as it encountered serious 
challenges from 2010 onwards.  
8.2 Safeguards and “islands of governance”  
The safeguards model relied on by the ADB and the Australian Government was introduced 
in Chapter 2, and described in further detail in Chapter 5. When the ADB is involved in a 
project, an assessment of social, environmental and financial risks is required prior to the 
project being approved.1031 Based on this assessment, a decision is made whether to approve 
the project. If approved, certain measures are often put in place to mitigate the potentially 
negative impacts that could be created by the project. Adverse impacts stemming from 
resettlement are one of the aspects that need to be considered in this assessment. These 
safeguards are supported by formal grievance mechanisms which can be used by affected 
communities to seek redress from multilateral banks, including the ADB and World Bank, 
when they have suffered harm from a poorly implemented project that has not complied with 
the relevant safeguards framework.  
                                                 
1031 See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation of this process in relation to the railway.  
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When the Australian Government is involved in a project with a multilateral development 
bank, it devolves responsibility for assessment of social and environmental risks, and 
responsibility for mitigating those risks, to the banks. It also uses the safeguard standards 
developed by the banks as its benchmark for assessing and mitigating risks. Thus, in the 
Cambodian railway project, as with other co-financed projects, AusAID delegated 
responsibility to the ADB for assessing Cambodia’s capacity and willingness to comply with 
ADB’s safeguards framework.1032 These arrangements are essential background for 
understanding the logistics of how safeguards assessments occur, and how risk is devolved 
when bilateral and multilateral partners work together on large multi-donor projects. To 
reiterate how this process works, included below is a table extracted from the Australian 
Government’s website explaining the respective responsibilities and roles of the Australian 
Government and multilateral banks when co-financing investments.   
Table 14: Roles and responsibilities in co-financed investments1033 
 
Roles and Responsibilities in co-financed investments 
 
Multilateral 
Development 
Bank 
Where DFAT co-finances an investment designed and led by a multilateral 
development bank, such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, 
their respective safeguard policies are applied. It’s the Bank’s responsibility to 
ensure compliance with these policies. Activity managers need to be aware 
that Bank staff can seek waivers from safeguard requirements. 
Assess partner government capacity (including policies, laws, regulations and 
partner country commitment) and ensure buy-in. 
Where the above assessment identifies gaps, the Bank must support design 
assessment and capacity-building of government to undertake resettlement 
planning and implementation. This may include national, provincial and local 
government, as well as civil society engagement.  
 
DFAT  
DFAT’s policy requirements must be met throughout the investment. 
Understand, agree and support safeguards arrangements including any 
supplementary activities with the bank. This may require specialist 
engagement and/or external advice to give confidence that the Banks’ 
processes match their own policies as well as ours. DFAT should not continue 
to fund implementing agencies or sectors that have a record of non-
compliance.  
Ensure participatory and transparent safeguard implementation and effective 
monitoring and supervision; including independent monitoring where 
appropriate. This includes monitoring the Banks’ compliance with their own 
safeguards. 
                                                 
1032 These arrangements were explained in Chapter 2 at Section 2.6 and Chapter 5.  
1033 Following the change of Government in Australia in 2013 and the merging of AusAID with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the terminology was updated, and references to “AusAID” were replaced with “DFAT”. This 
table is no longer available on the website, but slightly rephrased resettlement guidelines were released again in 2015, 
available on the DFAT website, see: Australian Department of Foreign Affiars and Trade (2015a). 
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As evidenced by the Cambodian railway project, the safeguards model and risk assessment 
process in place was ineffective in the early stages of the project. However, once advocates 
drew attention to how resettlement was occurring, gradually the ADB and Australian 
Government responded by improving the resettlement sites and providing additional 
compensation. Yet, as illustrated in Chapter 7, this support was provided primarily to the 
people in the resettlement sites. People who remained living along the railway tracks, who 
had not been formally resettled, were largely excluded from this support. The resettlement 
sites could thus be considered “islands of governance” in that they had become demarcated 
or separated, physically and institutionally, from broader Cambodian resettlement practices 
by the ADB resettlement site boundaries. A range of different types of assistance were being 
provided to people in the resettlement sites, such as health services and health insurance, 
financial literacy training and savings programs. These types of services and assistance were 
being organised with the support of the ADB and AusAID and were not being provided to 
all people across Cambodia who were being resettled, only those who were resettled under 
the ADB project.  
The “islands of good governance” issue was a central theme emerging in the interviews for 
the research. Numerous interview participants perceived the tension between safeguards 
approaches which resulted in so-called “islands” of influence and approaches directed at 
enabling broader programmatic reform within the host nation government and society. 
Participants were deeply divided about whether these “islands” had a positive trickle-down 
effect on broader policies or whether they simply became places of exception.1034 This 
tension was seen to emerge particularly in settings, such as Cambodia, where there is a 
significant disparity between national government standards and international project-
specific resettlement policies. It stemmed from the competing objectives of trying to foster 
local ownership of projects and programs at the same time as experiencing pressure both 
from within the banks, and especially from outside the bank (from bilateral partners NGOs, 
advocates and the public), to ensure high levels of social and environmental accountability 
are maintained.  
                                                 
1034 See Ong (2006); Johns (2015).  
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An important interview with a former, senior AusAID government official, speaking in a 
personal capacity, revealed the how the safeguards created what he perceived to be an 
unachievable standard for bilateral development partners, such as Australia, to be held 
accountable. This particular official is quoted extensively throughout the chapter because 
his seniority and position at the time meant he was able to offer a unique inside perspective 
on the decision-making processes that took place. As he explained:  
I think everybody had an interest to, sort of, pretend that these 
incredibly [complex safeguards] would be met within existing 
resources, I don’t mean just for this project, I mean across the board. 
I think we got ourselves into a terrible bind when we adopted these 
safeguards because what we needed to do was to say, “right, are we 
really sure, how practical is this? Where is the capacity within the 
countries? Where is the capacity within the banks? Where is the 
money? Can we actually do this?” And I think often the case is “no”. 
1035  
At face value the economic rationale for supporting the railway project was clear to decision-
makers when they read the early scoping studies, but at the same time, there was a type of 
collective willingness not to fully acknowledge the extent of complexity involved in 
successfully completing a project of this type. This kind of wilful blindness is reminiscent 
of Biddulph’s analysis of the LMAP conflict where the objectives of donors and the 
Cambodian Government appeared to align in the planning and approval phase, but dissolved 
upon implementation as the inherent complexities of the project and the wider political 
economy context in which it was situated became clear.1036 As the following quotes from 
the same former AusAID official illustrate:  
There seemed to be an enormous momentum to go ahead with the 
project, and there were lots of desirable outcomes that could come 
from it, at the same time as a sort of subliminal recognition that it 
                                                 
1035 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1036 Biddulph (2014).  
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was impossible to pull it off perfectly, but still a desire to go 
ahead…1037 
It was quite clear that Cambodia lacked basic infrastructure, so [the 
railway was going to be] absolutely fundamental if it was going to 
start shifting a significant amount of produce, particularly 
agricultural produce ... It was hard to argue that Cambodia didn’t 
need trunk-line railways, and at least some of the economic benefit 
that was postulated was quite significant, but obviously needed to be 
tested very closely. So from the beginning there was a strong 
economic case…1038 
The project posed a number of different types of challenges, quite separate from the 
resettlement issues potentially involved. As he recalled: “I remember reading [the concept 
paper] document, and thinking, wow, if you can pull this off then fabulous, but wow this is 
huge…”. Rehabilitating the railway was not simply a matter of repairing the tracks, but of 
re-building the whole system, including processes for managing and operating the railway 
network and staff. The complexity of the proposal is captured in the interview excerpt below: 
From the outset this looked like a really ambitious project…we 
weren’t talking about adding a few bits to an existing network, we 
were talking about completely re-building the network, completely 
replacing, starting again with the management of the railway 
entity…The interesting thing was, whoever put it together realized 
that to get value out of the railway, it couldn’t just be laying new 
track and getting new rolling stock, they realized that the whole 
railway system needed to be completely changed... The old railway 
company owned a lot of land and it owned lines that were not being 
used. It had a lot of people, I think on the books, who were not 
necessarily “ghost workers”, but workers from a long time ago who 
                                                 
1037 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1038 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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were not actually working. If the railways were going to fulfil their 
economic potential they… had to be very very well managed...1039 
ADB was looking for support, both financial and technical, from Australia and other donors. 
Australia was one of the logical member countries that the ADB could turn to in search of 
additional technical assistance financial support. This interview participant explained that at 
least from AusAID’s perspective, being involved in the railway was about providing 
technical support to the project that would otherwise not be provisioned. He also explained 
that, although resettlement issues were discussed, they were not the primary focus during 
the initial deliberations about whether to go ahead with the project. As he recalled: 
Resettlement was certainly flagged, as you would expect it to be with 
any significant infrastructure development program, [but] on all 
sides this was highly complex, potentially big pay-offs, but I think 
for me a fundamental [question] was do you have the resources, both 
financial and skills, to carry this off?  
Like many borrowers, Cambodia, was reluctant to borrow money from the ADB that would 
go towards the “softer” more social, environmental and governance-related aspects of such 
a project. He explained how this is a typical dynamic when dealing with a number of 
borrowing countries: 
The critical thing here is that a loan will embody some technical 
assistance but client countries are often very reluctant to borrow 
more than the absolute minimum. They’ll borrow [for building the 
infrastructure] because they see a return on that, a direct monetary 
return that can finance the loan, [but] they tend to be very reluctant 
to borrow for anything that they think is either unnecessary or 
overdone or just even on the social side that they might think is 
valuable, but, because it doesn’t in and of itself generate an income 
flow, they tend to say “we will not have that in the loan”. Then the 
World Bank or ADB is in a dilemma because it can look at something 
and say, “look you really need these other components to deliver this 
                                                 
1039 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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adequately, but the client won’t borrow for those things”, so it then 
has to find money from elsewhere. The risk of course is that it under-
provisions those things or it cannot finance them adequately, so they 
can’t get properly done.1040  
Grants, rather than loans, are one way of provisioning for greater “technical” expertise, 
which may include a range of specialisations, including social, environmental, fiduciary 
assistance relating to design and construction, as was the case in the railway. Another senior 
AusAID staff member, now working at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT), also explained the role of grants in complementing multilateral loans and thus 
requiring borrower countries to commit contractually to implement projects in a certain way:  
Grant money helps the banks and the government do things that they 
would not do otherwise. It’s as simple as that.1041 
Thus the grant money provided by Australia to Cambodia, via the ADB, was a way of trying 
to ensure the project included adequate technical expertise. Providing grants or additional 
finance to support “softer” more technical aspects of a project essentially enables lenders to 
have more leverage over the standards that could be expected to be met for a given project. 
Yet, the DFAT official explained the complexity of how these standards often worked in 
practice: 
The approach that the Bank has is essentially to get the countries to 
reiterate that they will abide by ADB policy, and then to do some 
relatively light monitoring of that, on the [basis that] the Government 
has said that it will honour that. And you just need to essentially just 
keep an eye on that…that works reasonably well in middle income 
countries that have a reasonable capacity to do that, they’re at a 
higher level of development, and the ADB policy and the World 
Bank policy, is much closer to the national policy and there isn’t a 
big discrepancy.1042 
                                                 
1040 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1041 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B). 
1042 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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But in a country where capacity is incredibly weak…there is an 
enormous discrepancy between the national policy and the 
international policy, so the Government is saying “we can only 
afford to do a fraction of this in our own resettlement work, so you 
are forcing us to adopt a standard that we just cannot meet across the 
board”, they tend to be fairly resentful of that. Then they have a 
relatively small capacity, technical capacity, I don’t think you need 
to be a genius to work out that you would need a different approach 
in that sort of country… and yet historically they really haven’t 
differentiated enough, and I think we are all a bit culpable on that. 
We should have all realized a long time back, that if we [AusAID] 
wanted them [the Bank] the institution to lift the standard, then they 
had to put a lot more effort into this. Then, quite frankly I think we 
all looked the other way and pretended that it wouldn’t, that 
somehow miraculously this wouldn’t happen…1043 
As this participant suggests, there is a tendency for two extremes to emerge in countries 
where the national country standards for social and environmental accountability are 
significantly different to the safeguard policy of the multilateral banks. He describes how 
projects are often under-monitored in the beginning when projects are first approved and 
implemented, on the basis that the borrower country has formally committed to comply. 
After problems emerge or are drawn attention to by NGOs, there is an intensive focus on the 
specific project in question. The involvement of an international development partner with 
a safeguards framework in place (such as the ADB or World Bank) or with a high-level of 
reputational risk, such as AusAID, also makes it easier to generate a strong policy or 
reactionary response. As the senior former AusAID Government official stated,  
We were the “soft underbelly” of this…The advocates knew this and 
used it, I think a little bit too mercilessly at times. We ended up being 
the ones most held to account for a lot of things that were not directly 
under our control.1044 
                                                 
1043 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1044 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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Yet, the capacity to influence projects was also the justification given by this participant as 
the reason for Australia’s involvement in the Cambodian railway project. As this former 
AusAID official explained when reflecting on the decision to go ahead with the project:  
I’m pretty sure that from the beginning we sort of said, “of course, 
the resettlement stuff is going to be complicated”. It was there from 
the outset. It was one of the reasons we came in and why we thought 
that being part of the project would make it better than it otherwise 
would be…1045 
The issue of how to finance and influence the outcome of infrastructure projects in countries 
with significantly different social and environmental standards was also a major issue at the 
World Bank Spring Meetings in 2013. Here, the debate took a number of forms. 
Representatives of the Bank who were engaging with Civil Society Organisation (CSO) 
representatives in the “civil society stream” were openly acknowledging the shortfalls of the 
World Bank, particularly in relation to resettlement. A draft of a major review of World 
Bank projects requiring resettlement was released around the same time and it was widely 
acknowledged that the World Bank had a mixed history in terms of its resettlement track 
record.1046 The World Bank had also publicly stated that its new safeguards policy would be 
reoriented towards a positive obligation to “do good” rather than simply a negative 
obligation to “do no harm”,1047 yet there was clearly not a consensus within the Bank in 
support of this new direction. One of the central disagreements that characterised the 
meetings over the course of a number of weeks, surrounded the most effective response to 
this dilemma.1048 A number of these meetings were held under “Chatham House Rules” and 
so the participants cannot be quoted. During this time, the CSOs put forth a joint submission 
for a human rights framework to be included into all World Bank project assessments and 
operations.1049 As the jointly supported CSO submission from Inclusive Development 
International, the Bank Information Center, Housing and Land Rights Network Habitat 
International Coalition and the International Accountability Project stated:  
                                                 
1045 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1046 See: World Bank (2012a). 
1047  See: World Bank (2012b, p. 2). 
1048 The meetings took place in April 2013 in Washington D.C at both the World Bank building and at CSO offices, 
including the World Resources Institute.  
1049 See: Inclusive Development International, Bank Information Center, Housing and Land Rights Network Habitat 
International Coalition & International Accountability Project (2013).  
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Given the unusually high risk of human rights violations during 
involuntary resettlement, and conversely, the opportunities for 
advancing the enjoyment of a range of human rights through a well 
planned and executed resettlement project, the revised policy should 
require human rights impact assessments be conducted during 
project preparation. Undertaking human rights impact assessments is 
a precondition for ensuring that the Bank is not complicit in human 
rights violations as a result of displacement caused by its projects. It 
is also an essential foundation for designing Resettlement Plans and 
Process Frameworks that effectively achieve policy objectives, 
including conceiving and executing resettlement as a sustainable 
development program and improving the livelihoods and standards 
of living of those resettled.1050 
The human rights framework submission was met with varying responses from World Bank 
staff. On the one hand, it was evident that the CSOs were being “managed” by creating a 
separate civil society stream for the discussions, so that these organisations would be 
“included” but also contained, so the CSOs would not disrupt the substantive and more 
formal Spring Meetings taking place in the World Bank building, which involved dignitaries 
and other international visitors. On the other hand, there was also a genuine interest from 
some World Bank staff members about the value of a human rights framework. Indeed, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) had taken the step in 2009 of recognising the 
explicit policy objective of avoiding forced eviction, using language that was consistent with 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and 
Displacement.1051 Also, the IFC had recently revised its Guidance Notes for the Assessment 
and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts, in which it explicitly 
acknowledged that:  
Business should respect human rights, which means to avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others and address adverse human 
rights impacts business may cause or contribute to. Each of the 
                                                 
1050 Inclusive Development International, Bank Information Center, Housing and Land Rights Network Habitat 
International Coalition & International Accountability Project (2013, p. 22).  
1051 See: Inclusive Development International, Bank Information Center, Housing and Land Rights Network Habitat 
International Coalition & International Accountability Project (2013, p. 13); International Finance Corporation (2012b). 
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Performance Standards has elements related to human rights 
dimensions that a project may face in the course of its operations. 
Due diligence against these Performance Standards will enable the 
client to address many relevant human rights issues in its project.1052  
These developments were mentioned many times by CSOs in their attempts to persuade the 
Bank to adopt a similar, if not more detailed, model. The reasoning behind trying to get 
references to human rights principles into the wording of the World Bank safeguards was 
that it would increase the advocacy options for the CSOs when engaging with the Bank. It 
would enable them to draw on other broader human rights commentary in their advocacy in 
relation to certain projects.1053 Yet, CSO representatives also acknowledged that it was 
because of this potential for increased responsibility that the Bank did not want to reference 
human rights principles or use the language of rights, as it would open the door and require 
them to engage with a much larger suite of protections embodied in the human rights 
framework. A number of World Bank staff during the private meetings made it clear they 
would be open to including equivalent standards, but would not be able to do so in “human 
rights” language. 1054 
Thus, the debates were polarised in the sense that CSOs clearly preferenced the human rights 
framework and World Bank staff were reluctant to adopt this language, but at the same time 
the views of individuals were plural. World Bank staff were motivated to attend a separate 
and additional in-depth meeting with CSOs at the World Resources Institute.1055 During the 
discussions, some staff explained that they felt the human rights framework had much to 
offer but could not see how the framework could be “operationalised” or translated into clear 
and realistic standards and guidelines at a project level. Others felt that the framework would 
make project implementation too rigid, and some also felt it would make the Bank’s clients 
completely uninterested in taking loans from the World Bank when they could get finance 
from elsewhere, especially from emerging lenders, such as China. These internal debates 
and discussions are reminiscent of Bebbington et al.’s exploration of how the World Bank 
                                                 
1052 International Finance Corporation (2012a, p. 1).  
1053 Conversations 
1054 These sections are based on informal conversations during the meetings with CSO participants and World Bank staff.  
1055 The meeting took place on 22 April 2013 at the World Resources Institute (WRI) in Washington D.C. and focused 
specifically on involuntary resettlement. Participants included the Bank Information Center (BIC), Center for International 
and Environmental law (CEIL), Inclusive Development International and a number of World Bank representatives from 
the Social Development and Safeguards sections of the Bank.  
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adopted social capital values in the 1980s, which he perceived as a “battlefield of 
knowledge”, in which social capital values were championed by some while others 
acquiesced, others resisted and some were simply too busy to engage, conveying the reality 
of how large institutions work, and debunking the idea that these organisations always work 
according to centrally-organised, monolithic or rationale principles.1056  
Indeed, while these consultations with community advocates about how to align safeguards 
with human rights were occurring in the World Bank building and nearby organisations, 
such as WRI, very different meetings were also taking place. Simultaneously, within the 
Bank were ongoing discussions at the Spring Meetings about how the World Bank could 
compete with countries such as China, and whether adopting the new “Country Systems” 
approach would offer a way of reducing the burden of compliance placed on borrowers. A 
“Country Systems” approach was approved by the World Bank in 2005 as a pilot project, 
signalling a move away from the traditional safeguards system. Instead of using the World 
Bank’s parallel safeguard system, it relies on the country’s own social, environmental and 
fiduciary structures and focuses on strengthening those overarching structures across all 
government expenditures, rather than simply in relation to a specific World Bank project.1057 
Following the World Bank’s lead, other banks, including the ADB, are also trialling similar 
approaches.1058 The Country Systems framework is also described on the World Bank’s 
website, where it says:  
To ensure appropriate use of the resources it provides, the World 
Bank - like most other development institutions - has specific and 
detailed operational requirements for the projects it supports. This 
has generally meant the creation of special units outside existing 
government structures solely to implement Bank-funded 
projects.  But isolating projects from the government systems of the 
client country limits institutional strengthening and capacity building 
and thus the impact of development assistance…Further, the 
parallelism with existing structures has often increased the 
transaction costs of working with the World Bank…Experience, 
                                                 
1056 Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson & Woolcock (2004).  
1057 World Bank (2015a). 
1058 See: Asian Development Bank (2015d). 
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independent evaluation, and operational research tell us that the 
impact of development assistance can be increased if development 
agencies support efforts to strengthen the institutions and systems 
that countries already have in place and work more directly with 
them since external development assistance accounts for only about 
1 percent of annual development spending by developing 
countries.  Using country systems also enhances country ownership 
and thus the sustainability of development programs.  In addition, 
using country systems can lower transaction costs and increase aid 
effectiveness by providing a natural focal point for donor efforts to 
harmonize their processes.1059 [Emphasis added].  
The parallel systems of islands of governance tension is evident throughout this excerpt. It 
is given as one rationale for advancing a “Country Systems” approach – which is perceived 
to reduce the creation of islands and instead contribute to broader country reform and 
capacity building of the borrower. Yet, many within the CSOs perceived the country systems 
approach to be a weakening of the safeguards in place and regressive when compared to the 
more traditional safeguards system,1060 which established clear safeguards standards and 
expectations. As a submission from BIC to the World Bank Group explained:  
The goal of increased country ownership of development programs 
and projects is a widely shared objective. We support this goal, but 
emphasize that country ownership should not be narrowly defined as 
the purview of one or two government ministries, but should be 
understood as involving a broad range of national stakeholders. Civil 
society organizations in potential pilot countries should be actively 
involved in pilot selection, assessment of safeguard equivalency, and 
design of country systems pilots… The Bank appears to be on a fast-
track in adopting this framework despite serious instances of 
safeguard policy weakening. We recommend that the Bank take a 
more iterative approach and not move to formal approval until 
                                                 
1059 World Bank (2015a).  
1060 The “traditional” safeguards system was used in the ADB co-financed railway project in Cambodia. 
302 
 
further clarification and engagement with stakeholders. More time is 
required on this sensitive proposal.1061  
Interestingly, the Bank Information Center’s proposal sought to broaden understandings of 
“country systems” to include the civil society organisations of the borrower countries; a 
conceptual leap from how country systems were being framed by World Bank 
documents.1062  
The tension between strengthening country systems and ensuring that the safeguards 
standards remained high was also a major issue in the fieldwork for a separate piece of 
consultancy work carried out by the author for BIC in 2014.1063 Here too the discussion 
about “islands of governance” versus broader programmatic reform emerged. This time it 
was in the context of another World Bank pilot of a new financing modality known as 
Program-for-Results or “PforR”. The PforR lending mechanism is not subject to the World 
Bank’s usual safeguards system, but instead relies primarily on the borrower’s systems to 
implement programs and manage social, environmental and fiduciary risks. It uses a 
streamlined safeguards approach and requires that the borrower gradually comply over a 
period of time. PforR cannot be used for “Category A” projects, which have been deemed 
to have very high social and environmental risks. World Bank representatives interviewed 
for the consultancy research explained how the approach enabled them to work more closely 
with the borrower government, rather than creating a parallel World Bank governance 
system. The CSOs engaged in advocacy surrounding PforR perceived the streamlined 
safeguards system, in which the obligations and requirements expected were far less clear, 
to be highly risky. As explained in a Summary of Concerns on PforR prepared by the Bank 
Information Center:  
P4R’s vague and somewhat discretionary approach to assessing and 
using a borrower’s [environmental and social] systems to address 
potential operational impacts offers unclear leverage over wider 
programmatic adoption of higher standards. This approach will 
                                                 
1061 Bank Information Center (2005, pp. 1-2).  
1062 The World Bank’s approach is summarised here: World Bank (2015a). 
1063 I travelled to Vietnam in April 2014 to undertake a small consultancy for BIC on the new lending modality known as 
“Program-for-Results” or “P4R”. See:  Jessie Connell & Grimsditch (2014, p. 49).  
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expose communities in areas where programs are implemented to 
higher levels of risk.1064 
A streamlined system which used a country systems approach was generally appealing to 
stakeholders interviewed from the Australian Government, ADB and World Bank. As one 
interview participant commented, when discussing the New Development Bank or “BRICS 
Bank” (formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which does not yet have 
a formal safeguards framework in place comparable to the World Bank:  
It does raise the issue…if you keep a lot of these extras which are 
laden onto the Bank, at what stage do the borrowers say, this is just 
not worth it really. And there is an expectation that the New Bank – 
[BRICS Bank] – will be easier to work with. It’s an issue, and I think 
the banks are conscious of it. Where do you get a balance?1065 
For many interview participants, this tension could be reduced to a type of “Catch 22” 
scenario: Safeguards were required to maintain high levels of social and environmental 
accountability. Yet, maintaining high standards made bank loans less competitive with other 
emerging lenders who had less stringent requirements.1066 Thus, the logic continued, that in 
this new era of alternative sources of finance, multilateral banks need to evolve and 
streamline their safeguards requirements to maintain their lending portfolios. The Catch-22 
emerges because projects still need to comply with the agreed basic social and 
environmental standards of the respective bank, otherwise a community complaint made to 
the World Bank Inspection Panel or ADB Accountability Mechanism might result in 
cancellation of the project due to non-compliance.  
Of course, in the same way that “islands” are not completely isolated from other territories, 
and have meaningful, albeit restricted connections with actors and processes outside their 
physical regions, it is also useful to think of the islands of governance that have evolved in 
Cambodia in a relational way. These islands or pockets where resettlement is governed by 
the resettlement policies and laws of donor countries on a project-by-project basis, are still 
physical, political and social domains that are fundamentally embedded within, linked and 
                                                 
1064 Bank Information Center (2014). 
1065 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B). 
1066 See the discussion in: Moore (2015).  
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defined in relation to their surroundings. They are also temporally limited by the contractual 
timeframes of the relevant international project, but even these temporal limitations are not 
absolute. There are influences that remain long after a project has been completed.1067 
Interestingly, one participant provided an example where he felt that the stereotype of 
emerging lenders had been negated. He recalled being in high level negotiations in China 
when the Chinese Government was seeking a loan from the World Bank. It eventuated that 
the World Bank loan was requested not because the financial support was needed, but 
because financing the project would activate the World bank’s safeguards and technical 
assistance operations. He explained:  
I’ve seen very interesting examples of this in China and to a lesser 
extent Vietnam, and these are sophisticated countries, who want 
good advice from the banks. They don’t just want money. China 
doesn’t even need the money. A good example is recently, about 4 
years ago, they borrowed just 200-300 million, for their North-South 
railway in China, which is going to be a multi-billion dollar activity. 
And when that came to the [World Bank] Board, some Board 
members were saying ‘well this is a waste of the Banks resources, if 
they can fund 20 billion dollars, 200 million is peanuts. Why are we 
bothering?’ And the answer was that the Chinese Government 
wanted the Provincial Governments, and big poorer provinces like 
Yunnan, to begin to understand how to address safeguard issues. 
They wanted to use the Bank…they knew if we put in as little as 200 
million the Bank safeguards applied to the whole project. They were 
actually dragging the Bank in and saying ‘you come and teach our 
people how to consult, how to reach out, how to set up all of the 
systems.’ The exact opposite of what people have been saying. 1068 
People just say China is going to do whatever it wants to do, but 
remember the central Government in Beijing is concerned about the 
                                                 
1067 For details of these arrangements, see Chapter 4, Section 4.6, especially the quote from ADB regarding “externally-
financed projects” (Asian Development Bank, Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport & Ministry of Rural Development (2014, p. 6).  
1068 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B).  
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Provincial Government’s capacity. How is the Provincial 
Government going to learn about how to treat the local populace? It 
will drag the central Government in, people will complain, it will get 
into the press in Beijing...that these poor peasants in this province 
have been bulldozed flat, and there is corruption going on…they get 
upset by that. 1069  
He also explained his hypothesis on this emerging area of inquiry. As he stated:  
When it comes to bilateral donors co-financing with the MDBs, my 
hypothesis would be that a well-designed grant/loan activity should 
lead to a better developmental outcome for the recipient. And to 
some extent, Cambodia is a good example. I think our involvement, 
and our pouring a lot of grant money into [the railway], should lead 
to a better developmental outcome for people in Cambodia. Even if 
it is just that main line from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville, and it 
works well and people have been looked after and provides an 
economic boost to the country. 1070 
There were also examples given in the context of the Cambodian railway project where 
people working closely with Government felt their counterparts had learnt from the 
experience of the railway, especially in relation to what was expected in terms of “good” 
resettlement, even though these standards had been largely isolated from broader 
resettlement policies and practices. As one Cambodian Government official also explained:  
I think it is changing a little bit. I think the Government is taking care 
of people, need to provide more services to them. At the same time, 
the Government doesn’t have  checks and balances mechanisms. The 
Government talks about policy and then expects the firm or company 
to do it. There [may be] an intention to manipulate this policy by not 
doing a proper infrastructure project in a new area where the new 
residents move in then they can save a lot of money. And then there 
might be a corrupt officer behind this position and then the central 
                                                 
1069 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B). 
1070 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B). 
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government does not have capacity to monitor the issue and that 
makes the people angry. That is the kind of issue. I think the 
Government has good intentions to provide good services to people 
because they have enough, I would say, they have enough experience 
with people being against them…So the Government is learning 
about this and they are trying to introduce a policy where better 
compensation, services, financial support [are provided] to them. But 
I think the problem is that there are some corrupt officials too 
involved in this by taking sides with the project developer. They 
ignore all the plans and discussions about the plans and infrastructure 
developments for those people. So I think that Government should 
consider the [possibility of] setting up a kind of independent 
monitoring agency. By doing this, I don’t think Government has the 
capacity or resources to do it by themselves. They should hire an 
independent body to do it.1071  
As the former AusAID official also remarked about ADB’s approach in the beginning of the 
railway project:  
…I think that potentially from the beginning, if they had pulled back 
and said “well, look, this is highly complicated, the environment is 
not particularly conducive to very efficient roll out of something this 
complex”… then they might have better resourced the whole 
thing…1072 
Another interview participant who had previously worked in Cambodia for a development 
agency during the Boeung Kak Lake conflict, provided a different perspective. In this case, 
the World Bank was financing a land titling scheme in Cambodia (LMAP). The involuntary 
resettlement policy of the Bank was triggered because families living on high-value land in 
Phnom Penh were excluded from receiving land title due to competing commercial interests. 
The result was a major public relations disaster for the Bank.1073 Reflecting on this time, the 
interview participant described how he felt that there was something inherently and 
                                                 
1071 Senior Cambodian Government official speaking in a personal capacity, 18 July 2013 (Participant 18B).  
1072 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1073 The Boeung Kak Lake was explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.7. 
307 
 
deliberately chaotic about how the World Bank and ADB dealt with problem projects. His 
view was that it was not simply a matter of “good policy implemented badly”, but rather 
there was a type of unacknowledged, but widespread understanding that projects might be 
initially under-resourced to deal with emerging social or land-related conflicts, but that until 
problems occurred, a rationale for increasing the resources and financial support to deal with 
them could not be garnered. Thus, rather than seeking clarity about the risks of a project 
before implementation, instead projects are under-resourced initially with implicit 
acceptance that additional resources would follow if problems were encountered or 
exposed.1074 Indeed, these insights are consistent with how the Cambodian railway project 
was handled, and also with the findings of the World Bank Review, which identified 10 
major World Bank projects between 1990 and 2010, where resettlement costs increased by 
almost 40 percent at project completion stage compared to the cost identified at the appraisal 
stage.1075  
This same interview participant explained that one of the pre-conditions for projects 
involving resettlement was certainty about land. In the Boeung Kak Lake example, he felt 
the World Bank and the Cambodian Government had “unreconciled expectations” about 
resettlement and land in that project. As problems were encountered, the challenge for the 
World Bank was “how to re-craft the narrative about its own involvement.”1076 During the 
interview, this participant referred to the well-known article by David Mosse, “Is Good 
Policy Unimplementable: Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid and Practice”, in which 
Mosse argued that the relationship between policy and practice could not be simply 
explained by an “unintended gap” between good theory and poor implementation in practice, 
which could be addressed by simply improving policy and implementing it more effectively. 
Mosse suggested that the driving force behind the actions of development actors was a desire 
to maintain coherent public representations of their behaviour, decisions and events. This 
interview participant argued that Mosse’s perspective resonated with him when he reflected 
                                                 
1074 Former employee of a development agency who was working in Phnom Penh during the Boeung Kak lake conflict 
relating to LMAP, 29 May 2013 (Participant 21B).   
1075 World Bank (2012a, p. ix).  
1076 Former employee of a development agency who was working in Phnom Penh during the Boeung Kak lake conflict 
relating to LMAP, speaking in a personal capacity, 29 May 2013 (Participant 21B). 
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on how the World Bank reacted to the NGOs and public controversy as the land titling 
scheme financed by the Bank in Cambodia spiralled out of control.1077  
8.3 Formal grievance mechanisms and independent advocacy 
Had it not been for the presence of active, vocal NGOs in Cambodia, it is possible that the 
impacts of the Cambodian railway resettlement would not have come to light, that additional 
investment and compensation would not have been provided, and that debates about ADB 
and Australia’s responsibility may not have taken place to the extent that they did, both 
publically and within the relevant organisations. The way that the events unfolded has drawn 
attention to the increasing reach and influence of advocacy NGOs, and the new ways in 
which they are working, especially in Cambodia. This is particularly the case as the railway 
project is one of a series of displacement conflicts in Cambodia that have featured in the 
local and international media in the past decade. As explored earlier in the thesis, Keck and 
Sikkink, in their influential work on advocacy networks, categorise the tactics that advocates 
use globally into four types of “politics”:  
1. information politics, or the ability to move politically usable 
information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most 
impact; 
 
2. symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or 
stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience 
that is frequently far away…; 
 
3. leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to 
affect a situation where weaker members of a network are 
unlikely to have influence; and  
 
                                                 
1077 Former employee of a development agency who was working in Phnom Penh during the Boeung Kak lake conflict 
relating to LMAP, speaking in a personal capacity, 29 May 2013 (Participant 21B); Mosse (2004).  
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4. accountability politics, or the effort to oblige more powerful 
actors to act on vaguer policies or principles they have formally 
endorsed.1078  
The advocacy surrounding the Cambodian railway project has involved combinations of 
each of these “politics” or approaches in various ways. Much of the advocacy surrounding 
the railway took the form of “accountability politics” or accountability advocacy, in which 
efforts were made to oblige the Cambodian government, ADB and AusAID to act on laws 
and policies that they have previously endorsed. Symbolism, leverage and information 
politics were also used. This advocacy was multi-pronged. NGOs worked concurrently at a 
local project-level in Cambodia, on cases such as the railway project, and also at a regional 
and international level. These sites and scales of international advocacy and influence were 
multiple and included Washington D.C., Manila, and other places and points of influence in 
Australia and Europe.1079 In the case of the railway, advocates accompanied community 
representatives to visit the ADB in Manila so that project-affected people had a more direct 
voice at the regional level. In the interviews with former ADB and AusAID staff these visits 
were memorable. Staff recall these meetings with community representatives in Manila as 
having a significant personal impact on them. Oxfam was one organisation working in 
partnership with Inclusive Development International at the time. As one interview 
participant recalled:  
I think, I dealt mainly with Oxfam Australia here in Australia. I had 
a lot of respect for them. Their ADB person would bring some of the 
Cambodian villagers to our annual meeting in Manila and we would 
meet with them.1080 
These efforts had powerful symbolism and increased the credibility of the NGOs as agents 
of the communities. It also made it easier to convey information and stories about the 
communities that were otherwise very distant from decision-makers in Canberra and Manila. 
In this way, credibility generated through access to community information was an effective 
aspect of the campaign. Blogs and online newspapers also provided timely and easy ways 
                                                 
1078 Keck & Sikkink (1999, p. 95). 
1079 As an example, see the website of Inclusive Development International for the range of campaigns still underway: 
http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/.  
1080 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B). 
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to distribute updates about the project, primarily through the Cambodian Trainspotter blog, 
updated mostly anonymously as developments in the railway project took place.1081 The 
blogs were also translated into Khmer and distributed widely via email and other social 
media websites.1082 Deeper, more comprehensive research also assisted the information 
politics of the advocacy campaign. Increasingly, this approach is being referred to among 
advocates as “evidence-based advocacy” and is an effective way of appealing and 
communicating to policy audiences within and outside Cambodia.1083 In the case of the 
railway, a series of in-depth research reports were compiled and distributed to the public, 
the Cambodian Government AusAID, the ADB and other parties over the eight years of the 
project. Most notably, these were Derailed, released in 2012 by BABC, based on field 
research with the affected communities,1084 and influential reports by STT in 2011 and 
2013.1085 In the interviews with consultants and former staff of ADB and AusAID, these 
reports were mentioned many times. As one interview participant explained, referring to one 
of the reports:  
Let’s start with positive. [Their] data is very positive. I think the 
thoroughness and comprehensiveness with which STT conducted 
their study is so informative for us. It has helped us already and it 
will help us in the future. We have adapted their way of data 
collection to ensure that the things that they have raised are covered. 
There are some things that we figured we’re not collecting as well as 
they did…and they were very transparent. But we will not collect all 
data at the level that they did, because that would be too intensive. 
That’s not the way we do monitoring, because you would have 
respondent exhaustion.1086  
While this type of “evidence-based” advocacy was considered helpful, the use of the media 
to draw attention to the project was often perceived as having the reverse effect on the 
capacity of the ADB to influence the Government. As one participant explained: 
                                                 
1081 The Cambodian Trainspotter blog is available at: https://cambodiatrainspotter.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/cambodia-
trainspotter/. 
1082 The Khmer version of Cambodian Trainspotter blog is available at: https://cambodiatrainspotter.wordpress.com/.  
1083 See: Inclusive Development International (2015b). 
1084 Bugalski & Medallo (2012); The reports are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.9 and in Chapter 5.   
1085 Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2011, 2013a, 2013b). 
1086 ADB staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 17 July 2013 (Participant 1B). 
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[T]he media has not been very positive…The resettlement plan is 
implemented by the Government. Whenever the Government closes 
up, it is a problem. And I don’t really care who causes it to close up, 
everything that causes them to close up creates a problem in 
implementation. It is always a negative. Any reason that causes the 
Government to be receptive to things is always good . And I think 
the NGOs can do that, although they have not. I think they have 
scope to do that.1087  
Leverage politics were also used in the railway campaign and had various impacts, many of 
which are difficult to judge. As Keck and Sikkink argue, leverage politics are the ability to 
call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are 
unlikely to have influence. In 2012, the ADB agreed to engage Michael Cernea, one of the 
world’s most experienced involuntary resettlement experts, as a consultant on the railway 
project. This was largely considered a success by the coalition of NGOs working on railway 
advocacy at the time. The NGOs had suggested during their regular meetings with the ADB 
on the railway that Cernea should visit Cambodia as an independent and impartial expert, 
given his background working for the World Bank. Cernea was considered to be a neutral 
and impartial observer acceptable to the ADB, the NGOs and the Cambodian Government. 
The ADB eventually agreed and organised Cernea’s visit.1088 However, this leverage 
strategy also had unintended ramifications in the tense environment of Phnom Penh. 
Informal conversations with people working in the relevant organisations suggested the final 
consultant report was critical of the railway resettlement process and these criticisms were 
received very poorly by the Cambodian Government. Once the report was finalised and 
submitted to the Cambodian Government, negotiations broke down between the ADB and 
NGOs around whether the report would be released publicly and whether the 
recommendations would be addressed. Eventually a compromise was made and a summary 
of the report’s recommendations were released, but not the full report.1089 This was described 
as a “cover-up” and an attempt to “smother” the report by Equitable Cambodia, other NGOs 
and the media.1090 News of the debacle made it into international advocacy networks, such 
                                                 
1087 ADB staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 17 July 2013 (Participant 1B). 
1088 Inclusive Development International (2014). 
1089 Cernea (2013). 
1090 Cambodia Trainspotter (2013).  
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as that of the International Network for Displacement and Resettlement, a network of 
researchers, advocates and professionals working on resettlement, which also circulated a 
media release titled “Cambodia Resettlement Debacle Cover Up: ADB Conceals Critical 
Expert Report”. 1091 
While the media attention surrounding the release of the report surely increased its 
international profile at a critical point in time, (shortly before the ADB Compliance Review 
Panel visited Cambodia to investigate the project in 2013), there were also other implications 
stemming from this aspect of the campaign. Off-the-record conversations during this time 
suggested that these events resulted in the “closing down” of conversations between ADB 
and the Government as they had been embarrassed over the incident. For a period of time 
following the report, ADB staff members described having decreased leverage or capacity 
to encourage implementation of any of Cernea’s recommendations as the public shaming of 
the Government, in this particular instance, had back-fired. Of course, this is a contested 
perspective on the series of events that unfolded. The dynamics were explained by an ADB 
staff member in detail:  
I think the problem [was] that there is just so much history. But if 
that report had come out for a different project that has no history…I 
think the Government would have been more positive to a report like 
that…Initially they agreed and were willing to consider 
[recommendations from a report]…they were positive, but now they 
are not. If you start quoting Michael Cernea, the likely response is, 
“we haven’t endorsed that report.” The NGOs asked for it to be 
released and the Government said “It is a working document.” The 
NGOs have a purpose in clamouring for disclosure but I hope they 
know and they see that this is the drawback, the fallout of so much 
lobbying to disclose that report…NGO criticisms where no solutions 
are identified or where proposals are not practical, do not help. It 
causes more damage than improves things. What the Government 
doesn’t want to do is to sign up for something that the NGOs will 
report as a scorecard… I feel that they are okay with criticism when 
                                                 
1091 Inclusive Development International (2013).  
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it’s not being advertised . They are okay with it and they are willing 
to do improvements that they think are suitable and that they think 
can be resourced. And when ADB and AusAID think that the 
recommendation is important and IRC agrees, but they say, sorry we 
have no resources, then we step in with support. That’s how this 
Michael Cernea [report] could have been used very well. But we 
were never given that chance unfortunately.1092 
These comments reflect the fine line that advocates tread in terms of drawing attention to a 
project, which may result in improvements to the way the project is managed, and advocacy 
which results in humiliation, which can lead to the Government “closing up” and refusing 
to negotiate. One advocate described this dichotomy as “hot” and “cold” advocacy,1093 and 
another explained that it was often difficult to know how “hot” you should get.1094 As the 
same advocate also explained, “The question is not whether hard advocacy is needed, 
[but]…knowing when to go hard and when to go soft is important.”1095  
Not all people within the ADB and AusAID felt that this type of “hot” advocacy was always 
detrimental. It was mentioned numerous times throughout a number of interviews that the 
ADB and AusAID would not have responded in the way that they did if the advocacy had 
been softer. This way of conceptualising advocacy was presented to one ADB staff member 
during an interview. Speaking in a personal capacity this participant stated:  
If the advocacy wasn’t as “hot” as it was, then nobody would have 
paid attention. It made us reflect.1096  
One observer with detailed knowledge of the Boeung Kak Lake conflict in Cambodia, also 
described the NGO strategies during this time as akin to “guerrilla warfare”. When asked to 
clarify further, this person explained that it was not so much the element of surprise that had 
characterised the experience, but the asymmetry of the relationship. He explained the 
analogy further by describing how “one party [the World Bank] is large, structured and 
                                                 
1092 ADB staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 17 July 2013 (Participant 1B). 
1093 International NGO representative, 5 February 2015 (Participant 10B). 
1094 International NGO representative, 21 July 2013 (Participant 16B).   
1095 International NGO representative, 21 July 2013 (Participant 16B).  
1096 ADB staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 20 February 2013 (Participant 2B).  
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institutional, while the other [the NGOs] are small and nimble.”1097 He felt that the NGOs 
had made a critique of the World Bank’s land titling project (LMAP), during the Boeung 
Kak lake conflict, that the project had not been able to tolerate, withstand or adjust to, and 
so it had been shut down.  
Discussions with former and current AusAID/DFAT staff members revealed their 
experiences of the NGO advocacy, especially when the railway first started encountering 
serious difficulties from mid-2010 onwards. It was a very personal experience for some. As 
the former AusAID official explained, referring to the publicity surrounding the children’s 
deaths in Battambang resettlement site:  
I’ve been on the front page of [the paper], basically being told I’ve 
got blood on my hands. It was a little bit too strained. It wasn’t the 
best…The whole thing spiralled out of control politically when there 
were representations made and then I think what happened was that, 
one of the groups wrote to us, and we had already been in 
correspondence, one of them wrote to us and attached an ultimatum 
regarding a response. I think I was travelling…and then they went 
straight into press, essentially saying “The Government was not 
responding and was washing its hands”, and that became the story, 
and it was very hard to manage it…1098 
He continued further to explain his perspective on the nature of the advocacy:  
On the one hand they did a good job of alerting people to the 
difficulties. And I don’t think the Bank in particular was sufficiently 
receptive at the beginning. But I think as it went on we ought to have 
been able to find cleverer ways of genuinely engaging…because it 
seemed to me that the sole thrust of making progress was adversarial.  
I think…there could have been other ways. I think that’s the 
challenge for NGOs in Cambodia more broadly – how to find ways 
of positively influencing government, not just bludgeoning them, 
                                                 
1097 Former employee of a development agency who was working in Phnom Penh during the Boeung Kak lake conflict 
relating to LMAP, speaking in a personal capacity, 29 May 2013 (Participant 21B). 
1098 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B).  
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which means the groups become enemies, you know, mutual 
suspicion, it doesn’t have to be like that. 1099 
A number of people within AusAID acknowledged that the ADB and AusAID were not pro-
active enough early in the project. As one DFAT staff member explained:  
I think the ADB held back for as long as they could, thinking “Oh 
Jesus, this is just such a mess. It’s too hard. We’ll leave it to the 
Cambodian Government.” Then the messages would get back that 
the Cambodian Government is just not abiding by the Agreement at 
all, [and the ADB would say] “oh well, we’ll talk to them about 
that…look you’re not abiding by the Agreement at all”…[and the 
Government would respond by saying] “what, aren’t we, sorry about 
that.” Then six months later it was getting worse.1100  
While there were many different views about how far NGOs should go to communicate their 
message, there were two consistent themes that emerged in terms of why the advocacy had 
been particularly effective in the case of the railway and other recent displacement conflicts 
in Cambodia. The first was because the NGOs in question were considered wholly 
independent from the ADB and Australian Government. They were not reliant on them for 
financial or political support and were not being contracted by the financiers to monitor the 
project. Equitable Cambodia, IDI, STT and others, were not in a formal contractual 
relationship with the ADB and were not receiving funding directly from the Australian 
Government. 
An interview with a former World Bank Inspection Panel member in Washington D.C. 
explained why the nature of these relationships was so decisive. This participant explained 
that when NGOs are paid by the Bank, “they do not challenge the Bank.” He also referred 
back to a much earlier experience in his career in Cambodia. In this earlier context, a network 
of NGOs had been engaged by the World Bank to monitor a World Bank project, but they 
were also paid by the Bank and bound by a confidentiality agreement. When they went 
public with their concerns they breached the agreement. As he explained: 
                                                 
1099 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B) . 
1100 AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 July 2014 (Participant 13B). 
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the Bank had to let them go because the shared data handled by the 
Forestry Department, which shows the dilemma the NGOs are 
in….they need funds to do the work they are doing, but this creates 
secondary problems…nothing happens if NGOs don’t push.1101 
The second broad reason that interview participants perceived the advocacy to be effective 
in the railway case was that the NGOs had been able to utilise the formal accountability 
mechanisms of the ADB. In explaining this focus, one IDI staff member stated, “We tried 
for many years to work with Government.” 1102 He went on to explain that now the focus 
was on international organisations and financiers, especially those with formal, quasi-
judicial grievance mechanisms that could be activated by community members. When asked 
about whether the NGOs were hoping international financiers, such as the ADB, would 
withdraw from Cambodia he answered: 
Our goal is not to push them [the international financiers] out. But 
they get the benefit, they have a responsibility to respond to affected 
people…They need to learn that they cannot just give money.1103  
A question that emerged during the interviews was whether NGOs in Cambodia should use 
their resources to more actively assist displaced communities in terms of developing 
livelihood programs and other interventions aimed at recovery. As part of these discussions 
some queried whether focusing on empowerment and rights was an effective way of 
assisting communities, when their more basic needs were not being met. A representative 
from IDI referred to a previous resettlement experience, which had been a catalyst for local 
organisations to stop providing basic services and support to communities, and instead focus 
on awareness raising, rights and empowerment. In the quote below, the representative is 
referring to the work of the local NGO, Bridges Across Borders Cambodia (BABC), which 
later became Equitable Cambodia and works closely with IDI.  
 [We] had a quite a big community development program that it has 
since phased out, because we are now focused more on trying to 
achieve structural change in the country…I remember at one point, 
                                                 
1101 Former World Bank Inspection Panel Member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 May 2013, (Participant 19B).   
1102 Local NGO representative, 11 March 2013 (Participant 7B).  
1103 Local NGO representative, 11 March 2013 (Participant 7B).  
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a Government official saying to the HIV families after the eviction 
at Borei Kela: “Don’t worry you’ll be fed with a silver spoon after 
the eviction because of the NGOs.” It’s very difficult [for us] because 
certainly people are in dire humanitarian situations and it’s very 
difficult to just abandon people after they’ve lost that 
struggle….Now [we] have made the decision to phase out that aspect 
of the work…change it actually to community organizing. The 
Community development program is now a community organising 
program. It is working with communities that are tenure insecure, but 
not under the immediate threat of eviction, with the aim of building 
strong communities that will be able to have a fighting chance of 
resisting eviction when it happens and networking with other 
communities to build an urban poor movement in Phnom Penh.1104 
These remarks reveal how IDI has shifted from more traditional community-development 
based work, to a “rights-based” approach. Where previously these NGOs may have provided 
food and other material support to resettled communities, their intention now is on 
community organising and rights-based empowerment. Interesting comments were made on 
this issue by the Inspection Panel member interviewed in Washington D.C. who explained, 
“Every NGO wants to be a development NGO, but there have to be a few NGOs that just do 
advocacy, otherwise it doesn’t work.”1105 
Another member of the Compliance Review Panel of the Inter-American Bank also based 
in Washington D.C. had similar remarks to make about the role of NGOs in holding banks 
to account.  
NGOs have a significant role to play….people need help getting 
access to information and even translating information into local 
languages. I believe affected people also have a right to compliance. 
It is important to make this known. 1106 
                                                 
1104 International NGO representative, 17 April 2013 (Participant 9B).  
1105 Former World Bank Inspection Panel Member speaking in a personal capacity, 24 May 2013, (Participant 19B).   
1106 World Bank Inspection Panel Member speaking in a personal capacity, 28 May 2013 (Participant 22B).  
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This interview participant also explained how some “strange alliances” would emerge 
between the NGOs, but that these misaligned partnerships were not always problematic. He 
stated: “The NGO agenda may not necessarily be fully aligned with the people’s agenda, 
[but] their case can be used to further the debate.”1107  
8.4 Inflexible resettlement principles and divergent community contexts 
One of the positive aspects of having strict resettlement standards embodied in the 
safeguards framework and supported by formal grievance mechanisms is that they can be 
used by communities and NGOs to place pressure on the banks to comply with laws and 
policies that they have previously endorsed. This has been described throughout the thesis 
as accountability advocacy. As illustrated in the previous section, there is enormous pressure 
at an international level to formulate clear resettlement standards and guidelines to reduce 
the negative impacts often created by resettlement. Yet, it is also clear that a fundamental 
tension emerges when universal principles and standards are developed at a centralised or 
international level and then applied to very different local settings.  
Chapter 7 of this thesis explored community perspectives of the railway project and revealed 
how the ADB safeguards framework eventually provided a powerful avenue to improve the 
quality of resettlement, which had a real and tangible impact on the lives of those living 
within the bounds of the resettlement sites. At the same time, the dynamics of the 
communities who remained living along the railway, especially in Poipet and Pursat, were 
significantly altered by the way the households were divided up, with some households 
entitled to relocation and a package of assistance while others were left without tenure 
security and certainty about their future. The dynamics which emerged from the fieldwork 
were explained to some of the interview participants during the discussions. One ADB 
official speaking in a personal capacity explained the principle of minimising displacement 
as it was applied in the Cambodian railway project: 
The right of way is very big. So this was a resettlement minimisation 
methodology to minimise resettlement. Basically they define a 
corridor of impact…I would want the narrowest possible corridor of 
impact. And why is that? Because that is consistent with the policy. 
                                                 
1107 World Bank Inspection Panel Member speaking in a personal capacity, 28 May 2013 (Participant 22B).  
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You first try to avoid [displacement]. The policy actually requires 
you to avoid [displacement]. …that’s the first thing you try to do. 
And in instances where you cannot avoid then you minimise and 
ensure the impacts are addressed. So as a resettlement specialist, 
when we are sitting at the table in the team, I will say, give me a 
corridor of impact that is the smallest possible. That’s always my 
mandate because that will affect less people [and have less] 
livelihood impacts. That’s the first thing you want to do. Now, the 
engineer or the designer will be the one to determine the corridor of 
impact based on safety and the possibility of construction. It cannot 
be too narrow that you cannot bring in your equipment, obviously, 
because that defeats the purpose. You physically need to be able to 
construct it…1108 
These comments reveal the overarching influence that the safeguards principles have in 
shaping the decisions made on “the ground” about resettlement. Yet, they also reveal how 
difficult it is to tailor or adjust these principles to the particularities of local communities, 
not just at a project-level but also at a sub-project level, as needs and circumstances vary 
from place to place. Another former ADB official was also asked about how unintended and 
perverse results can be avoided when applying safeguards principles. He described how 
challenging it was to incorporate a dimension of flexibility into the implementation culture 
of the ADB. He stated:  
…they [the ADB] would be absolute slaves to the rule book. It’s a 
very conservative institution. So if somebody said “yeah, but, we 
could get better outcomes, more consistent with the policy if we just 
did this…” nobody would back that internally. They would just say 
“‘but what does the rulebook say? Oh the rule book says X so X is 
what we do.” “We don’t do X-plus, we do X”. 1109 
This participant continued to explain the predicament that emerges when relying 
predominantly on a compliance-based approach to resettlement, such as that which is 
                                                 
1108 ADB staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 17 July 2013 (Participant 1B).  
1109 Former senior ADB official speaking in a personal capacity, talking about safeguard approaches within the ADB, 
November 2014 (Participant 4B). 
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promoted within the ADB. Referring to the community dynamics that emerged in the 
Cambodian railway project, he explained:  
To me that is an interesting little case study… if you are just going 
by the book, and this is the problem with the book…the book then 
gets very thick and you have got to comply. And of course, in the 
Bank, where the accountability is around policy compliance [there is 
a view that] “If I stick to the rule book, and I do everything by the 
rule, then I should be safe.” So there is an incentive to comply with 
that, as long as the internal systems facilitate and encourage that. But 
the drawback of having the detailed rule book is, you know, you can 
be a slave to that, and only that. But what we presumably want people 
to do, is exercise good judgment. The rules essentially should be 
saying, “these are the minimum standards and requirements, but if 
the greater good is facilitated by capturing those…[additional 
households]… and giving them the same benefits and access to sites, 
then, you know, do that. It should actually allow that and encourage 
that. 1110 
In response to the issue of minimising displacement, one advocate explained that 
displacement had not so much been minimised, but delayed, revealing the temporal limits 
to the influence that financiers, such as ADB and AusAID, had over the resettlement site. 
He is referring to the possibility that those who remain living along the railway will be 
relocated at a later date, once the ADB obligations on the Cambodian Government have 
ceased. 
[T]he way I look at it, displacement of these households was not 
minimized at all, but rather postponed, without the protections of 
ADB's safeguard policies and accountability mechanism (not to 
mention the resources).  I believe that actually constitutes non-
compliance with the resettlement policy, but we'll see how the CRP 
looks at this if the families decide to proceed with such a 
                                                 
1110 Former senior ADB official speaking in a personal capacity, talking about safeguard approaches within the ADB, 
November 2014 (Participant 4B). 
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complaint.  If such families are excluded from the scope of the 
resettlement policy, this is a strong argument for the need for a 
different set of safeguards on land tenure...”1111 
Another former ADB staff member commenting on the railway acknowledged that the 
generic principles of the ADB safeguards had been applied in an unfortunately strict way in 
this case, asking “is it the principles themselves or the way they were interpreted?” 1112 This 
person also suggested that if the original Detailed Measurement Survey of the communities 
and ongoing consultation had been done better, then these kinds of unintended impacts may 
not have arisen:  
I suspect that…done well, the ADB policy would have allowed for a 
wider range of income and housing options according to AP's 
[affected persons’] expressed need than appears here...the socio-
economic survey and census work plus consultation is supposed to 
identify options – it sounds like this did not happen?1113  
Yet, the original Resettlement Plan prepared in 2006 did identify that people along the 
railway in Poipet were more positively predisposed to the idea of moving that then other 
groups. These observations were not highlighted in the report, instead they were buried on 
pg. 48, where it stated:  
In Poipet, majority of the participants who attended the FGDs [focus 
group discussions] preferred off-site [relocation] to have more 
security of tenure if the distance from present site is not too far.1114 
Yet, the same resettlement plan also states that:  
The area required for reconstructing the Poipet station has been 
reduced from 6 hectares to 3 hectares to minimize displacement.1115 
                                                 
1111 International NGO representative discussing advocacy in Cambodia, correspondence after interview via email 6 May 
2015 (Participant 8B). 
1112 Former ADB safeguards consultant corresponding by email. A formal interview was not carried out and so a Participant 
no. was not allocated.  
1113 Former ADB safeguards staff member corresponding by email. A formal interview was not carried out and so a 
Participant no. was not allocated. 
1114 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007, p. 48). 
1115 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007) (Annex 2).  
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These different preferences which seem to have partially existed prior to the project 
beginning and which intensified over the course of the project, did not result in a different 
approach to resettlement in Poipet. The option of resettlement was only given to people 
within the narrow corridor of impact, although this resulted in highly inequitable treatment 
for the minority of people within the community who were left behind. Instead a critical 
mass of people and most of the community members moved to the resettlement site. As 
explored in Chapter 7, this was socially divisive for people in the community who were left 
behind. Upon returning from fieldwork for this study to Phnom Penh, the circumstances of 
the Poipet community were communicated informally to staff members of the ADB and 
Australian Government. However it was made clear during these informal conversations 
that additional money from donors was only to be allocated to the resettlement sites and that 
further resettlement would be avoided, given the negative publicity it had so far generated.  
Thus, it appears that divergent community interests and aspirations, which inevitably 
characterise resettlement, are inherently difficult to incorporate into resettlement plans and 
to communicate to donors and other development partners at different scales, such as those 
located in Manila or in Washington D.C. Complex community tensions of this sort do not 
fit easily into clear policy messages to financiers of projects requiring resettlement, 
especially those with reputational risks who are susceptible to embarrassment if non-
compliance is established.  
In the interviews with NGOs, community advocates also explained that they also found it 
very difficult to develop advocacy campaigns that adequately reflected the different 
positions and needs of the communities they were trying to represent. Although there have 
been moves towards a type of “evidence-based” advocacy, as explored earlier, advocates 
explained how they face many dilemmas during their community-based work.  
One of the most difficult challenges faced by advocates was staying connected to community 
perspectives when the grievances being experienced were essentially like a “moveable 
feast”. As already explored throughout the thesis, an feature of the research with the 
communities was the evolving nature of their views, perceptions and aspirations in relation 
to the resettlement process. Perceptions of loss, or of what would be lost, as well as 
aspirations for the future, fluctuated as conditions changed and as new information became 
available about opportunities or risks in the resettlement sites and communities of origin. 
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The aspirations and fears of those left behind also changed as remaining residents watched 
their neighbours adapt to resettlement conditions or be adversely affected by them. As 
compensation for resettled households increased over the course of the project – largely in 
response to complaints from NGOs – the appeal of resettlement also increased, especially 
for those who were not given resettlement as an option. Thus, even though the advocacy that 
surrounded the railway project was highly effective, this also had repercussions for how easy 
it was for NGOs to “stay in touch” or stay connected with communities about their changing 
needs. The households who moved to the resettlement site outside Phnom Penh, which 
experienced the worst impacts from resettlement, were also the closest in proximity to where 
the NGOs were based. Naturally this resettlement site became the focus of advocacy energy 
over time.1116  
When these issues were posed to NGOs during the interviews for the study, there was 
general acknowledgement that these tensions are inherent in doing international advocacy 
work. As one representative said: 
We are advocates after all, not sociologists trying to establish a 
comprehensive record of the overall resettlement process. However, 
our advocacy has been firmly grounded in evidence of negative 
social and human rights impacts, and it is those experiencing 
negative those negative impacts whom we have worked to 
support...1117  
The same advocate also reiterated that the advocacy strategy has tried to encompass people 
who were partially affected by the project, and who remain living along the railway:  
Most of those with immediate grievances were the people who being 
relocated into poverty, but the accountability mechanism complaints 
and advocacy campaign  also included the grievances of people who 
were “partially affected” and moved back into the right of way and 
were left with an inadequate amount of living space and a lack of 
tenure security.  There is a group of households along the tracks in 
                                                 
1116 Initially advocacy focused on the Battambang resettlement site.  
1117 International NGO representative discussing advocacy in Cambodia, correspondence after interview via email 25 June 
2013 (Participant 8B).   
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Phnom Penh and Poipet who are consistently represented in meetings 
with ADB and whose concerns have always been raised in 
advocacy.1118  
Another advocate responded that “there is only so much that NGOs can do.”1119 Another 
acknowledged the dilemma that campaigns risked being “quick and dirty”, but in such an 
environment “what are the alternatives?”1120. A different NGO representative said the issue 
of who NGOs represent was an ongoing question they struggled with, as sometimes 
communities have conflicting interests: 
“I came from a legal background where you can only work in the 
interests of your client...so you can’t have all of these divergent 
interests, but that’s the nature of work in the community.”1121  
This person also described how decisions about which interests to prioritise were often made 
by NGOs. For example, if there was a new type of accountability mechanism, there would 
be more interest in representing communities whose grievances aligned. This advocate 
explained that while it was always the community’s decision to complain, it was often very 
difficult to provide enough time for communities to make informed decisions about whether 
they wanted to make complaints about certain projects. Sometimes one community group 
would be ready to complain while others had not decided yet, but the complaint would go 
ahead. This advocate also described how it can get “messy in the middle”.1122 Whilst raising 
awareness among communities about their rights can be straight-forward, the specifics about 
what a community or individual wants as an outcome quickly becomes complicated. 
Reflecting on this issue, this person explained that “it’s one of the hardest things trying to 
work out who you can represent and to what extent, and dealing with those conflicts.”1123 
An important comment was made by one advocate reflecting on how difficult it was to 
represent communities and be involved in policy making at a global scale, for example in 
                                                 
1118 International NGO representative discussing advocacy in Cambodia, correspondence after interview via email 6 May 
2015 (Participant 8B). 
1119 International NGO representative, 5 June 2013 (Participant 17B) 
1120 International NGO representative, 11 March 2013 (Participant 11B).  
1121 International NGO representative, 5 June 2013 (Participant 17B).  
1122 International NGO representative, 5 June 2013 (Participant 17B). 
1123 International NGO representative, 5 June 2013 (Participant 17B). 
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Washington D.C. and still stay in touch with the communities they were purporting to 
represent. As this advocate explained: 
 “You get out of touch with the communities so quickly, even in a 
matter of weeks.”1124  
A number of advocates who were interviewed referred back to past experiences in Cambodia 
during the Highway One case and the Boeung Kak lake conflict.1125 The same advocate who 
felt it was easy to lose touch with the communities unless continual engagement was 
possible, reflected on his experiences during Boeung Kak Lake. He explained that the 
relationships between the NGOs working with the communities had been pressured. This 
interview participant also explained that when the complaint to the World Bank Inspection 
Panel was made in relation to Boeung Kak Lake, there was widespread dissatisfaction 
among the NGOs involved. Given the implications of the World Bank’s suspension of funds 
throughout the country, the feeling from some NGOs was that the decision to make the 
complaint was rushed and there should have been much broader consultation and discussion 
about civil society strategies before the World Bank was asked to suspend its loans. He 
explained how there was a strong perception from local NGOs that the Boeung Kak Lake 
conflict had become confrontational and “internationalised” and had alienated elements of 
local civil society, limiting the potential for locally appropriate opportunities to emerge to 
resolve the conflict. 1126 Although the Boeung Kak Lake situation has improved over time, 
this divided view about how the original complaint had been made to the World Bank 
Inspection was confirmed in an interview with the local NGO in question.1127  
Another interview participant recalled how in Highway One, those communities that became 
embroiled in long-standing ongoing conflicts about resettlement with NGOs, took longer to 
recover from the trauma of relocation. The interview participant felt that being involved in 
protests could have long-term implications for social harmony. The issue was significant 
enough in the context of both Highway One and Boeung Kak Lake to make its way into the 
                                                 
1124 International NGO representative working in Phnom Penh during the Boeung Kak Lake conflict relating to LMAP, 5 
February 2013 (Participant 10B). 
1125 See Chapter 4, Section 4.7.  
1126 International NGO representative working in Phnom Penh during the Boeung Kak Lake conflict relating to LMAP, 5 
February 2013 (Participant 10B).  
1127 Interview with local NGO representative in Phnom Penh, 26 June 2013 (Participant 15B).  
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media and project reports. An example of the community conflict emerging in the media in 
Boeung Kak Lake can be found in the article at Figure 31 below.  
Figure 31: Cambodia Daily Boeung Kak Lake petitions1128 
 
It is possible to see how advocacy becomes bound up in the evolving experience of affected 
communities. An awareness of how advocacy campaigns can also affect community 
relations is an integral aspect of working well with communities as an advocate. It is also 
possible to identify how as effective advocacy campaigns generate publicity, financiers and 
policy-makers in the target organisations begin to shift their responses to align with or 
address advocates’ messages to avoid or minimise the damage of the advocacy campaign. 
These shifts in resources, which may be in the form of additional compensation or extra 
provision of resources in resettlement sites, has an impact on community dynamics, 
perceptions and aspirations in relation to the project in question. Advocates need to work 
hard to maintain their alignment with communities as circumstances change. This process 
is depicted in Figure 32 below titled “The advocacy effect”, which aims to capture the 
cyclical and continually evolving nature of advocacy campaigns, community grievances and 
the role advocates play as intermediaries in these settings. At the same time, community 
awareness and engagement also grows as these campaigns develop.  
Figure 32: The advocacy effect 
                                                 
1128 Cambodia Daily (2013). 
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The most piercing critiques of how international NGOs worked with local communities, 
came from advocates within the NGOs themselves. A number of advocates argued that there 
needed to be a stronger code of conduct regarding community engagement and that 
grappling with these sorts of issues was a fundamental challenge that needed to be addressed 
to ensure the sustainability of community advocacy movements. In the international 
development arena – where clients are communities rather than individuals – there are few 
rules or sources of guidance. Advocates also explained that with such minimal financial 
resources at their disposal, once a campaign ends there are also few reasons to revisit 
communities to assess the impacts and relevance of advocacy over time. As Fisher has 
argued elsewhere, these processes make NGOs working in with affected communities 
intimately “tied up with contested notions of what it means to ‘do good’…the process of 
deciding what it is and how to pursue it.”1129 These insights also point to the empowering 
potential of advocacy NGOs and the complexity of their intermediary functions.  
None of the advocates interviewed suggested that the work they were doing with the 
communities should be reduced, rather they were looking for guidance and frameworks to 
                                                 
1129 Fisher (1997, p. 439).  
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conceptualise their relationship with the communities and understand how they could fulfil 
their self-appointed roles. This issue was being taken seriously within Oxfam in Cambodia, 
and it launched a project in partnership with Monash University investigating community-
driven accountability mechanisms aimed at improving the inclusiveness of advocacy 
strategies.1130  
8.5 Commercial drivers, public interest and the power of documents  
An additional complicating factor in the Cambodian railway project was the involvement of 
Australian commercial interests. Woven throughout the interviews were continual 
references to broader problems relating to the technical and commercial aspects of the 
railway rehabilitation, quite separate from the resettlement and safeguards debates taking 
place. The decision to cancel the project before completion, leaving the Cambodian 
Government with a debt of around US 81.1 million, plus interest, has contributed to 
speculation over the project’s management. These separate discussions about the 
governance of the project and the viability of the railway itself go to the question of the 
“public interest” value of the investment used to justify the displacement and resettlement 
of affected households.  
As explained above, the grant money provided by Australia to Cambodia, via the ADB, was 
a way of ensuring the project included adequate technical expertise, in relation to 
resettlement but also in relation to the technical aspects of building and managing the 
railway. Yet, this was not how some external observers perceived the drivers of Australia’s 
participation at the time the decision was made to go ahead. The partnership between 
Australian company, Toll Holdings and the Cambodian Royal Group significantly 
contributed to the controversy surrounding the project. On 12 June 2009, Toll Holdings and 
Royal Group signed a 30 year concession agreement to operate the railways in Cambodia 
and related freight logistics.1131 Toll Holdings was the majority partner with a 55 per cent 
share in the investment. Royal Group committed to a 45 per cent stake. The agreement was 
contingent on support from the Australian Government, essentially finance that would later 
                                                 
1130 When it emerged that this research overlapped with the Oxfam-Monash project goals, initially there were plans for me 
to join the research, however the complexity of combining the fieldwork with the Monash project eventually made it too 
difficult to combine. For details of the partnership, see: Monash University (2015). 
1131 Toll Holdings Limited (2009). 
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come from the ADB and from AusAID. As Paul Little, the Managing Director of Toll Group, 
stated on 12 June 2009 in a Press Release announcing the partnership:  
The agreement is conditional upon final confirmation of investment 
by the international community of circa USD 145 million. These 
funds will be used to upgrade the rail network to a modern inter-
modal facility on 98 hectares in Phnom Penh. Principal funding has 
been agreed by the Asian Development Bank.1132  
In 2012, organisations such as AidWatch claimed that the financial arrangements 
surrounding the railway were enabling Australian companies to benefit from public money 
intended for aid, stating that: 
While Australian companies have benefited from generous public 
subsidies in order to renovate the railways, many of those in 
desperate need of aid dollars have missed out.1133  
Recalling the early stages, the former AusAID official explained:  
I don’t know at what point they came into the mix, but of course there 
was Toll Holdings link…They were very interested in [the railway]. 
I think they could see from the outset, potentially if they could come 
in, essentially as the manager of the system, because there were 
engineering companies who had to come in and do line work, but 
Toll’s interest was in managing the system. Now we were always 
cognisant of that interest, but I don’t believe we had any, not in 
Canberra, I don’t think we were ever approached directly, or had any 
face-to-face meetings. Now I would have been happy to have talked 
to Toll…but I don’t believe they sort meetings with us. In retrospect, 
it might have been better if we had.1134 
He explained how he was aware that external observers have speculated that the decision to 
support the railway was driven by Australia’s commercial interests. He reflected: 
                                                 
1132 Toll Holdings Limited (2009) 
1133 AidWatch (2012, p. 1). 
1134 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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There was a supposition amongst many that, essentially, our 
decision-making was not driven by Toll, but at least very strongly 
influenced. This is not true in the AusAID case.1135 
His recollection was that while AusAID was assessing the risks and merits of the proposal, 
other discussions and agreements were taking place between Toll, the ADB and influential 
Australian counterparts. Essentially, it seems that a political commitment was made to the 
railway project before AusAID had made a full assessment. As he explained:   
…[S]ome interesting things did happen. … I do know we were put 
in a very awkward position……we were holding our options open 
and…then I think I guess all I can say is there were a series of other 
conversations that we were not party to, which meant that we were 
presented almost with a fait accompli at one point… Put it this 
way…there were conversations going on….that we were not party 
to, that seemed to imply a level of support that we had not taken a 
decision on. Because we weren’t party to that, I can’t tell who spoke 
to whom and when and all of that [occurred]… 1136 
In his view, AusAID did not simply relinquish its due diligence responsibilities even though 
it began to seem increasingly inevitable that AusAID would be involved in the project in 
some way. Moore stated:  
…we had to make a decision, “do we just acquiesce and accept 
this?”, we decided “no what we are going to do is to continue to do 
our due diligence and we would go to the Minister with a 
recommendation…do we go in…do we not go in…”. We did 
that…1137  
He described how it was AusAID’s role was to weigh up the potential economic benefits of 
the railway to Cambodia’s economy with the potential risks, provide this advice to the 
Minister, and let then Minister make a judgement call:  
                                                 
1135 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1136 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1137 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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I just said to [our representatives in Phnom Penh], look we just punch 
the numbers and we make a judgment, and if we think this is a bad 
investment, or if we think it’s fundamentally flawed or it’s too 
ambitious…then we go back to the Minister and we say that and the 
Minister makes a decision. If the trade people want to say, “we 
should do it”, well they can say that, and then the Minister can make 
a decision, not a problem.1138  
The decision to approve the project was clearly made in a pressured environment, but it was 
supported by AusAID and those reviewing the project’s merits. As he stated:  
There was a bit of heat on, but we didn’t cook the books. And 
when…the team looked at it, they came back fairly strongly, sort of 
saying, look we do think this work does need to be done, and if it’s 
not done then the whole transport system isn’t going to work 
properly and this is really going to curtail Cambodia’s future growth 
and development. 1139  
During the interviews and informal conversations, it was stated numerous times that a vast 
amount of AusAID’s resources from 2011 onwards were diverted to dealing with the 
Cambodian railway crisis. As the former AusAID official explained:  
Oh, boy, it was so difficult. More than once we got the point, I mean 
amongst ourselves, me, my staff, and I say that distinct from the 
leadership of AusAID and/or the Minister, of asking the question, 
“[if we had known] the grief that this was going to bring, if we had 
known that at the beginning, would we have recommended against 
it, and more broadly, given this, should we be shying against this sort 
of work in the future.?” And there were definitely different views on 
that…So people would say, well look, given the politics of all of this, 
and the fact that governments in Australia get very sensitive, they 
don’t like anything that is too risky, despite what they say, they are 
not going to be prepared to get out and argue the case, then when you 
                                                 
1138 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1139 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
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juxtapose that with the fact that we’re the ones who will end up 
copping a lot of the criticism, does it make sense to be doing this 
stuff?1140  
I think most people came to the view that no, that would be the wrong 
decision.  And yet there were other pragmatists who would say “look, 
it’s not just the risk of criticism and reputational damage, it’s the 
amount of management effort that needs to go into this, that will 
divert you from other things. So if you sign up from that, you are 
kidding yourself, you probably won’t make it much better, you’ll buy 
a lot of grief, and most importantly you won’t be able to do other 
things where you could get a whole lot of better outcomes.” I think 
the evidence on that is very hard to distil. Those are both very valid 
propositions and it’s really hard to decide. Very, very hard. People 
changed their minds on that during the course of events, but by and 
large, I think the development people kept coming back to the 
[development outcomes]. Otherwise why bother. 1141 
In a separate, significant interview, this enduring rationale that rehabilitating the railway 
would contribute to Cambodia’s economic development was challenged by a senior railway 
consultant.1142 This interview participant suggested that the feasibility studies completed for 
the railway were overly optimistic from the outset about the amount of cargo that could be 
transported by the railway. As this participant stated:  
I am very critical of the ADB [which] I consider [to have] badly 
mismanaged the Railway Rehabilitation project…One of the things 
I do not like about this process is that the ADB are trying to make a 
silk purse out of a sow's ear, as the saying goes.1143  
The story told by this participant was consistent with the problems explained in the Major 
Change in Project document released by ADB on September 2014.1144 The document 
                                                 
1140 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1141 Former AusAID senior staff member speaking in a personal capacity, 19 December 2014 (Participant 12B). 
1142 Senior railway consultant speaking in a personal capacity, 4 March 2015 (Participant 3B).  
1143 Senior railway consultant speaking in a personal capacity, 4 March 2015 (Participant 3B). 
1144 See the discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Asian Development Bank (2014h).  
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explained how Toll Royal Railway refused to take over the operations of the Southern Line 
on the basis of “insufficient technical performance”. 1145 The Cambodian Government 
requested the contractor, TSO-AS and Nawarat, to rectify defects however the contractor 
had stopped works. The document also explained how the problems stemmed from 
inaccurate feasibility studies and assessments conducted prior to the beginning of the 
project, stating that the “extent and nature of repair and rehabilitation works was 
significantly different from what had been assumed at appraisal.”1146 
The railway consultant interviewed claimed that the ADB had been warned about these 
problems many times by consultants working on the project, even as far back as 2005. This 
interview participant was outraged that it was only in 2013 that the problems finally were 
expressed in an official, publically available ADB document. His view was that 
rehabilitation of the railway was most likely not a commercially viable transport option for 
Cambodia, for reasons that were apparent from the outset, but not properly accounted for in 
the early feasibility studies. In his view, the project should not have been financed in the 
form that was proposed in 2007.  
It is worth returning to Wyatt’s discussion of “risk” explored in Chapter 2. Wyatt 
investigated risk in the context of large infrastructure projects supported by private-public 
partnerships in a transitional economy context, a scenario very similar to the ADB financed 
railway project in Cambodia. In these settings, Wyatt argued that the inherent complexity of 
these projects, the number of actors involved, combined with the inexperience of borrowing 
countries in dealing with international capital, essentially renders risk “invisible”.1147 As 
quoted earlier, he explains that:  
In the interplay between due diligence, the private incentive of profit 
and risk management, risks are rendered invisible, are shifted from 
powerful actors to actors with less power, and constructed by those 
able to control the definition of risks and their management.1148 
In the case of the railway, an ADB driven project with the promise of improving Cambodia’s 
economic development, it is possible to see how the risks of the project were hidden in the 
                                                 
1145 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 3). 
1146 Asian Development Bank (2014h, p. 4). 
1147 Wyatt (2004, p. 3). 
1148 Wyatt (2004, p. 3). 
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myriad of trans-national contractual arrangements with consultants, engineers and other 
experts commissioned to undertake different aspects of the work. Despite the enormous 
emphasis placed on risk assessments and mitigation in the ADB documents (see Chapter 5), 
in reality the risks were concealed or “made rational”, when in reality, the financial and 
social risks were very significant and there was, from the start, very little control that ADB 
could exercise over implementation. The formalities of the risk assessment process provided 
a façade, which conveyed to the reader assessing the project elsewhere (in Canberra or 
Manila) that the risks were knowable and could be controlled or mitigated through “technical 
assistance”. Ultimately, the impacts of the project have been and will continue to be borne 
by Cambodians – both at a national level in terms of the debts that must be re-paid to the 
ADB, but also at a community level, by the people whose lives have been fundamentally re-
aligned by the project.  
The question of whether lessons from the experience were internalised by either the ADB 
or the Australian Government is not clear. However, it would seem that the change in 
Australian Government in 2013, and merger of AusAID with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFAT), has largely dwarfed internalisation of the experience. While the 
reputational damage to AusAID was felt very keenly in 2013 (as made clear in the 
interviews), as AusAID was incorporated into DFAT and lost its distinct identity, people 
were faced with the new challenge of integration and the narrative around the embarrassment 
shifted or at least dissipated in the confusion around the transition.1149 A new agenda was 
introduced by the incoming conservative Government, which emphasised “aid-for-trade” 
and greater alignment of diplomatic and aid priorities.1150 The new Government renewed its 
commitment to financing infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region through multilateral 
banks, such as the ADB. In June 2015, the Australian Government joined the new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and will contribute around USD 695 million upfront 
capital over the next five years.1151 As the sixth largest shareholder in the AIIB, Australia 
will work with the other members of the new bank, led by China, to invest in major 
infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and bridges, aimed at improving economic 
                                                 
1149 SBS News (2013); Tran (2013). 
1150 Australian Department of Foreign Affiars and Trade (2015b). 
1151 The Guardian (2015). 
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connectivity in the region. After some debate domestically about whether Australia should 
join, the then Australian treasurer, Joe Hockey, announced that:  
We are absolutely satisfied that the governance arrangements now in 
place will ensure there is appropriate transparency and accountability 
in the bank.1152  
Throughout these discussions, the ADB and the World Bank continue to be held up as having 
“gold-standard” safeguards assessment frameworks.1153 Notwithstanding its recent 
experiences in Cambodia, in 2014, the Australian Government also signed a memorandum 
of understanding with the Cambodian Government to enable Australia to send asylum 
seekers who seek protection in Australia, to be resettled in Cambodia.1154 The first refugees 
arrived from Australia to Cambodia on the 4th of June 2015.1155 This move was surprising 
for people who have been observing how the Cambodian railway resettlement unfolded.1156 
8.6 Chapter review  
Building on the knowledge already available about resettlement, this chapter has drawn on 
interviews with people at different scales to explore four major themes. These themes relate 
to: (1) safeguarding resettlement and the potential for “islands of governance” to emerge 
which are ring-fenced from broader governmental programs and standards; (2) the 
importance of formal independent grievance mechanisms and enabling independent 
advocacy interventions in resettlement processes; (3) the limitations of generic best practice 
resettlement principles given the diversity of affected communities’ needs and aspirations, 
and; (4) the difficulty of assessing the public interest value of infrastructure projects 
requiring resettlement. 
The interviews reveal that there were processes in place to assess risks in relation to the 
Cambodian railway project, however they were in competition with other political and 
commercial drivers. Resettlement risks were considered, but they were not prioritised in the 
early phases of the project. From the Australian Government perspective, deferment to 
ADB’s safeguards system to manage financial, social and environmental concerns was 
                                                 
1152  The Guardian (2015). 
1153 Moore (2015).  
1154 Crothers & Doherty (2014) 
1155 Crothers & Doherty (2014).  
1156 R. Davies (2014). 
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considered adequate. Given the intensity of reflection that some AusAID/DFAT staff 
members expressed in the interviews, it would seem many lessons were learned by these 
experiences on a personal level. However, there is minimal evidence to suggest that these 
experiences have been internalised into ADB or DFAT’s institutional knowledge and 
resulted in any significant change in policy or direction. The railway experience seems to 
provide another example of host nation and donor objectives aligning in the optimism of 
planning and project inception, but unravelling upon implementation, as was the case for 
LMAP.1157   
The chapter has explored how international principles of “good resettlement policy” were 
used by NGOs as leverage to draw attention to the resettlement sites of the railway which 
resulted in certain improvements over time. At the same time, other principles were 
translated into the local context of the communities in ways that had negative impacts. These 
specific examples of how well-intended, seemingly sensible basic resettlement principles 
are subverted during local application has implications for how resettlement safeguard 
policies are developed at an international or regional level. But as the chapter has shown, 
there are few avenues for the aspirations and preferences of affected community members 
to be communicated to those designing and implementing large-scale infrastructure projects, 
especially over time as projects evolve.   
The chapter builds on the localisation of laws literature, articulated by Gillespie1158 in her 
examination of the regulatory and spatial implications of World Heritage designation. In her 
analysis, the everyday land uses of the local residents of Angkor Archaeological Park, often 
misaligned with the objectives of heritage protection. In the case of the railway, it is also 
possible to see how regulation has restricted and manipulated how railway residents interact 
with their lived environment.1159 The findings also support Boer et al.’s observation that the 
“hardness” of soft law – such as the safeguards – tends to be underestimated. 1160 Much like 
parts of Angkor Archaeological Park which became governed by international heritage 
protection law, as described in Gillespie’s study, the resettlement sites of the railway project 
                                                 
1157 See, Biddulph (2014).  
1158 Gillespie (2010).  
1159 Gillespie (2010, p. 18). 
1160 Boer, Hirsch, Johns, Saul & Scurrah (2016 forthcoming, page numbers undetermined). 
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became spatially bounded and re-configured through the application of the ADB safeguards 
policy.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Overview 
The original motivation underlying this research was to understand contemporary 
resettlement practices and their implications in Cambodia, situated within a global context 
of increasing displacement and population movement. The study was driven by the value 
position that resettlement safeguards models and approaches, as well as the advocacy 
campaigns designed to influence them, need to align with or reflect the diverse local needs 
and aspirations of people affected by relocation. The research was carried out with an 
appreciation of the rich, pre-existing literature on resettlement, but also with the view that 
the contexts or arrangements influencing how resettlement occurs are changing, as are the 
ways advocates are working with resettled people and the accountability structures and 
safeguards on which they rely.  
The study investigated these concerns through a close field-based examination of how 
people experienced resettlement for the ADB-financed Cambodian railway project, at a local 
community and sub-project level in five locations in Cambodia, and at national, international 
and institutional levels. Three research questions guided the study:  
 How did the actions and responses of the parties involved in resettlement 
processes for the railway (financiers, governments and NGOs) align with 
project-affected people’s aspirations and concerns? 
 
 Has the experience of involuntary resettlement faced by displaced 
communities been mitigated by NGO advocacy, and in what ways? 
 
 What are the implications of using international safeguards and 
accountability mechanisms to influence resettlement processes in a country 
in which domestic legal systems are not well established? 
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This concluding chapter first outlines the key findings of the thesis, identifying the ways in 
which the research makes a contribution to knowledge about the nuances of resettlement 
and resettlement governance. It then considers the implications of the study, acknowledges 
its limitations and identifies avenues for further research.  
9.2 Findings and contribution  
A conceptual framework was built iteratively throughout the early chapters of the thesis 
(Chapters 2-3), through which the analysis and findings need to be understood. A detailed 
literature review of resettlement studies situated the study. It argued that two dominant 
approaches shape the existing resettlement literature: The first is a socio-anthropological 
approach, which concentrates on understanding the experience of resettlement and 
articulating its differentiated impacts on communities. A second, more recent, rights-based 
literature focuses more on conceptualising the rights and protections available to people at 
risk of displacement and assessing compliance with resettlement safeguards, international 
human rights law and domestic laws. The early parts of the thesis argued that these 
approaches, especially the rights-based literature, tend to obscure the complexity of 
community resistance and the changing resettlement dynamics in communities as they 
exercise the rights and options available to them through involvement in international 
advocacy campaigns. The chapter also drew on tangential studies relating to civil society 
movements, risk and accountability, which offer creative ways of understanding the 
dynamics at play.    
The theoretical lens of the thesis was developed further by explaining perspectives from 
critical human geography and legal geography, especially concepts of scale. Legal 
geography approaches help to understand the “legally plural” environment of Cambodia, 
identifying the multiple legal regimes operating in the areas where resettlement for the 
railway occurred and the kinds of “multi-scalar” conflicts which can occur in these 
circumstances. The “localisation of laws” approach was introduced, focusing attention on 
how international law, legal principles or processes are translated into local conditions, and 
how they shape the lives of communities in different places. These approaches were used to 
explain and re-state the core desire of the study, which is to understand how international 
laws, policies and norms, developed at a global or “headquarter level”, (in this case 
resettlement policies and safeguards), are understood, re-interpreted and made sense of by 
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both policy-implementers “on the ground” and communities in their local, heterogeneous 
contexts. It also highlighted the arguments of Unruh & Williams1161 that legally plural 
environments often create the foundations for tenure insecurity, especially following 
conflict.  
This conceptual analysis laid the foundations to introduce the context and setting of the study 
itself (Chapters 4 and 5). Cambodia’s modern history and development trajectory were 
explored, outlining the patterns of displacement and land conflicts already documented. 
These sections examined the influx of private and foreign investment post-1993, including 
the recent shift towards concessional lending, rather than development assistance or “aid” 
being provided in the Asia-Pacific by multilateral banks for infrastructure building. These 
sections argued that there are weak institutional and legal mechanisms in place in Cambodia 
to regulate different foreign and private investors, or to protect people from arbitrary and 
poorly planned displacement and relocation. They also examined how the safeguards of 
multilateral banks provide rights and options to affected people that differ from those 
ordinarily afforded to landless Cambodian citizens. The chapter drew on the arguments of 
Dwyer1162, Milne1163 and Biddulph1164, to highlight the uneven geographies of Cambodia’s 
land reform interventions, creating spots and places of exception on the landscape in ways 
that are analogous to the islands of governance concept developed throughout the thesis in 
relation to resettlement.  
Chapter 5 involved an explanation of the technical background required to understand the 
Cambodian railway project, including the parties to the loans, and the multiple financiers 
(including ADB and the Australian Government), contractors and consultants involved, as 
well as the different resettlement plans developed and the locations where resettlement took 
place. It explained the original vision of the railway project and examined the publicly 
available information to understand why the project was cancelled in 2014, with major cost 
over-runs and more than 300 km of railway tracks yet to be repaired, leaving the Cambodian 
Government to repay around USD 81.1 million with interest to the ADB. The advocacy 
surrounding the project is also explored in these sections, including the various NGOs 
                                                 
1161 Unruh & Williams (2013).  
1162 Dwyer (2015).  
1163 Milne (2013). 
1164 Biddulph (2010, 2014).  
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involved and the types of strategies and innovative techniques used to expose the negative 
impacts of resettlement on affected communities.    
Together these early sections of the thesis (Chapters 2-5) convey the conceptual, historical 
and technical detail needed to situate and inform the field-based study. Cambodia, and the 
railway project in particular, are presented as an intriguing and iconic case study, through 
which recent resettlement approaches and safeguards dynamics can be explored. They 
provide a window through which to investigate how international financiers and donors 
support large infrastructure projects in a developing country context, how advocates are 
currently working to represent the rights of affected people and how risks are understood 
and rationalised by the different parties involved (financiers, NGOs and communities).  
Based on extensive fieldwork at different scales, primarily in Cambodia and Washington 
D.C., throughout 2012-2013 (explained in Chapter 6), the remainder of the thesis presented 
the findings, drawing on conceptual insights from earlier chapters to understand the tensions 
and dynamics revealed during interviews with communities, financiers and NGOs.  
Cumulatively, the original contribution of the thesis is that it presents an analysis of the 
nexus between development and resettlement in Cambodia, explaining the different, inter-
related components or dimensions of this relationship and the tensions it produces at 
different scales. In this context, development is intended in the plain-language sense, relating 
to economic, environmental and social change over time. In the case of Cambodia, it refers 
to the rapid financial investment and commercial transformation of the post-1993 period, 
but it also includes transformations within institutions and civil society groups (local and 
international), as well as the accountability architecture of investors (e.g. safeguards 
frameworks and accountability mechanisms, or lack thereof). Resettlement is understood to 
be the planned displacement and relocation of people, but also includes processes which 
have a displacing effect on livelihoods and sources of income or cultural and social identity, 
even where people are not physically displaced.  
The core findings and arguments of the research are summarised below, in terms of how 
they speak to each of the research questions in turn.  
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 How did the actions and responses of the parties involved in resettlement 
processes for the railway (financiers, Government and NGOs) align with 
project-affected people’s aspirations and concerns? 
Analysing how the actions of financiers, governments, and NGOs aligned and misaligned 
with community needs and aspirations first involved examining the “texts” (reports, media 
releases, resettlement plans, strategies, advocacy reports) of key actors (financiers and 
NGOs), before going to the communities to discuss their views, experiences and 
perspectives on the resettlement process already underway. This was followed by a series of 
formal and informal interviews where preliminary findings or insights about community 
views were explored or re-stated to stakeholders, especially within the ADB, Australian 
Government and NGOs. This iterative process enabled an understanding of how events 
unfolded over a number of years. It made it possible to comprehend the dimensions of the 
resettlement process (the compensation component, the experience of making complaints to 
the ADB, the process of physically moving and trying to re-establish livelihoods, and efforts 
to respond to problems) from multiple perspectives over time, and as triangulated between 
the communities, ADB/Cambodian and Australian Government and the NGOs.  
The fieldwork with communities revealed diverse needs and preferences among people who 
had moved to the resettlement sites and those who continued to live along the railway (who 
were not given the option of relocation). However, there were shared aspirations among 
community members for land ownership (made possible through resettlement). This 
scenario contrasts with the circumstances described in Laos by Baird relating to internal 
resettlement, as in the case of Laos almost all people resettled previously owned land or had 
the right to lawfully reside on land.1165 In the context of the Cambodian railway, the desire 
for land-based assets in the resettlement sites was often in tension with the need to sustain 
secure livelihoods, especially when the resettlement sites were situated long distances from 
their previous homes, as was the case in Phnom Penh. This predicament was experienced by 
almost all people interviewed in the resettlement sites. It was also a concern for people still 
living along the railway who were contemplating whether they would accept relocation, if 
it was offered. People were negotiating these competing stresses in the absence of clear 
information from the Government or ADB about what might happen to them in the future 
                                                 
1165 Baird & Shoemaker (2007). 
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and what was required to receive land title. Instead, they pieced together whatever 
information they could find or deduce from sporadic leaflets and visits from the 
Government, from neighbours and from informal assurances from community leaders and 
Village Chiefs.  
Mobility was a key coping strategy for resettled people in all of the sites as they balanced 
new pressures. These strategies mimicked increasing trends towards migration as a way of 
diversifying livelihood options in Cambodia and Southeast Asia, as identified by writers 
such as Rigg.1166 In Poipet, people in the resettlement sites were often continuing their 
previous occupations, which relied on frequent, short-range movement across the nearby 
border with Thailand. Yet, in each example of longer-range migration in this study, except 
one, households described resettlement as the catalyst for their new household arrangements. 
A range of different strategies emerged, including building small structures to “claim the 
land”, while travelling and renting back at their old locations, migrating elsewhere for work 
in Cambodia and even to Thailand to earn money to send back to family in the resettlement 
sites. Family fragmentation tended to result from increased mobility, particularly the 
separation of children and parents. 
As might be expected, but is under-acknowledged in resettlement studies, project-affected 
people’s views on displacement and resettlement were constantly evolving. Community 
members affected by the project were engaged in an intensive experience of assessing and 
re-assessing their circumstances and options as the project progressed, as they received new 
information, and as they saw conditions slowly improve in the resettlement sites in response 
to advocacy from community leaders and NGOs.  
A defining feature of the railway project was that the impacts of resettlement were highly 
uneven in the five locations where resettlement took place (Poipet, Pursat, Battambang, 
Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh). These variations revealed the asymmetrical effects of the 
resettlement scheme and its spatial manifestations at a sub-project, township level. While in 
Pursat people were relocated only 400 metres from their previous homes, in Phnom Penh 
people were relocated 20 km from their previous locations to a peri-urban, semi-rural setting 
in which they were not given farming land and there were very few local employment 
opportunities. On the other hand, people who resettled in Poipet, near the Cambodian-Thai 
                                                 
1166 Rigg (2006).  
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border around 4-5 km from their previous homes, seemed to benefit from the proximity of 
the resettlement site to borderland markets and nearby special economic zone. By all 
accounts, all five communities experienced tremendous stress during the initial stages and 
many families were in debt. Yet, after conditions began to improve (in response to intensive, 
targeted advocacy), and a series of additional compensation payments were made, the 
dynamics of resettlement in the communities began to change, especially in the more remote 
and rural areas.  
In this context, the “micro-geography” of each resettlement site was central. Where the 
resettlement sites were relatively close to previous locations (especially in Pursat and 
Poipet), and people began to see improvements in resettlement conditions, the appeal of 
resettlement (which came with land ownership) increased for those who still lived without 
tenure security along the railway. Many residents felt their exclusion from relocation was 
inequitable, given they had previously lived together in close proximity. The legal 
geography of the resettlement scheme meant that neighbourhoods were “split” in two by the 
resettlement plans. The safeguards policy of the ADB had the effect of law in this 
circumstance, as it was enforceable through threats of eviction, which would eventually be 
enforced with violence or physical removal if compliance did not occur. The precise location 
of a household prior to resettlement, i.e. proximity to the centreline of the railway and 
corridor of impact, determined whether a household would receive land and a wide range of 
other benefits provided under the project. Those who lived within the 7 metre corridor of 
impact received land, and those who lived outside its bounds did not. While many did not 
want to leave their homes along the railway, especially in Phnom Penh, many others in 
Pursat and Poipet felt the process for allocating land and compensation was arbitrary. In this 
way, the Phnom Penh resettlement site, which had been the focus of media attention and had 
come to represent the negative impacts of the project when they were described in the media 
and at national and trans-national forums (including in Manila and Australia), did not reflect 
how the railway project was being experienced in other areas of Cambodia. Additional 
rounds of compensation paid to people in the resettlement sites exacerbated these dynamics, 
and may intensify further after another round of compensation is expected in 2015-16, 
following the ADB Compliance Panel Review (CRP) recommendations.  
These subtle, shifting community dynamics were not shaping the Cambodian Government’s 
response, nor that of the ADB. To an extent, they were also not the focus or primary concern 
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of the media or advocacy campaigns surrounding the project, although the resource 
limitations of the NGOs need to be acknowledged (See Chapter 8, Section 8.4). The 
Cambodian Government was responsible for implementing the resettlement components of 
the project, with assistance from ADB, and was required to comply with the ADB’s 
resettlement safeguards policy. Despite the shared circumstances of the communities at a 
sub-project level (in terms of tenure insecurity), the principle of minimising displacement 
required by the ADB resettlement policy was maintained throughout the project. The 
compliance-oriented approach of the ADB (explored in Chapter 8) guided implementation, 
and while it assisted advocates who used the resettlement policy as leverage, it did not result 
in a more tailored or locally appropriate resettlement response. The existing boundaries of 
communities in each location were not followed. Instead new lines of social organisation 
were drawn. A “one-size-fits all” method for determining who would be relocated 
underpinned the resettlement scheme, rather than a strong alignment with specific 
community circumstances, needs or aspirations.  
The focus of advocacy activities surrounding the project was to draw attention to the 
negative impacts of the ADB-guided scheme, and advocates were clearly driven by 
community grievances. They were able to provide stronger representation to people who 
were relocated, than those who were not, as these people fell more clearly into the categories 
set up by the ADB resettlement policy. People partially-affected by the project, who were 
not relocated, were still eligible to complain to the ADB and were supported by NGOs, but 
their grievances were more difficult to articulate and differentiate from other landless 
Cambodians who were also not included in the resettlement scheme. As the resettlement 
policy contained rigid categories of eligibility for assistance, there were many who fell 
outside its ambit, and thus largely outside the scope of people whom NGOs could 
meaningfully represent (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
Overall, the interviews also revealed the plurality of views that different stakeholders held 
on the resettlement controversies within each of the stakeholder groups. There was no 
singular view of what was fair and what should happen next that was maintained by all ADB 
Cambodian and Australian Government staff, and there were many different, often 
conflicting views on the best advocacy approaches among NGO staff.   
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 Has the experience of involuntary resettlement faced by displaced 
communities been mitigated by NGO advocacy, and in what ways? 
As conveyed above and throughout the thesis, the actions of advocates working to represent 
communities affected by resettlement had an impact on the quality of the resettlement sites 
and on the trajectory of the project. While it may, in part, have also contributed to its eventual 
cancellation and the reluctance of donor countries, such as Australia, to contribute further to 
the investment, its impact on the specific communities displaced was considerable. 
Interviews with community members who participated in human rights training with the 
NGOs, and who had learnt about how to complain to the ADB using its accountability 
mechanism, reveal how little people expected from the Cambodian Government and how 
important it was to them that they received external assistance. Many of these people had 
not previously had contact with NGOs before the project. By the time fieldwork took place 
for this study, a number of community members had a sophisticated understanding of the 
resettlement policy affecting them, the rights and benefits they could receive under the 
project, as well the process involved in seeking redress. Some community members had 
even been propelled on to an international stage by accompanying advocates on trips to 
Manila to describe the project’s impacts to staff working at ADB headquarters. This “scale-
jumping” illustrates the types of potentially transformative experiences taking place within 
the communities, and potentially within the organisations meeting with affected people.  
Awareness of rights had been built through contact with NGOs, but also through the gradual 
engagement of ADB staff in a more intensive way than at the beginning of the project. 
Community members who had direct contact with the ADB Office of the Special Project 
Facilitator (OSPF) were impressed by the thoroughness of the review that took place, as 
each of the complainants’ individual circumstances and compensation packages had been 
re-considered by the Facilitator. Cumulatively, the experiences described throughout 
Chapters 7 and 8, provide insights about the realities of being embroiled in community-
driven accountability processes. This analysis also makes a contribution to legal geography 
scholarship (explored in Chapter 3) by exploring how project-affected people in Cambodia 
navigated the safeguards framework and the accountability mechanism of the ADB. It 
considers how people interpreted and made sense of safeguards policies that were re-shaping 
their lives in a very material way, yet were developed in other, foreign locations (primarily 
Manila, Canberra and Washington D.C. – see Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8). It has built on the 
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work of Biddulph,1167 Milne,1168 Dwyer,1169 and Gillespie,1170 through exploring another 
context in which regulatory and legal processes have re-shaped the physical and social 
landscape in Southeast Asia. In this context, resettlement for the railway exacerbated 
inequalities through arbitrarily providing benefits to some and not to others through 
processes of spatial re-organisation determined by policies and principles formulated outside 
Cambodia at other scales.  
Advocates employed a range of different strategies to draw attention to the project, including 
accountability advocacy, leverage politics and symbolism (as discussed in Chapter 8). The 
advocacy dynamics surrounding the railway project are an important dimension of the 
development-resettlement nexus, especially as it takes form in Cambodia where NGOs are 
vocal, resourceful and influential in the land and development sector. Those subjected or 
targeted by the campaigns within the ADB and Australian Government appreciated what 
NGOs were trying to achieve, but had mixed views about the value of so-called “hot 
advocacy” in which the Cambodian Government and others were shamed and embarrassed 
publicly for their actions.  
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the campaigns, advocates still conveyed in the 
interviews that they found it difficult to “stay in touch” with community needs as they were 
changing throughout the project. This dynamic or challenge was described in Chapter 8 as 
the “advocacy effect”. It is a cyclical process in which advocates work to represent people 
based on certain grievances, yet the consequent improvements or adjustments to the project 
flowing from the advocacy tend to re-shape or re-align the community grievances being 
represented, and so forth. These evolving views and preferences of communities are 
inherently difficult to include within trans-national advocacy campaigns.  
 What are the implications of using international safeguards and 
accountability mechanisms to influence resettlement processes in a country 
in which domestic legal systems are not well established? 
                                                 
1167 Biddulph (2010).  
1168 Milne (2013). 
1169 Dwyer (2015).  
1170 Gillespie (2010).  
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How to influence, mitigate or limit the negative social and environmental impacts of large 
investments and projects has been the source of decades of conflict between civil society 
groups and multilateral banks, especially the World Bank. As Chapter 2 conveyed, the 
World Bank, and others such as the ADB, have slowly adopted safeguards and 
accountability frameworks that aim to minimise negative impacts and enable project-
affected people to make complaints. Some authors have suggested that banks, like the ADB, 
mimicked the World Bank in adopting these standards, as a result of “institutional 
isomorphism” or because they felt coerced to do so, rather than because there was genuine 
institutional support for such frameworks.1171 Nonetheless, these safeguards and standards 
now apply to bank projects, although there are continual re-evaluations of the safeguards, 
pilots of different safeguard models, and ongoing debates about how better to work with 
borrowing countries who resist the safeguards requirements (see Chapter 8). Traditional 
multilateral banks are also under pressure to find ways to work with borrowing countries in 
these contexts, in response to competition from emerging lenders that do not necessarily 
have these accountability frameworks in place. The Cambodian railway project provided 
many insights relevant to this debate.  
The experience of the Cambodian railway project provides a number of learnings for those 
seeking to understand resettlement processes in settings where political will to assist affected 
communities is lacking. It is clear that compliance with safeguards is particularly difficult 
to achieve where the implementing government is not committed to broad-based social 
protection or equality outside the project in question. Thus, resettlement is acutely 
challenging in circumstances where the gaps between national government and project-
specific/multilateral bank resettlement policies are significant. The thesis argued that these 
gaps cannot be overcome only through internal monitoring and supervision, or through 
contracting independent consultants to oversee resettlement sites.  
In the case of the railway, resettlement challenges were not addressed because there were 
strict resettlement standards in place or through monitoring and supervision arrangements 
and oversight. At least 37 social and environmental and monitoring reports were prepared 
by ADB consultants prior to April 2015, not including other progress reports and more 
informal internal monitoring assessments for the railway (see Chapter 5). They were 
                                                 
1171 Park (2014).  
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mitigated through intensive NGO advocacy, which leveraged the safeguards, and which 
resulted in major changes to how the project was being managed. Undertakings to improve 
standards occurred following NGO advocacy, not before, and even then, remedial actions 
were narrowly confined to the “rulebook” by a compliance-based approach (see Chapter 8). 
The ADB’s CRP report confirmed that ADB staff waited until NGOs drew attention to 
resettlement problems before engaging at the required level of intensity. Consequently, the 
combination of internal ADB safeguards, monitoring and resources (which could be 
redirected as needs were identified) combined with independent advocacy which articulated 
community needs, was the catalyst for change in the railway resettlement scheme. Yet, 
improvements in resettlement standards occurred well after people had been relocated and, 
even then, they were directed almost entirely at supporting people who were relocated, not 
those who stayed behind. 
The thesis also argued that as NGOs and communities complained and conditions improved, 
the resettlement sites became increasingly demarcated, physically and institutionally, from 
their surrounding locations. In this way, some of the resettlement sites became what could 
be called “islands of good governance”, or at least “islands of governance”. The resettlement 
sites were not completely isolated from the land and people that surrounded them. They 
were still legally, socially and institutionally enmeshed within Cambodian society. 
However, within the bounds of the resettlement sites, ADB project standards, safeguards 
and expectations provided the benchmark and took precedence over local laws and 
processes. They became exceptional spaces where international safeguards standards 
applied, which were markedly different from broader Cambodian resettlement practices (see 
Chapters 4 and 7).1172 Improvements in the sites, additional compensation and benefits 
increased the appeal of resettlement for many people, except in Phnom Penh. Residents in 
the Phnom Penh resettlement site were still experiencing hardships that would most likely 
take many years to overcome, notwithstanding the additional support.  
The interviews revealed how debates about the “right” way to address these problems were 
occurring within the ADB and Australian Government, and were evidently controversial 
among staff members and consultants. There were many disagreements behind the scenes 
about the adequacy of the processes in place, due diligence and accountability (see Chapter 
                                                 
1172 See Ong (2006); Gillespie (2010).  
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8). From the information available, it also appears there were diverse views about 
resettlement and social obligations within the Cambodian Government. It seems the railway 
project was a learning experience about the complexity of resettlement for some in the 
Cambodian government, but for others it was a cautionary experience making them reluctant 
to commit to co-financing arrangements which came with stringent safeguards (see Chapter 
8). Whether internationally-financed projects or so-called “islands of governance”, such as 
this one, have broader positive programmatic impact on government practices, or serve as a 
disincentive to borrow from lenders such as the ADB, is not clear and is a topic requiring 
further investigation. 
9.3 Implications of the study  
How communities recover from displacement is a topic of growing importance as conflict, 
environmental events, infrastructure and development projects continue to displace millions 
of people each year in many countries. The research did not explicitly set out to develop 
policy answers to the challenges posed by resettlement. As a first priority it tried to 
understand the underlying forces shaping resettlement and resettlement advocacy, without 
trying to over-simplify community, financier or NGO dynamics in ways that might make 
them amenable to policy recommendations. Yet, the study has a number of conceptual and 
practical implications for policy-makers and researchers.  
The research supports a move away from simple approaches to resettlement premised on the 
notion that it is possible to mitigate negative social and environmental impacts of 
infrastructure projects only through the establishment of safeguards and monitoring systems. 
The research suggests these safeguards systems only function to protect communities where 
civil society actors are independently monitoring the project. It would seem that, in theory, 
adopting some version of the country systems approach could lead to less exceptionalism 
and create an environment for a more even implementation of policies and protections. 
However any country systems approach would need similar levels of independent 
monitoring and scrutiny to offer comparable protections. Understandings of country systems 
(the domestic institutions, legal systems, policies of a borrowing government) should also 
include the local civil society actors and international advocacy NGOs that comprise this 
sector (see the “conceptual leap” described in Chapter 8, section 8.2). In strengthening 
country systems and institutionalising good resettlement practices and policies in borrowing 
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governments, stronger support and engagement with the broader civil society landscape is 
also necessary.  
There is also a far greater need to adequately resource projects requiring resettlement from 
the outset. Failure to resource resettlement projects adequately seems to come from an 
almost deliberate decision to ignore or to be wilfully blind to the risks inherent in 
infrastructure and development projects. As Mosse would argue, there is an inherent 
tendency for policy to gloss over these types of conflicts, as the tendency for policy makers 
to focus intensely on the future, and on “new beginnings”, is often not moderated by a 
genuine analysis of past problems and failings.1173 The different actors involved in the 
railway project conceived of the risks of the project and weighted these risks in different 
ways. From the financiers’ perspective, this thesis identified a pattern in Cambodia and 
elsewhere, of under-resourcing resettlement, and waiting until problems arise or are drawn 
attention to by external advocates, and then responding in a crisis-driven, piece-meal way 
(see Chapter 8, section 8.2). The risks of the project were multiple and included social, 
financial, commercial, logistical and legal risks, given the context and country in which it 
was being implemented. These risks were known and many were identified at the outset, yet 
were rationalised in carefully constructed project documents. As Wyatt argued in relation to 
infrastructure investments in Laos, risks were made “invisible” through overlapping 
contractual and risk mitigation arrangements at the expense of the state or the host nation in 
which the projects are taking place.1174 In the case of Australia, learnings from the railway 
project may have occurred at a personal level among the staff involved, but at an institutional 
level they were largely dwarfed by the change in Government which occurred after the 2013 
Federal Election. In the context of the ADB in Cambodia, it is unclear whether learnings 
were internalised as there is a history of non-compliance with resettlement safeguards in 
past projects that are similar to the current project (see Chapter 4).  
As illustrated in the previous section, there is enormous pressure at an international level 
(within multilateral banks and other forums) to formulate clear resettlement standards and 
guidelines to reduce the negative impacts often created by displacement. Yet, it is also clear 
that a fundamental tension emerges when universal principles and standards are developed 
at a centralised or international level and then applied to very different local settings. Well-
                                                 
1173 Mosse (2004, p. 640).  
1174 Wyatt (2004).  
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intended, yet generic or “best practice” resettlement principles contained in the ADB 
safeguards policy, which guided the resettlement process (such as the requirement to 
minimise displacement), can result in uneven and inequitable impacts. International 
principles need to be tested and tailored through genuine participatory approaches in each 
local setting more intensively than is typically the case, not through cursory consultations 
which narrowly apply standards or policies developed at a headquarter-level or which 
circumscribe eligibility for assistance using broad-brushed geographic or social criteria.  
Internal monitoring arrangements and safeguards frameworks alone are not sufficient, 
although they provide points of leverage for external advocates. The strategies shown to be 
most effective in this setting included the use of the ADB grievance mechanism, which 
resulted in formal and independent review by the ADB (through the OSPF and CRP). This 
was possible because advocates worked with communities to draw attention to the project’s 
impacts. Oversight of this nature is only possible when civil society organisations are 
autonomous and able to work with communities without fear. 
From a practical, methodological sense, premising any resettlement policy or study on the 
understanding that community views are evolving, heterogeneous, and not “fixed” in time, 
is fundamental from a policy and planning perspective. Emerging understandings of how 
people use mobility as an adaptation strategy following resettlement could also improve how 
resettlement policies support mobile residents who are not always present in resettlement 
sites to access services and assistance.  
9.4 Limitations and further research 
Certain community and stakeholder groups were not as well reached or represented as they 
could have been in the study. If there was an opportunity to plan the fieldwork again, greater 
“unstructured” research time would be set aside to reach community members in obscure 
settings or circumstances through a type of snowballing technique. For example, the bamboo 
operators (mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6) who worked all along the railway line and whose 
livelihoods were dependent on transporting people and goods via bamboo trains, were not 
interviewed for the research. Their whereabouts was not known at the time of field work and 
the priority was to locate and interview people in the resettlement sites. There were also 
many migrant workers who were employed to work on repairing the lines who were sleeping 
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and living along the tracks while doing repairs, who may have offered unusual insights into 
the different contractors working on the project.  
While people who remained living along the railway were interviewed, to an extent, this 
was an “add-on” or late-stage methodological decision; one that entirely re-directed the 
focus of the study and, without which, would have led to very different conclusions. The use 
of skype and mobile phones to reach residents who had left the sites and gone to Thailand 
was also a fruitful research method, but it was also discovered or utilised late in the research. 
Its full potential was not realised in terms of locating and capturing the perspectives of hard-
to-access groups in a systematic way. Greater use of methodologies, including different 
types of communications and mapping technologies, that might capture the views of mobile, 
hard-to-access community members, would have enhanced the present study and would do 
so for any future resettlement research.  
Other stakeholders, such as Toll Holdings (the railway concessionaire), were approached 
during the research but declined to be interviewed. There was also limited research carried 
out with representatives of the Cambodian Government, in an informal and formal sense. 
Greater persistence in this domain may have assisted and any future research could make 
more use of in-country networks to reach these people. During the current study, I was 
hesitant to contact Cambodian Government staff due to a concern that they might hinder or 
disapprove of the research, and also with a knowledge that the relationship between the 
NGOs and the Government had deteriorated, and there was significant mistrust of anyone 
inquiring further and writing about the beleaguered railway project.1175 The study also 
presented the views of stakeholders anonymously. While this enabled more direct quotation 
and scope to reveal sensitive details, it meant that the specifics of who was expressing certain 
views were tempered.  
The thesis has explored the relationship between development and resettlement in 
Cambodia, explaining its different, inter-related components as they took shape in the 
context of one project in Cambodia. It has contextualised this project extensively in the early 
stages of the thesis, and made comparisons with other similar projects and advocacy 
                                                 
1175 The distrust that has developed between NGOs and the Cambodian Government is illustrated by the recent passing of 
the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO) in Cambodia in August 2015, which requires 
“political neutrality” from all NGOs and Associations working in Cambodia. See: International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law (2015). 
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campaigns. Investigation of these broader implications in interviews with stakeholders is 
reflected in the analysis throughout. It has not tried to present findings that are representative 
of all displacement and resettlement in Cambodia, Southeast Asia or of all “developing 
country” contexts. As Chapter 4 explained, it is more of an iconic study reflecting tensions 
and pressures that are brought to bear in contexts where domestic legal protections and 
institutions are not well established, and where international financiers with safeguards and 
accountability frameworks employ a strict compliance-based approach. It conveys both the 
extent of influence that international financiers can have within the bounds of a given 
project, as well as the limits of this influence on other aspects of governance external to the 
project.  
If anything, the research emphasises the exceptional nature of such projects and 
arrangements, and begs for further research to understand the processes shaping more 
“ordinary” types of displacement involving the Cambodian Government, and other private 
and foreign investors, without the same types of accountability structures. It also draws 
attention to the growing need for research to understand how displacement and resettlement 
is occurring (and will occur) under the schemes of emerging lenders, such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (discussed in Chapter 4). This type of investigation 
would require considerably more persistence at the networking stage to establish 
connections which would facilitate the same type of ethnography at various scales (e.g. in 
Beijing and Delhi, and at various other headquarter levels), but it would also glean 
information about an obscure aspect of infrastructure lending and resettlement politics of 
major contemporary significance.  
The study has relied on an in-depth case study approach, which would undoubtedly benefit 
from a more comparative perspective, i.e. a comparative investigation or analysis of 
different types of projects and lenders. However, if there is one single message that can be 
conveyed by this research, it is that without “going deep” and investigating projects or 
resettlement events in depth, at an intensive, sub-project level, where many different types 
of community members are included in the research over an extended period of time 
(especially those who are excluded from a specific project’s benefits),  it is not possible to 
be confident that project dynamics or multi-faceted community perspectives have been 
captured. Studies which rely on financiers’ reports and datasets to make sweeping 
comparisons, or on NGO descriptions of community needs or impacts, unless rigorously 
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tested and validated through community-based field work at multiple scales, cannot be used 
as a reliable indication of resettlement impacts, especially from a socio-anthropological 
perspective (as described in Chapter 2). This is stated with the knowledge that even the 
dynamics described in detail in this thesis are not fixed, they are subject to change. 
Scudder1176 has already argued for a type of longitudinal approach to resettlement research, 
in his defining study of resettlement for the Kariba dam spanning four decades. The present 
study would be enriched by return field visits over the years that come, after this thesis is 
submitted, to consider change and continuity in the communities relocated for the railway 
and those who remain behind. 
  
                                                 
1176 Scudder (1993).  
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Afterword 
Payments under the additional compensation deficit scheme began in 2015. Of the total 
3,573 “registered” affected households, 3,333 households were able to be contacted by the 
Government’s Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC).1177 As at 31 July 2015, 
3,089 households received additional compensation, while 90 were yet to collect their 
compensation. The recent quarterly progress report states that a “typical reason for not yet 
collecting the payment is that they live in distant locations and need to arrange a convenient 
time.”1178  
For the affected households who could not be contacted, the progress report explains that 
the IRC approached family members, friends, Village Chiefs and Commune Chiefs, and 
published public announcements in local newspapers, asking households to make contact 
with the IRC within a month. 37 households responded, but 240 households are still 
unreachable.  
On 11 September 2015, a second request for compliance was also submitted to the ADB’s 
Compliance Review Panel (CRP) by representatives of 22 families who lived along the 
railway line in Phnom Penh and one family in Poipet.1179 The families’ complaints fell into 
two categories. Some households complained on the basis that they should have been 
considered fully affected because the land remaining for them to reside on was less than 
30m2. , the minimum size allowed. Any smaller and households were required to relocate. 
They argued that on this basis they should have been considered wholly affected and 
provided with resettlement and compensation. They also claimed that they do not have 
security of tenure and cannot live with dignity in the remaining conditions along the railway. 
The second category were households living along the railway in Phnom Penh, who were 
considered fully affected, but argued that they should not be required to move to the Phnom 
Penh resettlement site because it caused the impoverishment of the households who have 
already moved there and it is too far away.  
                                                 
1177 This number of affected households is less than accounted for in the original resettlement plans, partially because of 
the eventual decision not to relocate 240 households in Samrong Estate in Phnom Penh who are still living in limbo as to 
whether they will be required to move, See: (De Carteret 2014).  
1178 Asian Development Bank (2015g). 
1179 Asian Development Bank (2015f). 
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On 20 November 2015, the CRP’s decision was released. It found that the new complaint 
did not warrant a new investigation by the CRP, but that the grievances were “real and 
persistent” and should be dealt with under the existing remedial action plan, approved by 
the ADB after the first CRP complaint decision in January 2014. It remains to be seen how 
the ADB Board will respond, and whether ADB Management in Cambodia are able to work 
with the Cambodian Government to implement the recommendations of the CRP. 
A recent progress report on the remedial plans in place explains that a study trip by IRC staff 
to Thailand was undertaken in February 2015 to learn about resettlement practices and 
policies. Two groups of IRC staff undertook a one week course on public engagement and 
conflict resolution in May and June 2015.1180 
The future of the other remaining railway residents, especially in Poipet, still remains 
uncertain, as these people have either not formally complained or were not able to complain 
on the basis of any technicality (e.g. the 30m2 rule mentioned above). 
 
                                                 
1180 Asian Development Bank (2015g). 
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Appendix B – List of community members 
interviewed 
Participant 
no.  
Household 
no.  
Location - 
City 
Location - 
Resettlement 
site/Railway/Other 
Sex 
(where 
recorded) 
Age 
(where 
recorded)  
ADB 
Complaint 
 
Date 
1A 1 Phnom Penh Other Male  N/A 
18-Feb-
13 
2A 2 Phnom Penh Other Female  N/A 
1-Jul-12 
and 16-
Feb-13 
3A 3 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  No 
15-Feb-
13 
4A 3 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  No 
15-Feb-
13 
5A 4 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
16-Feb-
13 
6A 5 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
16-Feb-
13 
7A 6 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
16-Feb-
13 
8A 7 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female 66 Yes 
18-Feb-
13 and 
26-Jul-
13 
9A 8 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
18-Feb-
13 
10A 9 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
21-Feb-
13 and 
26-Jul-
13 
11A 9 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Male 26 Yes 
21-Feb-
13 
12A 10 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female 32 Yes 
21-Feb-
13 
13A 11 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
21-Feb-
13 
14A 12 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female 57 Yes 
21-Feb-
13 
15A 13 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
Jul-13 
16A 13 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Male  Yes 
Jul-13 
17A 14 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
Jul-13 
18A 15 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Male  Yes 
24-Jul-
13 
19A 16 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Male  No 
26-Jul-
13 
20A 17 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Male  Yes 
Jul-13 
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21A 18 Phnom Penh Railway Female  No 
26-Jul-
13 
22A 19 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  No 
Jul-13 
23A 20 Phnom Penh Resettlement Site Female  No 
Jul-13 
24A 21 Phnom Penh Railway Female  No 
26-Jul-
13 
25A 22 Phnom Penh Railway Male  No 
26-Jul-
13 
26A 23 Phnom Penh Railway Male  No 
24-Jul-
13 
27A 23 Phnom Penh Railway Female  No 
24-Jul-
13 
28A 24 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Male 66 Yes 
23-Feb-
13 and 
21-Jul-
13 
29A 24 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Male 66 Yes 
23-Feb-
13 
30A 25 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female 50 No 
23-Feb-
13 
31A 26 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female 24 No 
23-Feb-
13 
32A 27 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female 25 No 
23-Feb-
13 
33A 28 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Male  Yes 
24-Feb-
13 
34A 29 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Male  Yes 
24-Feb-
13 
35A 30 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female  Yes 
24-Feb-
13 
36A 31 Sihanoukville Railway Female 42 No 
24-Feb-
13 
37A 32 Sihanoukville Railway Female 56 No 
25-Feb-
13 
38A 33 Sihanoukville Railway Female  No 
25-Feb-
13 
39A 34 Sihanoukville Railway Female  No 
25-Feb-
13 
40A 35 Sihanoukville Railway Female  No 
25-Feb-
13 
41A 36 Sihanoukville Railway Female  No 
25-Feb-
13 
42A 37 Sihanoukville Railway Female  No 
25-Feb-
13 
43A 38 Sihanoukville Railway Female 60 No 
25-Feb-
13 
44A 39 Sihanoukville Railway Male 56 No 
25-Feb-
13 
45A 40 Sihanoukville Railway Male 23 No 
25-Feb-
13 
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46A 41 Sihanoukville 
Resettlement Site 
(Working in 
Thailand) Female 48 No 
Jul-13 
47A 42 Sihanoukville 
Resettlement Site 
(Working in 
Thailand) Female 31 No 
Jul-13 
48A 43 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female  No 
Jul-13 
49A 43 Sihanoukville 
Resettlement Site 
(Working in 
Thailand) Male 28 No 
Jul-13 
50A 44 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female  No 
Jul-13 
51A 45 Sihanoukville Resettlement Site Female  No 
Jul-13 
52A 46 Sihanoukville 
Resettlement Site 
(Working in 
Thailand) Female 32 No 
Jul-13 
53A 47 Pursat Resettlement site Male  Yes 
7-Mar-
13 
54A* 48 Pursat Resettlement site   Yes 
7-Mar-
13 
55A* 49 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
56A* 50 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
57A* 51 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
58A* 52 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
59A* 53 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
60A* 54 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
61A* 55 Pursat Resettlement site   No 
7-Mar-
13 
62A 56 Pursat Resettlement site Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
63A 57 Pursat Resettlement site Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
64A 57 Pursat Resettlement site Male  No 
7-Mar-
13 
65A 58 Pursat Resettlement site Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
66A* 59 Pursat Railway  Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
67A* 59 Pursat Railway  Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
68A* 59 Pursat Railway  Male  No 
7-Mar-
13 
69A* 59 Pursat Railway  Male  No 
7-Mar-
13 
70A* 59 Pursat Railway  Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
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71A* 60 Pursat Railway  Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
72A* 61 Pursat Railway  Male  No 
7-Mar-
13 
73A* 62 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
74A* 63 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
75A* 64 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
76A* 65 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
77A* 66 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
78A* 67 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
79A* 68 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
80A* 69 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
81A* 70 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
82A* 71 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
83A* 72 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
84A* 73 Pursat Railway    No 
7-Mar-
13 
85A 74 Pursat Railway  Male  No 
7-Mar-
13 
86A 75 Pursat Railway  Male  No 
7-Mar-
13 
87A 76 Pursat Railway  Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
88A 77 Pursat Railway  Female  No 
7-Mar-
13 
89A 78 Battambang  Resettlement site Female 50 No 
6-Mar-
13 
90A 78 Battambang  Resettlement site Male 55 No 
6-Mar-
13 
91A 79 Battambang  Resettlement site Male  Yes 
6-Mar-
13 
92A 79 Battambang  Resettlement site Male  Yes 
6-Mar-
13 
93A 80 Battambang  Resettlement site Female  Yes 
6-Mar-
13 
94A 80 Battambang  Resettlement site Female  Yes 
6-Mar-
13 
95A 81 Battambang  Resettlement site Female 32 No 
6-Mar-
13 
96A 82 Battambang 
 Resettlement site 
(Working in 
Thailand) Female 40 No 
6-Mar-
13 
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97A 83 Battambang  Resettlement site Male 19 No 
Jul-13 
98A 83 Battambang 
 Resettlement site 
(Working in 
Thailand) Female 47 No 
6-Mar-
13 
99A 84 Battambang Railway  Female 72 No 
6-Mar-
13 
100A 84 Battambang Railway  Male  No 
6-Mar-
13 
101A 85 Battambang Railway  Female  No 
6-Mar-
13 
102A 86 Battambang Railway  Female  No 
6-Mar-
13 
103A 87 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
3-Mar-
13  
104A 88 Poipet Other Female  N/A 
3-Mar-
13 
105A 88 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  N/A 
3-Mar-
13  
106A 89 Poipet Resettlement Site  Female  No 
3-Mar-
13 
107A 90 Poipet Resettlement Site  Female  No 
3-Mar-
13 
108A 91 Poipet Resettlement Site  Female  Yes 
3-Mar-
13 
109A 92 Poipet Resettlement Site  Female 36 No 
3-Mar-
13 
110A 92 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male 36 No 
3-Mar-
13 
111A 93 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
3-Mar-
13 
112A 94 Poipet Resettlement Site  Female  Yes 
3-Mar-
13 
113A 94 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
3-Mar-
13 
114A 95 Poipet Resettlement Site  Female 61 Yes 
3-Mar-
13 
115A 96 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
3-Mar-
13 
116A 97 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
 Jul-13 
117A 98 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
 Jul-13 
118A 99 Poipet Railway Female 62 No 
4-Mar-
13 
119A 100 Poipet Railway Female 58 No 
4-Mar-
13 
120A 101 Poipet Railway Female 58 No 
4-Mar-
13 
121A 102 Poipet Railway Female 63 No 
4-Mar-
13 
122A 103 Poipet Railway Male 53 No 
4-Mar-
13 
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123A 103 Poipet Railway Female 43 No 
4-Mar-
13 
124A 104 Poipet Railway   No 
4-Mar-
13 
125A 104 Poipet Railway   No 
4-Mar-
13 
126A 105 Poipet Railway   No 
4-Mar-
13 
127A 105 Poipet Railway   No 
4-Mar-
13 
128A 95 Poipet Resettlement Site  Male  Yes 
3-Mar-
13 and 
5-Mar-
13 
129A 96 Poipet Railway Female 33 No 
5-Mar-
13 
130A 97 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
131A 98 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
132A 99 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
133A 100 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
134A 101 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
135A 102 Poipet Railway Female 66 No 
5-Mar-
13 
136A 102 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
137A 102 Poipet Railway Male 46 No 
5-Mar-
13 
138A 102 Poipet Railway Male  No 
5-Mar-
13 
139A 103 Poipet Railway Male  No 
5-Mar-
13 
140A 103 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
141A 103 Poipet Railway Female  No 
5-Mar-
13 
142A 104 Poipet Railway Female  Yes 
4-Mar-
13 
143A 104 Poipet Railway Male  Yes 
4-Mar-
13 
144A 104 Poipet Railway Male  Yes 
4-Mar-
13 
 
*Note: In Pursat, individual interviews turned into informal focus groups as participants joined the discussion. Participants 
73A-84A, 66A-72A, and 54A-61A, were interviewed respectively in three separate groups. 
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Appendix C – List of other interview 
participants* 
* The list below indicates the interview participants who took part in a formal interview and 
does not include those who were consulted informally over the course of the research. Some 
participants have since left or changed their positions. Others worked for more than one of 
the organisations listed over a period of time. To protect the identity of interview 
participants, stakeholders are grouped according to their affiliation at the time the railway 
project was being implemented. The broad category of “local and international NGOs” is 
also used to conceal the identity of participants. See Chapter 6: Methodology for a list of the 
NGOs included in the research as well as a list of those who were approached but declined 
to be interviewed. All participants were being interviewed in a personal capacity, especially 
those who worked for the Australian Government, ADB and the World Bank Group.1181  
Participant No. Stakeholder group Date 
1B ADB  17 July 2013 
2B ADB 20 February 2013 
3B ADB 4 March 2015 
4B ADB November 2014 
5B Local or international NGO 22 July 2013 
6B Local or international NGO 18 July 2012 
7B Local or international NGO 11 March 2013 
8B Local or international NGO 17 April 2013 
9B Local or international NGO 17 April 2013 
10B Local or international NGO 5 February 2012 
11B Local or international NGO 11 March 2013 
12B Australian Government  19 December 2014 
13B Australian Government 24 July 2014 
14B Local or international NGO 16 February 2015 
                                                 
1181 To preserve the identity of one of the participants they are counted twice in the table, as they worked for more than one 
of the organisations during the project.  
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15B Local or international NGO 26 June 2012 
16B Local or international NGO 21 July 2013 
17B Local or international NGO 5 June 2013 
18B Cambodian Government  18 July 2013 
19B World Bank/IFC/IBRD 24 May 2013 
20B World Bank/IFC/IBRD 29 May 2013 
21B Development agency 29 May 2013 
22B World Bank/IFC/IBRD 28 May 2013 
23B World Bank/IFC/IBRD 5 June 2013 
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Appendix D – Letter to ADB  
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Appendix E – Response from ADB  
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Appendix F – Semi-structured verbal questionnaire 
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Appendix G – Participant information sheet (English) 
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Appendix H – Participant Information Sheet (Khmer)
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Appendix I – Consent form (English) 
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Appendix J – Consent form (Khmer) 
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Appendix K – ADB Public information booklet
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Appendix L – Senate Estimates Committee excerpt 
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